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ABSTRACT 
In a nation-state, ethnonationalism and political nationalism equate with each other in 
both theory and practice. In a multinational state, the mutual antagonisms between the 
two forms of nationalism demonstrate. In multinational states such as Ghana where 
"politics of the belly" prevails, ethnonationalism is the political nationalism, and more 
the substance rather than style of politics. This is the paradox within the rationality of 
Ghanaian politics. Owing to the modernising and integrative factors associated with 
urbanisation, urbanites are notioned to be detribalised and more prone towards political 
nationalism than ethnonationalism. A survey on the political attitudes of supposedly 
detribalised Ghanaian urbanites would reveal that urbanites, although geographically 
detribalised, are not so attitudinally, and for most, association with their ethnonational 
roots grew stronger with length of urban experience, even if there is no proof of a direct 
relationship between the two, or between association with roots and ethnonationalism. 
Ethnonationalism results from "politics of the belly", and subsequently, the 
postcolonial nation-state project, which seeks to integrate a heterogeneity of 
ethnonational identities submerged under single statehood, becomes a chore as a result. 
The thesis argues that identity perceptions among Ghanaians, vis-a-vis fellow 
multinational citizens, are influenced by the immediate political history as well as 
distant myths of origin, and that, an accentuation of current enmities between various 
ethnonational groups enhances the invocation of myths of origin to explain the present. 
The anthropological proof that majority of Modern Ghana are traceable to Ancient 
Ghana, except Ewes and CTMs', offers an explanation to: (a) modem heightened 
animosities between Akans and Ewes, even though there is no evidence of enmity 
between the two groups in the distant history, and; (b) the perception by some, that 
Ewes are not "native" Ghanaians. The thesis highlights the overall effects of citizens' 
identity perceptions on political actions and trends in Ghana. The thesis contributes 
that, there is a wider, more inclusive Guan ancestry and perception for the majority of 
Ghanaians than any current, exclusive, "latter-day" Guan identity, and that, the 
adoption of the name "Ghana" for the postcolonial state has more to do with 
anthropology than political fantasy. Both the Ghana hypothesis and Guan controversy 
are thereby explained. The thesis also discusses past agitation by non-Ewe groups in 
the Volta Region of Ghana for a separate Region, as well as the case for pan-Eweist 
irredentism in the West African sub-region. The scope of the thesis is broad, 
encapsulating theorising on the doctrine of nationalism, and assessing the extent of its 
global applicability. The essential Eurocentricity of the doctrine is exposed, as well as 
its subsequent inapplicability to several pre-l 8th century nations in Africa, for example 
the Fanti and Ashanti. 
The thesis further contributes that Ghanaian spouses tended to conceal their political 
views from each other, the ratio weighing against the female gender. The research 
involved methodological innovation, utilising a computerised technique to circumvent 
the `culture of silence 'Z and potential negative response to postal questionnaire method. 
The innovative strategy ensured anonymity, confidentiality and express delivery, and 
has positive application for societies with limited freedom of political expression. 
1 Paul Nugent (1997) describes the other groups in the Volta Region apart from the Ewes as "Togo 
Remnants" or "Central Togo Minorities" - CTMs. For a fuller discussion of this, see sections 2.1 and 2.12 of the thesis, or Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000. 2 See sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.6 of the thesis. 
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Introduction 
2 
This research aimed at: (1) conducting a survey of Ghanaian urbanites in order to 
measure the current trends of ethnonationalism versus political nationalism', by 
investigating their voting attitudes and intentions, in order to establish the extent to 
which proneness towards political nationalism by supposedly detribalised urbanites, is 
imagined or real, of style or substance; (2) critically examining patterns in Ghanaian 
voting behaviours by analysing the distinctive patterns between ethnonational and state 
attitudes. Briefly, ethnonationalism is the form of nationalism demonstrated in 
solidarity with, or towards one's ethnonational identity group, and political nationalism 
is patriotism towards the state institution (Hutchinson 1994, pp. 42 & 43; Kellas 1991, 
pp. 51 & 52). Where there is a nation-state, ethnonationalism is equated with political 
nationalism at both the theoretical and practical levels. But within a multi-national state 
such as Ghana, a paradox exists whereby, although the two political attitudes are 
theoretically mutually antagonistic, they almost equate with each other within the 
realities of the local political rationality. 
The research therefore examined the hypothesis that ethnonationalism and political 
nationalism are mutually antagonistic phenomena, the primacy or growth of one 
signifying the decrease of the other, ceteris paribus, and the extent to which this theory 
holds in reality, using Ghana as a test case. It would appear that the conflict posited 
between ethnonationalism and political nationalism, is not universally demonstrable, 
and that, within the rationality of the context of African politics, and Ghanaian politics 
in particular, ethnonationalism and political nationalism sometimes equate, rather than 
1 The terms ethnonationalism and political nationalism are fully explained in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of 
the thesis. Briefly, ethnonationalism is the form of nationalism demonstrated in solidarity with, or 
towards one's ethno-national identity group, and political nationalism is patriotism towards the state 
institution. Where there is a nation-state, ethnonationalism becomes automatically equated with political 
2 
3 
stand at odds, with each other. This paradox has arisen as a result of: (a) the notion that 
the modernising and integrative effects of social mobilisation, resulting for example, 
from urbanisation, could result in the transfer of primary allegiance from the 
ethnonational group to the cosmopolitan state (Connor 1994, p. 35), and; (b) the 
conceptual synonymity that urbanisation is detribalisation (Wilson 1941, pp. 12 & 16; 
Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6; Wilson and Mafeje 1963, pp. 13-46,53). Hence, detribalised 
urbanites should be more prone towards political nationalism than ethnonationalism. 
But detribalisation may only be geographical and not attitudinal (Agyeman 1988, pp. 
35-6; Mair 1965, pp. 11-2; Watson 1958, p. 5), or may provide conditions for the 
rejuvenation of primary ethnonational allegiance (Morrison 1982, p. 186). This 
research therefore examined the notion that urbanites are detribalised, by investigating 
geographical vis-ä-vis attitudinal detribalisation among Ghanaian urbanites, and the 
extent to which they maintain association with their ethnonational roots, and 
subsequently, the extent to which proneness towards political nationalism is real or 
imagined. The research also explored the patterns of ethnonationalism and political 
nationalism. As voting behaviour is one indicator by which the two political attitudes 
can be tested, the research aimed at investigating the voting intentions of Ghanaian 
urbanites in order to find out the patterns of ethnonationalism and/or political 
nationalism. In the event, the research results offered an indication of the possible 
voting patterns for the December 2000 multi-party elections, although this was not a 
prime intention. Despite the pretence among Ghanaian urbanites, and the often false 
impression given, that ethnonationalism is not a consideration when it comes to voting, 
the opposite is rather the case, and for most people, it is the main issue. The potential 
nationalism, but in a multi-national or multi-ethnic state, the distinction between the two automatically 
surfaces as well. 
3 
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for this form of nationalism remains high, as well as its future prospects, within the 
Ghanaian political milieu. 
It would appear, that the rational response to the "politics of the belly"2 by the majority 
of Ghanaian citizens, and urbanites in particular, is more of ethnonationalism rather 
than political nationalism, and for them, being ethnonationalist is the true way of being 
a political nationalist (or demonstrating one's patriotism towards the Ghanaian state). 
In contrast therefore with the implicit supposition that urbanites should be political 
nationalists, the research exercise envisaged that the findings should reveal the extent 
to which any of the two political attitudes (ethnonationalism and political nationalism) 
is of substance or style, and how this affects politics in Ghana. The research revealed 
that, contrary to the ideals of political nationalism, as espounced by Hutchinson and 
Kellas (Hutchinson 1994, pp. 42-7; Kellas 1991, p. 52), in practice, most Ghanaian 
urbanites are ethnonationalists, and that, generally-speaking, political nationalism is 
more of style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics. The research also revealed 
that the longer Ghanaian urbanites experienced urbanisation, the higher the association 
with their ethnonational roots became. But the thesis does not prove, or offer the view, 
that association between urbanites and their roots influences ethnonationalism. Rather, 
ethnonationalism is as a consequence of the "politics of the belly". It is also worth 
stating that, although the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the highest 
levels of association with roots, the data does not reveal any direct relationship between 
the two, and therefore the thesis does not offer a view that there is a relationship 
between ethnonationalism and association with roots. 
4 
5 
It must be noted, that never in the history of elections in Ghana has the voters' register 
required any individual to indicate their ethnonational identity. It has therefore been 
difficult to have a pinpoint idea of the ethnonational patterns in political attitudes. 
Thus, one uniqueness about this research is that, not only did it derive data on the 
ethnonational identities of individual respondents, but also provided an analysis of the 
patterns of political attitudes so derived from these identities, as well as their 
implications for Ghanaian politics as a whole. None of the previous research conducted 
on Ghanaian political attitudes: either by the International Federation of Electoral 
Systems (in conjunction with the Electoral Commision of Ghana) in 1997, or; Research 
International, or; the University of Ghana's Department of Political Science on the 
1992 and 1996 elections, investigated the specific linkages between ethnonational 
identities and the patterns of nationalism, as this has done. It is also worth pointing out 
that this research was not necessarily about which candidate or party would win or lose 
the December 2000 elections, but rather an investigation into the attitudes of 
nationalism among Ghanaian urbanites, using voter attitude as an indicator. As 
potential voters were not required to indicate ethnonational identity at registration, 
election results can only offer general patterns of nationalistic attitudes. Although this 
research was not conducted because of the elections, posterity would reveal that the 
election results, as well as the pattern of the immediate post-election governmental 
appointments, would confirm the themes, concerns and conclusions discussed within 
the thesis. 
2 "Politics of the belly" is briefly explained as the politics surrounding the state supervision of the 
distribution of opportunity and wealth (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55). A fuller discussion on this can be 
found in sections 1.6,2.1,3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the thesis. 
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The research also included a thorough evaluation of the theories of nationalism by 
delving into the debate on the invented doctrine or ideology of nationalism, and 
discussing the issue of whether or not, nations existed, and nationalisms occurred 
before the modernist and Eurocentric 180' century threshold. The discussion reveals the 
live processes and reasoning behind the invention of the doctrine, as well as the 
corresponding positions of the varying authorships. It would appear that the two main 
sides of the debate constitute primodialism and perennialism on one hand, and 
modernism and instrumentalism on the other3. Briefly, primordialism is the natural or 
organic view that nationalism has existed since antiquity, that all nations since 
antiquity, have originated from, or been founded on tribe or ethnic group. Perennialism, 
like primordialism, also holds the view that nationalism is perennial, a natural given 
which has been in existence since humanity (or antiquity), but differs from 
primordialism, with the view that not all nationalisms before the 18`h century threshold 
were organically inspired - for example, the French Revolution of 1789 although staged 
by a largely homogeneous national group, was economically-inspired, and not based on 
ethnonational sentiments. Modernism is the view that both the doctrine and practice of 
nationalism began with modernity, using the 18`h century as a threshold, and nations 
such as France, England and Spain, as model examples on which the doctrine has been 
The terms primordialism, perrenialism, modernism and instrumentalism are fully explained in sections 
1.3.1,1.3.2,1.3.3 and 1.3.4 of the thesis. All four terms indicate theoretical positions in the broad 
debate on nationalism, with primordialism and perennialism belonging to one end of the spectrum, and 
modernism and instrumentalism on the other. Briefly: primordialism is the natural or organic view that 
nationalism has existed since antiquity, that all nations since antiquity, have originated from, or been 
founded on tribe or ethnic group; perennialism, like primordialism, also holds the view that nationalism 
is perennial, a natural given which has been in existence since humanity (or antiquity), but 
differs from 
primordialism, with the view that not all nationalisms before the 18`h century threshold were organically 
inspired - for example, the 
French Revolution of 1789 although staged by a largely homogeneous 
national group, was economically-inspired, and not based on ethnonational sentiments; modernism 
is 
the view that both the doctrine and practice of nationalism began with modernity, using the 
18`h century 
as a threshold; instrumentalism is the view of modernism which holds that identity expressions are 
instrumentalist or situational, that is, based on the situation in which people find themselves, and on any 
such identities as gender, class, religion, etc. 
6 
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drafted (Kedourie 1966, p. 9; Kohn 1940; 1946, pp. 1&4; Seton-Watson 1977, p. 6; 
Smith 1991, pp. 43-4; 1995, pp. 29 & 35). Instrumentalism is the view of modernism 
which holds that identity expressions are instrumentalist or situational, that is, based on 
the situation in which identity groups find themselves, and on any such identities as 
gender, class, religion, etc (Smith 1986a; 1991; 1995, p. 30). The discussion includes a 
critique of the theoretical arguments. It commences with an in-depth evaluation of the 
meanings and usages of the terms "tribe", "ethnic group" and "nation" and how the 
terminology have been derived. This discussion leads into the compilation of a 
checklist for the attributes of a tribe (or ethnonational group) and a nation. 
Subsequently the checklist is used as a "plumbline" against two Ghanaian examples 
(the Fanti and Ashanti). The exercise reveals that the checklist is not peculiar to the so- 
called "model" nations, and therefore not universalistic, but instead Eurocentric. 
The thesis also discusses secessionisms, separatisms and irredentisms, and their 
implications for global inter-"nation"-alism, especially for postcolonial Africa4. Briefly, 
secessionism and separatism revolve around claims of a group to a homeland and the 
withdrawal of such territory from the jurisdiction of a larger state to which it belongs. 
Irredentism revolves around the redeeming of a known or targeted territory, and/or 
identity group, on the basis of shared identity or history. All three forms of nationalism 
denote an attempt at national self-determination, and subsequently to gain international 
legitimacy (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 97; Mayall 1990, p. 50). The discussion on separatism 
and irredentism sets the context for the discussion of Ewe irredentism in Chapter 2. 
4A full discussion on the terms seccesionism, separatism and irredentism can be found in section 1.5 of 
the thesis. Briefly, whereas all three forms of nationalism denote an attempt at national self- 
determination, and subsequently to gain international legitimacy, secessionism and separatism revolve 
around claims of a group to a homeland and the withdrawal of such territory from the jurisdiction of a 
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Chapter 1 therefore demonstrates a grip on how theorising on the subject of nationalism 
has evolved and discusses the extent to which the theories of nationalism are globally 
applicable. The research was subsequently placed within the African context and 
dimension of nationalism, highlighting the continent's Partition and its implications for 
nationalism, and thereby setting a framework for the nature of African politics within 
which to discuss Ghanaian politics. The research has examined the feasibility of the 
postcolonial Ghanaian nation-state project, by which a heterogeneity of ethnonational 
identity groups have been placed under the umbrella of single statehood, with the hope 
that they should integrate (Smith 1991, p. 59) over time. But the prevalent nature of the 
"politics of the belly" would seem to be grooming citizens in the opposite direction. 
The tension or conflict between ethnonationalism and political nationalism, as 
demonstrated by the survey data, proves that the attempt of the colonial legacy to 
subjugate separate national identities under a single state, which should then act as an 
incubator for the gestation of new nationhood (Ibid), is only achievable within the 
understanding that whereas ethnonational homogeneity is a tall order for any new 
multi-national state, ethnonational heterogeneity is not a problem for the attainment of 
national identity for, as well as nationality within, the postcolonial state. The 
rationalization of ethnonationalism by the majority of citizens, in response to the 
pervasive "politics of the belly", seems an indirect nod of approval to the latter, and the 
scenario clearly indicates, that the state does not have a smooth ride in creating `the 
necessary condition and matrix for the gestation of national loyalties' (Ibid). It follows 
therefore, that the prospects of national integration for a state with subject groupings 
sharply antagonistic towards each other, and where the state system perpetuates these 
larger state to which it belongs, and; irredentism revolves around the redeeming of a known or targeted 
territory and/or people on the basis of shared identity or history. 
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antagonisms through unfair political arithmetic motivated by ethno-sectarian interests, 
are very bleak. Despite its jurisdictive authority over the modern Ghanaian territory, the 
state has somewhat failed to live up to egalitarian expectations. The research 
concludes, that the rationalization of ethnonationalism and the "politics of the belly" 
militates against the potential for an integrated Ghanaian nation, or accentuates 
ethnonational heterogeneity, should state power be utilised as motivated by 
ethnonationalism. In reality, the Weberian ethos of the state has been rejected by Africa 
in general, and Ghana in particular, and it would take a strong political will from both 
politicians and the rest of citizenry to transform the political game from 
ethnonationalism to political nationalism in Weberian terms. The Ghanaian nation-state 
project, and by extension, that of most African countries, has not prospered on the 
infertile ground of multiple national identities boxed under a single state. 
The research also investigated the traditions of origins of the various ethnonational 
identity groups in Ghana and the influence which these myths of origin have on 
citizens' perceptions vis-ä-vis fellow identity groups, as well as the overall effects of 
such perceptions on political actions and trends in Ghana. The various ethnonational 
groups have been historically and anthropologically traced to their current ethno- 
geographical locations in Modem Ghana (see maps of Ghana and West Africa in 
Appendix I). The thesis argues that a combination of the political processes of the 
immediate, as well as distant past, are responsible for the perceptions and political 
actions of Ghanaian citizens, and that an accentuation of current mutual antagonisms 
between identity groups, enhances the invocation of the myths of origin to support the 
present. For example, although there is no historical enmity between Akans and Ewes 
(Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8), explanations for the current heightened political enmity 
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between the two groups can also be sought from such seemingly far-fetched reasons as 
Akans and Ewes having separate anthropological backgrounds. The research therefore 
traced the anthropological origins of the various ethnonational identity groups and 
linked them with the current politics. It would appear that a wider, more inclusive Guan 
ancestry and perception exists for the majority of Ghanaian citizens than any current, 
exclusive, "latter-day" Guan identity, and that the adoption of the name "Ghana" for 
the postcolonial state has more to do with the fact that majority of Modem Ghana, with 
the exception of the Ewes and "Central Togo Minorities"5, are traceable to Ancient 
Ghana. The origination of the "Ghana" hypothesis is explained in section 2.2. The 
thesis also took up the challenge in explaining the Guan controversy (section 2.4). In 
addition, the thesis discusses the current politics surrounding the wishes of the CTMs 
and other groups in the Volta Region of Ghana vis-a-vis their neighbouring Ewes, as 
well as the latent pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region. The research 
concludes that the comparative stability of the Ghanaian state, as opposed to that of 
other African countries where inter-ethnic issues have been highly explosive, can be 
attributed to a number of factors including: the presence of a predominant core ethnie 
(the wider Guan ancestry); the Akan factor; a rationalization of ethnonationalism, as 
well as; the nod of approval given to the "politics of the belly". 
The thesis also provides commentaries on demonstrations of ethnonationalism and/or 
tribalism with regard to the ensuing political processes, for example, how the Northern, 
Fanti and Krobo votes were likely to be influenced by the political context leading to 
5 Paul Nugent (1997) describes the other groups in the Volta Region apart from the Ewes as "Togo 
Remnants" or "Central Togo Minorities" - CTMs. For a fuller discussion of this, see sections 2.1 and 
2.12 of the thesis, or Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000. 
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the 2000 elections. It is important to state that the political complexion of the Ga- 
Adangbe ethnonational group was difficult to decipher. 
The research also yielded findings on the relationship between the other main 
demographic factors and politics, apart from ethnonational identity (or tribe). Although, 
the research did not set out mainly to investigate the relationship between gender and 
politics, the findings reveal that compared between the two sexes, there has been a 
greater tendency for Ghanaian females to try as much as possible to conceal their 
political opinions, and this not being an effect of the researcher's gender on 
interviewees. With the remainder of the demographic factors, it would appear that as 
far as Ghanaian politics is concerned, it is not so much age, occupation, or education 
which matter as the ethnonational considerations. 
Tema was chosen as the city for the fieldwork and the reasons for the choice are 
outlined in section 3.5. The fieldwork included a survey and an unstructured interview 
with the Member of Parliament for Tema. An excerpt of this interview is provided in 
Appendix IX. The questionnaire used for the survey is in Appendix X. The survey data 
is analysed using SPSS, and all statistical information from the SPSS data editor are in 
Appendices XI - XXI. The thesis provides justification for the methodological choices 
made at all stages of the research process. Chapter 4 discusses the fieldwork process, 
its associated problems and how they were surmounted. The thesis provides a 
methodological discussion of the practicalities which ensued in the choice of data 
gathering strategy within the "culture of silence"6 which had prevailed in the Ghanaian 
6 The term "culture of silence" is fully explained in section 4.1.2 of the thesis. Briefly, it denotes a 
political culture within which freedom of expression is limited. 
11 
12 
socio-political context. Despite any difficulties, the aims of the research were not 
compromised for an inefficient data-gathering strategy. In the relatively inhibiting 
political culture of Ghana, the originally intended research strategy of a postal survey, 
or house-to-house questionnaire-based interviews, had to be shelved. However, the use 
of a laptop and a computerised interview process resulted in overcoming research 
problems. 
The fieldwork conducted from 25 January to 22 February 1999, followed an initial 
agreement by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana7, to supervise 
it. Subsequently, the letter of introduction from the University of Ghana8 served the 
very good purpose of giving me access to interviewees. The most cooperative of 
interview sites were the Cocoa Processing Company (CPC) Ltd, where a special notice 
was put on all bulletin boards at the factory site to ensure maximum awareness of my 
research exercise, and the Ghana Textiles Printing (GTP) Co. Ltd, where I was given a 
letter by the management to confirm that I had interviewed their employees9. 
Employers who gave me their complimentary cards have them displayed in Appendix 
VI(b), including the Management of Tema Oil Refinery who seemed overly politically 
sensitive and therefore granted me only 2 interviewees, and ALUWORKS, whose 
management officially refused me interviewing rights on the basis of not wishing to be 
seen by the ruling government as cooperating with a research construed as rather 
revealing and provocative. A list of schools and their respective heads in Tema, who 
See letter from Professor Joseph Ayee, Head of Department of Political Science at the University of 
Ghana, to to Middlesex University, dated 31 July 1997, in Appendix III. 
8 See introductory letter, dated 22 January 1999, which I took on all my interview rounds, in Appendix 
IV. 
9 See letter from Ms Martha Clerk to Middlesex University, dated 10 February 1999, in Appendix V. 
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are willing to be publicly documented as having taken part in the fieldwork exercise, is 
provided in Appendix VI(a). 
A glossary of political parties registered for the election is provided in Appendix II, 
This is aimed at giving the reader an initial feel of the Ghanaian political landscape, 
and also serves as a key to understanding the political behaviours and themes discussed 
in the thesis. It will be advantageous for the reader to browse through this glossary 
before reading chapter 2, and peruse it before chapter 3. There were nine political 
parties campaigning for the elections, but the main competition was between the ruling 
National Democratic Congress - NDC and the main Opposition New Patriotic Party - 
NPP. As of 31st July 1999, all nine parties had registered with the Electoral 
Commission and had been issued with certificates. The remaining registered political 
parties include: The People's National Convention - PNC; The Convention People's 
Party - CPP; The National Reform Party - NRP; Democratic People's Party - DPP; 
Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere - EGLE - Party; Great Consolidated Popular Party 
- GCPP, and; The United Ghana Movement - UGM. Full details of each party are 
given in the glossary. 
The thesis was completed before the December 2000 multi-party elections in Ghana. 
However, as bureaucracy would delay its submission, and more importantly, as results 
of the 2000 elections and the immediate post-election political drama would strongly 
support the thesis, a Postscript is provided as a final chapter to substantiate the 
arguments. Sections 6.1,6.2 and 6.3 of the Postscript offer an analysis on the results of 
the elections, and updates on the "politics of the belly" as well as pan-Eweist 
irredentism within the West African sub-region respectively. All three sections confirm 
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the thesis, and substantiate the argument that within the contextual and prevalent 
"politics of the belly", ethnonationalism, rather than political nationalism, would 
continue to dominate the substance of Ghanaian politics as evidence of the rationality 
within the local political reality. Appendix XXII provides a picture of the ethnic 
arithmetic in the new administration of President Kufour. 
S. 
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Chapter 1 
The Invention Of A Doctrine 
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1.1 TRIBE AND NATION: THE CHECKLIST 
1.1.1 Tribe and ethnic group 
Several definitions, descriptions and explanations have been given for the term tribe. 
Piddington defines it as: 
A group of people speaking a common dialect, inhabiting a common territory and 
displaying a certain homogeneity in their culture. The tribe is never exogamous; 
in fact, its members marry fellow-members more often than they marry outsiders. 
The tribe is not primarily or usually a kinship group, but in certain cases all 
members of a tribe claim descent from a common ancestor. The tribe is frequently 
a political unit for purposes of the internal administration of justice and external 
relations, such as the prosecution of war (Piddington 1950, p. 164). 
An analysis of the manifestations and characterisations of the term tends to portray the 
following fundamental features or attributes: (1) a collective proper name; (2) a myth 
of common ancestry; (3) shared historical memories; (4) one or more differentiating 
elements of common culture; (5) an association with a specific `homeland'; (6) a sense 
of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (Smith 1991, p. 21). As a 
checklist, not every tribe would exhibit all of these attributes at every one time. 
However, any one of the above could be demonstrated by any tribe or ethnic unit, for 
example, the English. 
It is important to state that the synonymous usage of the terms "tribe" and "ethnic 
group" in the social sciences and humanities have contributed to some of the confusion 
that occurs when an attempt is being made to explain tribal and ethnic phenomena. It 
would appear that the identification of "tribe" is first to be located in the aspects of 
birth, blood relations, endogamy and kinship as the items of most significance, with 
any allusions to culture being peripheral (Piddington 1950, p. 164). Although through 
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endogamy common blood results, kinship is not always derived from common blood, 
but also by law, as for example a spouse being the "next of kin". Lucy Mair states that, 
`it is not the biological calculation of the proportion of "common blood" - actually 
genes - that measures nearness of kin; it is the law of any given society' (Mair 1965, p. 
62). On the other hand, the phrase "ethnic group" is defined in terms of social 
behaviour. Since some people can be `socially defined as belonging together by virtue 
of common descent' (Francis 1976, p. 6), it would appear that, the term "ethnic group" 
can suffice in certain respects for "tribe" but not vice versa. Thus, an ethnic unit (or 
ethnic group) is defined as `any major collectivity that is socially defined in terms of 
common descent' (Ibid). Perhaps this is where due to loose application, the grey areas 
of synonymity creep in. It must be noted that "common descent" is not only of blood, 
but merely of any forms of orientation or traceability, for example, religion, occupation 
or peer group. Francis claims that, `ethnicity may be said to be dominant if it is salient 
in the orientation of social action, especially in determining the personnel of a social 
unit as well as the rights and obligations of the people involved' (Ibid). Thus, whereas a 
tribe is more or less genetically defined, the ethnic unit is socially defined. The latter 
therefore covers aspects of "common descent" which may not necessarily constitute 
traceable blood relations or kinship, for example the development of a common native 
culture forged as a result of the residing together of peoples of different kinship, blood 
backgrounds or common ancestry on the same geographic territory. In this case 
Smith's phrase `a community of native birth and culture' -(Smith 1991, p. 11) can 
suffice for an ethnic unit, as can also be said for emigrants from a particular country, 
say "Italians in Australia" (Mair 1965, p. 13). 
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Francis goes further to describe the formation of secondary ethnic groups. According to 
him: 
Our discussion will furthermore reveal that societal units that are ethnically quite 
heterogeneous and actually based on territorial, economic, or political principles 
of social organisation may be reinterpreted and socially defined as if they were 
based on shared ethnicity. We shall call such units secondary ethnic units 
(Francis 1976, p. 6). 
It is easy to deduce therefore, that by way of other competing loyalties in society which 
could be through class, political party, neighbourhood and peer groups, professional 
and business groups, or even trade unions and religion, an ethnic group could 
crystallise or form over and above tribal identity (Hutchinson & Smith eds. 1994, pp. 
32 & 98). In all the mixed characteristics however, Pierre Van Den Berghe states that 
`nevertheless, in their ideal-typical form, each kind of group has a clearly distinct basis 
of solidarity: kinship and interest respectively' (Ibid, p. 98), 
1.1.2 Nation 
Many authors have also severally defined the term nation. According to Seton-Watson: 
A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a 
sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness ... no "scientific definition" of the nation can be devised: yet the phenomenon has existed and 
exists ... a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community 
consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not 
necessary that the whole population should feel, or so behave, and it is not 
possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which 
must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possess 
"national consciousness" ... (Seton-Watson 1977, pp. 1& 5). 
According to Elie Kedourie, ' ... nations by definition, are composed of citizens who 
are at one with each other, among whom there is neither conqueror nor conquered, 
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neither ruler nor subject, but are all animated by one general will, willing the good of 
the nation, which is also that of the individual' (Kedourie 1966, p. 120). Also, according 
to Walker Connor, a' ... nation connotes a group of people who believe they are 
ancestrally related' (Connor 1994, p. xi). The above are reinforced by Naomi Chazan's 
view which presents the nation as relating to ` ... the psychocultural phenomenon of a 
group of people possessing a common symbolic referent and joint aspirations and who 
desire to give political expression to these identities' (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1). J. V. 
Stalin, in dealing with the national question, states that `a nation is a historically 
evolved, stable community of people which arose on the basis of a common language, 
territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' 
(Kammari 1951, pp. 12-3). According to Smith `the nation is a large, vertically 
integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and 
collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which 
differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in 
relations of alliance or conflict' (Smith 1983, p. 175). Hans Kohn, in dealing with the 
fundamental conditions for the growth of modern nationhood lists the following: 
national homogeneity as a result of the breakdown of class and gender barriers; internal 
and external peace and security; growth in economic and political life resulting in the 
erasure (eradication) of feudal power; the emergence of the middle class - shift in 
social prestige (Kohn 1940, pp. 69-85); literary activity and research into the national 
past; a doctrinal or standard text, for example the Bible, poems, etc; the emergence of a 
recognised national language; citizenship rights and liberty (Kohn 1946, pp. 69-91 & 
156). A discussion of nationhood cannot be done without a discussion on the state. The 
most notable definition of the state is given by Weber as `a human community that 
successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
19 
20 
territory' [Camilleri et al (ed. ) 1995, p. 22; Pierson 1996, p. 8; Smith 1983, p. 178; 
Weber 1970a, p. 78]. Naomi Chazan affirms the above by defining the state as `a legal- 
territorial concept ... that set of structures and institutions that seek to maintain 
effective control over a given population within a specifically defined geographical 
area' (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1). Smith also affirms both definitions and makes a further 
distinction when he claims that, the state refers `exclusively to public institutions, 
differentiated from, and autonomous of, other social institutions and exercising a 
monopoly of coercion and extraction within a given territory' (Smith 1991, p. 14). It 
becomes clear that, as has been the obfuscation by common usage, of the distinction 
between the terms "tribe" and "ethnic group", so have the distinct relationships 
between "nation" and "state" been confused (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 1). Seton-Watson 
makes the distinction clearer. According to him: 
States can exist without a nation, or with several nations, among their subjects; 
and a nation can be co-terminus with the population of one state, or be included 
together with other nations within one state, or be divided between several states. 
There were states long before there were nations, and there are some nations that 
are much older than most states which exist today. The belief that every state is a 
nation, or that all sovereign states are national states has done much to obfuscate 
human understanding of political realities. A state is a legal and political 
organisation, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens 
(Seton-Watson 1977, p. 1). 
It seems that some of the attributes of a nation overlap with those of a tribe or ethnic 
unit. However, as a result of many developments over the centuries, coupled with the 
simultaneous development of an international community, several other in-organic 
characteristics have assumed in the conditions for nationhood. An analysis of 
definitions, characterisations and descriptions of the term "nation" tends to portray the 
following attributes to a nation: (1) A large centralised government; (2) a common 
territory; (3) a collective proper name; (4) common myths of ancestry or origin or 
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shared historical myths; (5) a common language; (6) a common economic life and 
policy; (7) common citizenship rights for all citizens and a common mental make-up 
(that all citizens belong to the same nation/territory/state); (8) evidence of some sort of 
ideology or doctrine serving as guidance to leaders of the nationalist movement and 
leading to the emergence of the nation; (9) evidence of cohesion between the masses 
(people) and the aristocracy - (no class barriers in politics); (10) a public education 
system. As like tribe (in Section 1.1.1), this checklist means that any nation would 
manifest any combination, or all of these attributes. 
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1.2 AN INVENTED DOCTRINE 
Just as there are several authors on the subject, so are there several explanations of 
nationalism, some essentially doctrinal and others definitional, some tirelessly 
attempting to explain a phenomenon that seems in their opinion natural to humanity, 
even if in different forms and manifestations over different epochs, and others trying to 
explain an unnatural doctrine imposed on humanity. In all this, others also try to 
explain/expose what the agenda of the doctrine or definition is. In this last respect, and 
perhaps in the others as well, Elie Kedourie seems to have hit the mark in his 
description of the whole scenario. According to him: 
nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. It rep tends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of 
population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate 
exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states. 
Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is divided into nations, that nations are 
known by certain characteristics, which can be ascertained, and that the only 
legitimate type of government is national self-government. Not the least triumph 
of this doctrine is that such propositions have been accepted and are thought to be 
self-evident, that the very word nation has been endowed by nationalism with a 
meaning and a resonance which until the end of the eighteenth century it was far 
from having. These ideas have become firmly naturalised in the political rhetoric 
of the West, which has been taken over for the use of the whole world (Kedourie 
1966, p. 9). 
The problem about: (a) the invention of the Eurocentric doctrine or ideology of 
nationalism, and: (b) the fixation of the advent of nationalism around the 18`h century - 
with the French Revolution as a key exemplary event (Smith 1991, pp. 43-4; 1995, pp. 
29 & 35; Seton-Watson 1977, p. 6; Kohn 1946, pp. 1& 4), revolves around the 
formation of three European nations, specifically, England, France and Spain as 
"examples" or "models" of the processes of nation-formation. Thus the doctrine has 
derived its ethos from the patterns associated with the political processes by which 
these "model" nations have so emerged. The emergence of England as a nation 
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coincided with the emergence of the modern state both of which took place in the 
period from the 16 `h to the 18 `" century (Kohn 1940; Kohn 1946, p. 4). This event, 
coupled with the experience of France, have each been constituted as a "perfect" 
example of what has been described as a nation being `co-terminus with the population 
of one state' (Seton Watson 1977, p. 1). 
As far as the threshold for the advent of nationalism is concerned, the list of dates 
usually singled out to signal or typify the 18th century includes: 1789 and 1792 - first 
and second phases of the French Revolution; 1775 - First Partition of Poland; 1776 - 
American Declaration of Independence, and; 1807 - Fichte's addresses to the German 
Nation (Hutchinson and Smith eds. 1994, p. 5). The period spanning the 18th to 20"' 
centuries has been noted generally as one of formation of nations in Western Europe, 
with their populations not necessarily being co-terminus with their governing states, 
since in a few multi-national situations, more than one nation have emerged under one 
state, and in some cases what used to be one nation has eventually emerged under 
different states, for example the former Yugoslavia. Within this time span, scholars of 
modernism would dare to propose that all "less fortunate" and aspiring nations were 
imitating the "success pattern" of the successful "models" who had already "arrived" as 
nations by the 18th century as a result of a "more fortunate" history of military power 
and prowess which burgeoned during the 16 `h and 17th centuries (Smith 1991, p. 59). 
This "bloc" of a time-span was not uneventful. The role of the state in creating 
nationhood was phenomenal. Through its managerial role, geographical and 
jurisdictive powers, the supervision of such activities as taxation, conscription and 
employment, tended to require and develop a sense of bonding and loyalty from 
subjects or citizens. Additionally, the emergence of infrastructure that aided the co- 
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ordination and communication between classes and areas, thus facilitating the 
extension of citizenship rights, also tended to remove any geographical barriers within 
a territory. Thus, the view that the processes of nation-formation were baked by the 
state, acting as the engineer, political incubator and supervisor at the same time, has 
some credibility since it created `the necessary condition and matrix for the gestation 
of the national loyalties so evident today' (Ibid). In the case of England, the state was 
the rulership of the Tudor Monarchs from the 16 `h century (Kohn 1940, p. 93). 
However, Smith argues that the mobilising and penetrative powers of the state could 
not take the full responsibility for nation-creation and the bonding of citizens, in that, 
the state was largely a bourgeois organisation, and that `the lower classes were not 
politically incorporated until the end of the l9`h century in France and England, and 
women not until the 1920s' (Smith 1991, p. 60). Milton and Cromwell (both statesmen 
and intelligentsia at the same time) spearheaded the Puritan Revolution which rebelled 
against the Tudor Monarchy and sought the citizenship rights of civil liberty from 
"Custom and Authority" -(church and state-monarchy) - within the matrix of a 
Christian doctrine or ideology (Kohn 1940; Seton-Watson 1965, p. 5). In addition, the 
two colonising countries (England and France) had a much wider global influence, that 
is, an empire resulting from the incorporation of other peoples. This constitutes some 
evidence that the state had the ability to allow a fuller local integration of all classes if 
it so politically willed. Smith therefore argues that, the responsibility for nation- 
formation is a combination of state design and also two simultaneous evolving 
processes, which are: first, the capitalist revolution and the subsequent move towards a 
market economy; and second, a cultural or educational revolution. With the former, 
trade networks were established between these "model nations" and their colonies, 
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yielding, mercantile wealth to their bourgeoisie, rich benefits to the state and enabling 
it to raise larger and better-equipped armies and expert civil service staff. With the 
latter, the Reformation and its resultant upsurge of Protestant Churches led to the 
development of secular studies in both the humanities and natural science, alongside 
with the development of an intelligentsia, who despite their important roles in the 
universities, were still subordinate to the state. Thus, the administrative, economic and 
cultural revolutions resulting in a political socialisation through a public mass 
education and communication system within the period, also contributed their quota in 
the nation-building or nation-creation processes of the "model" nations. As an 
ethnicist, Smith furthermore argues that all this developed around a central core of 
aristocratic ethnie, from which the dissemination and transmutation of `myths, 
memories and symbols embodied in customs, traditions, codes and styles' were 
effected (Smith 1991, p. 61). 
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1.3 THE DEBATE ON NATIONALISM 
A debate on the doctrine or ideology of nationalism therefore ensues as the question 
looms up: were there no nations and nationalism before the French Revolution in the 
late 18`x' century? It is essential to spell out that the term "nationalism" stands for two 
basic things: one as `a doctrine about the character, interests, rights and duties of 
nations' (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 3), and the other as; `an organised political movement, 
designed to further the alleged aims and interests of nations' (Ibid) with the purpose of 
independence and/or national unity. The doctrine or ideology and its practical 
outworkings (nationalist movements) have been programmed to go together, such that, 
without the ideology there are no nationalist movements and vice versa. This pre- 
supposes the idea that, it was after the 18`h century threshold (when the doctrine of 
nationalism was in place) that events towards nation-creation or nation-building 
became known as moves towards nationalism, or nationalist movements. Hence, there 
were no nationalist movements before the 18th century threshold, and furthermore, any 
attempts by any polity towards nation-building before this threshold were/are not to be 
considered as constituting nationalism. According to Seton-Watson, `once the doctrine 
had been formulated, it was used as a justification for creating nationalist movements, 
and then sovereign states to encompass the lands in which it was claimed that nations 
lived' (1977, p. 6). Smith argues against this invention of a doctrine by debunking the 
mutual presupposition hanging between the doctrine and practice of nationalism. He 
claims that `for just as there are many nations without nationalisms, so there are as 
many nationalisms without nations. The term(s) "nation" and "nationalism" are 
analytically and empirically distinct. And where nationalism arises without a pre- 
existent nation, the "nation" for which it strives is only an embryo, a project, a "nation 
of intent"' (Smith 1983, p. 175). The perennialists (like Seton-Watson) and 
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primordialists (like Kedourie) also agree that nations, and therefore nationalism have 
ever been, from time immemorial, albeit in different forms and variations of self- 
awareness and activism. They claim that the roots of nations: 
stretch back into the medieval era, or even antiquity. There never was an age 
without its nations and nationalisms, even if the doctrine of self-determination 
was born in the modern epoch. Every human being feels in `his or her bones' the 
enduring power of their nations, the almost timeless quality of the national 
character. Nations can be found from earliest antiquity, from the beginnings of 
records in ancient Sumer and Egypt, and they have dominated political life in 
every era since that time (Smith 1995, p. 35). 
The perennialist argument is further supported by Seton-Watson who makes the 
definitive contribution that: 
no "scientific definition" of the nation can be devised: yet the phenomenon has 
existed and exists ... a nation exists when a significant number of people in a 
community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed 
one. It is not necessary that the whole population should feel, or so behave, and it 
is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population, 
which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possess 
"national consciousness" ... (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 5). 
Following from the above view given by Seton-Watson, another question looms: what 
exactly is a nation, whether real or of intent? Is it only when both the cultural and 
political units or boundaries are congruent (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1; Gellner 1983, p. 1)? 
What term is given to situations where anti-colonial nationalisms lead to clearly- 
defined state boundaries. Would "national consciousness" derived from a united anti- 
colonial nationalism make a newly-carved, multi-national state, a nation-state? 
Following from the ethnicist definition of a nation (Smith 1983, pp. 175-6) as reflected 
in the definitions given by Chazan, Kammari, Kedourie and Seton-Watson (above), it 
becomes clear, that perhaps most (if not all) African countries which gained 
independence from the Partition would not qualify to be called nation-states, as this 
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could only be possible when one adopts the statist definition of a nation where 
nationalism results into a territorial-political unit, as against a psycho-cultural and 
unified unit based on alleged descent and common culture (Smith 1983, pp. 175-6). It 
becomes easy to make the distinction that, where the anti-colonial nationalism was 
pursued by a people of alleged common descent and culture - in which case the 
nationalist movement was a cultural movement (Ibid), and at the same time the territory 
of independence from colonialism is inhabited strictly and solely by the said people, the 
country is a nation-state from the time it gained independence. With the fast-racing 
globalising trends of economics, government and multi-cultural melting pots, as well as 
the growing prominence of the term "globalisation" in academic literature - especially 
in the 1990s (Giddens 1998, p. 28), another questions looms into the frame: `is the 
nation-state becoming a fiction ... and government obsolete? ' (Ibid, p. 31). Proponents 
of the dramatic effects of globalisation on the nation-state like Anthony Giddens, argue 
that globalisation deducts from some of the nation-states' powers, particularly those 
which underlie Keynesian economic management, and also enhances the potential for 
regenerating local identities (Ibid, pp. 31-3). However, opponents of this view argue 
that despite the over-arching, supra-nationalist potential of globalisation, the nation- 
state identity would remain and become even more sharpened within the matrix of the 
increasing competition through inter-nation-alism. 
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1.3.1 Modernism 
Contrary to the perennialist view is that of the "modernists" -a `modern generation of 
scholars' (Smith 1991, p. 44), who claim that the occurrence of nationalism begins 
from the 18 `h century, and is contingent on the evidence of a nation-formation process 
similar to the "model" nation-formation processes of France, England, Spain, etc., and 
lining up with the elements of a definition of nationalism, which is, ` ... an ideological 
movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence 
on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or 
potential "nation" like others' (Smith 1983, p. 171). Although the modernists disagree 
on the timing of this "threshold" [some preferring the 18th century, and others 
preferring a 19th & earlier 20th century periods, with adherents to the latter periodisation 
basing their argument on the fact that this period witnessed both the "nationalisation of 
the masses" or their inclusion into the running of the state machinery, and the 
enfranchising of women (Smith 1991, p. 44)], their argument dwells within the 
"contingency" that `the conditions that brought the nation into being were absent in 
antiquity and the middle ages, and the differences between pre-modern and modern 
collective cultural identities are too great to be subsumed under a single concept of the 
nation. As "aptly" described by Smith, `mass "citizen-nations" can only emerge in the 
era of industrialism and democracy' (Ibid), that is, `nations and nationalism are treated 
as products of the specifically modem conditions of capitalism, industrialism, 
bureaucracy, mass communications and secularism' (Smith 1995, pp. 29 & 35). In 
addition to the fact that the modernist concept of a nation is itself subject to criticism, 
can one actually say that there was no democracy anywhere in the world in the pre-18`h 
century period, or that there is democracy after it? It is more or less, as quite rightly 
described by Smith, an imposition of a `Western concept of a nation onto quite 
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different areas and periods' (Smith 1991, p. 44). But although Smith further adds that 
even a multi-dimensional concept of a nation would still not suffice for the wide 
cultural differences between areas and historical epochs, it is evident that as an 
ethnicist, a bias cannot be hidden, in that, he terms a strong example such as that of 
Ancient Egypt as a mere ethnic state and not a nation. He claims inter-alia, that Egypt 
had a national identity (and consequently national consciousness) yet Egyptians did not 
feel that they were citizens of Egypt, neither was there anything that constituted 
nationalism because there were class divisions in all sectors of society (politics, 
religion, economy, education, legal rights, etc. ), and that a public culture of equal 
opportunities was not inculcated into the middle and lower classes (Ibid, pp. 45-6). 
This argument can be criticised in two ways: doctrinally and historically. First, 
according to Seton-Watson: 
the formation of national consciousness does not necessarily lead to nationalism. 
A nation which has become conscious of itself, whose members are united within 
the same country, independent of foreign rule, does not need to be nationalist, to 
formulate nationalist doctrines or create nationalist movements. The English and 
the Spaniards are cases in point. But although you can have a nation without 
nationalism, you cannot have nationalism without national consciousness (Seton- 
Watson 1965, p. 4). 
What remains to be tackled is the historical point, that is, the fact that the gap between 
the aristocracy and the masses, whether it be social or political, may not have been 
bridged yet. Most probably, that gap is not bridgeable. It all depends on whether the 
social boundaries constituted political boundaries. But additionally, using modem 
Britain as an example, one can see that despite a mass public culture and modem 
technological trends in mass communication and co-ordination both media-wise and 
geographically, and thereby linking up the polity as it were, there are still class 
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differences in the UK and a wide gap between the aristocracy and the people. There is 
the royal family, which owns large royal private property, with the Queen as President 
of the polity (to whom the Prime Minister of the public must submit his or her 
manifesto), and with several other royal sub-titles and offices e. g.; dukes, earls, barons, 
etc. spread over the country. Prospective heirs of the realm must not break their 
marriage vows or else cease to be head of the Church of England. Public recognitions 
such as MBE, OBE, QC, etc. are awarded only by the Queen. Attitudes of British 
citizenry to the royalty are periodically unstable, ranging from positive to negative. The 
royalty (just like of old) is absolutely devolved from both the lower and middle classes. 
Would this scenario of class division not constitute attributes of non-national identity 
as attributed to Egypt? Furthermore, Scottish and Welsh citizens of the polity have 
opted for devolution from the British Parliament. There is no such absolute thing as 
tribal or national homogeneity in Britain. It can be argued that Britain is ethnically 
heterogeneous, comprising of English, Scots, Welsh and Irish. Furthermore, isolating 
any one of them, for example England, from the British equation, would not equate the 
serious class divisions in each of the identity groups, for example the English In terms 
of education, children of the nobility still attend special schools like Eton. Also, there is 
no longer free university education in England, thus making upward mobility and 
integration more difficult for the lower classes in their already-existing predicament of 
diminishing returns in socio-economic status. Furthermore, big business and the 
highest paid jobs are also run by the nobility and established families. In the "public" 
civil service, the highest jobs are reserved for the highly educated, with the ruling 
political party and its Ministers setting the political agenda. The state machinery has 
neither been "nationalised" to the level of the masses, nor to the universal and 
proportional inclusion of women, who are still occupationally dis-enfranchised in 
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English society. The lower classes are not easily integrating. There are still affluent 
sections of society by geographical demarcations - some geographical areas are visibly 
rich, and some poor. State religion (the Church of England) is highly organised with the 
Head of the Royal Family as its head (unless disqualified by marrying a non-royal). The 
legal system does not speak equal opportunity since legal aid is restrictive to some 
cases, and not others. Thus, one cannot say that a universal set of equal rights and 
opportunities exist for all citizens in England or Britain. This is a similar transposition 
of Ancient Egypt, despite differences in culture and epochs. Essentially, the very 
criteria which has been used in disqualifying Ancient Egypt from being a nation, ie; the 
failure of the state breaking `free from its aristocratic and priestly bases unlike the 
French and British states' (Smith 1991, p. 46), ought to be the plumbline in current 
analysis. Going by the contingencies and criteria of the modernist scholars, the scenario 
of modern Britain, (or England in isolation) is still lacking, and therefore, neither polity 
should constitute a nation, two centuries after the French Revolution "threshold". It is 
evident that `the chief actors (are) king [or queen], ministers and bureaucrats, with the 
middle classes appearing later, and the aristocrats and clergy often ambivalent' (Ibid, p. 
68). The aristocrats and clergy have not been marginalized, their heritage and culture 
have, even in principle, not become everyone's, in the post-modem England or Britain 
they have not been by-passed, to counter Smith (Ibid). 
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1.3.2 The antithesis of modernists 
It would appear that the modernist position is only a fashionable viewpoint around 
which modernist intellectuals romanticise, as the literature would reveal that some of 
the modernists do not actually believe what they say, for example, Anthony Giddens. A 
close examination of his writings betrays this antithesis. As a modernist, Giddens states 
that `nationalism, like the nation-state, is a phenomenon generated originally from 
within Europe, and I think it is right to stress that it would not have emerged without 
the bourgeois idea of popular sovereignty that ushered in the modem phase of 
European liberalism' (Giddens 1987, p. 177). Somewhere else, Giddens posits an 
antithetical view which strongly lends support to primordialism and perennialism. 
Giddens states that `... nationalist sentiments relate to a myth of origins supplying a 
psychological focus for the unity of the political community; but any interpretation of 
origins that has concrete reference to the past is likely to stimulate as much tension as 
harmony, because of the diversity of cultural differences characteristically involved' 
(Giddens 1985, p. 273). Myths of origin, as a psychological element for uniting any 
people, constitutes one of the major cornerstones of the argument against the modernist 
position. Giddens' acceptance of the validity and potential of myths of origin as a 
driving force of nationalism, defeats his position as a modernist, in that, myths of origin 
are a phenomenon which relates from antiquity. 
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1.3.3 Primordialism and perennialism 
Smith elaborates on the view that primordialism seems to be a more plausible 
explanation of nationalism. Primordialism in its extreme form holds that tribal 
identities exist just as speech, sight and smell, and that humanity, by nature, belongs to 
fixed tribal communities just as families. This organic version further connotes the 
view that nations have "natural frontiers", `a specific origin and place in nature ... a 
peculiar character, mission and destiny' (Smith 1995, p. 31-2). This view, which 
equates nations and ethnies as being synonymous and part of the natural order of the 
processes of nationalism, is reminiscent of `a naturalistic attribute of humanity' (Ibid), 
and synonymous with Gellner's theory of the co-terminus existence of nation and state 
boundaries, an ideal which any attempt towards its attainment constitutes an expression 
of nationalism (Gellner 1983, p. 1). Inherent in primordialism, of course, is the concept 
of `ethnic origins of nations', which is based on the position that modem nations have 
ethnic foundations or roots, usually a combination of predominant, pre-existing, core 
ethnie and other minor ethnic groups (Smith 1986a, pp. 13-8). Another view of 
primordialism - the historical evolution of tribal communities, despite its depiction of 
the geographical and political displacement of some of these communities, at least also 
supports their organicity. The socio-biologist version of primordialism as postulated by 
Badcock (Smith 1995, p. 32), additionally portrays ethnicity as being enhanced by 
genetic evolution, nepotism, kin-grouping, etc. However, this view seems to be 
mechanistic, in that it fails to explain broader, non-biological manifestations of cultural 
similarity and assimilation, and even biological assimilation. It is important to highlight 
the difference between primordialism and perennialism at this juncture. The former (in 
all of its forms), although lays emphasis on the avoidance of time specificity on any 
manifestations of nationalism, has its emphasis embedded in nature, that is to say, that 
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forms of primordialism constitute the "`givens" of human existence' (Smith 1991, p. 
20). Thus "organic" ethncity (Ibid; Ibid 1995, pp. 31-2), has a strong place in 
primordialism. Perennialism on the other hand, also avoids any time specifity in 
categorising nationalisms and agrees to the inception of nationalism from antiquity, but 
does not emphasise the organicity or naturalisation of events. This connotes the view 
that there can be some instrumentalism in perennialism, and implies that not all forms 
of pre-"modem" nationalisms were organically or ethnonationalistically-inspired, that 
is, organised by an organic tribal or national identity group. The French Revolution, 
was basically economically-inspired although it was staged by a largely homogeneous 
national group. Situational ethnicities therefore have a place in perennialism since they 
cannot be consigned only to the period after the modernist threshold. 
1.3.4 Instrumentalism 
Definitely, the most potent argument against primordialism is instrumentalism (and 
especially the manifestations of "situational ethnicity"). The instrumentalist approach: 
is one that regards human beings as having always lived and worked in a wide 
range of groups. As a result, people have a variety of collective identities, from 
the family and gender to class, religious and ethnic affiliations. Human beings are 
continually moving in and out of these collective identities. They choose, and 
construct, their identities according to the situations in which they find 
themselves. Hence, for instrumentalists, identity tends to be "situational" rather 
than pervasive, and must be analysed as a property of individuals rather than of 
collectivities (Smith 1995, p. 30). 
The instrumentalist argument therefore holds the view that, ethnic identities are neither 
static nor fixed, and that owing to several factors, which could be socio-marital, 
political, economic, religious, and supported by contexts such as trade, urbanisation 
and employment or even conquest, human beings tend to assume a variety of collective 
35 
36 
identities which are "situational" rather than pervasive. [Note that this is not the same 
as the historical evolution of core or organic tribes]. Such collective, non-tribal 
identities are sometimes termed as secondary ethnicities, as due to their "non-primary" 
nature and with regard to their inorganic, non-tribal reasons for formation. They seem 
to assume and occur over and above the primary organic identity of people, that is, the 
tribal identity. As echoed by Morrison, `dynamics and ecology operate such that 
ethnicity is always changing albeit around a base' and that `ethnicity is the result of the 
complex series of changes in contemporary life which affect individuals on a daily 
basis. Several identities or a mix of identities can be seen among members of an 
assumed homogenous group' (Morrison 1982, p. 90). Therefore, some kind of 
secondary ethnicity can be manifested, as tribal identity is influenced by several factors 
such as urbanisation, education, socio-economic status, ideology or religion, etc. As 
already demonstrated, the phrase "secondary ethnicity" or the term "secondary" has not 
been devised by mere inference. E. K. Francis, one of the sources of its academic 
usage, claims that `primary ethnic groups were transformed into secondary ethnic 
groups because of endogenous changes, such as modernisation, shifts in the balance of 
political power, transculturation, or loss of leadership' (Francis 1976, p. 209). He 
further concludes that `economic factors are of paramount importance in secondary 
ethnic-group formation, whilst in primary ethnic group formation political factors take 
precedence' (Ibid, p. 210). 
However, these pseudo, quasi, ephemeral and secondary ethnic identities, and their 
supporting instrumentalist theories seem to overlook the feelings and sentiments that 
are associated with tribal roots, and the organicity of naturalistic groupings. They fail to 
explain an aspect of situational ethnicity, itself based on the organic sentiments of 
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primary tribal groups, which could be of irrational and explosive potential even in a 
modernising and increasingly interdependent world, where people sacrifice their lives 
for their tribal or national fatherland or motherland (Smith 1995, p. 39), in civil or 
military wars, or even in suicide bombings. This explosive and sensitive aspect of 
situational ethnicity can also be found in `the variety of ways in which ethnic members 
respond in a larger community to policies or actions, which have a bearing on the 
ethnic members' (Morrison 1982, p. 139). For example, the foundation of the Ashanti- 
based National Liberation Movement (NLM), which emerged from the Ashanti Region 
of Ghana, results from the fact that the colonial government of the Gold Coast had 
refused to respond positively to demands for an increase in the producer price of cocoa 
beans. Owing to the fact that most of the cash crop was being produced from the 
Ashanti Region, and those proceeds contributed largely towards the national exchequer, 
the Ashantis saw themselves as financing the rest of the country on their cheap labour 
and toil. A simple economic demand for more money had been tribalistically-inspired, 
and had actually led to the formation of what is currently the strongest political party in 
Ghana - the New Patriotic Party (NPP) -a more or less Ashanti-led and -dominated 
party (see section 2.11 and the Glossary of political parties in Appendix II). As duly 
summarised by Morrison, `whenever a group perceives discrimination, whether or not 
based on ethnic phenomena, the group will reassert its ethnic base and thwart national 
integration' (Ibid, p. 186). Thus, it is clear that an aspect of instrumentalism, i. e., 
"situational" ethnicity, is not always inorganic. This supports Smith's view, that the 
instrumentalist argument/approach (or instrumentalism) `fails to explain why people 
should choose ethnicity or nationalism as their vehicle of advancement rather than class 
or religion' (Smith 1995, p. 39). Instrumentalism seems to concentrate on the dynamics 
of the elite or the intelligentsia's manipulation of the masses instead of the very 
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dynamics of mass mobilisations. It seems to be more of a tree-top method of analysis as 
against grass-root (Ibid, p. 40). It also seems to take attention away from the popular 
power of nationalism - (the tribal base) - in order to ascribe it to superficial and super- 
imposing influences. Essentially, it is the people that make a nation. Leadership and 
any extraneous conditions of context only shape the politics. Thus, Smith refers to the 
modernist doctrine of nationalism, and also instrumentalism, as the `myth of the 
modern nation' (Ibid). It would appear therefore, that despite the role of elite leadership 
in "nationalist" movements, their instrumentalist agenda does not seem to be that well- 
meaning or sincere enough with regard to actual nation-formation, although their 
agenda would at least lead towards state-formation. In this case it would also appear 
that the motives of elite leadership may seem not to be "doctrinally" pure, - (that is, in 
terms of the 18 `h century doctrine of nationalism), and that their actions may not always 
match up with the doctrine of nationalism. 
Smith highlights this in an explanation of the doctrine that: 
nationalism holds that power emanates from only a "people" who form a 
seamless whole, an indivisible brotherhood which abolishes all existing ties, 
whether of family, neighbourhood or occupation. The only genuine identity is a 
national one, and every man, be peasant or worker, merchant or intellectual, can 
only rediscover self and freedom through that new collective identity. By 
sloughing off lethargy, passivity, ignorance, routine, tradition, and the burdens of 
rural backwardness, and by joining the nationalist movement, subjects become 
free citizens, and social divisions will be swept away through the unity created by 
a common struggle and purpose (Smith ed. 1976, p. 7). 
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Elie Kedourie also reiterates the seemingly usurping role of elites and intelligentsia. He 
states that: 
... nations 
by definition, are composed of citizens who are at one with each 
other, among whom there is neither conqueror nor conquered, neither ruler nor 
subject, but are all animated by one general will, willing the good of the nation, 
which is also that of the individual. Historic boundaries present yet other 
difficulties, for they may not have been the same at different periods in history.. . 
(Kedourie 1966, p. 120). 
These last two statements by Kedourie and Smith corroborates one of the main items 
on the checklist for nationhood, that is, that there must be some cohesion between the 
masses and the aristocracy, and that the state needs to break free from its aristocratic 
and priestly bases just as happened with the French Revolution (Smith 1991, p. 46). 
1.3.5 More pre-"threshold" flaws of the modernist argument 
The modernist argument is still flawed, in that, as echoed by Seton-Watson (1977, p. 5) 
there were several nations in existence before the modernist threshold, for example, the 
Fanti and Ashanti of Ghana (Beecham 1968; Giddens 1985; Hayford 1903; Meyerowitz 
1952 & 1958; Wilks 1971). Therefore another main issue that needs to be dealt with is 
the argument of lack of "evidence" - (or processes of nation-formation similar to the 
English and French examples) - within certain polities of the world. This "evidence" is 
more explained by Smith when he states that `ideas and doctrines such as the cultural 
determination of politics, auto-emancipation, the primacy of the nation and popular 
sovereignty, had to wait until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for more than 
fleeting expression as did their translation into nationalist activities and movements' 
(Smith 1991, p. 51). Smith further states that in most colonies `both cultural and 
political identities were lacking. Any identity or solidarity that a colonial population 
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possessed was initially the product of the incorporation and changes brought by the 
colonial power' (Ibid, p. 106). But it is important to note that nation-building and 
nationalism around the world goes much further beyond the modernist threshold and 
European examples. The Ashanti in Ghana were known to have been in existence as a 
powerful nation-state long before 1699 when trouble began to brew between them and 
the Dutch over the procurement of slaves (Yarak 1990, p. 96), obviously over a century 
before the 18 `h century threshold. Smith's criteria of "evidence" had already manifested 
in several places before the threshold. In addition, some of the pre-requisites stated in 
the doctrine of nationalism, for example a public education system, do not constitute a 
necessary precondition for the occurrence of nationalism. In certain societies the public 
education system was embedded in their social system of livelihood and not as 
bureaucratically organised as the Western European examples Smith would like to refer 
to. If a mass public education system and institutions of higher learning are to 
constitute a criteria for the occurrence of nationalism, then politics in Timbuktu, a city 
known to have founded some of the world's first universities and finest academic 
centres, should be classified as highly nationalistic. It is also interesting to note that 
Smith's definition of a nation is devoid of one of the crucial determining factors of 
nationhood, that is, language (Ibid, p. 14). Other definitions, (for example that given by 
Stalin when he dealt with the National Question in his document at the end of 1949), 
says that `a nation must have four characteristics: a common language, a common 
territory, a common economic life and a common-mental make-up. No group which did 
not possess all four was entitled to be considered a nation' (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 4). 
In the case of England, language played a major role in the formation of national 
consciousness and nation-creation over the centuries. In 1362, the English Parliament 
replaced the French language with English on the basis that the former was partially 
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incomprehensible to the people of the land (Kohn 1940, p. 69). The English language 
had itself only emerged in the 14 "' century as a fusion of Saxon and French (Seton- 
Watson 1965, p. 5). Therefore, it would appear that Smith's definition is inadequate. 
1.3.6 Evidence of "ideology" of leadership 
Smith also concedes for the perennialist argument by saying that `it is true that 
nationalism, the ideology and the movement, is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating 
from the late eighteenth century, but it is also possible to trace the growth of national 
sentiments which transcend ethnic ties back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, if 
not earlier, in several states of Western Europe' (Smith 1995, p. 38). Having jumped 
another major hurdle, it is clear that, national sentiments are perennial (at least if not 
always primordial), but the ideology is what scholars postulate as modernist. A huge 
question them looms: was there no "doctrine" or "ideology" of nationalism in existence 
before the 16th/18`h century threshold?. The following statement made by Smith seems 
to highlight the necessity for this question. He claims that: 
modem nations are legitimated through a universally applicable ideology, 
nationalism. As an ideology, nationalism holds that the world is divided into 
nations, each of which has its own character and destiny; that an individual's first 
loyalty is to his or her nation; that the nation is the source of all political power; 
that to be free and fulfilled, the individual must belong to a nation; that each 
nation must express its authentic nature by being autonomous; and that a world of 
peace and justice can only be built on autonomous nations. This `core doctrine' of 
nationalist ideology emerged only in the eighteenth century, first in Europe and 
then elsewhere, although some of its components were foreshadowed in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was unknown before 1500 in Europe or 
elsewhere, and therefore anything resembling the modem mass nation 
(underpinned by nationalism) was likely to be fortuitous as well as rare. Modern 
nations implicitly subscribe to this nationalist ideology, and frequently evoke 
elements of it to underpin various claims and practices (Ibid, p. 55). 
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Hans Kohn, in listing the fundamental conditions for the growth of modern nationhood, 
highlights among other things, the evidence that the nationalist leaders had some sort of 
"ideology" or "doctrine" that they followed as a guideline in the processes of 
nationalism leading to the emergence of the polity as a nation. He said that the doctrinal 
text could be some standard doctrine or some sort of laid down principles recognised 
by the society or the leadership. Citing the Bible and poems as examples of such 
standard "ideology" or "doctrine", he claims that the nationalist movement which led to 
the emergence of England as a nation took shape in the Puritan Revolution led by 
Milton the poet and Cromwell the statesman and priest. He therefore claims that the 
English used the Old Testament as the guiding principle/document/doctrine/ideology in 
pursuing liberty of citizens from the State and the Church (Kohn 1940, pp. 79-94; 
Smith ed. 1976, p. 3). Although the premise for this development (England being 
God's chosen nation) is highly debatable, the birth of English nationalism in a religious 
matrix in the 16th century, nevertheless led to the development and adoption of a 
biblically-based doctrine in the 17th century, and which subsequently led to the 
emergence of England as a nation in the 18th century. The birth and preparation in the 
16`h century was done under the Tudor Monarchs, and as a progression, this bore fruit 
in the 17d' century with the emergence of the new classes, as a result of the "non- 
exclusive" opportunities in the expansion of trade and the accumulation of wealth in 
the pursuit of capitalism. This seems to explain why Kohn adopts the modernist view 
that `nationalism is unthinkable before the emergence of the modem state in the period 
from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century' (Kohn 1946, p. 4). What Kohn 
seems to have blatantly ignored is the fact that in centuries past, in antiquity, the Bible 
has been used by several peoples as a standard doctrine of guidance, the most glaring 
example being the Biblical Jews. As already stated, the Zealots of the 1st century AD in 
42 
43 
Judea sought for an independent Jewish nation devoid of Roman domination but with a 
Jewish political Messiah as the ruler of Jews (Smith 1991, p. 49). It must also be said 
that not all religions are based in a Biblical matrix, and since all religions seem to have 
a set doctrine, it would appear that every society that experienced nationalsim and were 
religious at the same time, had an ideology, so long as the nationalist leadership sought 
guidance from within the religious matrix of the said society. This fact is supported by 
Beecham, who made this very important observation about tribes in the Gold Coast or 
Modern Ghana, that `among the causes which contribute to the formation of national 
character, a principal place is to be assigned to religion. Religion is indeed the mould of 
character, and never fails to give a peculiar expression to those distinguishing features 
of a people, which other causes may have originated ... ' 
(Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1). 
Two very significant examples in Ghana can be cited. First, the Fanti in Ghana are 
known to have had an ideology strictly adhered to by their leaders in their nation- 
building, military and other nationalistic efforts. This ideology was based in their 
religion. According to Casely Hayford, the Fantis had a destiny which they consciously 
worked towards its attainment (Hayford 1903, p. 80), and Beecham reiterates how 
religious guidelines were appropriated for military purposes, in that, `the measures 
prescribed to ensure success in war afford a striking proof of the direful influence 
exerted by the national superstitions ... ' (Beecham 1968, p. 206). The emergence of 
the Fanti as a nation took place sometime before the 17 `h century, and their religious 
matrix dates as far back as the 13`h century, long before the 18`h century modernist 
threshold of the doctrine of nationalism (Meyerowitz 1952). Likewise, the Ashanti 
religious doctrine dates as far back as the same period with the Fantis (since both 
nations are of common ancestry), but the Ashanti emerged as a nation in 1701 (Ibid). 
According to Beecham, throughout the history of the Ashanti, there was a closely and 
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conscientiously followed agenda to pursue and fulfil `national customs which have 
been handed down to the people from remote antiquity' (Beecham 1968, p. 91). It is 
therefore clear that there were ideologies and doctrines (not all of which had a religious 
basis) in existence long before 1500 as stated in Smith (1995, p. 55). This therefore 
locates another major flaw in the modernist school of nationalism which postulates that 
nationalism (whether as a doctrine or occurrence) began with either the 16 `h or 18 `x' 
century. 
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1.4 PRE-"THRESHOLD" MODEL NATIONS- 
It would be an important exercise to cross-check with the checklists at the beginning of 
this chapter, whether certain pre-18`h century nationalisms actually led to nation- 
formation, and whether there were nations before the 18`x' century threshold. The Fanti 
and Ashanti of Ghana will be used in this case. 
1.4.1 The Fanti nation 
As an introduction, it is important to state that Anthony Giddens recognises the 
nationalistic endeavours of the Fanti in creating their own state without European 
influence (Giddens 1985, p. 273). However, Giddens fails to indicate: (a) that this 
occurred before the eighteenth century modernist threshold, and; (b) that the Fanti 
assumed nationhood before the threshold, as the following narrative would reveal. A 
close examination of the Fanti and Ashanti of Ghana in the light of the already 
discussed checklists for tribe and nation, would reveal that, not only were they nations 
before the eighteenth century, but also experienced nationalisms before this threshold. 
The Fanti have undergone much evolution over the years. The current Fanti nation in 
modem Ghana, include some Eguafo, Djomo, Efutu, Djabi, Etsi, Agona and the 
original Fanti. They all have a common ancestry and belong to the Fanti sub-linguistic 
grouping of the Akan identity. The Central Region of Ghana is geographically a stand- 
alone Fanti territory although there are a number of en bloc Fanti residential enclaves in 
the bordering Western Region. A fuller discussion of the origins of the Fanti is done in 
section 2.7 of the thesis. However, a brief anthropological history of the Fanti reveals 
that the original Fanti are a group of Guan originating from the Djomo ruling class in 
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Timbuktu who moved southwards to join the Bono and eventually settled with them as 
sanctioned during the reigns of King Asaman -1295 to 1325 and King Ekumfi Ameyaw 
I -1328 to 1363 (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 81; 1958, p. 8). The Bono, who formed the first 
Akan state in modern Ghana, originate from the `Great White Desert' or Sahara. Their 
capital, Bono-Mansu was founded in 1295 and destroyed by the Ashanti in 1742 
(Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 29-33). The geographical site of the Bono state was located in 
current Northern Ghana, however, in the early years of its founding, the Eguafo, Afutu 
and some of the original Fanti deserted King Asaman in 1300 and moved southwards 
towards the coast. This resulted in the founding of the Efutu state by the Eguafo and 
Efutu in the fourteenth century under the leadership of the two brothers Bonde and 
Gyan. Kwaman was also founded around the shore-located Saltpond by the Fanti 
(Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 77 & 130). Kwaman became the capital of the Abuka Fanti 
state. A split from the Efutu led by Edwe and Etumpan resulted in the founding of 
Ogua (Cape Coast), which has become the overall capital city of the Fanti nation and 
the Central Region of Modem Ghana. Some citizens from Ogua left to found Dwemma 
near Mumford on the coast, and finally the Tumpa or Simpa state, which is now called 
Winneba (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-5). Ephirim-Donkor argues that Bonde and Gyan 
were not brothers, and also that Edwe and Etumpan were one and the same person 
(Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 23-4). However these arguments neither discount 
traceability of the Fanti from Guan ancestry nor that of the Efutu to current Winneba. 
Some time at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Adminadze Fanti and some 
Djomo from Bono territory moved southwards to join the Etsi Fanti, resulting in the 
founding of the Mankessim state. Thus, the merging of the aforementioned constituent 
states and cities resulted in the emergence of the overall Fanti nation by the beginning 
of the seventeenth century, although the exact date is not fixed. Subsequent migrations 
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added to their number. For example, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the 
Djomo and some of the original Fanti who had previously settled with the Bono, 
moved southwards to join their relatives who had made the first move in 1300. Some 
Djomos and Fantis also delayed their move until 1740 (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 81-2). 
Much later, in 1870-1, an amended Fanti National Constitution was to become the 
Fanti nation's response to the political situation arising from the policies of the British 
colonialists who had come to settle. The amendments, which were made to protect the 
political and territorial interests of the Fanti nation in the colonial era, occurred several 
decades after the emergence of the Fanti states into nationhood. Prior to the amended 
constitution, the Fanti nation lived together in divisions of several states within the 
same territory, each with a chief and capital. Together, all these states were governed 
by a Paramountcy. The King or Paramount Chief had jurisdiction over all the Fanti 
states within the federated Fanti territory. The amendments to the existing constitution 
changed the polity into a Fanti Confederation of States or Fanti Confederacy, thus 
dealing with certain political, economic and social provisions which the Fanti 
bargained for under the new colonial arrangements (Hayford 1903, pp. 327-44). Prior 
to, and after the emergence of the Ashanti nation in 1701, the Fantis traded with the 
Ashanti, other neighbouring political entities, and the Europeans on the coast, and 
controlled most of the trade between the Europeans and the interior. Trade items 
included gold, ivory, gun powder, clothing, alcohol, salt and pepper. Citizens of the 
Fanti nation felt that they belonged. In addition to a common language, the same 
citizenship rights and customs were shared by all the Fanti states. Subsequent 
migrations of the remainder of the Fanti tribes from Northern Ghana to the coast during 
the seventeenth century further increased the sense of history of the Fanti folk and 
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enriched their myths of ancestry and origin. There was some sort of cohesion between 
the masses and aristocracy. Apart from kingship dynasties, public office was not 
restricted to any particular class. The Gold Coast "Emancipation Ordinance" of 1874 
(which reflected the rights of the aborigines before colonialism) states that anyone who 
could trace their ancestry to the Fanti nation was: 
eligible for any important office in the body politic, and he can always hold up his 
head among his fellows, however poor his condition. So dearly does the freeman 
prize his condition that, if by an act of folly on your part you call him a slave, he 
will bring you before a native tribunal, prove that he is a slave, and get you 
mulcted in heavy damages. The freemen formed the bulk of the people (Hayford 
1903, p. 82). 
The public education system was embedded in their social system of livelihood and not 
bureaucratically organised. This is explained by the intermittent migrations and 
constant warfare, which did not give room for long-term establishment of educational 
institutions. Timbuktu, their base of origin is well known for elaborate and formally 
organised educational systems as well as the home for some of the world's most 
famous university systems prior to the Islamic onslaught which caused the Fanti to 
migrate. 
The torchbearers of Fanti nationalism followed an ideology embedded in their religious 
system in which was enshrined the vision and destiny of the Fanti nation, guidelines for 
military action and the constitution (Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1; Hayford 1903, pp. 327- 
44). Hans Kohn, in listing the fundamental conditions for modern nationhood, 
highlights among other things, the evidence that the nationalist leaders had some sort of 
ideology or doctrine which they followed as a guideline in the processes of nationalism 
leading to the emergence of a people as a nation. Kohn claims the doctrinal text could 
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constitute standard doctrine or laid down principles of the society or its leadership. 
Citing the Bible and poems as examples of such standard doctrine, he explains that the 
nationalist movement which led to the emergence of England as a nation took shape in 
the Puritan Revolution led by Milton the poet and Cromwell the statesman and priest. 
Consequently, the English used the Old Testament as the doctrinal basis in pursuing the 
liberty of citizens from State and Church (Kohn 1940, pp. 79-94; Smith ed. 1976, p. 3). 
Although the premise for this development (England as God's chosen nation) is highly 
debatable, the birth of English nationalism in a religious matrix in the sixteenth century 
nevertheless led to the development and adoption of a biblically-based doctrine in the 
seventeenth century which subsequently led to the emergence of England as a nation in 
the eighteenth century. The birth or preparation in the sixteenth century which occurred 
under the Tudor Monarchs, progressed and bore fruit in the seventeenth century with 
the emergence of the new classes as a result of the non-exclusive opportunities in the 
expansion of trade and the accumulation of wealth in the pursuit of capitalism. Not all 
religions are based in a biblical matrix, and since all religions have a set doctrine, it 
would appear that every society which experienced nationalism and was religious at the 
same time, had an ideology so long as the nationalist leadership sought guidance from 
their religious doctrine. This view is supported by Beecham who made a similar 
observation about certain polities in Ghana (especially the Fanti and Ashanti) that 
`among the causes, which contribute to the formation of national character, a principal 
place is to be assigned to religion. Religion is indeed the mould of character and never 
fails to give a peculiar expression to those distinguishing features of a people, which 
other causes may have originated' (Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1). According to Casely 
Hayford, the Fantis had a destiny which they consciously worked towards attaining 
(Hayford 1903, p. 80). Beecham further reiterates how religious guidelines were 
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appropriated for military purposes, in that `the measures prescribed to ensure success in 
war afford a striking proof of the direful influence exerted by the national superstitions' 
(Beecham 1968, p. 206). The emergence of the Fanti nation took place at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century and their religious matrix dates as far back as the thirteenth 
century (Meyerowitz 1952), long before the eighteenth century modernist threshold of 
the doctrine of nationalism. This confirms Smith's view that there were ideologies and 
doctrines of nationalism in existence long before 1500 (Smith 1995, p. 55). As itemised 
therefore, the Fanti had satisfied the checklist for nationhood before the modernist 
threshold - before the goal posts were set. 
1.4.2 The Ashanti nation 
When the inhabitants of the area around the Niger Bend, roughly between Djenne and 
Timbuktu were routed and forced out by Islamized Saharan Berbers at the beginning of 
the eleventh century1° some of the refugees of the Dia (Dja), Libyan Berber and Gara 
tribes who fled from the Niger region managed to colonise aboriginals to the north- 
west and west of modem Ghana (the area in current La Cote d'Ivoire) and founded 
states including the Bona and Kimbu Kingdoms. After suffering defeat, these kingdoms 
10 Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion give the zenith period of Ancient Ghana as the eleventh century, the 
same century in which it was over-run by Islamic invaders. Although the Islamic campaigns begin with 
the eleventh century (Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17), it was not until `the middle of the eleventh century', and 
precisely 1076, that the final conquest by the Arabic Almoravids occurred (Levtzion 1971, p. 127). The 
mid-eleventh century is also seen as the zenith and crucial period of Islamic campaign in the Western 
Sudan. Levtzion explains that Ghana of the mid-eleventh century `offered the example of resistance to 
Islam' (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion claim to have obtained their information 
from the same source - the Sudanese Tarikhs or Tarikh-es-Sudan (Levtzion 1971, p. 122; Meyerowitz 
1952, p. 51). Also, al Sa'di (one of Levtzion's Islamic oral sources) was a native of Timbuktu (Levtzion 
1971, p. 140). Levtzion maintains that a king of Ghana resisted Islamic conversion and stuck to his 
ancestral religion (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Meyerowitz also submits that a large number of the people of 
Ghana (including some of the kings) migrated southwards in order to avoid compulsory Islamic 
`conversion' (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51). 
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subsequently moved further south into the tropical rain forest of modem Ghana 
resulting in the founding of the Akyerekyere and Twifo-Heman kingdoms in AD 1500, 
the Akwamu kingdom around 1575 and Dormaa around 1600. Refugees from the Bona 
kingdom moved eastwards and northwards and settled in the Bono Kingdom, and their 
descendants subsequently founded the Ashanti kingdom in 1701 in the heart of the 
tropical forest. The akyeneboa or totem animal of the Ayoko clan of Dia descent was, 
and still remains the falcon (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 106; 1958, pp. 19-20). The kingdom 
became a large confederation of states as a result of conquests and annexations. For 
example, Kokofu, Nsuta, Juabin and Aduman states, which later became part of the 
Ashanti confederacy, were founded before 1600. Later on, Mampong, Adansi and 
Bekwai also became part of the confederacy. Ivor Wilks confirms the Meyerowitz 
account of the emergence of Ashanti as a nation in 1701, the date by which a number of 
tribes including the Denkyira had been conquered and their allegiance automatically 
transferred to King Osei Tutu (Wilks 1971, p. 370). Wilks maintains that by 1680, the 
national identity of the Ashanti kingdom had emerged (Wilks 1971, p. 373) however, 
given that there existed surrounding tribes who were competing with Ashanti for 
supremacy in the area, and especially that the war between Ashanti and Adansi in 1680 
ended in a stalemate (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 109), it is understandable why the 
emergence of the Ashanti as a nation is fixed not at 1680, but at 1701, the year of 
overall conquest and subjugation of all surrounding enemy tribes by the Ashanti. The 
battle of Feyiase in 1701 in which the Denkyira were defeated is noted in history as the 
deciding factor. In addition to the conquest of the last opponent, this made way for the 
Ashanti to have access to the Gold Coast. Even the Dutch settlers sent an ambassador 
to King Osei Tutu of Ashanti in 1701 from their headquarters in coastal Elmina (Wilks 
1971, p. 373). 
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Unlike the Fanti, the Ashanti nation had a much larger empire and territory as a result 
of the many successful conquests, and rightly so, a larger centralised government. 
Beecham claims that it was a kingdom of power, majesty and large geographical extent. 
Regarding the greatness of the Ashanti nation, Beecham states: 
the empire of Ashantee is not so much one State placed immediately under one 
government, as an assemblage of States owing a kind of feudal obedience to the 
sovereign of Ashantee. According to Dupuis, the empire extends westward from 
the River Volta about four geographical degrees, and reckoning from the 
neighbourhood of the coast, four degrees of latitude; comprising an area of about 
sixty thousand miles. Over the whole of the countries within these limits, the 
King of Ashantee, he says, exercises supreme sway; all kings, viceroys, or 
caboceers, being his absolute and unconditional vassals, as tributaries or not; and 
most of them holding their governments by virtue of an appointment from the 
court (Beecham 1968, pp. 85-6). 
The empire was also known for its great military might. According to Beecham, 
`Bowdich calculates that Ashantee proper can alone send two hundred and four 
thousand soldiers into the field; and its disposable force, since the Ashantee invasions, 
has been estimated by old residents at upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand' 
(Beecham 1968, p. 108). The Ashanti had a very elaborate and vibrant economic life. 
In addition to Kumasi being a trade centre, their trade links (unlike the Fanti who 
controlled the coastal trade) stretched much further north and inland, even as far as 
Tripoli in North Africa (Beecham 1968, pp. 144-60). There was cohesion between the 
masses and aristocracy as well as checks and balances on the king. It is stated that `the 
king was not an absolute ruler but was controlled to a certain extent by a council 
comprising the queen mother, chiefs of the most important provinces, and the general 
of the army' (Ajayi & Crowder 1976, p. 25). Thus, despite the pomp and majesty 
surrounding the throne, the political system of kingship ensured that the king had 
severe limitations. 
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According to Beecham: 
the king of Ashantee, (As-hanti, ) although represented as a despotic monarch, 
having the lives and property of his subjects at his absolute disposal, is not, in all 
respects, beyond control. He is placed in a situation somewhat similar to the 
ancient Medes and Persians; among whom it was a principle, that what had once 
passed into law, the power of the sovereign himself could not change ... Now, 
the king of Ashantee is under a somewhat similar obligation to observe the 
national customs which have been handed down to the people from remote 
antiquity; and a practical disregard of this obligation, in the attempt to change 
some of the customs of their forefathers, cost Osai Quamina his throne (Beecham 
1968, pp. 90-1). 
Throughout Ashanti history, there has been a conscientiously followed agenda to 
pursue and fulfil `national customs which have been handed down to the people from 
remote antiquity' (Ibid). An ideology with origins from remote antiquity was followed 
by the Kings of Ashanti as a guide for rulership and leadership (Ibid). A public 
education system was also in place largely through oral tradition (Ibid, p. 167). 
Therefore, judging from the checklist, the Ashanti were also not only a nation, but 
existed as long as almost a century before France and England emerged as nations. The 
modernist argument of the 18th century threshold is therefore flawed, and does not 
apply, at least to the Fanti and Ashanti nations of pre-modern and Modern Ghana. 
Thus, empirical evidence from Fanti and Ashanti history clearly indicate that nations 
and nationalisms had occurred in parts of the world other than Europe, and in countries 
other than England, France or Spain. 
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1.5 SECESSIONISM/SEPARATISM, IRREDENTISM AND INTER- 
"NATION"-ALISM 
Secession and irredentism are two forms of nationalism revolving around the popular 
principle of national self-determination which `was advanced as the new principle of 
international legitimacy after 1918' (Mayall 1990, p. 50). The doctrine of irredentism is 
derived from the Italian phrase terra irredenta, meaning "territory to be redeemed". An 
essential presupposition of the doctrine is that there must be a redeeming state as well 
as a known or targeted territory to be redeemed (Neurberger 1991, p. 97; Chazan ed. 
1991, p. 97). The term irredenta was first used to refer to those Italian-speaking 
territories, specifically Trente, Dalmatia, Trieste and Fiume, which were culturally 
Italian but had remained under Austrian and Swiss rule after Italian unification during 
the nineteenth century. The Italian movement to annex these Italian-speaking areas 
became known as an irredentist movement. Subsequently, the current political usage of 
irredentism refers to any territorial claim or political effort made by a sovereign state to 
annex or incorporate geographical territory within another state, the occupants of which 
the irredentist state claims to have commonality of background or purpose with, on the 
basis of past shared ethnicity or history. The irredentist aim is for geographical, ethnic 
and historical union with the related population segments in adjacent countries within a 
common political framework as proposed or presented by the irredentist state (Chazan 
ed. 1991, p. 1; Mayall 1990, p. 57). In all irredentist claims, the elements within the 
combination of sheer territoriality and genuine ethnic or national sentiments vary from 
case to case. The Argentinian claim on the Falkands is deemed as irredentist snce the 
Falkland islands or Malvinas do not contain an Argentinian population (Chazan ed. 
1991, p. 3; Mayall 1990, p. 57). Mayall argues that, irredentist claims not supported by 
strong secessionist movements are likely to face defeat if the case is submitted to 
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international legal arbitration because there is no existing authoritative judicial ruling 
from either the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the United Nations to follow. The 
consistent refusal by Britain on one hand, and Argentina and Spain on the other, to 
submit the case of the Falklands/Malvinas to the ICJ's arbitration strongly suggests that 
both sides are not sure of what the outcome of the judicial ruling will be (Mayall 1990, 
p. 62). 
Two distinguishing types of irredentism are: (a) `the attempt to detach land and people 
from one state in order to incorporate them in another, as in the case of Somalia's 
recurrent irredenta against Ethiopia, and; (b) the attempt to detach land and people 
divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them in a single new state - 
a "Kurdistan", for example, composed of Kurds now living in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and 
Turkey. Both forms of reconstituted boundaries would qualify as irredentist' (Chazan 
ed. 1991, p. 10; Howoritz 1991, p. 10). Irredentism of the first type can be found in 
such historical examples as: 
the Greeks in Albania and Turkey, the Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland, 
and the Croats in Austria and Yugoslavia. Contemporary cases abound: the 
Somalis in Ethiopia, the Muslims in Kashmir, the Swazis in the Republic of 
South Africa, or the Ewe in Ghana. It does not, however, refer to the efforts to 
reunite the two Germanies, Chinas, or Koreas, where political differences 
separate groups that view themselves as culturally or historically cohesive 
(Chazan ed. 1991, p. 2). 
Irredentism of the second type includes such examples as: 
the Slovenians in Austria and Yugoslavia; the Macedonians in Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia and Greece; the Pushtans in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Armenians 
in the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran; the Tajiks and Uzbeks in the Soviet Union 
and Afghanistan; the Azerbayjanis in the Soviet Union and Iran; and the Kurds in 
Turkey, Iran and Iraq. In such cases, the ethnic group may seek union with one of 
the countries, or it may call for independent statehood (and, indeed, the group is 
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frequently divided internally precisely on this question). A variant of this second 
type may be a situation in which components of multiethnic states have irredentist 
claims aimed at creating entirely new nation-states. The Kurdish demand for 
statehood falls directly into this category, as does the Armenian example. In both 
these instances, however, there is no parent state to press ethnic claims, and hence 
there is uncertainty regarding the classification of these states. Thus, although it is 
clear that not every border dispute is irredentist, the matter of recognition and 
identification of irredenta is not as clear cut as it might appear on the surface 
(Chazan ed. 1991, pp. 2-3). 
Irrespective of any theoretical or practical difficulties in the classification of irredentas, 
a distinction needs to be made between irredentism and secessionism or separatism. 
Whereas irredentism is more or less `a movement by members of an ethnic group in 
one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders' 
(Horrowitz 1991, p. 10; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 10), secession is any attempt by an ethnic 
group with claims to a homeland to withdraw its territory from the jurisdiction of a 
larger state to which it belongs (Ibid, pp. 9-10). An example of a secessionist or 
separatist bid is Biafra versus the Nigerian Federation between 1967 and 1970. Like 
irredentisms, not all secessions or separatisms are successful. Indeed, successful 
secessions are rarer than successful irredentisms, with few examples such as the 
creation of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) from Pakistan in 1971 (Mayall 1990, 
p. 61) and the very latest - that of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999. As Mayall puts 
it, secession also refers to `unsuccessful separatist rebellions against the state. Indeed it 
is frequently used to describe any attempt by a national minority to exercise its right to 
self-determination by breaking away either to join another state or more often to 
establish an independent state of its own, or at least an autonomous region within an 
existing state' (Ibid, p. 61). Secessionist or separatist demands may therefore range 
from autonomy to full independence (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1). It must be noted that the 
success of the latest case has depended very much on the authority and cooperation of 
56 
57 
the United Nations. On August 30 1999, more than 90% of East Timorese voted in a 
UN-organised referendum to choose independence and autonomy from Indonesia since 
the latter forcibly took control of East Timor in 1975 
(http: //www. cnn. com/ASIANOW/southeast/9908/30. etimor. 05/). Among a number of 
reasons, religion seems to be the most distinguishing driving force behind this move 
towards secession. East Timor's population is predominantly Catholic whereas 
Indonesia's is predominantly Muslim 
(http: //www. cnn. com/1999/ASIANOW/southeast/12/17/etimor. world ... /index. htm). 
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1.6 THE AFRICAN CONTEXT OF NATIONALISM 
The Partition of Africa resulted in many ethnonational groups being divided by 
"international" boundaries, for example, `the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin; the Berbers 
in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya; the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi; the Afars in Djibouti 
and Ethiopia; the Khoi-Khoisan in Botswana and Namibia; the Hausa in Nigeria, Niger 
and Ghana; the Akan in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire; the Bakongo in Angola and Zaire; 
and many more' (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 5). The long list of groups which were split up 
among several states continues with `the Somalis, Bakongo, Ewe, Zande, Fulani, 
Ngoni, Chewa, Lunda and Yao' (Neurberger 1991, p. 98; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 98). 
Given the scale of ethnic separation across the African continent, irredentism is 
comparatively low. This is attributable to a general consensus by African governments, 
stipulated through the OAU, to respect the sanctity of the inter-"nation"-al borders 
created at independence. This consensus ideology is framed by the obligation of OAU 
member states to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined 
in Clause III of the OAU Charter (1963), and reinforced by the Cairo Resolution of 
1964 (Neuberger 1991, p. 107; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 107; I. M. Lewis ed. 1983, p. 91). 
But it must also be noted, that this consensus by OAU member states to accept the 
frontiers of the colonial Partition has not resulted in a successful containment of 
potential ethnic-related political problems and violence, as some have spilled over the 
borders of the Partition. The tension between the containment of these ethnic-related 
problems and their potential to spill over the borders of the Partition is, according to 
Basil Davidson, part of the institutional crisis the African continent is currently going 
through (Davidson 1987, p. 5). This underpins Davidson's point, that perhaps efforts 
`to write into the early independence constitutions the notion that the colonial frontiers, 
now reborn as national frontiers, need not be immutable, unchangeable, traced as it 
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were by the hand of God' (Ibid, p. 6), should have been heeded to. Added to the 
incongruity between ethnonational units and state boundaries, is the dilemma 
associated with the imposition of a single statehood on multinational communities, 
both at the theoretical and practical levels. Fred Burke, in stating the practical dilemma 
which the nation-state project posed for Uganda, also mentioned the trickle-down 
effects which the colonial, incongruent, arbitrary, border demarcations had on local 
government as well, in that, `in other areas of Uganda, however, the local government 
unit encompasses a number of small and antagonistic tribal groups' (Burke 1964, p. 1). 
At the thoretical level, Burke reiterated the wrestle against this dilemma in earlier 
scholarship by such academics as Lloyd Fallers, who wrote: 
What, in this situation, is to be the unit of study? What, indeed, is the "real" unit, 
the unit which "matters"? Is it the tribe, because the colonial territory is simply an 
artificial boundary enclosing a congeries of people who feel no mutual loyalty or 
kinship, held together only by the superior force of a European power? Or is it in 
fact the colonial territory, because the tribes are too small and their institutions 
too foreign to the nation-state pattern to have a future ... 
(World Politics, 9 (2), 
1957; Burke 1964, p. vii). 
This dilemma has translated itself into the conflict between ethnonationalism and 
political nationalism, which also holds at both theoretical and practical levels". 
Contrary to popular perception and widespread commentary that the Partition occurred 
among the European colonial powers at the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-5 
(Hargreaves 1974, p. 5), by 1884, many boundaries had already been set. The Berlin 
Conference was more or less convened as an attempt to reach `some measure of agreed 
international control' (Asiwaju and Nugent eds. 1996, p. 21) over what to do with a 
" This is discussed in the introductory chapter. A fuller discussion on the conflict between 
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colony once it had been formally claimed as so. There was a consensus among 
Conference participants that the economic exploitation of colonies would be open to 
participation by all parties regardless of the coloniser, thus ensuring free trade and 
neutrality, especially in the Congo and Niger basins. The Conference itself did not set 
any specific territorial boundaries. In addition, one main participant - Germany - 
proposed the establishment of a `clear criteria for international recognition of territorial 
claims' (Ibid, 21-2). This criteria was never achieved, despite the developing myth that 
effective occupation, was to be a principle on which to validate a territorial claim. As 
set out in Chapter VI of the Conference's Final Act, effective occupation was limited to 
the coasts, which in any case, had already been partitioned before the Conference. 
Although the Berlin Act did not justify the principle of effective occupation 
universally, some participants, particularly Britain, abused the principle to pursue their 
own subsequent interests far removed from the aims of the Conference. The principle 
therefore made room for spurious legality for the exercise of partitioning (Ibid, 22-3), 
springing mainly out of the immediate perceptions of economic, political and strategic 
interests to individual European powers. It is a certainty that the "validating" of 
territory was not based on the internationally approved principles which Germany 
sought to achieve through the Conference, but instead through ad hoc negotiated 
agreements between the European powers, hence the arbitrary boundary divisions and 
groupings plaguing the African continent today (Ibid, p. 31). 
The scenario explained above serves as the reason for the paradox associating African 
boundaries with respect to the incongruence between the boundaries on maps and the 
reality of geopolitical frontiers, as well as the cultural homogeneity which these 
ethnonationalism and political nationalism can be found in section 3.1.1 of the thesis. 
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boundaries have sought to divide (Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 1-17). However, as 
argued by Asiwaju, the phenomenon of artificially segregated national groupings or 
"transborder peoples" is not a feature restricted to Africa, but also common to Europe 
and other parts of the world. Asiwaju argues that empirical data does not support J. R. 
V. Prescott's theory that the evolution of boundaries in Europe and the rest of the 
world, differs as a process, from the African experience. Asiwaju argues, for example, 
that there is no comparative difference, on one hand, in the experiences: 
of the Catalans, an ethnic group, neither French nor Spanish, split into two by the 
Franco-Spanish border drawn through their homeland in the Cerdanya valley of 
the Eastern Pyrenees; and on the other, the Yoruba, also an ethnic group, neither 
English nor French, split into two by the Anglo-French colonial (now 
international) boundary between British Nigeria and French Dahomey (now 
Republic of Benin) drawn through the homelands of specific subgroups in 
Western Yorubaland (Ibid, pp. 255-6). 
However, Asiwaju further argues that the boundaries instituted by the colonial Partition 
are obstructionsist to regional integration, and that there are advantages in Africa 
concentrating on the integrative aspects of the homogeneity of "transborder" peoples as 
against any artificial, divisive and inter-"nation"-al antagonisms and insecurities arising 
out of political boundary restrictions (Ibid, p. 260). 
It would appear that, in the main, antagonisms revolving around colonial boundaries 
exist only between state authorities, and that border populations have little interest in 
the renegotiation of boundaries, due to the advantages they gain from a maintenance of 
the status quo. Boundaries as clearly indicated on maps are not as clear cut in 
geographical reality, and the fact that border zones have not been susceptible to 
rigorous and thorough surveillance has compounded the problem and increased their 
ambiguity, as well as making them havens of opportunity for both legitimate settlers 
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and fugitives. "Transborder" families and ethnic groups choose to live on whichever 
side of a border can be comparatively exploited in terms of tax credits, facilities and 
opportunities for smuggling (Ibid, pp. 268-9). Both Asiwaju and Nugent conclude that, 
as is already clear from African behaviour that borders are permeable, it would be 
functionally advantageous for the continent's boundaries to be recognised more as 
conduits than barriers. The way forward should be seen in the strengthening of regional 
cooperation such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or 
the South African Development Community (SADC), if not an integral union of the 
whole continent (Ibid, pp. 269-71). 
It becomes clear, that whereas there is a broad agreement on what the solution to the 
problem should be, that is, any strategy which will result in: (a) a reinforcement of the 
`underlying unities of Africa, rather than its obvious disunities' (Davidson 1987, p. 6), 
and/or: (b) the integrative aspects of the homogeneity of "transborder" peoples as 
against any artificial, divisive and inter-"nation"-al antagonisms and insecurities arising 
out of political boundary restrictions (Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, p. 260), there 
seems to be different approaches to the goal. Davidson proposes a reorganisation of the 
whole continent into the natural frontiers of the various identity groups as should have 
been done during the colonial period (Davidson 1987, pp. 5-6), and Asiwaju and 
Nugent propose regional economic blocs of integration which obviously ignore ethno- 
cultural identities (Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 269-71). 
Irrespective of any potential for: redrawing boundaries along the lines of natural 
identities; regional economic integration; the advantages which "transborder" 
communities might be reaping from ambiguous loyalties to neighbouring countries; 
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irredentisms of subregional dimensions; the containment of different national groups 
under single statehoods; etc., the Partition has created a phenomenon of political 
competition among ethno-national identity groups, with the aim to control state power 
and resources along sectarian and clientellistic lines. This phenomenon, as briefly 
explained here, is termed as "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55)12. 
Davidson attributes this problem to the European model of nationalism, and its 
associated imposition of a state upon a geographical territory. This has not profited 
Africa, especially where multiple national identities have been subjugated under single 
statehoods with the aim of forging an "all-embracing community" (Davidson 1994, pp. 
259-60). In zeroing in on the Ghanaian example, Nugent states that `the legacy of the 
Gold Coast as a federation of "native states" is very obvious today' (Lentz & Nugent 
eds. 2000, p. 23). The general effect of the phenomenon of "politics of the belly" on 
African politics, and Ghanaian politics in particular, is the tendency for citizens to 
respond by adopting political attitudes and making political choices best suited to their 
calculative ethno-sectarian interests. A full discussion of the impact of this 
phenomenon on Ghanaian politics begins from Chapter 3. In the interim, Chapter 2 
serves as a precursor, by exploring the traditions of origin of the various ethnonational 
groups in Modern Ghana, and relating them to the current identity group perceptions, 
as well as trends in ethnonationalism and political nationalism within the country. 
12 See footnote 2. A fuller definition of "politics of the belly" is given in section 3.1.1 of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
The Traditions Of Origin 
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2.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter seeks to elaborate on the ethnonational configuration of modem and 
multinational Ghana, by tracing the ethno-geographic origins of identity groups to their 
current ethno-geographic locations in all the ten current politico-administrative Regions 
of the country (see maps of Ghana and West Africa in Appendix I). Overall, the chapter 
offers the view that the majority of modern Ghana have migrated from the area 
occupied by the Old Ghana empire which, in the height of its glory spanned the broad 
geographical area of the Western Sudan, a section of the Sahara, and the Djenne and 
Timbuktu regions. By exception, the Ewes and non-Ewe "Togo remnants" (Nugent 
1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178), are not of Guan ancestry, 
and do not share the same traditions of origin with the majority of Modern Ghana. They 
are successfully traced to the geographical territory which spans the four countries of 
Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. A case is made for the Ewe irredentism that has 
existed in the West African sub-region since the Partition. The chapter engages in a 
lively discussion on the historical development of Ewe nationalism and how this relates 
to the current politics of the sub-region, especially Ghanaian politics. The chapter also 
explains the emergence of the identity of "Mabians" or "Northerners" (citizens from 
Northern Ghana), and how this relates to politics in Ghana. 
A broad authorship is utilized in critiquing the chapter. The historical traditions from 
the several authorships largely compliment each other and seem to differ slightly only 
in terms of style and dating, but not substance. It is clear however, that in addition to 
providing the widest coverage on the traditions of origins of most of the country 
(except the Ewes and some CTMs), the works of Meyerowitz are the most detailed and 
comprehensive. The other authors including Vansina, Owusu, Herskovits, Ellis, 
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Levtzion, Wilks, Manoukian, Daaku, Wilson, Nugent, Kwamena-Poh, Gilbert and 
lately Ephirim-Donkor, do seem to have comparatively sketchy and patchy records of 
events, and for only one or two separate identity groups each. In order to present a 
coherent flow of events therefore, Meyerowitz's account is used as the main 
commentary, complimented by the others. In addition, the other accounts from 
complimentary authors have been used as a strong critique against the Meyerowitz 
account. Thus, the critique represents a lively discussion on authorships criticising, 
confirming and complimenting each other, interspersed with the occasional 
disagreement on dates. The critique also discusses oral tradition as a source of 
historical material, and the challenges associated with reliance on oral sources. The 
authorship of Nugent, Amenumey and Law are mainly utilised for the Ewe traditions of 
origin. All three authors share the common strand regarding the origination and 
migratory route of Ewes, that is, from an eastern location -a Yoruba-related area along 
the borders of Nigeria - westwards towards Benin, Togo and Ghana. But Law and 
Nugent disagree on the nitty gritty of the migratory routes and stop-overs. 
This chapter has been necessitated by the simple fact of the relationship between 
ethnonational identities and politics, on one hand, and how this influences the "politics 
of the belly" (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55) in Ghana, and generally Africa, on the other. It 
has therefore become necessary to examine the traditions of origins and their associated 
influence on people's perceptions, (real or imagined), as a means of explaining the 
linkages between these traditions and the identity patterns in current Ghanaian politics. 
It is not so much the veracity or mythicality attached to these traditions of origin, as the 
perceptions and subsequent identity patterns which have developed from them, as well 
as their repercussions on the politics of Ghana. For example, Nugent makes the point, 
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that the suggestion of ancient enmity between Ewes and Ashantis, and any link of it to 
their political differences today is historically false, and rightly so, in that, pre-colonial 
Anlo-Ewes were Ashanti allies (Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8). However, it cannot be 
ignored also, that the current enmity between the two groups, revolves around the issue 
of a minority Ewe with different origination from the majority of Modern Ghana, 
currently sharing a single statehood as a result of the Partition. Whether or not this is of 
remote or immediate import to the post-colonial era and the current politics, is 
immaterial to the perception of enmity resulting from the historical and political 
processes that led to the creation of Modern Ghana. Whereas there was no enmity in 
the historical past between the two groups, enmity has currently assumed as a result of 
their histories. The following quote by Donald Rothchild perfectly encapsulates or 
sums up the link between group perceptions and the "politics of the belly": 
Ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilize and compete 
effectively for state-controlled power, economic resources, positions, contracts, 
awards and constitutional protections. Ethnicity as used in this context, refers to a 
subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties, and 
aspirations; ethnic group suggests organized activities by people who are linked 
by a consciousness of a special identity, who jointly seek to maximise their 
corporate political, economic, and social interests. Ethnicity, or a sense of 
peoplehood, has its foundation in combined remembrances of past experience and 
in common inspirations, values, norms, and expectations. The validity of these 
beliefs is less significant to an overarching sense of affinity than is the people's 
ability to symbolize their closeness to each other. The origins of the people may 
be imaginary, but as political memory interacts with the experiences of the past, 
new socially constructed identities emerge and become the basis of a 
consciousness that in some circumstances can prove very destructive (Rothchild 
1997, p. 4). 
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An idea of how influential myths of origin are to identity perceptions, is further 
reiterated in a publication on Irish nationalism 13, which states: 
History shows that what is believed to be true is often more potent than what is 
actually true. So when we say the origin of tribalism is found in history, we must 
remember that we are dealing with "legend", that is, the interpretation placed by 
the community on its history, its reaction to and rationalisation of past events14 
In a more closely-related example, something of the nature of the heightened tensions 
and mutual ethnonational antagonistic attitudes, resulting from perceptions based on 
the history or myths of origin of ethnonational groups within Modern Ghana, is 
portrayed in a discussion on a Ghanaian e-mail listserv known as Okyeame's. In the 
ensuing discussion16, the current Akan-Ewe animosities are clearly highlighted by the 
Akan-Ewe rival discussants, as one Akan makes a remark which touches on the 
sensitivities of Ewe-speaking peoples in the West African sub-region, and when 
queried about it, follows up with clearer and more emphatic statements about Ewes in 
Ghana not being native Ghanaians because they were incorporated into Ghana from 
Togo by the plebiscite of 195617. 
13 New Ulster Movement. Tribalism or Christianity in Ireland?, NUM, 1973 (Publication No. 9), p. 8. ... _........ ...... . r4 ..... Ibi........ d................................. .... ...... _....... .............. ... ... ....................... . ----------- ............................................................. __....... __......... _..... _............ .............. ..... . _............ . 15 Okyeame is a Ghanaian electronic mail listserv. Discussions can be very heated, and as the listserv is 
unmoderated, the uncensored views of discussants find their way into the public domain, especially on 
the explosive subject of ethnonational identities in relation to politics, as portrayed in the discussions in 
Appendix VII. 
16 Full details of the discussion between the rival Akan and Ewe discussants are available in Appendix 
VII. The Akan-Fanti, whose remarks aroused the anger of Ewes on the listserv is Steve Garbrah, and the 
main Ewe responses to his views are generated from Anthony Mawuli Sallar, C. K. Ladzekpo, Doe 
Ladzekpo, Bensa Nukunya and Andy Kwawukume. Other Akans, for example, Kwadwo Boahene and 
Mark Opoku-Adusei are also discussants. As the discussion covered some aspects of my thesis - 
(traditions of origin, ethnonational identities and perceptions) -I entered the fray to seek some 
clarifications on the relevant contributions being made, as well as contribute. I was debating under my 
cyber nickname "frisky". In the discussion, Doe Ladzekpo seemed always to address me as "Rev" 
Amoah as he had heard from the grapevine that I had received some sort of Bible College training in the 
past. 
1' Results of the plebiscite in 1956 led to the United Nations Organisation's (UN) decision to annex the 
part of British Togoland to Ghana, just before the latter's independence from British colonial rule. 
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If the historical backgrounds of individual ethnonational groups has a crucial influence 
over current perceptions of identity and politics vis-ä-vis others, it becomes obvious 
therefore, that any pre-colonial anthropological and historical evidence should be 
examined and given due consideration as a means of making sense of the current 
politics. It is becoming more widespread, that any academic focus on Ghanaian 
ethnicity and politics, cannot ignore the history and anthropology of its peoples and 
how this links to current trends. As an introduction to one of the most recent works on 
Ghana, edited by Paul Nugent and Carola Lentz, they state: 
Our initial intuition was that, by contrast with parts of Southern Africa, many of 
the identities of present day Ghana were not simply an "invention" of the colonial 
period, but drew on older "we"-group processes of inclusion and exclusion. For 
that reason, the contributors were invited to adopt a long-range perspective on 
identity, spanning the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods (Lentz and 
Nugent eds. 2000, p. 2). 
As already argued, perceptions assumed by indvidual ethnonational groups vis-ä-vis 
others, render arguments of veracity, mythicality, as well as attachment of remote 
significance to the traditions of origins a moot point. Besides, it would appear that due 
significance ought to be attached to the anthropological evidence than is usually 
accorded. The findings of Sandra Greene regarding her study of the Anlo-Ewe 
emphasize this point, as well as the relevant connections between the distant past and 
current trends. According to Greene: 
I argue, in particular, that ethnic identities - defined here as notions of "we" and 
"they" based on geographical origins, as well as time of residence and kinship 
relations - existed well before the impact of European colonialism. I also argue 
that Anlo women were viewed and viewed themselves as integral members of 
their lineages and clans. They identified fully with these groups and it was 
because of this fact that Anlo women - along with Anlo men - throughout their 
history became deeply involved in both supporting and undermining the 
boundaries that define "we" and "they" in Anlo. This was the case during the pre- 
colonial period when an influx of refugees and conquerors prompted the Anlo to 
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redefine who was, and indeed, an Anlo. It continued to be so during the colonial 
and post-colonial periods when missionaries, colonial government officials, a 
new emergent educated Anlo elite and average Anlos began to generate in the 
twentieth century a new and larger ethnic identity in response to yet another set of 
developments [Greene 2000, pp. 29-30; Lentz & Nugent (eds. ) 2000, pp. 29-301. 
Hence, this chapter has been an exercise to establish a historical context, from which 
current identity patterns of political nature can be traced, in order to derive some 
understanding and illumination from the history which buttresses these patterns. Any 
current patterns which demonstrate linkage between the contextual history and current 
politics, are at least briefly mentioned, and further discussed in the following chapters. 
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2.2 ORIGINATION OF THE "GHANA" HYPOTHESIS 
The first Gold Coast literary source to suggest any link between the ethnonational 
groups of Modern and Ancient Ghana was Reverend W. T. Balmer, who speculated 
that the Akans and Ahantas are traceable to the ancient Negro kingdom (Balmer 1925, 
p. 27). R. A. Mauny also referred to this in his article in Africa Vol XXIV, 1954. After 
Balmer's theory, and from 1928, J. B. Danquah took interest and developed it further, 
thus culminating into a research he conducted in England from 1934-6 (Ofosu-Appiah 
1974, p. 29). Thereafter, Danquah debated extensively on the subject, for example, in 
his article of 20 July 1949 in the African Morning Post (Akyeampong 1971, pp. 45-7) 
and succeeded in strongly impressing this hypothesis on the main political players of 
the time, that the adoption of the name "Ghana" had become a foregone conclusion as 
part of the struggle towards independence. The hypothesis encountered some 
criticisms, for example, from Mauny, who referred to it as a belief (Mauny 1954, p. 
200), and among other things claimed: that `... nothing is known of the origin of 
Ghana .. .' (Ibid, p. 
205); that `all that can be said of the history of Ghana before the 
coming of the Arabs in the eighth century must, in the present state of our knowledge 
of West Africa, be merely speculation' (Ibid, p. 207); that `... we know little of the 
pre-Islamic Ghana civilization' (Ibid p. 209), and; that `the real origins of the Akan are 
unknown' (Ibid, p. 211). Mauny's claims were followed by rebuttals from Danquah in 
the November-December 1957 edition of The West African Review, in which the latter 
argued that a second century map of the Greek geographer and astronomer Ptolemy 
`included a town situate on the Niger, which he named Thamondakana in the country 
of the Nigritae', and that Thamondakana shares the same geographical location with 
present day Timbuctoo (Akyeampong 1970, p. 113). Danquah argued that `.. 
Ptolemy's Thamondakana must be referred to as the Ghana of ancient history, and that 
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the name Kana (Akana) in that name is no other than a verbal variation of Akan' (Ibid, 
p. 114). In rebutting Mauny's claims of lack of evidence whether any ancient 
Mediterranean people knew the northern part of the Sahara or ever visited tropical 
West Africa (Mauny 1954, pp. 200-1), Danquah argued: that Herodotus records 
Pharoah Neco's Phoenician circumnavigation of the African continent which covered 
geographical areas of the Sahara beyond Libya; that a Carthaginian voyage made by 
Hanno with sixty ships and 30,000 sailors passed around West Africa, and again; that 
Herodotus records five Nasamonean youngmen from the Great Syrtis in the 
Mediterranean crossing the Sahara and coming into contact with the Niger 
(Akyeampong 1970, p. 113; Rawlinson (ed. ) Vol 11 1875, pp. 46-53,383; Vol III 1875, 
pp. 142-9). Danquah provided sufficient evidence to deal with Mauny's criticisms, but 
was also aware that some amount of scepticism remained. Danquah therefore held his 
ground, but also stated that `... the Akan claim to origin in Ghana is only a hypothesis, 
not yet a theory. But that does not prevent those who have eyes to see to see its truth' 
(Akyeampong 1970, p. 121). Irrespective of whatever difficulties the hypothesis had 
encountered, the end result was that `at the time of independence the Gold Coast had 
become Ghana' (Ofosu-Appiah 1974, p. 29). Given that Nkrumah and Danquah no 
longer belonged to the same party at the time of independence, it remains unclear 
exactly what ticked Nkrumah to settle on the name "Ghana", other than the fact that the 
force of Danquah's arguments had remained with the major political players of the 
time, thereby making the name choice a foregone conclusion. Several other 
authorships, both around the time of the Mauny-Danquah debates, and following that, 
prove the anthropo-historical connection between the majority of Modem Ghana and 
Ancient Ghana. This chapter deals with this connection in more detail. 
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2.3 INTRODUCTION TO THE ETHNO-GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF 
MODERN GHANA 
Modern Ghana as a country is divided into ten politico-administrative Regions. 
Beginning from the hinterland Northern Territories and flowing eatswards and 
southwards towards the coastal South, they are the Upper-West Region, Upper-East 
Region, Northern Region, Brong-Ahafo Region, Western Region, Central Region, 
Ashanti Region, Eastern Region, Greater-Accra Region, and the Volta Region. Each 
region has its administrative capital, but the country's capital is Accra, located in the 
Great-Accra Region. Ghana is a multi-national state, with both large and small national 
and/or linguistic groupings, some of whose constituent sub-groups have similar 
geographical and historical origins. The Akan constitutes the largest grouping, about 
52.4% of Ghana's total population of about 16 million. The Mossi or Mole-Dagbani- 
Gurense grouping make up about 15.8%, the Ewe 11.9%, the Ga & Adangbe 7.8%, the 
Gurma 3.3%, the Yoruba 1.3%, and other 7.5% (Britannica 1994, p. 615). With the 
exception of the Ewes, and a few other non-Ewe groups in the Volta Region of Ghana 
who have been dubbed by Paul Nugent as the "Central Togo Minorities" - CTMs or 
"Togo Remnants" (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178), 
the majority of modem Ghana are believed to originate from a common ancestry traced 
to the Djenne-Timbuktu area (Meyerowitz 1952; 1958). The Ewes have been clearly 
traced from the Abomey dynasty in Dahomey (currently Benin) and may have Yoruba 
ancestry (Argylle 1966, pp. 3-5; Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 1991, p. 26; Nugent 
1997, p. 13). Also, over the last three centuries, as a result of migrations, conquest and 
resettlements, there have been some evolutionary patterns, resulting in some groups 
being engulfed and subsumed under new names, whilst others have been split into new 
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and different groups. For example, currently, the Akan (the largest linguistic grouping) 
includes the Akuapem and Agona. However, Kyerepon-Guans and Late-Guans (based 
in the Eastern Region) - and who form part of the Akuapem - refer to themselves as 
Guans, and not Akan (Kwamena-Poh 1973, pp. 3&8; Meywrowitz 1952, pp. 77-9). 
Also, Efutu-Guans of Winneba, whose current geographical location is based in Akan- 
Fanti territory in the Central Region, refer to themselves or are known as Guans. In 
addition, although they are originally a patrilineal people, they have been socially 
influenced by their matrilineal and dominant Akan-Fanti neigbours (Ephirim-Donkor 
2000, p. 2). Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, also in the Central Region, were Guans but 
have since become matrilineal, after having contact with the surrounding and 
matrilineal Akan-Fantis (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-9)18. Although there is a wider and 
more ancient Guan ancestry incorporating the majority of modem Ghana (including 
Akans), and although the evolution of group identities has resulted in the emergence of 
new identity names, there exists a few groups who have held onto the ancient Guan 
identity, name, or tag. Subsequently, the Guan name and identity has significance in: 
(a) tracing the Guan ancestry of the majority of Ghanaian groups who currently do not 
use the Guan tag, as well as; (b) having current and specific reference to the few groups 
who have held on to the Guan tag. For example, the current Ga-Adangbe grouping, 
although not Akan are also of Guan ancestry (Ibid 1952, pp. 77-8), but do not use the 
Guan tag. Therefore, whereas the majority of Modern Ghana are of Guan ancestry, only 
a handful of groups currently use the Guan tag or refer to themselves as Guans. The 
18 An interview with Andrew Asamoah, who hails from Senya Bereku, and whose father is a sub-chief of 
the town, confirms that although the Senya Guans originally practised patriliny, the traditional lineage 
practice has switched to matriliny since being in close proximity with the matrilineal Akan-Fantis. 
Andrew also analyzed that although the current traditional position is matrilineal, the details of 
inheritance vary on a case by case basis as a result of influencing factors such as the stipulation of a 
will, adherence to the Intestate Succession Law of 1985, and/or the the political strength of the external 
family. 
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Akuapem, Aguana, Bono, Ahafo, Ashanti, Fanti and Akyem, who are all of Guan 
ancestry, are all now classified as Akan. Even some Efutu-Guans refer to themselves as 
Akan and prefer to speak Fanti instead of Guan (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 10 & 13). 
Some of the earlier Akan tribal-states were Bono, Asante, Akyerekyere, Twifo-Heman, 
Akwamu and Domaa, Kormante and Etsi (Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17). The latter ones 
include the Fanti, Akyem and Akuapim. The Akerekyere and Twifo-Heman do not 
exist as a tribal entity anymore, having been overrun by more powerful neighbouring 
states. They would now be mixed up among any of the remaining earlier or later Akan 
sub-groups. The evolution of identity groups, whether along political and/or linguistic 
contours, has been countrywide, and therefore, the current Akan-speaking and Guan- 
speaking peoples of southern Ghana are not the only examples of current linguistic 
homogeneity. The Gur-speaking Nanumba, Dagomba and Mamprusi of Northern 
Ghana are separate polities, but are culturally linked by the Gur language, which they 
share with some Mossi kingdoms south of Burkina Fasso, a neighbouring country north 
of Northern Ghana (Drucker-Brown 1999, p. 181; J. Royal, Anthrop. Inst. 5, (2), 1999, 
p. 181). 
According to Meyerowitz, the Akan people of Gold Coast or Modem Ghana, have 
migrated from the area around the Niger Bend, roughly between Djenne and Timbuktu, 
their former dwelling site, until they were routed and forced out by Islamized Saharan 
Berbers at the beginning of the 11 `h century by Assaud or Azawagh. [I. Hrbek and J. 
Devisse argue that the ruler of Ancient Ghana - situated north of the Inland Niger Delta 
- was more accommodating to the Muslim Almoravids, and that Ancient Ghana 
officially became Islamic after the Almoravid conquest at the end of the 11 `h century 
(Hrbek and Devisse 1988, pp. 354-61)]. Some of these Akan states, are able to trace 
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their ancestry and geographical origins to a different area and era before Djenne and 
Timbuktu (the Ancient Ghana territory and polity). The Bono-Takyiman or (Techiman- 
Brong) recall from their ancestral history that prior to the Niger area, they were settled 
farther north in the "White Desert" or Sarem (the country of the sand), now called the 
Sahara (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 33; 1958, pp. 17-8). The tradition as preserved by the 
Kormante and Etsi have the name of the place as "Djadu", "'N'Djadum" or "Diadom", 
whose literal translation is: "Dja confederation" or "Dia confederation" (Ibid 1952, p. 
64; 1958, pp. 17-8). In current Akan, dum or dom literally means, a crowd of people. 
According to Meyerowitz, the identification of the names Djadu, Djadom or Diadom 
may be with the Oasis of Djado (or Jado) located in the western Tibesti in Eastern 
Sahara. The Arab name of Djado seems to be "Agwas" for the Tuaregs of Air; "Gua" 
for the Tuaregs of Fezzan; and "Braun" (sounding like modern Brong) for the Tebu. It 
is said therefore, that the Akan have a mixed ancestry. The pre-11`h century Agwas of 
the Eastern Sahara (or with prefix: Ilagwas) are also known as "Agwatin", "Ilagwatin", 
or "Ilaguantan". The tradition follows that they were Eastern Libyans of the same stock 
as the Luata in North Africa. Altogether, all the above-mentioned tribes or people- 
groups are believed to originate from Kushite stock, or are descendants of Kush (Cush), 
from the Tigris-Euphrates area in Mesopotamia (Ibid 1952, pp. 63-9; Ibid 1958, pp. 17- 
20). [This extension of the myths of origin of some groups in Ghana `from as far away 
as the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia' (Wilson 1992, p. 12), has attracted a lot of 
controversy, as some historians have labelled it as far-fetched. However, Wilson argues 
that the variation of the traditions of origin which suggests a migration from the Chad- 
Benue region, has some validity (Ibid)]. The Dja, or "Za", "Zaga" (Arabic "Zaghawa") 
gave the Djado Oasis its third name, and their origins are believed to be Abysinnia, or 
Southern Arabia. The Zaga are known to have conquered the Eastern Sudan, Eastern 
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Sahara and a large portion of North Africa sometime in the 1s` century AD. Thus, the 
Zaga or Zaghawa Kingdom was founded in the Tibesti area of the Eastern Sahara 
(Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8). [This is confirmed by the Arab writer Al Muhallebi - AD 
903-63 (Palmer 1936, p. 156)]. The Fezzan-Lake Chad caravan route also span this 
region. The pre-11 `h century Zaga Kingdom appears to be: (a) a confederation of the Za, 
Dja or Dia, who are believed to have formed the ruling aristocracy and also named the 
state, the Oasis of Djado, serving as the seat of government; (b) the Agwas, Gwa 
(without prefix and suffix) or Gua, who are Libyan Berbers from Eastern Libya, and; 
(c) the Gara out of whom the Tibu and the Kora'an (called Garawan in the Fezzan - 
medieval descendants of the Garamantes of antiquity) emerge. Currently, Kora'an is 
still part of the Zaghawa, now populating Eastern Sudan. Tibu is the language of both 
present day Kora'an and Zaghawa people (Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8). It appears 
therefore, that the founders of the Akan states descended from: the Dia or Za (Diaga or 
Zaga); the Libyan Berbers, and; the Gara of Tibesti who migrated southwards as a 
result of Arab conquests of North Africa, and their territory replaced with the Lemta 
Tuaregs who were displaced from the Fezzan by the Arabs. The inter-tribal settlement 
along the Niger Bend between Djenne and Timbuktu ended up in the incorporation of 
the aboriginals in the area into the clanship of the settlers. As is unsurprising among 
matrilineally organised groups, the intermarriages with the aboriginals resulted in the 
ethnic purity of the settlers from North Africa being corrupted. As part of the huge 
Islamic campaign which affected both the Sahara and sub-Sahara, when the Islamized 
Berbers routed the new Dia or Dja Kingdom near the Niger Bend, thousands of the Dja 
sought refuge further south, thus founding a number of states among the Mo (Grusi- 
speaking aboriginals). Subsequent defeat by the Mo just before AD 1300, caused a 
further southward movement into Gonja (the Northern territories in Modern Ghana). 
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Movements further south by some others resulted in settlement around the Black Volta 
River known as the Bono Kingdom and founded by Asaman. The Bono Kingdom 
became the first Akan state in Ghana. Other refugees of the Dia, Libyan Berber and 
Gara tribes who fled from the Niger region, managed to colonize aboriginals to the 
north-west and west of Modem Ghana (now La Cote d'Ivoire) and founded states 
including the Bona and Kumbu Kingdoms. These subsequent kingdoms, after suffering 
defeat also, moved further south into the tropical rain forest of modem Ghana resulting 
in the founding of the Akyerekyere and Twifo-Heman kingdoms in AD 1500, Akwamu 
around 1575 and Domaa around 1600. Refugees from the Bona Kingdom moved 
eastwards and northwards and settled in the Bono Kingdom, and their descendants 
subsequently founded the Asante Kingdom in 1701 in the heart of the tropical forest 
(Ibid. pp. 19-20). According to Meyerowitz: 
the descendants of the Dia, Dia, or Za seem to be represented among the Akan by 
the Diala (Ayoko clan), who founded the Bono Kingdom about AD 1295; the 
Adiaka, who founded the Dia-Mo (or Djomo) Kingdom at the same time; the 
Diana (Ayoko clan), who founded the Juaben and Bekwai States, now in the 
Asante Confederacy; and the Diara-N'Koran (Ayoko clan), who founded first the 
Bona Kingdom in the beginning of the eleventh century, then the Kokofu and 
Kumasi states (seventeenth century), and finally the Asante Kingdom. The 
akyeneboa, or totem animal, of the Ayoko of Dia descent was, and still remains, 
the falcon (Ibid, p. 20). 
The historical analysis continues that the descendants of the Libyan Berbers - Agwas 
(Gua), Agwatin, Laguantan, or Iguantan - without the prefixes and plural suffixes - 
Gwa, Gua or Guan, became the most powerful clan in the Bono Kingdom, having 
"styled" themselves "Agwana" or "descendants of Gwa". (A is the Akan prefix for 
living things). In other Akan states the name, in the various districts, became Aguana or 
Eguana, Agona, Akwona or Aguna. Their totem animal and state emblem, as is from 
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their remote ancestry, is parrot, since the majority of the Bono people were by descent 
Gwa or Guan. As the historical account further explains: 
Bron" or "Abron" (nasalized "Brong") recalls the Saharan "Braun", one of the 
names for the Oasis of Djado in the Eastern Sahara. "Brong" is a contraction 
"Bonong", the accent being on the second syllable. The Takyiman-Brong 
pronounce the name of their former kingdom "Bono", that is to say, without the 
ng-sound at the end. Bono, as mentioned above,, was the first great Akan 
Kingdom in Ghana. The Bonos proudly sang: O' Bono be- ank-ama, meaning 
"Bono who alone gives civilisation" (Ibid, pp. 20-21). 
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2.4 THE GUAN CONTROVERSY 
Before delving into the regional locations of the current ethnonational groups in 
Modern Ghana and their relevant traditions of origin, it is important to explain (solve) 
what I have termed as the Guan controversy. 
According to Meyerowitz, some groups in Modern Ghana, including the Akan, are 
traced from the Niger Bend area - popularly referred to as the area between Djenne and 
Timbuktu (Meyerowitz 1952; 1958). For example, the Gonja (or Guan-Dja) of 
Northern Ghana are also traced to the Djenne-Timbuktu area (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51; 
1958, p. 17). Kwamena-Poh also refers to the Guans as part of the "Niger-Congo 
family" and relates them to some Akan groups such as the Fanti and Twi (Kwamena- 
Poh 1973, p. 12). Ephirim-Donkor also traces the Efutu-Guans to Timbuktu (Ephirim- 
Donkor 2000, pp. 25-7). As already analyzed (in Section 2.3), according to 
Meyerowitz, some of the Akan states [e. g. Bono, Etsi and Kormantse (Meyerowitz 
1952, pp. 33,63-5; Ibid 1958)] trace their ancestry to a Saharan location as well as an 
era prior to Djenne-Timbuktu. Furthermore, Meyerowitz traces the etymology of the 
word "Guan" to the Saharan and Libyan Berbers (Meywrowitz 1952; 1958, pp. 17-20). 
There is therefore, a wider, more ancient, inclusive and latent Guan ancestry than what 
amounts to the current exclusive usage of the Guan tag by a handful of groups in 
Modern Ghana such as the Efutu-Guans, Kyerepong-Guans, Late-Guans and Kpesi- 
Guans. The wider Guan ancestry and identity includes such ethnonational groups as the 
Gonja (Guan-Dja) and Akan. It is therefore not surprising that some Akans and Gonjas 
refer to themselves as Guans and vice versa. For example, as already mentioned, some 
Efutu-Guans of Winneba see themselves as both Fanti and Guan, as they live in Fanti 
territory and speak Fanti as well as Guan (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 10 & 13). The 
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confusion within the Guan controversy is aptly summarised in the statement: `whether I 
am Effutu or Fantse I am still an Akan' (Ibid, p. 13). The Efutus are originally 
patrilineal, but their patriliny has been socially influenced and threatened by a variety 
of factors inherent in proximity with their dominant Akan-Fanti neighbours (Ibid, p. 2). 
Also, the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, who are current occupants of Fanti territory in 
the Central Region, were patrilineal Guans but are now practicing matriliny 
(Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76-80)19. 
Second, in addition to the over-riding, wider and more inclusive Guan ancestry, plus 
the few confusing cases of evolutionary interchangeability between Akans and Guans, 
there are Guans who, although have encountered Akans (or have perhaps even been 
under Akan jurisdiction), remain Guan-speaking, have kept, and currently keep a strong 
Guan identity. For example, the Kyerepon-Guans and Late-Guans (Kwamena-Poh 
1973, pp. 3& 8). Kwamena-Poh states that, unlike the Kyerepon dialect which has 
been invaded by some Akan words, the Late dialect has remained "compact" and 
uncorrupted (Ibid, p. 10). At the extreme end of the spectrum, we have the `Kpesi- 
Guans (earliest settlers of Guan extraction)' [Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76-7], who have 
never mixed with the Akan, have been based in the southeastern tip of Modem Ghana, 
and were the original `owners of the land and lagoons between Accra and the mouth of 
the Volta' (Ibid pp. 64-5; Field 1940, pp. 82-4). The Kpesi-Guans are not Akan. 
Third is the issue of patriliny and matriliny. Guans are originally a patrilineal people, 
but some who have entered Akan territory or mixed with Akans, have become 
matrilineal. Guans who have never mixed with the Dja or Akan, or been under their 
19 See footnote 18. 
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jurisdiction, remain patrilineal (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77), for example the Kpesi-Guan. 
Some Guans who have encountered the Akan have maintained their patriliny, for 
example the Late-Guans and Kyerepon-Guans. The Efutu-Guans have been socially 
influenced by the neighbouring Akan-Fanti matrilineal system, and are undergoing a 
struggle between patriliny and matriliny, with serious ramifications to the Efutu 
political system and the process of electing the Efutu King (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 
2). However, others have converted to matriliny, for example the Senya-Guans of 
Senya Bereku (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76 & 79). Therefore, any hard and fast distinction 
between a patriliny of Guans and/or a matriliny of Akans is not as universalistic as 
authorships such as Michelle Gilbert would like to portray [Africa 64 (1) 1994, p. 100; 
Africa 67 (4), 1997, pp. 501-2]. 
Within the ethnonational configuration of modem Ghana, it must therefore be seen that 
there is a current, remnant and exclusive Guan usage and identity, as well as a latent, 
wider and inclusive Guan ancestry. The Guan name and identity therefore has 
significance in: (a) tracing the Guan ancestry of the overall majority of Ghanaian 
groups some of which do not currently use the Guan tag, as well as; (b) having current 
and specific reference to a few groups who have held on to the Guan name, and still use 
the Guan tag, for example the Kpesi-Guans, Kyerepong-Guans, Late-Guans and Efutu- 
Guans. 
At Independence in 1957, the name Ghana was chosen to replace the colonial name 
Gold Coast for reasons including the anthropological proof that the majority of Modern 
Ghana - of the wider Guan ancestry - have migrated from the geographical area of 
Ancient Ghana. This wider Guan ancestry therefore has a siginificant contribution 
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towards the modern Ghanaian identity which over-rides any exclusive, latter-day clings 
or allusions to the Guan tag by a few groups. It is for this same reason that groups 
which are not of the wider Guan ancestry, for example the Ewes and CTMs, are viewed 
by some Ghanaians (rightly or wrongly so) as modern "immigrants", and not only 
because of the more recent colonial annexation from Togo to Ghana just before 
independence. Hence, any current ethnonational differences between groups of the 
wider Guan ancestry (e. g. Akans, Gonjas, etc. ) and those not of Guan ancestry (e. g. 
Ewes) is farther-fetched than is normally understood. Akans and Ewes have never been 
enemies historically (Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8). However recent developments of 
colonial and post-colonial import have contributed to the current high-tensioned 
political differences between the two groups. Therefore, despite the lack of historical 
enmity, it would appear that, the recent historical and political developments of the 
immediate pre- and post-independence period, have heightened the notions of common 
Guan (and especially Akan) identity against minorities such as the Ewe. 
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2.5 THE BONO KINGDOM AND THE BRONG-AHAFO REGION 
The capital city of the Bono kingdom, Bono-Mansu, is purported to be the `oldest 
centre of Akan civilisation south of the Black Volta river' (Manoukian 1950, p. 13; 
Meyerowitz 1952, p. 29). The date for the founding of this city is fixed at 1295 and its 
destruction by the Asante at 1742, and the whole Bono kingdom in 1740 by the same 
(Ibid; Ibid). The Bono ruling class (and the Bonos for that matter), are known by the 
Takyiman tradition to have originated from the "Great White Desert", (the Sahara) 
from where they migrated to Diala or Diula, close to a big river, with their livestock, 
and later moved on to settle in Mo (or Mossi), the aboriginals of the region 
immediately north of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. 
Inspite of the great kingdom founded here by the Bonos, a defeat in war resulted in 
some of them fleeing southwards to Gonja as refugees along the military routes charted 
and led by their fleeting army. From Mo to Gonja in the Northern Territories, they were 
led by three men, two of whom died. The surviver is Nana Asaman. It is said that on 
reaching the fringes of the Black Volta, the remaining and surving Bono folk under 
Nana Asaman defected from the main Bono body and crossed the Black Volta to the 
fringes of the tropical forest about 30 miles east of modern Takyiman - formerly the 
second largest city in the Bono kingdom after Bono-Mansu (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 33- 
4). It is not known whether the split was initiated by Nana Asaman, but as the tradition 
continues, Nana Asaman led this defected group, and in a time of crises, led them to 
build two sites, first Yefri, and later Bono-Mansu, which later became the capital of the 
new Bono. (One group of refugees who did not follow Nana Asaman broke away and 
wandered through the forest via the Afram, a tributary of the Volta, and finally reached 
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the coast to found the town of Eguafo. The same Eguafo also founded Elmina (Ibid, pp. 
70-1). Another group which also moved southwards to the coast, became the Afutu or 
Efutu people who founded Ogua - now called Cape Coast, and Tumpa or Simpa - now 
called Winneba (Ibid, pp. 74-5). Bono rose to wealth and fame as a result of gold 
discovered in its territory. Bono-Mansu became a market centre to which traders from 
Sudan, Egypt, North Africa and Arabia came through the caravan routes, and the main 
trade items were gold and kola nuts. In the first half of the 17`x' century, Bono-Mansu 
defeated and annexed Beeo-Nsoko. Later on, at the height of its power, the Bono 
kingdom was attacked by the Asante and Bono-Mansu was totally destroyed in the 
process by 1740. The Bono people, together with the Ahafos in the Ahafo district, form 
the Brong-Ahafo region of Modem Ghana, where Takyiman and Nkoranza are still 
prominent trading towns, the latter being next-in-line to Takyiman in terms of 
prominence in the Bono Kingdom. Brong is pronounced as in "Bono". 
The Ahafo district is inhabited by the Ahafos, the allied Kukuom and the rival Mim. 
The settlement of the Ahafo dates from the middle of the 18th century (Dunn & 
Robertson 1973, p. 10), and in accordance with the literal meaning of Ahafo (hunters), 
oral tradition has it that they trickled into the area as isolated communities hunting for 
and gathering animals and forest produce (Ibid). Many Ahafos admit that they are 
"strangers" and also admit that their settlement is within the last two centuries, thereby 
proving that the Ahafos have no autochthons (Ibid, p. 12). However, a more objective 
account has it that Ahafo settlement is a `by-product of: (a) conflict during the 
eighteenth century between the rival states of Ashanti and Denkyira, and; (b) the 
expansion of Ashanti after the defeat of Denkyira in the epoch-making battle of Feyiase 
- 1701' (Ibid). Being part of the geographical and military union of 
the Ashanti 
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confederacy, the Ahafos had to pay tribute to their Ashanti overlords. When the 
Ashanti Confederacy was abrogated in 1901, both the Ahafos and Kukuom (under the 
paramount leadership of the latter) enjoyed autonomy and independence until it was re- 
established in 1935 (Ibid, p. 13). Mim, a close associate of the Ashanti, prospered in 
the re-establishment of the Ashanti Confederacy in 1935. The Ahafo district as a whole 
seems to be fraught with political vicissitudes. In 1958, the Convention People's Party - 
CPP of Nkrumah's government restored Kukuomhene (Chief of Kukuom) to 
paramountcy, and deposed the Mimhene (Chief of Mim). Mimhene re-gained the upper 
hand when Nkrumah's government was overthrown in a coup d'etat in February 1966. 
This coup was more or less Ashanti-led, and Kukuomhene was abrogated as a result 
(Ibid). This political see-saw has resulted into the two main political alliances in the 
Brong-Ahafo Region - the Kukuom faction and the Mim faction. The former advocated 
secession from Ashanti in order to form an independent Ahafo state, on the grounds 
that they originate from the Denkyiras (Ashanti's historic rival), whilst the latter alligns 
with Ashanti in support of a wider Ashanti union incorporating Ahafo (Ibid). 
Incidentally, both Mim and Kukuom are located in the Ahafo district of the Brong- 
Ahafo Region. Thus, Nkrumah's CPP government, and any other subsequent 
government/party to which the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia tradition (which assumed 
government in December 2000) has been opposed (for example, Rawlings' P/NDC 
government which ruled until December 2000), usually plays upon this historic 
factional division to gain divisive foothold over the Ahafo district of the Brong-Ahafo 
Region, as a political ploy against the Ashantis. This ploy has had recurrences in 
Ghana's modem political history. The Danquah-Busia tradition - the Progress Party 
(PP) as it was called in 1969 - was led by Dr. Kofi Busia to electoral victory 
culminating in Ghana's Second Republic which began in 1969. Busia became the 
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Prime Minister of the Second Republic. Busia however, hails from the Brong-Ahafo 
Region and is a descendant of the royal family of Wenchi (Wenkyi or Wankyi). But 
Wenchi is in the Bono (Brong) section of the Region and has not had any direct 
dealings with the Ahafo rivalries. Relations between the Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti 
Regions have always been erratic and sensitive, with each playing on one another's 
weaknesses. The loyalty and electoral alliances which are supposed to have been 
between them due to their common ancestry from the Djenne-Timbuktu area, seem not 
to have crystallised, even after Busia's leadership of the PP to electoral victory in 1969. 
The Ashanti defeat of Bono in 1740 might be an explanation. Because as a vassal state 
to the Ashanti, the Bono (Brong) had to pay tribute from off their own land (now 
controlled by the Asantehene) to Kumasi, as well as accept settlers and hunters 
"posted" there by authorisation from Kumasi (the capital of Ashanti). Even as at now, 
some Ashanti chiefs still assert rights to demand and allocate land in the Brong-Ahafo 
Region (Ibid, p. 12). It would appear that the electoral results from 1992 and 1996 
indicate that overall, the Brong-Ahafo Region has not supported the Ashanti-led 
Danquah-Busia tradition. Results of the 1992 Parliamentary elections reveal that out of 
the 21 constituencies in the Region, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) - the Danquah- 
Busia tradition as it assumed from 1992 - lost in as much as 20 of them, all to the rival 
and then ruling NDC (Nugent 1993, pp. 54-8). It would appear also, that as compared 
with the other Regions in Modem Ghana, the Brong-Ahafo Region feels very much 
neglected in overall country-wide development. Thus, the then ruling NDC party, 
capitalised on the recurrent implications of the political see-saw, and courted the 
Brong-Ahafo Region with the allocation of development projects including 
electrification, pipe-borne water, increases in cocoa producer prices and the building of 
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feeder roads. As Nugent states, `Projects across the country were therefore timed to 
reach fruition in the immediate run-up to the poll' of 1996 (Nugent 1999, p. 297). 
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2.6 THE "GONJA" KINGDOM AND THE NORTHERN, UPPER-EAST AND 
UPPER-WEST REGIONS 
The Gonja territory, as the analysis below would reveal, changed names form Gonja 
kingdom, to Kania kingdom, to Nta kingdom and finally to Gonja. The aborigins of the 
Gonja kingdom were the Mo (Mossi) people (commonly called Grunshi by the 
Europeans). The Dja-Mo or Djo-Mo or Ka-Dju-Mo, are Mossi people who had 
accepted the matrilineal organisation of the N'Gwa from Dja (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 53). 
The origins of the Gonja, according to tradition dates from the 11`h century. A section 
of the Gonja people - the Guan-Dja, claim that their ancestors, the N'Gwa or A'Gwa, 
came from the region called Dia or Dja known to be between Djenne and Timbuktu, in 
order to avoid compulsory "conversion" to Islam when the moslem Assauano or 
Assaud (Azawagh), leader of the Islamized Berbers, invaded it at the beginning of the 
I1 `h century (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51; 1958, p. 17). [Note that the Dia kings who 
succumbed to Islamic conversion as a result of the same routing were also to be found 
in the "Niger Bend" area, their capital being transferred from Kukia to Gao on the 
Middle Niger from 1009 to 1010 (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51)]. Between 1200 and 1300, 
the N'Gwa or A'Gwa states around the Niger Bend were conquered by the Bozamfri 
people from Zamfara in Northern Nigeria. The N'Gwa proper were routed in 1200, the 
Mamprusi in about 1250 and four or five other states in Mossi in about 1300. These 
"Bozamfri refugees" from Mamprusi later conquered Dagomba in the latter half of the 
14th century (Ibid, p. 49). Thus, the Gonja Kingdom, which occupies the Northern 
Territories of the Gold Coast was created from the refugees who came from Dia or Dja 
- the region between Djenne and Timbuktu (Ibid). 
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In the middle half of the 15`x' century, under the leadership of King Darigudienda of the 
Dagomba, the Gonja kingdom was conquered by the Dagomba and Mamprusi. 
Darigudienda (whose descendants established the Kania kingdom) took the town of 
Bona, married the Bona princess and had a son called Bonkane. A generation or two 
after Bonkane had succeeded him, the Kania kingdom came into existence in Gonja 
resulting in the ousting of the Dagomba from the territory. The Kania or (Accany or 
Akan), according to the tradition of the Twifo-Heman, originated from the Kingdom of 
Kumbu -a confederated state of the great Mande Mali Kingdom. When Djenne, the 
capital state of Mali was conquered by the Songhai in 1473, Kumbu passed into the 
hands of the Songhai. The founders of Kania are therefore Akan from Kumbu in 
Mande who took refuge in Bona before settling finally in the Gbipe region on the Black 
Volta, immediately north of Bono-Mansu. The capital of Kania was Kania-se or 
Kaniamase, and the King of Kania's title was Kinimpase-Wura (Ibid, pp. 54-5). 
Sometime in 1591 [a date preserved in the Koran as "the 1000`h year of the Hegira" 
(Ibid)], a Mande general named Djakpa, accompanied with a lot of refugees came and 
sought refuge for a brief period in Dja-Gbon (or the Bole area), after which he attacked 
the Kania kingdom. As King of Kania, Djakpa styled himself as Ndo-wura (Nda-Wura 
or Nta-wura), that is "Lord of Ndo (Nda or Nta)". They are sometimes also referred to 
in literal Fante language as Ntafo (meaning people of Nta). Djakpa, after consolidating 
his power, defeated the Dagomba and their capital Njani or Djani was transferred south 
into Konkomba territory. The name Njani or Djani was corrupted to Yandi or Yendi, as 
the town and its people are still called today. Today, the Nta area is still called Gonja 
territory. Djakpa died through mortal wounds when he tried to invade and capture the 
Bono territory south of the Northern Territories (Ibid, pp. 55-9). In about 1600, the 
Mandingo people (called Mande or Mende by the Gonja and Bono people) came from 
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Kangaba and Segu, conquered the whole Gonja country (or the Northern Territories), 
and established themselves as the ruling class till today (Ibid, p. 54). On the 
administrative map of Modern Ghana, the "Northern Territories" are now the Northern, 
Upper-East and Upper-West Regions (see Appendix I). Together, these three politico- 
administrative regions occupy a geographical section of Ghana usually referred to as 
Northern Ghana, and its occupants as "Northerners". Phonology helps to understand the 
origins of the Gonja. According to Meyerowitz: 
to understand the term N'Gwa, it is necessary to explain that N'Gwa and A'Gwa, 
and Guan are forms of the same word. "N" or "A" is the noun class prefix of 
Gwa or Guan. Other variants of the word Guan in use in Gonja are Gban and 
Gbon; G'bon in turn is the same as M'bon, the ancient name for the Bono in the 
Gonja; in other words the language confirms what the Gonja allege - namely, that 
Guan, Gonja, A'Gwa and Bono are all closely related to one another and have a 
common ancestry. Seeing that the Gonja call the Akan Ka-Mbon, and that the 
Akan and Bono also regard themselves as closely related and that they have the 
same matrilineal clans, one may assume that the word Akan is also derived from 
Guan, and may be a variant of A'Gban (A'Kpan) or A'Guan. There is further the 
Akan clan name Anana, the final "na" means `descendants of, which is derived 
from A'Gwa or A-N'Gwa (with the Akan prefix "A" before the old prefix "N"). 
Anana, pronounced thus in Bono, has become Agona in Asante and Anona in 
Fante. The small state Agona in the coastal district, founded by mixed Guan and 
Akan was written Agwana, Aguna, and Agonna on old European maps. It is 
interesting to note here that the elders of the Na of Yendi, ruler of the Dagombas, 
whom I consulted, called the N'Gwa people Sosi or So people. Since these people 
came from Dja, they ought to be by origin the same as the So-nke, which also 
means So people (So-nke was later corrupted to Soninke). The N'Sona or A'Sona 
clan people among the Akan, including Bono, Asante, Fante and so forth are, as 
their name says Descendants of S, and have partly come from the `Sosi' area into 
the Gold Coast, partly direct from the Timbuktu region, or via the Northern Ivory 
Coast. The name of the country, Gonja, Gbon-Dja, Gban-Dja, Guan-Dja or 
Giuan-Nia, is derived from Gbon, Gban, or Guan and Dja, Nja or Nia, the country 
of origin of its chief inhabitants (Ibid, pp. 52-3). 
Sometime after the final destruction of the Bono Kingdom by the Ashantis, the Ashanti 
hegemony and control of the hinterland extended to the Northern Territories. Ashanti 
controlled the trade between the coast and the hinterland, with the "Northerners" acting 
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as middlemen between the Saharan trade routes and the Ashanti. Ashanti trade 
influence extended as far as Salaga in the Northern Territories, Salaga being the chief 
trade centre in the area. After the Ashanti had consolidated its gains from her central 
position in the coastal-interior trade, it began to militarily challenge the Northern 
neighbours, resulting in several wars being fought with the Gyaman, Gonja and 
Dagomba between the 17'h and 18 `h centuries. The Ashanti also fought southwards 
against coastal tribes and the European establishments over trading rights and "free 
trade" between the coast and the Northern Territories, resulting in seven different wars 
in 1821,1824,1826,1828,1865,1873-4 and 1894-6 (Massing 1994, p. 16). First 
contacts of colonial authorities with the Northern Territories took place after the Berlin 
Conference of 1884, the initial aims of contact being for the sole purposes of 
commercial treaties. The first were from the Germans in 1886 and 1888. Thereafter, 
Germany, intent on avoiding a conflict with either France or Britain, agreed with 
London on a neutral zone within which both colonial powers would `abstain from 
protectorates or exclusive influence' (Ibid, p. 17). Despite British overtures to the 
native authorities of Dagomba, Gonja, "Gurunsi" and Mossi, the Ya-Na of Yendi 
accepted protection from Germany in 1894, and subsequently all Anglo-German 
negotiations on trade influences broke in 1895 until the Anglo-German Border Treaty 
was signed in 1899 (Ibid, p. 19). The area east of the border was until 1914 
administered by Germany as "Schutzgebiet Togoland", until British troops from the 
Gold Coast annexed it from 1919 till 1947, after which it became a United Nations 
(UN)-mandated area. Before this period the British colonial-cum-military officer - the 
Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories (CCNT) - had joined the Gold Coast 
Executive Council in 1934 and the Gold Coast Legislative Council in 1946. The results 
of the plebiscite of May 9 1956 (discussed in Section 2.12) released the "Togoland" 
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area of the Northern territories finally into the hands of the Gold Coast and henceforth 
Ghana (Ibid, p. 20). The "Northern Territories" or the Northern, Upper-East and Upper- 
West Regions of Ghana have taken various active parts in the political history of 
Modern Ghana both in the pre-independence struggle and in the post-independence era. 
Among many other things, the late President Hilla Limann (who died on 23 January 
1998) was President of Ghana's Third Republic and leader of the Nkrumahist-led 
People's National Party which won the elections in 1979. Until his death, he was the 
Paramount Chief of Gwolu in "Gonja" country under the chieftaincy title Kuoro Hilla 
Limann III. In addition, due to the ethnic arithmetic normally worked out by Ghanaian 
governments, there have always been a fairly good representation of "Northerners" at 
the political helm of affairs. As at May 1997, the cabinet of the ruling NDC 
government had six people hailing from Northern Ghana (West Africa 12-18/05/97, p. 
742). 
It can be argued that, owing to the common ancestry of the Gonja peoples, their 
emergence as a nation would have been formed had it not been the advent or 
intervention of colonialism. Although the Ashanti conquered the Bono who were south 
of Gonja, they never conquered the Gonja even though they had trade influences and 
links with them. There is also the likelihood that the Bono would/could have joined 
forces with their Gonja relatives of common ancestry against Ashanti. 
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2.6.1 "Northerners" versus "Southerners" 
Owing to the colonial history of the Gold Coast, the associated development of the 
coastal Southern Ghana and the relative underdevelopment of the inland Northern 
Ghana, a somewhat common identity has formed among the "Northerners". Northern 
Ghana is meant the geographical area occupied by the current politico-administrative 
sections known as the Northern, Upper-West and Upper-East Regions of Ghana. 
References to Northerners as Mabians springs from the Northern Ghana traditional 
word "mabia" or "mmabia", meaning "my brother". Northerners see themselves as 
belonging to a common identity or "brotherhood" in a way that Southerners do not. 
There is the obvious, occasional inter-tribal conflict in Northern Ghana, as usually 
occurs between the Nanumbas and Konkombas for example (Lentz & Nugent eds. 
2000), but there does not seem to be that tense tribal antagonism as exists in the South 
between Akans and Ewes for example, and which has translated into far reaching 
political connotations. The whole of Northern Ghana is savanna land which makes a 
clear vegetational distinction from the forestry South. Perhaps this also adds to the 
development of the Northern identity with respect to the dry weather and associated 
agricultural pursuits. Moreover, commonality of feeling among Northerners seems to 
have derived from the relative underdevelopment of their location, as well as having a 
relatively predominant Muslim community in comparison with the South. Northern 
Ghana has very scarce educational resources whereas the best educational 
establishments in Ghana are located in Southern Ghana. Incentives to schooling have 
been rather low, and for several decades after independence, Northerners have been 
entitled to free education as an incentive to educational pursuits. Despite sharing the 
Guan identity with most of Southerners, any combination of the scenario explained 
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above has contributed to the "brotherhood" which has resulted in Northerners 
becoming Mabians. Occupants of Northern Ghana have been accustomed to such name 
calling as "Northerners", or "people from the North", etc. thus lumping citizens living 
in this geographical area into one identity. It nnist be noted, that in terms of citizenship, 
Northerners are no less Ghanaian than occupants of other geographical sections of 
Ghana. Also, the "mabian-ness" of Northern Ghana does not reduce in any way the 
beauty of the tribal diversity which exists in the sub-region, as Table I depicts: 
Table 1: Major tribes of Northern Ghana in their current politico-administrative 
Regions: 
tribe 
1)agomba 
language 
Dagbani 
major city/town 
Tamale, Yendi, 'l'ulon 
regioi 
n/r 
Gonja <ionja Damon o, Salaga n/r 
Nanumba Nanumba Wulensi n/r 
Konkomb 
a 
Konkomb 
a 
Kpandai, Dambai n/r 
Bimoba Bimoba Nakpanduri n/r 
Mam rusi Mani ruli Walewale, Gamba ºa n/r 
Frafra - 
Nabdams, 
Gurunses, 
Talensis 
Nabke, 
Gurunne, 
Talene 
Bolgatanga, Bongo, 
Zuarungu, 
Zorko 
u-e/r 
Kusasi Kusali Bawku u-e/r 
Kasena/Na 
nkani 
(Grushie) 
Kasem Navrongo, Paga u-e/r 
Builsa Builsa Sandema 
Wala Wala Wa u-w/r 
Dagaaba Dagaare Nandom, Lawri, Jira a u-w/r 
Sisala Sisala Tumu u-w/r 
Source - George Atiah Nsoh (see acknowledgements) 
However, despite the fact that Northerners and Southerners share the same citizenship 
in Modern Ghana, the less fortunate history and ecology o1- the area, and the COlllnloll 
Mabian identity thus evolved, has translated into several implications. For example, 
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Northern migrants living in any city, town or village in Southern Ghana often 
coagulate, cluster or ghetto-ise themselves into a common residential area which has 
come to be termed as "Zongo". Second, politics in Ghana seems to treat Northerners as 
second class citizens. The inclusion of Northerners into the political arithmetic only 
seem to occur for the sake of woeing their votes for electoral victories, as happened in 
1979 when the choice of Dr Hilla Limann (a Northerner) as the presidential candidate 
of the People's National Party - PNP, became the crucial factor to the PNP's victory at 
the elections. 
2.6.2 The "Northern" vote 
It would appear that in subsequent years, politicians have tactically cashed in on the 
Northern votes with promises of political favours which have not been forthcoming. 
Therefore, in a pre-election development, discontent was expressed at what appeared to 
be a scheme by the top hierarchy of the ruling NDC to sideline Northerners in their bid 
for the vice-presidential candidacy. The Northerners complained that both past two 
elections in 1992 and 1996 had an Ewe president and an Akan vice-president. As the 
NDC's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections was an Akan-Fanti (John Ata 
Mills), Northerners deemed it as their bona fide right to field their candidate. Alhaji 
Salpawuni Alhassan, Executive member of the Chogo-Tishigu Constituency in Tamale, 
said `the country has got to a stage where we think that the North should be given the 
chance' (Ghanaian Online Chronicle, Vol. 8 No. 83,28/03/00). Hence, all Zongos in 
the country had been put on the alert to fight against the trend in political 
discrimination against Northerners (Ibid). It became obvious, that the general direction 
of Northern votes depended very much on the ethnonational identities of the 
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presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Subsequently, `a union of citizens from 
the three Northern regions and various Zongo communities throughout the country, 
calling itself COZONGO, dared the leadership of the NDC to make the right choice of 
a Northerner as a running mate or face the consequences' (GRi Press Review, 
24/05/00; http: //www. mcglobal. com/History/May2000/24e2000/24eOr. html). 
Obviously, the rationality (Sections 3.1.1 & 3.1.2) behind the ethnonationalism of the 
Northerners, was dictating the direction of their votes. The COZONGO made it clear 
that they were not asking for a favour, and that this was a `genuine demand', owing to 
the immense contribution and sacrifices which Northerners had made to the NDC's 
success (Ibid). Although some power brokers within the NDC were of the persuasion 
that the NDC's vice-presidential candidate should be an Ewe, and had in mind Dr Obed 
Asamoah, since the choice of running mate lay with Ata Mills, the NDC eventually 
bowed to the political pressure of the Northerners, as well as what seemed to be the 
political wisdom of the 2000 electoral season, and selected Alhaji Amidu as the party's 
vice-presidential candiadate. Soon afterwards, the NPP also selected Alhaji Mahama 
Aliu, a Northerner, as the party's vice-presidential candidate. Professor George Hagan, 
the presidential candidate for the CPP also selected Alhaji Ibrahim Abubakr, a 
Northerner, as his running mate, and Goosie Tanor the presidential candidate for the 
NRP also picked Cletus Kosiba, a Northerner, as his running mate. The competition for 
the Northern vote therefore became keener than expected. However, as the NDC was 
popularly approached by Northerners to field a Northern vice-presidential candidate, 
and as it was the first party to do so, it would appear that the NDC's accession to the 
popular Northern request paid off, in that, the party's presidential candidate won most 
of the Northern vote in the first round ballot held on December 7: 50.75%, 52.13% and 
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62.29% for the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West regions respectively (see Section 
6.1 in Postscript). 
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2.7 THE CENTRAL REGION 
With the exception of the Ewes, and a few non-Ewe tribes in the Volta Region known 
as the "Central Togo Minorities" or "Togo Remnants" (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & 
Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178), the majority of Modern Ghana trace their ancestry 
from Dia or Dja in the region between Djenne and Timbuktu. Also, not all people in 
the Central Region are Fantis, or even Akans in the modem Ghanaian sense. As already 
mentioned, a number of the few groups in Ghana who have retained the Guan tag, can 
be found in the Central Region, which is currently and strictly Akan-Fanti territory. For 
example, the Efutu-Guans of Winneba and the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku. Also, the 
area of the Central Region just behind Winneba has been popularly known on 18 
century European maps as AGuana territory (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-80). 
A group of refugees who split from the leadership of Nana Asaman at the time of the 
founding of the Bono Kingdom, moved further southwards through the forest, possibly 
alongside the route of the Afram, a tributary of the Volta, and founded the town known 
as Eguafo. Kobena Amankwa, a grandson of the first Eguafohene founded a village 
called Amankwa-kurom (translated as Amankwa town) between the sea and the lagoon. 
Amankwa-kurom, together with a nearby Afutu settlement at the opposite side of the 
lagoon and built around the same time, jointly became known as `the village of two 
parts', and was named by the Portuguese and Dutch traders as El Mina, as it is called 
today. Another grandson of the first Eguafohene, called Akyene Takyi founded `Little 
Eguafo', which was later called by the Dutch who built their fort there as Komenda, as 
it is still called today. The descendants of another grandson of Eguafohene later 
founded Djabi, and subsequently Shamaa. Tradition has it that among the followers of 
the Eguafo Prince, were a people called Djabi, who according to their remaining 
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ancestors in ancient Djabi in the Djenne area, were among the founders of Wag'du, 
west of Timbuktu, and who later moved to the ancient town of Ghana, staying there 
until 1224. Ancestors of Shamaa also claim to have been Djabi from Walata, a town 
situated 100 miles north of the ancient town Ghana on the great caravan route which 
led to Morocco, and founded by emigrants from ancient Ghana in 1224. A 
Mohameddan people later drove them away, resulting in their return to rejoin some of 
their brothers in Timbuktu. They later moved southwards to Bono-Mansu during the 
reign of Akumfi-Ameyaw (1328-1363), one of the most notable chiefs of Bono. The 
Djabi later left Bono-Mansu to join the Eguafo, and subsequently founded Diabi, and 
Shamaa. An explanation of why the migrant Djabi called their second town Shamaa 
could be because Walata was situated in a region called Chama - or Ghana 
(Meyerowitz 1952, p. 74). 
The Efutu claim to have come to the coast round about the middle of the 14 `h century at 
the foundation of Bono. They claim to have had no matrilineal ruling class and 
therefore elected their chiefs from the Dentzen and Tufua (the organisations of the old 
and young warriors respectively). [As Guans, they are patrilineal, and this is confirmed 
in Ibid, p. 77]. Under the leadership of two brothers Bonde and Gyan, they founded 
Awutu (or called by the Fanti as Efutu). A split from the Efutu led by Edwe and 
Etumpan resulted in the founding of Ogua, now know as Cape Coast. Its large size and 
inadequate drinking water led some of its citizens off to found Dwemma near Mumford 
on the coast, and finally Tumpa or Simpa, now called Winneba, as it is this day (Ibid, 
pp. 74-5). Cape Coast is currently the capital city of the Central Region. The Etsi were 
the first Dja people to have settled along the coast of the Gold Coast. They lived up 
north with the Bono and left the region as a result of famine. As habitual fisherfolk in 
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the "large river" (or Benue River) they followed their fishing career along this river and 
ended up in Nigeria. After being attacked by a people from a north-easterly direction, 
they came to settle in Benin City. After the conquest of Benin City, they came to 
southern Benin, and afterwards moved in a south-westerly direction to found Egya and 
Onyinatsiadze (now known as Anomabu). Kormantse (or Kormantin) was founded by 
Njadum people who had also fled from the Bono area and had also gone through Benin. 
A people of Fante dialect called Asebu (who were neither of Dja nor Akan origin, and 
were "great lovers of fetish", came from Benin and founded Asebu and Moree. They 
are said to have originated from a desert area beyond Northern Nigeria (Ibid, pp. 63-9). 
Their love for fetish can be attributed to having passed through the Benin area, which 
was inhabited by the Ewe, a people very much known for their fetish cults. In the reign 
of the second King of Bono (Akumfi Ameyaw I), a group of Fante disserted the Bono 
folk for a southward direction towards the coast and founded Kwaman near the shore- 
located Saltpond. Kwaman became the capital of the Abuka state. 
After the destruction of Kania by Djakpa sometime at the beginning of the 17th century, 
some Fante (known as the Adminadze Fante) and some Djomo people from Bono- 
Mansu also disserted the city for a southwards direction and settled with the Etsi by 
reason of linguistic similarity, resulting in the joint founding of Mankessim by all three 
groups. A quarrel between the Fante and the Djomo resulted in the latter moving on 
into deeper Etsi country to found Gomoaman (derived from Djomo-na-man). ("Djomo" 
is the Gonja pronunciation, same as "Gyomo" or "Gomel". "Na" means "descendants 
of'. (O)man means "state". The state is now known as Gomoa-Assin. With time, the 
stronger Fante subdued the Etsi over the whole stretch of coast from Akumfi to 
Yamoranza, killed the Etsi chief in process, additionally conquered Afutu, Eguafo, 
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Komenda, and Shamaa and finally founded Anomabu at Onyinatsiadze. When Bono- 
Mansu was destroyed by the Ashanti in 1742, the Fante and Djomo who had remained 
in Takyiman (the second largest city in the Bono Kingdom) had to move away, and as a 
result joined their brothers down south on the coast and finally settled in Akerakurom, 
which they renamed Mankesim. Again, the Etsi in the region were subdued in order to 
achieve this, during several individual battles at Etsi towns including Abakab, 
Aduoagyro, Sunkwaa, Anoo, Bosom Adwi (Atwe) and Gyrakan. Due to geographical 
insufficiency, the Djomo moved on to join their brothers in Gomoaman (Gomoa- 
Assin), and later founded the nearby Gomoa-Adwumako state. The Djomo are also 
among the founders of Bono-Mansu. 
The group of Fante who came southwards later from Bono-Mansu after its destruction 
by the Asante - "the latter-day Fante" - seem to have subdued their brothers at the coast 
as well as the Etsi, and ruled such large capital states as Mankessim (capital 
Mankessim), Nkussukum (capital Saltpond), Abora Dunkwa (capital Abacrampa), 
Abora Abeadze (capital Domenase), Abora Kwamankase (capital Ayiredo) and Akumfi 
(capital Ebirem). Komenda was founded by a group of the "latter Fante" who first 
settled at Kormantin and later moved to Eguafo. The region behind Winneba 
(designated on 18th century European maps as Agwana, Aguna or Agonna), was 
inhabited by Guans from the North. These Guans were first conquered by the Akwamu 
during the 17 `h century, got their freedom after the fall of Akwamu in 1734, and were 
reconquered by the Mbooko from Ahafo in the Brong-Ahafo area. Following the 
capture of the Mbooko by the Asante in the Domaa-Asante war, both the Mbooko and 
the Agwana (or Guans) became servants of the Asante. They later escaped and hid in a 
settlement which they founded known as Kuntanase, near the forest area of Lake 
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Bosumtwe. During the reign of Asantehene Opoku Ware, they were rediscovered, as a 
result of which they moved out of their hide-away settlement to seek refuge in the 
Breman State. There, they founded Nyankurum, near Esikuma, the capital of the 
Breman State. A quarrel which arose between the Agwana (and Mbooko) and the 
Breman resulted in the conquest of Breman, and by this the rest of the towns within the 
Breman State including Kwaman, Asenka, Bobokuma (or Bobikuma), Abodom, 
Nsaban (or Nsabaa), Odabeng (or Odobeng), Brakwa, Akuntanase (or Kuntanase), 
Ochiso, and Okyi. With this large conquest, the Agona State was founded in 1750 
(Ibid, pp. 79-80). Finally, a group of Denkyira, while fighting their way through 
Adanse, joined the "latter-day Fante" at Mankessim, and later broke away to found 
Anyan-Denkyira on the Mankessim-to-Accra road (Ibid, pp. 81-3). Dunkwa is the 
current capital of the powerful Denkyira kingdom which was founded in the central 
forest in 1620 by the Asante. Denkyira was defeated first by the Asante in the famous 
battle at Feyiase in 1701. Subsequently, they migrated to an area adjacent to their 
Akwamu relatives in Wasa-Amanfi, and founded Dunkwa (Ibid, pp. 94-5). Thus, the 
current location of Dunkwa is not the origins of the Denkyira. The original Denkyira 
kingdom came out of the royal line of the Agona (Aguana) clan (Ibid, p. 104). 
2.7.1 The Fanti vote 
As already explained, the NDC's presidential candidate for 2000 (Mills) was a Fanti, 
and soon after his public endorsement as candidate, a Mills Brotherhood Club was 
inaugurated at Winneba in the Central Region by Dr Don Arthur (GRi Newsreel, 
14/03/00). Dr Don-Arthur, a key adviser to Rawlings, is also a Fanti, and one of four 
Fanti key figures in the NDC's cabinet known as the "Fanti Confederacy". A 
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perception had assumed (rightly or wrongly so), that Mills's background could be used 
to whip up Fanti sentiments for the NDC. Panic therefore arose from within the Mills 
camp when Professor George Hagan, a Fanti from Cape Coast, and a lecturer at the 
University of Ghana, also emerged as the presidential candidate for the Nkrumahist 
Convention People's Party (CPP), since this meant a keener competition for the Fanti 
vote (GRi Press Review 14/06/00; 
http: //www. mclglobal. com/History/Jun2000/l4f1000/l4fDr. html). Although Mills is a 
Fanti, and Kufour is Akan, Fantis in the Central Region seemed to be presented with an 
alternative choice in the CPP presidential candidate. Doubtless, anti-NDC-cum-Fanti- 
ethnonationalists preferred Professor Hagan (GRi Press Review 14/06/00; 
http: //www. mclglobal. com/History/Jun2000/14f2000/14mr. html), however, as a 
candidate of a minor party, he was not expected to pull a significant percentage of votes 
away from even his own people, especially if any candidate of the two major parties 
was Akan, or even so, Fanti. 
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2.8 THE WESTERN REGION 
The Western Region of Ghana shares its western border and a thick forest region with 
the neighbouring country and French-speaking La Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast). The 
Western Region is populated mainly by the Nzima, Ahanta, Wasa, Anyi (or Brosa), 
Sewhi and other peoples. Ghana's first president, the late Kwame Nkrumah was an 
Nzima. The Ahanta state was founded by the ruling class of the Evalue people who 
claim to have been among the founders of Eguafo. The Nzima (N'Zi-mba) arrived from 
beyond Kankyeabo in the north of La Cote d'Ivoire, and settled west of Evalue between 
Cape Three Points and La Cote d'Ivoire's border. They also founded Axim, which 
became the capital of the Nzima state. Beyin, the capital of the Western Nzima state, is 
said to have been founded by Asebu from Anweamea. A group of refugees who fled to 
La Cote d'Ivoire from Takyiman after the fall of Bono-Mansu in 1740, later returned to 
the Gold Coast to join the Asebu. Refugees from besieged Bono who had also passed 
through La Cote d'Ivoire country, founded Kabeku, and thereafter Atuabo, which 
became the capital of the Eastern Nzima state. Another group of Fante refugees from 
Takyiman, and of the Asona clan came to live in Wartrain and later Bentenase, both in 
Wasa country. They met the Erzohele people (Nzima from Axim), and together 
migrated seawards to found Miegwina. These latter-day Takyiman refugees also 
founded Asiama based on land given them by their brothers in Atuabo (Meyerowitz 
1952, pp. 84-6). The Wasa-Amenfi State in the south-western forest of the Western 
Region was founded by some refugees of the Akwamu who were defeated in the 
Akyem area of the Eastern Region in 1734 (Ibid, pp. 99). The Aowin (Anyin) State was 
founded by Brosa (Anyi) people from Anwianwia in the Ahafo district. They were 
refugees, and after founding Aowin, moved southwards and founded Enchi, the present 
capital of the Anyin State (Ibid, p. 117). The northern part of the Western Region is 
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dominantly populated by the Sewhi people, forming the Sewhi State which is a 
confederation of three states: Sewhi-Wiawso, Sewhi-Anwiaso and Sewhi-Bekwai. The 
original royal house fled to La Cote d'Ivoire after the Asante defeat in 1743, and their 
descendants still live there. The Sewhi Anwiaso State was founded by refugees from 
Wankyi after the conquest of Wankyi by the Asante in 1740. Sewhi-Bekwai was 
founded as a result of a quarrel which broke out between Wiawso of the Ayoko clan 
and the Sewhis of the Koona clan. The two clans lived together under the jurisdiction 
of Asantehene Osei Yao. Therefore, after the quarrel, they were granted permission to 
leave for Bekwai (Ibid, p. 118). The Western Region's main claim to fame in Ghanaian 
politics is inherent in the fact that the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, an 
Nzima, hailed from there. In comparison with the other tribes, Nzimas are very few. 
106 
107 
2.9 THE GREATER-ACCRA REGION 
The La or Ga Boni, another group of Guan, immigrated into the Gold Coast, towards 
the end of the 16`x' century, after making a detour to Nigeria (Manoukian 1950, p. 13; 
Meyerowitz 1952) and approaching Modern Ghana through the Benin area, and settling 
among the Kpesi aborigines at the mouth of the Volta. Under their chief Okpolaebi, 
they founded, on their own La Doku and La Badi. But together with the Ga Wo and Ga 
Masi, who came with them from Benin, they founded Accra, which soon grew into 
importance (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77). These Guans can be traced to an area somewhat 
north of modem Ghana, from a territory that seem to lie between the White Volta and 
Red Volta and a part of the original Mossi territory north of the "Northern Territories" 
of modern Ghana (Ibid, pp. 77-9). The Ga Boni are Adangbe-speaking people, and 
form part of the Ga-Adangbe group which currently occupies the Greater-Accra Region 
and parts of the Eastern Region of Ghana. 
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2.10 THE EASTERN REGION 
The La or Ga Boni are Guans and aboriginals of Mossi territory. The Kyerepon-Guans 
are also aboriginals of the area around "a" tributary of the Black Volta. (Ibid, p. 78). 
The Anum people founded Senya after 1734 when the Akwamu overthrew the Akyem 
and Akwapem people (Ibid, p. 76). Out of a quarrel between the Ga and La- or Ga- 
Boni, around 1580-1600, the chief of the latter left with most of his people some 30 or 
40 miles inland and founded some 30 odd villages in the hilly country of Akwapem 
including Ahenase, Adiha, Dome, Sokorowanso, Dosu and Kubease. New Late, which 
exists today is their chief town. Around the same period as stated, some La Boni 
families wandered further inland from the coast, and together with some Afutu, 
founded Obutu, near Senya-Bereku. The La or Ga Boni are the actual aborigins of part 
of the Mossi territory further "North" in current Gonja territory between the White 
Volta and the Red Volta. When the Bono and some N'Gwa or Angwa vacated this 
region around 1300 (as a result of the routing by the Bozamfri people from Zamfara in 
Northern Nigeria), they settled with some Kyerepon people beside a tributary of the 
Black Volta. The settlement is still known today as Laboni. [This explanation - 
together with the names - has been given in retrospect, since the time of arrival of the 
Ga Boni from Benin to the coast is towards the end of the 16th century (Ibid, p. 77), 
three centuries after the Bozamfri invasion of Mossi territory. Unless of course when 
the Ga Boni left they first went to Benin and retracted later to the Gold Coast coastland, 
or better still unless they were known as La or Ga Boni when they were at their 
autochthonous region in Mossi territory. If this latter explanation is true, it would mean 
that they have maintained their name throughout their migrations around for three 
centuries before re-entering into Gold Coast territory. This is confirmed in Ibid, p. 79]. 
Some of the Ga Boni, after the "Bozamfri" invasion, went southwards into Gonja 
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territory and settled with the Kyerepon beside a tributary of the Black Volta, others 
joined Nana Asaman's group into founding Bono-Mansu, and others left with the Afutu 
(one of the breakaway groups from Nana Asaman) to the coastal region (Ibid, pp. 77- 
8). 
It would appear that when the Adangbe-speaking and patrilineal Ga Boni, who stayed 
in Gonja with the Kyerepon, strayed from the area and detoured through Benin before 
returning to the Gold Coast, the Kyerepon migrated southwards and settled in Nsawam 
in a town known as Abotoase, about 25 miles north of Accra (which had probably not 
been built then). Louis Wilson also states that the Adangbe-speaking and patrilineal 
Krobos also trace their route as a migration from the direction of Benin and Togo 
(Wilson 1992, p. 12), most probably, after having detoured from Gonja territory. With 
the arrival of the Akwamu people at nearby Anyandawaase, the Kyerepon moved 
inland into the hills of Akuapem and founded the Kyerepon state, a confederation of 
five towns [or Amanonum], and which included Adukrom (the capital), Abonse, Abirin 
(or Aburi), Awukugua (capital of the current Akuapim state) and Odau (Meyerowitz 
1952, p. 79). It is therefore amazing that the "stray Ga Boni" (the former neighbours of 
the Kyerepon in Gonja territory) should also after three centuries, wander around 
through Benin and also come and settle in the same hilly country of Akwapem. It was 
simply the similarity of language (as highlighted in Ibid, p. 77), as well as the common 
patriliny shared by the "non-stray Ga Boni" and the Afutu, which attracted the former 
to join up with the latter to found Obutu and live together. The Afutu came to the coast 
around the middle of the 14`h century (Ibid, p. 74) and the Ga Boni also came to the 
coast towards the end of the 16th century (Ibid, p. 77). Thus, adding the time of the 
quarrel between the coastal Ga and "stray Ga Boni", as a result of which the latter 
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moved inland to join the Afutu (and consequently the Kyerepon state in the same 
Akwapem area), we should be approaching some three centuries, and this corroborates 
the analysis. But, it would also appear that a loophole has not been filled. The Afutu are 
said to be a mixed breed of people originating from different tribes in the "North" 
where there was a "big river" (Ibid, p. 75), and the Ga Boni are also said to originate 
from a part of Mossi territory north of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (Ibid, 
p. 78). If the "big river" is the Niger, then the loophole is not yet explained. If it is the 
Volta or part of it, then that explains it! According to Meyerowitz's explanation, there 
possibly was a Guan State in eastern Bono whose people (according to the traditions of 
Prang and Yeji), regarded themselves as brothers of Late, i. e. the La Boni. Therefore 
since the Kwaman, Kumawu and Agogo people of Asante refer to these Guan as Bono- 
Ntwumu (Nchumu-ru), one may assume that the La Boni were originally a branch of 
the large tribe Guan. Kokofu is deemed as once the site of the Guan capital, and that 
the Guan king, Atele Firempon, lives on the traditions of Kwaman, Kumawu, Agogo 
and Kwahu. Also, the current geographical sites of towns such as Kumawu, Kwaman, 
Agogo, Atonso, Satenso, Atwea and Mampon are all on King Atele Firempon's land. 
Therefore, the Kyerepons are Guans. Guans who have never come under the Dja or 
Akan, have remained a patrilineal people (Ibid, p. 77). Despite any traceability of tribal 
groupings to autochthon or common origins, the evolution of tribal names due to 
migratory reasons, has resulted in the Kyerepon-Guans "remaining" or "emerging" as 
part of the "remnant" or "latter-day" Guan ("in contrast" with the wider Guan ancestry 
traceable to Ancient Ghana territory). The Kyerepon-Guans are therefore only a part of 
the wider Guan ancestry. The Late-Guans were the aboriginals of the region which is 
part of the Mossi territory north of the Northern Territories (Ibid, p. 78), the same place 
where the Afutu-Guans of Winneba and the Ga Boni seem to have come from. 
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Nugent also confirms their autochthonous status in relation to the current geography of 
Modern Ghana. The confusion created by the current restriction of the Guan tag to the 
"remnant" Kyerepon-Guans, Efutu-Guans, Late-Guans, Senya-Guans and Kpesi-Guans 
(Kwamena-Poh 1973; Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-80) - [what I have termed as the Guan 
controversy] - is confirmed by the fact that in 1985, a Festival of Arts and Culture 
which featured `a Grand Durbar of "all Guan communities"', was held in Boso, their 
capital. This festival was meant to hold the political significance that these 
autochthonous Ghanaians had the potential to re-assert an autonomy in Ghanaian 
traditional affairs (Nugent 1997, p. 19). They share a common patriliny with their 
neighbours - the Ewe (Ibid), as well as the Adangbe-speaking Krobos in the Eastern 
Region of Ghana (Wilson 1992, p. 12). Between the two patrilineal societies lies the 
official boundary which splits the Eastern Region from the Volta Region. From the 
autochthonous area up-"North", some Guans moved directly southwards to the coast, 
whilst others wandered around to Benin and re-entered Gold Coast later on. The 
Akwamu State had its capital as Asaremankese (now known as Asamankese), with 
many towns and villages under its jurisdiction, including Apeda (or Apedwa), Apapam, 
Akyem-Asafo, Akyem-Kwaman, Tafo and Mbease. The Akwamu State came to an end 
in 1734 when the three neighbouring and subject Akyem States and their allies rebelled 
and defeated the Akwamu. The three Akyem states are Akyem-Abuakwa (capital Kibi 
or Kyebi), Akyem-Kotoku (capital Oda), and Akyem-Bosome. The two latter states are 
said to have been founded by emigrants from Denkyira (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 99). 
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2.10.1 The Krobo vote 
Regarding pre-election developments, the Krobos in the Eastern Region, a safe 
electoral area for the National Democratic Congress (NPP), known as only second to 
the Volta Region, were said to have shifted camp. The Yilo Krobos defied a heavy 
downpour of rain in order to attend a National Patriotic Party (NPP) election rally in 
the area. Thousands of them, who claimed to have supported the NDC in 1992 and 
1996, had declared an intention `to ignore the NDC's vain promises and test the NPP 
for the next four years come December 2000 elections' (GRi Press Review 02/06/00; 
http: //www. mcglobal. com/History/Jun2OOO/O2f2OOO/O2fDr. html). 
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2.11 THE ASHANTI REGION 
Tradition has it that the Asante royal clan, the Ayoko clan also originates from the 
Timbuktu (Tumutu) area through the Queenmother Nyamkomduewuo who ruled a 
country in the region of Tumutu until it was destroyed by Moslems, as a result of which 
her son left southwards and founded the Bona Kingdom in northern La Cote d'Ivoire 
(Ivory Coast). Bona was later conquered by King Darigudienda of Dagbon (or 
Dagomba) (Ibid, p. 54) sometime in the latter half of the 15 `h century, and who was 
succeeded by his son Bonkane (a product of the Dagomba King Darigudienda and a 
Bona princess). The Kania or Akan (Accany/Acane) people, a Mande people 
originating from the Kumbu Kingdom (one of the confederate states of the Mande Mali 
Kingdom), also came around 1500 to establish political foundations, and as a result of 
this competition, the Dagomba disserted the Bona region. Much later, between 1591 
and 1600, another group of Mande led by Djakpa conquered Bona. Djakpa's son and 
successor, Quattara introduced Islam, as a result of which three princesses left with a 
group each for other territories in the forest area southwards. These princesses and 
other people together established areas such as Kokofu, Juaben, Nsuta and Adman, all 
of which later became part of the Asante Kingdom. Thus, around 1600, the first large 
Akan (or Kania) group settled in Okumanyinase (later corrupted to Kumase) which 
later became the capital of the Asante. 
The Asante grew through a succession of kings from Oti Akenten to Obiri Yeboa to 
Osei tutu and to Opoku Ware. Since the Denkyira controlled vast portions of land, the 
Asante inherited a considerable geographical area by conquering Denkyira State, 
followed with the conquest of the Doma states of Abamperedase, Suman and Gyaman 
by 1730, followed with that of the Akwamu in 1734, and followed with that of the 
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mighty Bono by 1740. Bono-Mansu, the capital of Bono was finally destroyed by the 
Asante in 1742. During the reign of Opoku Ware, Bono was destroyed by the Asante, 
and therefore all the tributary states of the Bono from Banda to Krakye on the Volta 
became Asante territory. The Nta in the north (which was under the Kania kingdom) 
and Dagomba, as well as the three Akyem states were all conquered by the Asante in 
less than 50 years from the founding of the Asante Kingdom by Osei Tutu in 1701. 
However, their imperialistic effort was frustrated by Europeans who lived by the coast. 
The British defeated the Asante in 1900 and the latter was annexed to the Gold Coast in 
1901 (Ibid, pp. 104-11,54-9). The Ashanti Region spans a large forest area suitable for 
the cultivation of cocoa, Ghana's top cash crop. In 1954, an agitation for a rise in the 
producer price of cocoa led to the emergence of a nationalist movement in Kumase 
known as the National Liberation Movement (NLM). This Movement became the 
foundation for the Danquah-Busia political tradition, which represented itself as the 
Progress Party (PP) for the 1969 elections, Popular Front Party (PFP) for the 1979 
elections, and the NPP for the 1992,1996 and 2000 elections (see section 1.3.4 and the 
Glossary of political parties in Appendix II). 
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2.12 THE EWES & THE VOLTA REGION 
Paul Nugent states: 
Out of a list of 28 separate Guan peoples compiled in 1980, no less than 14 were 
from the Volta Region. This included not just the Nkonya, but the Lolobi, 
Akpafu, Likpe, Santrokofi, Bowiri, Logba, Nyangbo, Tafi and Buem - although 
for some reason the Avatime were excluded from the list. This classification was 
a radical innovation in the sense that nobody had previously thought to label the 
so-called "Togo remnants" as Guan (Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, p. 178). 
Nugent writes that the Volta Region is currently not occupied by only Ewes, but also by 
other non-Ewe tribes, who together with the Ewe-speaking peoples, are termed as 
"Central Togo Minorities" (CTMs) or "Togo remnants". The CTMs are found in both 
Ghana and Togo (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178). 
For example, the Likpe encountered the Ewe-speaking Danyi and Wli (by sharing 
boundaries with them), but whereas the Likpe are currently based in Ghana, the Danyi 
are based in Togo. The Togoland hills which harbours the CTMs, straddles the borders 
of both countries (Ibid, pp. 2-3). However, regarding the traditions of origins, there is 
common agreement between Nugent and other authors such as Amenumey and Law, 
that all current occupants of the Region have migrated westwards from an eastern 
location, perhaps close to the heart of Yoruba territory (Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 
1991, p. 26; Nugent 1997, p. 13). The origins of non-Ewes in the Region are debateable 
to a certain extent (Nugent 1997), but the common agreement between these three 
authors leads to the establishment of an important fact, that the Ewes in Ghana do not 
share the same geographical origins with the majority of Modern Ghana. This has 
contributed to the marginalisation of Ewes in Ghana, both historiographically and 
politically. Although, Nugent offers a view that their marginalisation is partly (if not 
wholly) due to the way in which historical knowledge about them has been constructed, 
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he at the same time exercises caution, in that: (a) his view, described by himself as a 
simple deduction, is based on an examination of evidence accumulated over the recent 
past, and also; (b) Nugent is starkly aware of Sandra Greene's findings and argument, 
that the "we-group definition" among Anlo-Ewes is steeped in distant pre-colonial 
evidence (Ibid, p. 26; Greene 1996; Lentz & Nugent 2000, pp. 29-30). Therefore the 
pre-colonial development of the Ewe identity is not to be ignored. As Nugent himself 
states, with regard to CTMs, `there may, therefore, be greater continuities between the 
pre-colonial, colonial and indeed post-colonial periods than is commonly allowed for' 
(Nugent 1997, p. 26). In order to grasp a fuller picture, this thesis has traced the pre- 
colonial history of the Ewe-speaking peoples in the West African sub-region, as well as 
contextually examine how this relates to the politics of the colonial and post-colonial 
periods, thereby establishing its relevance to current politics in Modem Ghana. 
The Ewe-speaking peoples occupied the stretch of land in West Africa from the east of 
modem Ghana (formerly Gold Coast), to as far as the west of Nigeria. This 
geographical region is also termed as the Slave Coast of West Africa. The Ewes 
therefore span the four countries of Ghana and Nigeria, which are English-speaking, 
and Togo and Benin (formerly Dahomey), which are French-speaking (see maps of 
West Afrca in Appendix I). Comparatively, there are less of them in Ghana (occupying 
the region south-east of the Volta river) and in Nigeria (only in the region west of the 
Niger Delta). Their concentration, both numerically and geographically, have therefore 
always been in Togo and Benin. Argyle confirms the location but makes a stricter 
geographical demarcation by stating that the Slave Coast `corresponds to the coastal 
portions' of the four countries (Argyle 1991, p. 14). A confirmation of this and a more 
detailed definition is given by Ellis thus: `the Slave Coast is that portion of the West 
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African coast situated between the Volta River on the west and the delta of Niger on 
the east, the Benin River being taken as the western boundary of the latter, and thus 
extends from about 30' east longitude to about 5 degrees east 8' longitude' (Ellis 1890, 
p. 1). Before and around the period 1890, the inhabitants of the Slave Coast consisted 
of the following tribes and states, commencing with the most westerly, and on the sea 
front: Awuna, Agbosomi, Aflao (or Flohow), Togoland, Geng, Great Popo, Dahomi, 
Kotonu, Fra and Appa, To the north of the above-mentioned tribes and further inland 
are Anfueh, Krepe, Ewe-awo, Agotine, Krikor, Mahi (or Makki), Ewemi and Port 
Novo (Ibid, pp. 5-7). With the exception of the Agotine who speak Adanme, all the 
mentioned tribes speak dialects of the one language Ewe. Among these tribes, 
Togoland and Geng were under German colonial control, whereas Great Popo, Kotonu 
and Port Novo were under French control. Dahomi, Ewe-awo, Mahi (Makki) and 
Ewemi did not seem to be under any specifically-designated colonial control for any 
considerable length of time, although the colonial control and influences over 
surrounding tribes affected them in many significant ways. The rest of the tribes were 
under English control (Ibid, p. 7). According to Ellis, `the boundary between the 
German and French territories is a meridian passing through the west point of the 
island of Bayol, in the lagoon, and runs inland as far north as the ninth degree of north 
latitude' (Ibid, pp. 7-8). According to Amenumey, at the turn of the 20th century, there 
had evolved as many as 120 Ewe tribes or political chieftaincies which (to name just 
the few in south-east Gold Coast and southern Togo) included, eastwards from the 
River Volta, the Anlo, Some, Be, Ge; inland from the coast, the Peki, Adaklu, Ave, 
Tove, Ho, and further inland and north, the Kpando, Watsi and part of Atakpame 
(Amenumey 1989, p. 1; Bukh 1979, p. 15). Despite inter-tribal wars generated mostly 
by economic interests, especially jealousies over geographical salt and fishing rights 
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and control over the slave trade, the Ewe tribes recognised or perceived themselves as 
`one people sharing a common language and social customs' (Amenumey 1989, p. 3) 
or `one nation with a common language, history and culture' (Bukh 1979, p. 18), until 
the advent of colonial rule effected some political separations. According to Law, the 
Ewe in the Volta Region of Modem Ghana were known in pre-nineteenth century 
sources to be called the Krepi. The "Peki" State in the interior of the Volta Region was 
also known as "Krepi" State, however, the name "Krepi" was generically used for the 
whole Ewe group (Law 1991, p. 14). Although the Krepi or Ewe comprised of 
numerous autonomous groups (a fact which confirms Amenumey's statement above), 
they are known to loosely or politically trace or associate their origins to the ruler of 
Notse (Nouatja), a region based `in the interior to the north-east' (Ibid). This same 
Krepi polity also refers to "Anlo" on the coast. East of the interior Krepi/Ewe were two 
groups, the Aja, and Tado - or Sado (Ibid, pp. 14-5). According to Argyle, the traditions 
of origins of the Ewe-speaking peoples were kept by chroniclers whose lives were on 
the line if they made any errors in their accounts, thus ensuring a much less variation 
over time. Argyle recounts about an observation made by Herskovits (1938), that there 
seems not to be any differences between Norris' version of 1789, Le Herrise's rendition 
of 1914 and other variants published in the interim regarding the origins and 
establishment of the Adja-Tado (or Adja-Sado) dynasty (Argyle 1966, p. 2). The royal 
families of the Slave Coast, moving eastwards from the "Krepi", Anlo, Aja, Hula (or 
Pla), Whyte (or Hueda), Allada, Fon (or Dahomey), are all of the same stock as the 
royal dynasty that established Abomey, since all originated from Adja-Tado (or Adja- 
Sado). The people of Adja-Tado are themselves from Ketu in the east and according to 
Argyle, their royal kingship is related to Yoruba peoples. Adja-Tado is said to have 
been established at about 1300 (Ibid, pp. 3-5). Abomey was the capital of Dahomey and 
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Dahomey seems to have conquered Werne, Allada and Whydah between 1710 and 
1730 (Law 1991, p. 17). Sometime before 1600, the ancestors of the royal family of 
Abomey emigrated from Adja-Tado. In one version of the tradition, intercourse with a 
leopard encountered in the forest resulted in the wife or the daughter of the king of 
Adja-Tado giving birth to a son. This miraculous child was called Agasu and became 
the tohwiyo (super-natural founder) of the royal family of Abomey. Other varying 
versions of the tradition of origin also do not miss out on the incipient role of the 
leopard. It is said that either the descendants of the leopard or that of a Yoruba 
magician (who had married a vassal of the King of Adja-Tado) killed the King. 
Irrespective of whoever managed to kill the King of Adja-Tado, the "Agasuvi" 
(meaning, children of Agasu) were led into migration in Allada territory by 
"Adjahouto" (meaning, the one who killed Adja), and settled there. When this leader 
died, he became the tovodun or "deified" ancestor of the "Agasuvi". Owing to this 
leader's superiority over Aida, the tovudon of the natives of Allada, his name became 
"Adja-to-hou-Aida" meaning, "the father of the Adja is greater than Aida" (Argyle 
1966, pp. 4-5). According to Argyle, `the leopard is a common symbol of royalty in this 
part of West Africa, and to assert that they were descended from the animal was a 
claim by the Agasuvi for the right to kingship' (Ibid, p. 5). After settling at Alladah, the 
Agasuvi prospered and dominated the surrounding territory through a succession of 
kings notably Dogbagri, and later occupied the plateau of nearby Abomey. The move to 
Abomey actually occurred after the death of Dogbagri. As the details of the lineage 
unfolds, around 1625, the headship of the Agasuvi, Dogbagri, died and a contest 
between his two sons Dako and Ganhesou ended up in the former becoming the leader. 
Dako is considered as the founder of the dynasty of Abomey (Ibid, pp. 6-7). 
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2.12.1 The Partition versus Ewe irredentism 
British rule over Eweland in the Gold Coast, which began in 1850, did not actually 
encompass all the Ewe-populated regions even as at 1874, until the German presence in 
the Ewe-populated regions of modern Togoland in 1884 posed a threat to both colonial 
parties. A boundary agreement reached and signed between the colonial powers 
effected a split between the Ewe regions. The Ewe states of Anlo, Some, Klikor, Peki 
and Tongu were apportioned to the Gold Coast, and the remaining ones to the German 
Protectorate of Togoland. There were strong protests against the partition (Amenumey 
1989, pp. 3-4) The Germans later lost the Protectorate, and a split of the Togoland 
territory between Britain and France resulted in British Togoland and French Togoland. 
In the meantime, protests about the spilt generated into the Ewe Unification Movement, 
which aimed mainly at bringing the Ewe people under one administration, and also to 
secure the release of the relations of "Gold Coast" Ewes in British Togoland who had 
now come under French administration in French Togoland as a result of the colonial 
split of boundaries (Ibid, p. 1), and furthermore to avert certain developmental 
disabilities suffered by the Ewe `which were directly attributable to the division' of 
Ewes among the two colonial powers (Ibid, p. 47). It appeared that the Ewes generally 
preferred British rule to French rule (Ibid, pp. 12-3). Activities of the Ewe Unification 
Movement eventually led to the formation of an All Ewe Conference (AEC) in June 
1946 (Ibid, p. 43). In August 1946, the AEC protested to the newly-created United 
Nations Organisation (UN) and the British Government about the draft Trusteeship 
Agreement drawn by Britain and France for the administration of the divided Ewe 
territories under the two colonial powers. This protest was disregarded and the colonial 
agreement was approved (Ibid, pp. 46-7). French authorities in Togo campaigned in 
various ways against the unification movement (Ibid, pp. 62-3). It must be borne in 
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mind that British Togoland included certain tribes in its northern territories who were 
non-Ewe, but because the Ewe straddled the boundaries of both colonies, the decisions 
of the formal annexation of British Togoland to the Gold Coast impinged more on the 
Ewe problem than on any considerations of other tribal groupings in the North. In the 
North, the Konkomba of the Gold Coast and the B'moba of British Togoland (Ibid, p. 
337) were not of the same tribe. Under UN General Assembly Resolution 944 (X), on 
15/12/55, the British were ordered to organise a plebiscite in British Togoland `in order 
to ascertain the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants in regard to (a) the union of 
their territory with an independent Gold Coast or (b) separation of British Togoland 
from the Gold Coast and its continuance under trusteeship pending the ultimate 
determination of its political future' (Ibid, p. 259). The plebiscite conducted in June 
1956 resulted in 52% of voters for unification of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, 
and 42% for separation (Ibid, p. 266). Consequently, on 13/12/56, the UN passed 
Resolution 1044 (XI) sanctioning the unification. The annexed territories of Gold Coast 
and former British Togoland soon became independent in March 1957, together as 
Modem Ghana. According to Amenumey, `Since Britain had always administered 
British Togoland jointly with the Gold Coast, the difference between 1957 and the 
period preceding it was one of degree, but not of kind. The problem remained, as 
before, that of the relationship between the Ewe of French Togoland and the rest of the 
territory' (Ibid, pp. 274-5). 
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2.12.2 The climax of irredentist, secessionist and territorialist claims 
Despite the Ewe unification argument, the deterioration of the relationship between 
Ghana's Nkrumah and Togo's Sylvanus Olympio made this impossible as both parties 
infuriated each other with irredentist claims made over one another's territory (Ibid, pp. 
39,337-45; Zartman 1969, p. 82). This was worsened when at independence in 1960, 
Togo began to harbour some of Nkrumah's political enemies by granting them political 
asylum (Ibid, p. 344). Ghana's intention as revealed through its draft Republican 
Constitution in March 1960 was to welcome all peoples outside her borders with any 
racial, family or historical links into an integrated Ghanaian State (Ibid, p. 342). This 
included the Ewes of Togo as well as Agnis from La Cote d'Ivoire (Neuberger 1991, p. 
100) and of course the territories they occupied. With the background of a long- 
standing Ewe unification bid straddling over a territory wider than the newly-created 
boundaries of the two independent states, coupled with the political domination of the 
new Togolese government by Ewes under the leadership of the Ewe nationalist 
Olympio, Togo was `a quasi Ewe nation-state' (Neuberger 1991, p. 100). The tenure of 
pan-Eweist nationalism continued even during the post-Olympio, non-Ewe 
administration of Gnassingbe Eyadema. Togo under Eyadema supported the irredentist 
Togoland Liberation Movement (TOLIMO) activities in Ghana in the period spanning 
the 1970s and 1980s. However, in the absence of an Ewe administration in Togo, it 
would seem that TOLIMO irredentism had lost much of its pan-Eweist sting to what 
appeared as Togolese territorialism (Ibid). Although at independence in 1960 the 
electoral victory of Ewe unificationists in Togo (Olympioists) meant brighter prospects 
for pan-Eweism, the impossibility for Nkrumah and Olympio to reach an agreement on 
a political modus viviendi meant disaster for Ewe unification. In the absence of an Ewe- 
dominated state machinery after the Olympio administration, there was no continual 
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backing of Ewe irredentism by Togolese government. This is mainly because 
Olympioists now came to represent the Opposition in Togolese politics, and their 
wishes would not be carried out by Eyadema's administration. Togolese, pan-Eweist 
irredentism therefore waned as the Togolese state gradually reduced its parental support 
to Ewe unification. In theoretical terms, as Ewe unification ceased to have any de-facto 
state backing, it ceased to become an irredentist movement. Amenumey expresses this 
frustration in both theoretical and practical terms in his summary of Ewe nationalism. 
According to Amenumey: 
Ewe nationalism represented a major attempt to invoke the principles of self- 
determination, but it was limited in its objective. It was neither a typical 
irredentist nor a secessionist movement; nor did it aspire to ethnic sovereignty. It 
wanted Ewe unification but not a separation of the Ewe-inhabited area from the 
existing territorial units to constitute a separate state. What was envisaged was a 
coming together of the territories in which the ewe were comprised (Amenumey 
1989, p. 348). 
It must be noted though, that Amenumey's statement (above) on Ewe nationalism is 
restricted only to the Ewe tribes which occupied the geographical territory of the 
Togolands, and not the original vast Eweland of the Slave Coast ranging from east of 
the Gold Coast to west of Nigeria. But, in addition to any nationalistic drive which the 
Ewe lacked, or could have developed, an argument can be made that the advent and 
threat of colonialism, which resulted in the partitioning of the Ewe sub-tribes, is the 
main factor which militated against the emergence of the vast Ewe territory into a 
nation. Had the Ewe been left alone, national consciousness, and consequently national 
self-determination may have naturally emerged. Prior to colonialism, the cultural 
homogeneity of the Ewe peoples was clearly in shape, even if they were a loose 
collection of chieftaincies, and political formations in Eweland were in the form of 
states of multi-tribal or mono-tribal units, with varying geographical jurisdictions for 
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each state (Amenumey 1989, p. 3; Bukh 1979, pp. 15 & 18; Ellis 1890, pp. 5-8). As it 
were, the chance for the Ewes achieving any real political homogeneity and hegemony 
was disrupted by colonial intervention and the Partition of Africa. This confirms Basil 
Davidson's "wasted years" view and the role of colonialism in disrupting indigenous 
nation-formation processes in Africa. Davidson claims that `wasted years because, in 
every crucial field of life, the British (and of course other colonial powers) had frozen 
the indigenous institutions while at the same time robbed colonised peoples of every 
scope and freedom for self-development' (Davidson 1992, p. 72). Somehow, the 
destiny of the Ewe peoples was determined by colonial politics over and above their 
heads and which they had no control of. Given that `the Ewe sub-tribes had never been 
one political unit' (Bukh 1979, p. 18), and were antagonistic towards each other 
through inter-tribal wars, there is therefore no proof that any nascent Ewe national 
consciousness, political unification and self-determination would have eventually 
constituted into a nation-state. However, the fact still remains that the advent of 
colonialism has prevented history from determining whether or not this would have 
happened. The former President, Jerry Rawlings, is Ewe. Ewes have been referred to in 
the past as being nepotistic and inward-looking [Smock & Smock, 1975, p. 247; Lentz 
& Nugent (eds. ) 2000, p. 24]. In the last three presidential and parliamentary elections, 
the Ewes, who predominate the Volta Region, have massively supported Rawlings and 
the NDC20. 
20 See Volta Region election results in Appendix VIII and Section 6.1 in the Postcript. 
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2.13 A CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONS OF ORIGIN 
2.13.1 Vansina and Owusu 
Inspite of the fact that other academics regard the work of Meyerowitz on Ghana as a 
`systematic account' (Owusu 1970, p. 16) and also as `one of the best works devoted to 
the past history of pre-literate peoples' (Vansina 1965, p. 15), there are other claims 
which discredit it. According to Owusu, Meyerowitz's account on the Agona is a 
mistaken version because she neglected `extant respectable recorded sources' regarding 
the Agona people. According to Owusu, in addition to Meyerowitz's failure to examine 
another account on the Agona by A. B. Ellis (another anthropologist), her `major 
weakness' is inherent in the fact that she also failed to speak to the elders of Nsaba who 
also have another version of the establishment of the Agona State. Nsaba is purported 
to be the seat of the Paramount Chief of Agona until 1931 (Owusu 1970, p. 17). Owusu 
furthermore contends that, in addition to the medium of an interpreter being a 
stumbling block to relating truth, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the elders 
(of Nyakrom) interviewed by Meyerowitz to withold or conceal some information from 
her regarding the defeat of the Agona by the Gomoa-Fante, and the loss of the 
paramountcy position of Agona by Nyakrom to Nsaba. Owusu therefore makes the 
argument that Meyerowitz received a distorted version of events as far as the 
establishment of Agona is concerned. He further argues out the possibility that 
Meyerowitz based the date of the establishment of the Agona State (1750) on her 
observation of the occurrence of the name "Agwana", "Agana" or "Agonna" on certain 
18`h century European maps. Owusu argues that a Dutch map dated 1670 also refers to 
the "Agwanna Kingdom". Additionally, Owusu argues that a quote of A. B. Ellis 
regarding an occurrence on 28 May 1662, that `the King of Aguna, instigated by the 
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Dutch, had plundered their [English] factory at Winnebah' (Ibid, pp. 17-9; Ellis 1893, 
p. 55), also lends weight to the establishment of the Agona State prior to 1750. By this 
and other subsequent observations, Owusu makes the claim that less weight should be 
attached to the works of Meyerowitz on Akan origins. 
Vansina's critique of Meyerowitz's work falls mainly within source criticism and 
methodology. He admits that the innovations by which Meyerowitz arrived at her 
conclusions, and the processes through which she makes her deductions from oral 
sources are very rare indeed. Vansina recognises that the work is a masterpiece 
(Vansina 1965, p. 15). He also views the extent to which Meyerowitz utilises the rich 
sources of traditional specialists like `minstrels, masters of ceremony, royal drummers, 
royal hornblowers, the king's spokesman, his grave priest, his stool-carrier-chief, 
female soulbearers of the souls of the deceased queen mothers, masters of ceremonies 
to the state gods, court functionaries and the administrator of the capital' (Ibid, p. 33), 
as not only a sign of great dedication, but also a demonstration of how specialised the 
duties of the functionaries are. However, he complains, (in a rather incongruous fashion 
to his previous praise), that Meyerowitz `has not attempted to explore the reasons for 
this, nor has she exercised much critical judgement in her handling of her sources' 
(Ibid). A specific example Vansina uses is an account given by Meyerowitz about the 
separation into two of the twin city Beeo-Nsoko which was located in the Banda 
Kingdom (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 46-48). In this account, Meyerowitz claims that the 
two sons of the King of Beeo and the Moslem chief of Nsoko, fell in love with the 
same girl, and in order to settle their jealousies and rage, literally cut her into two 
halves, one for the other, and this "split" thereby led to the destruction of the twin city 
through factional wars and ultimate destruction. According to Vansina, the story 
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(tradition) could have been thematic or proverbial, and therefore Meyerowitz's 
gullibility to the literal meaning of the story as an explanation to the destiny of the 
destruction of the city signifies a `lack of critical judgement' in the `handling of her 
sources' (Vansina 1965, p. 15). However, not being in total disagreement with 
Vansina's assertion and appreciating the point he makes, there seems to be no reason 
given [by Vansina] as to why Meyerowitz should thematize or proverbialize what she 
has been made to understand as literal truth. Also, Vansina does not indicate by what 
"yardstick" Meyerowitz should exercise `critical judgement'. The "barbarity" or 
irksomeness of the story is not a yardstick for claiming its falsity. Nor is there any 
proof that the details of the story or tradition as given did not actually occur. It would 
appear that Vansina's criticism may not be fair. Vansina makes further criticism about 
Meyerowitz's use of onomastics in tracing the origins of various tribes and the 
derivation of tribal names. Vansina criticises Meyerowitz's derivation of the term 
"Guan" form "Illagua" and "Laguantan". He claims that in addition to these names 
being non-existent, their "false" deduction from the Arabic forms "Luvata" and 
"Lewata" make the derivation even more spurious, since no linguistic adducements 
could be derived as evidence to support the ultimate "Guan" derivation (Ibid, p. 16). 
But it is also interesting to note that Vansina does not come up with what he thinks 
constitutes (or should constitute) the meaning of the Arabic forms "Luvata" or 
-Lewata". Also, it would appear that Meyerowitz, does arrive at other tribal names 
from "Laguantan", for example the "Agwana" or (Aguna & Agona), and not only the 
Guan. Therefore this weakens the Vansina criticism. But ironically, the Agona are of 
Guan ancestry. 
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2.13.2 Herskovits versus Ellis 
" Herskovits gives a short critique of A. B. Ellis. He claims that the author did visit 
the places he wrote about, and had actual experience in one of them, (i. e. the Gold 
Coast), but he criticises that Ellis is noted among Africanists for his notoriety in 
`uncritical burrowing from other authors'(Herskovits 1941, pp. 55-6). 
" 2.13.3 Levtzion: 
" Levtzion (1971) suggests that Ghana was a kingdom of antiquity, although the date 
of its foundation is uncertain. He expresses certainty however, over the fact that Ghana 
was located in the "Sahil" (or "Sahel" or "Sahara") - referred to as "`the shore" of the 
huge sea of sand' (as already discussed in Sections 2.3 & 2.5). He infers and concludes 
from this, that Ancient Ghana (and its geographical location) `is to be associated with 
the growth of traffic across the Sahara'. He claims the main item for the traffic was 
gold. He refers to his sources as `Arabic' (Levtzion 1971, p. 120). Sahil is the Arabic 
word for `a shore' (Levtzion 1971, p. 122). This seems to corroborate information from 
Meyerowitz, who maintains that a large chunk of the inhabitants of Modem Ghana 
(especially the Bonos) inhabited a region farther north in the Great White Desert or 
Sarem (Sahara) - `the country of the sand', before moving southwards to the Niger 
area. Sarem is the Akan word for an unvegetative region. According to the preserved 
tradition of the Kormantse and Etsi of Modern Ghana, this desert area was known as 
"Djadu" or "Zaghawa" (Arabic) or "Agwas" (Tuareg) or "Braun" (Tebu). All three 
names seem to be common to the modem Akan who seem to have had a mixed 
ancestry (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 17; 1958, p. 33). Levtzion accepts evidence given by al- 
Sadi, that Ghana was a capital town of Baghana, and the explanatory evidence from al- 
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Bakri in 1067-8, that "Awkar" was a Berber name for a region known as "Wagadu" 
(Levtzion 1971, p. 125). Wagadu seems to be a derivation of Dj adu and Zaghawa, both 
of which mean and stand for the same people (Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8). Both 
Meyerowitz and Levtzion give the zenith period of Ancient Ghana as the 11th century, 
the same century in which it was over-run by Islamic invaders. Although the Islamic 
campaigns begin with the 11th century (Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17), it was not until the 
`the middle of the eleventh century', and precisely 1076, that final conquest by the 
Arabic Almoravids occur (Levtzion 1971, p. 127). The mid-eleventh century is also 
seen as the zenith and crucial period of Islamic campaigning in the Western Sudan. 
Levtzion explains that Ghana of the mid-eleventh century `offered the example of 
resistance to Islam' (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion claim to 
have obtained their information from the same source - the Sudanese Tarikhs or 
Tarikh-es-Sudan (Levtzion 1971, p. 122; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51). Also, al Sa'di (one 
of Levtzion's Islamic oral sources) was a native of Timbuktu (Levtzion 1971, p. 140). 
Levtzion maintains that a king of Ghana resisted Islamic conversion and stuck to his 
ancestral religion (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Meyerowitz also submits that a large 
number of the people of Ghana (including some of the kings) migrated southwards in 
order to avoid compulsory Islamic "conversion" (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51). Hrbek and 
Devisse also argue that the ruler of Ancient Ghana managed to ward off Islamic control 
of his polity, was accommodating to the Almoravid Muslims and maintained excellent 
relations with them, and that, not until Ancient Ghana was conquered by the 
Almoravids towards the end of the 11th century, that it officially went over to Islam 
(Hrbek and Devisse 1988, pp. 357-61). The conquest by the Almoravids therefore 
explains the southward migration of the citizens of Ancient Ghana, as compulsory 
conversion could not be resisted at this stage. 
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2.13.4 Wilks 
Ivor Wilks does rely on the works of Meyerowitz in detailing some ecological 
underpinnings and the geographical location of the Akan and Bono tribes from Ancient 
to Modem Ghana. Apart from the lack of specificity in dates, there seems to be 
corroboration in the fact that some particular tribes in Modern Ghana have originated 
from the Western Sudan. Wilks states that the nucleus of the Gonja kingdom is to be 
found in migrants from Western Sudan (and of Malinke culture) in the mid-sixteenth 
century (Wilks 1971, pp. 344-5). Meyerowitz holds that the current Gonja ruling class 
came to the Black Volta area from Kanagba (Kanga) and Segu in the Western Sudan 
around 1600 (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 54). Wilks lists a number of communities or 
settlements which grew around the Dyula to include the (Akan-speaking) Bron, the 
(Goan-speaking) Dompo and the (Senufo-speaking) Nanfana. Wilks demonstrates 
clearly that the date given by Meyerowitz for the founding of the Bono kingdom is 
unacceptable. Notwithstanding a discrepancy in dates however, the essential trace of 
the Bono and Akan states from the Western Sudan is not disputed. The alternative story 
of Bono people originating from a cave in Takyiman (as supported by Wilks) also 
seems unacceptable, due not only to the impossibility of the account, but also to the 
fact that the evidence of migration from the Western Sudan is too enormous to set aside 
for any ridiculous cave origins meant to substantiate an "alternative autochthonous 
status". It would appear that the discrepancies in dating is only due to discrepancies in 
calendar calculations rather than the essential agreement in accounts regarding the 
origins of the Bono, Akan and other tribes being of Western Sudanese ancestry. 
Nevertheless, Wilks relies heavily on Meyerowitz for other trade and migratory details 
of the Akan and other tribes, and argues for the similarities in the Akan and Bono 
languages, an occurrence, which can be witnessed today. Wilks also argues that the 
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Bono people of Modern Ghana speak Akan languages and practise Akan customs. 
However, he notes that, not only do they utilise Malinke language in performing their 
rituals, but also purify hammers and anvils (instead of ancestral stools) for their rituals. 
Furthermore, he maintains that current Bono masked dancing cults, for example the 
Sakrabundu, are of Malinke origin (Wilks 1971, pp. 355-9). 
It is clear that Wilks' account of the traditions of origin are less rich than that of 
Meyerowitz. For example the Wilks account of the origins of the Akwamu (Wilks 
1971, p. 365) is very sketchy when compared with the Meyerowitz account 
(Meyerowitz 1952, p. 98) which gives not only the origins of the Akwamu, but also 
details of their conquests and failures, relationships with other tribes, associated 
geographical locations, trade patterns and partners, as well as dates. Wilks also 
confirms the Meyerowitz account of the emergence of the Ashanti nation in 1701 
(Meyerowitz 1952, p. 106), the date at which a number of tribes including the Denkyira 
had been conquered and had subsequently transferred their allegiance to the 
Asantehene Osei Tutu (Wilks 1971, p. 370). Wilks maintains that by 1680, the Ashanti 
kingdom had emerged (Ibid, p. 373), however, in view of the fact that there were other 
surrounding tribes who were competing with Ashanti for supremacy in the area, and 
especially, that the war between Ashanti and Adanse in 1680 ended in a stalemate 
(Meyerowitz 1952, p. 109), it is understandable why the emergence of Ashanti as a 
nation is fixed not at 1680 but at 1701, the year by which all surrounding tribes had 
been subdued and had as a result transferred their allegiance to the Asantehene as part 
of the Confederacy of states whose capital was at Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti. The 
battle of Feyiase in 1701 in which the Denkyira were defeated seems to be the deciding 
factor. In addition to the fact that the last opponent had been conquered, the defeat of 
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the Denkyira made way for Ashanti to have access to the Gold Coast. Even the Dutch 
settlers sent an ambassador to King Osei Tutu in 1701 from their headquarters in 
coastal Elmina (Wilks 1971, p. 373). In another example - the origins of the Fante, it is 
also seen that Wilks corroborates the Meyerowitz account. Wilks claims that the 
Borbor (or Bore) Fante came southwards from Bono-Takyiman, defeated the Etsi (who 
already lived south by the coast) and founded Mankessim (Wilks 1971, p. 370). This 
account is already given at least twice separately by Meyerowitz (1952, pp. 68,82). But 
it would appear that this time, Wilks gets his dates wrong. Wilks maintains that the 
Borbor Fante defeated the Asebu in 1707-13, whereas the date given by Meyerowitz for 
this occurrence is 1740. Given: that the Fante lived with the Bono; that it was due to 
the conquest of the Bono kingdom in 1740 which caused the migration of the Fante 
southwards to re-establish contact with the Etsi and Asebu at the coast, and; that both 
the Etsi and the Asebu (former neighbours of the Bono and Fante) were actually living 
at the coast when the Fante re-"contacted" them (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 63-68,82), it 
seems that more authenticity is attributable to Meyerowitz's date than Wilks's. Other 
authors including Acquah, also seem to agree with the Meyerowitz account (Acquah 
1959?, pp. 15-8). Wilks' shaky account is further confirmed by his admission to having 
little knowledge of the Etsi, a people well traced by Meyerowitz (1952, pp. 63-9). 
Meyerowitz's grasp of the traditions of origin is clearly demonstrated, and it would 
appear that her version of events gives a fuller and more detailed picture of the origins 
of the tribes of Modern Ghana. In addition to the fact that many authors rely on her 
account, the actual current geographical distribution of the tribes in Ghana gives 
credence to her version of events, in that, their location matches the exact version as 
given by Meyerowitz, a feat which none of her critics has been able to accomplish. 
Inaccuracies in dating is not only peculiar to Meyerowitz but to the other authors as 
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well, including Wilks. Given that date discrepancies have not in themselves resulted in 
wide dissimilarities in the accounts of origin, and also given that current ethno- 
geographic patterns of the tribes in Modem Ghana corroborate Meyerowitz's account, 
it must be said that her work, although not totally sacrosanct, seems to be more reliable 
than those of her opponents. In addition, her opponents, for example Wilks, also 
exhibit inaccuracies and flaws in dating. 
2.13.5 Manoukian 
Madeline Manoukian, in geographically locating certain tribes in Modem Ghana, 
confirms various sections of the Meyerowitz account. According to Manoukian: 
The evidence at present available shows that the Akan did not arrive in the far 
north of what is now the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast before the 
eleventh century. In the coastal zone, the Etsi, who regard themselves as 
`brothers' of the Bono, a branch of the Akan, claim to have been the first settlers 
in the region, and their arrival can be dated at the beginning of the thirteenth. 
Their tradition has it that they met some Brossa people in the Central coast area, 
ancestors of the modem Brossa or Aowin. These appear to have been the first 
Brossa to have been driven from their home, north-west of the Gold Coast forest 
belt, by the invading Akan from the Niger bend in the eleventh century. Etsi and 
Brossa were followed from the beginning of the fourteenth century by Bono 
(Brong) Fanti, Guang (mostly under Akan domination), by Afutu from the 
Northern Territories and beyond, and by the Asebu and Ga-Adangbe from 
Nigeria. The forest zone was not occupied by the Akan proper before the end of 
the fifteenth century, when the arrival on the coast of the first European settlers, 
the Portuguese, brought prosperity through trade in gold and slaves (Manoukian 
1950, p. 13). 
The above quote from Manoukian goes to confirm the following facts: (a) that the 
Akan began to move towards Modem Ghana from the Niger Bend during the 11`h 
century as a result of the Islamic invasion of Ancient Ghana (as already confirmed by 
Levtzion, Meyerowitz and Hrbek & Devisse); (b) that the Etsi were the first of the Dja 
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tribes to settle in the Northern Territories, and that whereas some of their Bono, Fante 
and Afutu "brothers" moved directly southwards to the coast, some of the Etsi detoured 
to Nigeria and returned to the coastal regions of Modern Ghana through Benin 
(Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 63-4); (c) that although the Etsi were the first tribe from the 
Niger Bend to settle in the Northern Territories (at the beginning of the 13th century), 
the first of the tribes to become a state was the Bono, founded in 1295; (d) that some 
Guan, Afutu and Asebu people (who had settled in the Northern Territories) also 
detoured through Nigeria and later approached the forest and coastal regions of Modem 
Ghana through Benin (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 66-9), and; (e) that the Ga-Adangbe are 
people of Guan ancestry who migrated from the Northern Territories, detouring 
through Nigeria and approaching the coast of Modem Ghana from Benin (Meyerowitz 
1952, pp. 77-9). Further evidence from Manoukian also confirms sections of the 
MeyeroWitz account. Manoukian confirms that the Guans lived in the Northern 
Territories, and that most Akan are of Guan ancestry, including Akans in the Akwapim 
area and Efutu in current Fanteland (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-7). This can also be 
sifted from the quote below: 
The Guang (Gbanya) are the northern neighbours of the Akan peoples, and small 
pockets of Guan-speakers are found in the Akan area, for example in a number of 
small towns on the Akwapim ridge, at Krachi, and at Efutu in Fanti country. The 
eastern neighbours of the Akan are speakers of the `Togo remnant languages', 
and the Ewe, and their south-eastern neighbours are the Ga Adangbe peoples 
(Manoukian 1950, p. 9). 
134 
135 
2.13.6 Daaku 
The works of other Ghanaian authors in the tracing of the traditions of origins through 
oral tradition and other pieces of evidence can also be discussed. K. Y. Daaku has some 
works on the Sefwi and Denkyira (Daaku 1974 and 1970) respectively. His account of 
the Sefwi people tends to be highly consonant with that of Meyerowitz. With regard to 
names and the political structure, Daaku presents Sefwi-Wiawso, Sefwi-Anwiaso and 
Sefwi-Bekwai as three mutually independent paramountcies of the Sefwi people, 
whereas Meyerowitz presents Sefwi generally as a confederation of the three states 
mentioned by Daaku (Daaku 1974, p. v; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 117). Also, although on 
this occasion the Daaku account seems to be more elaborate, it would appear that the 
Meyerowitz account is a very sharp, concise and brief summary of the same events 
narrated by Daaku. Both Daaku and Meyerowitz agree to the roles played by Ashanti 
and Denkyira, as well as the chronology. For example they are both consonant on the 
fact that: (a) the Sefwi-Wiawso people (of the Ayoko clan) are of Asante descent or 
were propped up by the Asante; (b) the Sefwi-Anwiaso people (of the Asona clan) are 
descended from Wankyi, and; (c) that the Sefwi-Bekwai people (of the Koona or 
Ekoona clan) are descendent from Adanse in Ashanti. Daaku asserts that the last phase 
of the Denkyira imperial campaigns could be pinned down to the period from 1680 to 
the end of the 17`h century, and Meyerowitz also gives 1690 as a specific date of a 
particular Denkyira campaign led by Ntim Gyakari against the Sefwi-Bekwai (Daaku 
1974, pp. vii-x; Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 117-8). Although Daaku's account seems to be 
more authoritative, in that it is more elaborate, the account has a few factual and 
structural incoherences. For example, in his introduction, Daaku claims that the Aowin 
people, the aboriginals of the current Sefwi territory were very scanty and therefore 
adopted an open door policy of welcoming and harbouring other migrating tribes in 
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order to increase their population. However, evidence in the Daaku account of wars 
between the Aowins and Sefwis and other neighbours tends to discount this "open door 
policy" (Daaku 1974, p. 10). This makes it even more confusing as regards Daaku's 
theory of the etymology of the word Sefwi (Sehwi) as "Esa-wie" or Esa-hie", meaning 
"war is over" (Daaku 1974, p. vi). On the whole, looking at the fact that the publication 
dates of the Meyerowitz and Daaku accounts are 22 years apart, and also that they both 
consulted with different people (but from the same royal household), it is remarkable 
that they should both end up with such astounding similarities in account. This not only 
confirms the importance of the Meyerowitz account, but also lends some credence to 
traditional oral sources as important data sources. Daaku's account on the Denkyira 
(1970), which is also based on oral tradition, does not seem to differ in substance from 
the accounts of Meyerowitz and other authors. 
2.13.7 Wilson 
Louis Wilson states that any suggestion that the origins of Ghanaian groups are 
traceable `from as far away as the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia' (Wilson 1992, 
p. 12), is far-fetched, if not false. However, Wilson argues that the variation of the 
traditions of origin which suggests a migration from the Chad-Benue region, has some 
validity (Ibid). 
136 
137 
2.13.8 Nugent 
Paul Nugent puts forth a thesis that the non-Ewe occupants of the Volta Region, and 
perhaps even the so-called Akan tribes in the Region, altogether described as the 
"Central Togo Minorities" (CTMs), have a pre-colonial history which seems to be 
more related to Ewes than Akans (Nugent 1997). Geographically, the CTMs `are 
presently to be found strung out along the Togoland hills on either side of the 
international border' of Ghana and Togo (Ibid, p. 2). He also shares, with Amenumey 
and Law, the common Ewe tradition of migrating westwards from an eastern Yoruba- 
related location (Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 1991, p. 26; Nugent 1997, p. 13), thus 
confirming the clear distinction between the origins of the Ewes as against the majority 
of Modem Ghana. Nugent and Law both agree on the Yoruba connection, as well as 
Ketu being a major location or springboard in the migratory route of the Ewes, but 
differ on the next destination from Ketu. Nugent has this as Notse, whereas Law's 
rendition of events points to Tado, and later on to Notse. Nugent attributes this 
difference in renditions to `nothing more than a difference of oral traditions amongst 
the Aja-[Tadol/Ewe sub-groupings' (Nugent 1997, p. 13). It is clear from Amenumey, 
Law and Nugent (and others) that the Ewe/Krepi groups in the Volta Region are linked 
to Notse, but the link between the CTMs and Notse is not clear from Nugent's paper. 
Nugent draws distinctions between the various tribes within the Volta Region based on 
linguistic nomenclature, self-defined by these tribes. However, he is also aware of the 
dangers inherent in using language as the criteria of distinction, in that, languages can 
be learnt over time, thus masking actual tribal roots. He cites the example of the Yikpa, 
a currently Ewe-speaking people who may have been speaking Sekpele about a century 
ago (Ibid, p. 3). Still on linguistic nomenclature, Nugent further reiterates that, although 
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the general pattern of colonial historical discourse identified "tribes" as the main unit of 
group analysis, the autochthonous status accorded the CTMs was based on linguistic 
evidence (Ibid, p. 6). Given that, what exactly is autochthonous about this linguistic 
evidence is not explained, the validity of the assertion that the CTMs are/were 
autochthonous is somewhat shaky. 
Nugent's oral sources on the Likpe (or Bakpele), especially what culminates into the 
"Atebubu tradition" (Ibid, pp. 9& 14), are to be cautiously considered, in that, the 
authenticity is based on the weak assumption that what Linguist Udzu says is true. 
There is also a contradiction or confusion in what appears to be Rattray having 
accepted the "Atebubu tradition" about Likpe, but at the same time `apparently not 
taken in by it' (Ibid, p. 14). It is noticeable that Nugent accepts a piece of oral tradtion 
collected by Rattray (Ibid, p. 4), but should be skeptical about the piece of oral 
evidence given to Rattray by Linguist Udzu (Ibid p. 14) - there is no evidence of an 
established criteria for discriminating between the two. The evidence gleaned from 
Nugent's paper is that the Likpe tradition is not yet settled (Ibid, p. 12) because of 
competing histories (Ibid, p. 26). 
2.13.9 Kwamena-Poh 
Kwamena-Poh makes an essential contribution to the traditions of origin, especially 
those of the few, current Guan-speaking groups. He also refers the origins of the Guan 
to a "Niger-Congo family", and links the Guan language to some Akan dialects such as 
Fanti and Twi (Kwamena-Poh 1973, p. 12). However, it would appear that Meyerowitz 
is the source of the more substantial, wider and far-reaching traceability and etymology 
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of the people and word "Guan" respectively. Meyerowitz claims her sources include 
the tradition of the Late-Guans (Meyerowitz 1952). As Kwamena-Poh is himself an 
Akuapem Guan, and has been deemed as having an interest in the rendition of the 
accounts of the "latter-day" Guans (Africa 67, (4) 1997, p. 509), it would appear that in 
addition to any views between his work and that of Meyerowitz, the main distinction is 
that Meyerowitz successfully deals with both the issue of a wider inclusive and latent 
Guan ancestry, as well as the current and remnant Guan tag. 
2.13.10 Gilbert 
Michelle Gilbert's entrance into the debate is made by his attempt at drawing a hard 
and fast line between a Guan patriliny and Akan matriliny (Africa 64 (1) 1994, p. 100; 
Africa 67 (4), 1997, pp. 501-2). However, as already explained in Section 2.4, this 
distinction is not universalistic. Although Guans are originally a patrilineal people, 
there are some who have entered Akan territory or mixed with Akans and have become 
matrilineal. Guans who have never mixed with the Dja or Akan, or been under their 
jurisdiction, remain patrilineal (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77), for example the Kpesi-Guan. 
Also, some Guans who have encountered Akan have maintained their patriliny, for 
example the Late-Guans and Kyerepon-Guans. The Efutu-Guans of Winneba are 
currently struggling between patriliny and matriliny owing to proximity with the Akan- 
Fantis. However, the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, who were previously patrilineal, 
have converted to matriliny (Ephirim-Donkor 2000; Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76 & 79). 
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2.13.11 Ephirim-Donkor 
Like Owusu and Vansina (in Section 2.13.1), Ephirim-Donkor also has a bone to pick 
with Meyerowitz. He claims that `the 1530 date offered by Meyerowitz as the founding 
of Winneba is incorrect' (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 22) and that `the fundamental flaw 
in Meyerowitz's study was the distorted information provided to her by the deposed 
king, Ayirebe Acquah III' (Ibid). Ephirm-Donkor argues that Meyerowitz was used by 
this king as a channel of misinformation to propagate a new political order through 
matrilineal succession, something which contravenes the Efutu past, and is a major 
contributor to the continued political conflict in Efutu. Despite any discrepancies in 
accounts, some of Ephirim-Donkor's arguments [for example, that Bonde and Gyan 
were not brothers, and/or that Edwe and Etumpan were one and the same person (Ibid, 
pp. 22-3; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 75)] do not essentially discount the import of 
Meyerowitz's message that the Efutu originally had a patrilineal ruling class, and as a 
people, have migrated through the centuries to their current location Winneba. 
Ephirim-Donkor confirms this, but would not forgive Meyerowitz for communicating 
the erroneous view that Efutu kings were elected from the militia or dentzen (Ephirim- 
Donkor 2000, p. 24; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 75). Readers must bear in mind that Ephirim- 
Donkor is no ordinary Efutu, but is also Nana Obrafo Owam X, the traditional ruler of 
Gomo Mprumem. Therefore, like Kwamena-Poh of the Akuapem (Section 2.13.9) a 
totally impartial interest in the sensitive issues of Efutu cannot be attributed to him 
even if his account is to be considered superior to that of Meyerowitz as far as Efutu 
history is concerned. Ephirim-Donkor also traces the Efutu-Guans of Winneba to 
Timbuktu (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 8,25-7) and confirms the Ghana hypothesis 
(Section 2.2). Moreover, his book sheds light on the Guan controversy, the identity 
crisis of some Efutus as to whether they are Guan and/or Fanti, and the evolutionary 
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struggle of the Efutu political and social system between patriliny and matriliny (Ibid, 
pp. 2,10 & 13). 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design And Methodology 
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3.1 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FORMULATION 
3.1.1 "Politics-of-the-belly" 
"Politics of the belly" is a Cameroonian political phrase which summarises a status quo 
of unequal distribution and accumulation of public opportunity and wealth, aptly 
described by the term "figuration" burrowed by Jean-Francois Bayart from Norbert 
Elias (Elias 1978, p. 130), in which a system of social inequality operates through the 
political interdependence of allies (or opponents) within the political arena, along tribal 
or clientelistic contours, and supervised by the State (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55). In 
simple terms, the patron-client relationship operates such that, the holders of political 
power within the state (patrons) ensure that their supporters (clients) are rewarded 
within a framework by which state resources are accessed and appropriated as personal 
tribute along the circuit of corruption and reciprocity. Politics-of-the-belly operates 
within the backdrop of the characteristic personalized and traditionalised political 
arrangement termed as patrimonialism, a system whereby the holder of political power 
or `the ruler allocates political office to his clients on the basis of patronage, rather than 
according to the criteria of professionalism and competence which characterize the 
civil service' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 6). In patrimonialism therefore, there does not 
seem to be a clear cut demarcation between the private and public spheres of allocation, 
distribution and administration, and the clientele utilises political attention in 
distributing state resources to their benefit instead of restructuring society and bridging 
class gaps. Subsequently, in its advanced form, neo-patrimonialism is the term which 
describes `the personalized character of African politics, in which formal constitutions 
and organizations are subordinate to individual rulers (the president or "big man") ... 
' 
(ROAPE 1998, No. 76, p. 235). The term neo-patrimonialism has assumed an approach 
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which `seeks to make sense of the (real or imaginary) contradictions to be found in the 
state in sub-Saharan Africa ... and accounts for the undeniable fact that the public and 
the private spheres largely overlap. Second it helps to explain in which ways the 
operation of a political system is no longer "traditional" - hence the weight of the 
prefix neo' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 9). To underscore its murkiness is the 
dangerous precedent that `criminal activities can serve the patrimonial purposes of 
patron-client relationships' (Ibid, p. 79), and that perhaps this situation is given support 
by the irony that `there has always existed in Africa a wide range of activities (such as 
corruption) which, although illicit from a strictly constitutional point of view, have 
been regarded as patrimonially legitimate by the bulk of the population' (Ibid). The 
murky, shadowy and indistinctive nature of the private and public spheres render the 
successful emergence and subsequent operation of civil society a difficult task. Civil 
society has been defined as `an intermediate layer of associational structrures 
occupying the space between the state, on the one hand, and ethnic and kinship 
networks, on the other. In this conception, civil society refers to the organisations and 
interests which act to influence public policy and moderate the authoritarian tendencies 
of both community and state' (ROAPE 2000, No. 85, p. 432). It has been argued that 
`the notion of civil society would only apply if it could be shown that there were 
meaningful institutional separations between a well organized civil society and a 
relatively autonomous bureaucratic state' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 17). 
Although it is an interesting fact that corruption, politics-of-the-belly and forms of 
patrimonialism are not unique to Africa (ROAPE 1998, No. 76, p. 237), it must be 
noted that the roots of clientelism and African presidentialism are located in a 
combination of the nature of colonial development, the transition from colonialism, as 
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well as the performance of the post-colonial state within international stipulations 
(ROAPE 2000, No. 85. pp. 428,430 & 432). But even more note-worthy, and perhaps 
the lesson to be learnt by Africa, is the fact that the experience of Japan and the other 
"Asian tigers" proves that development can occur irrespective of corruption and 
clientelistic patronage. It would appear that the difference between the Asian and 
African experience is that, Asian patrmonialists reinvested their booty locally and 
nationally, whereas their African counterparts often dissipated their wealth in local 
ostentation and stached their financial wealth in Swiss and other foreign banks (Chabal 
and Daloz 1999, pp. 106-8). 
Given the `dependence of accumulation and class formation on state power and public 
resources (RAOPE 2000, No. 85, p. 429), and that `clientelism in this sense represents 
a politics of class domination as distinct from a politics of class struggle ... a means of 
enabling propertied classes to legitimate their political dominance' (Ibid, p. 435), the 
critical question poses whether politics-of-the-belly is an essential stage in economic 
accumulation in Africa. Obviously it is only essential for the purposes of the selfish 
accumulation of assets to the advantage of those who hold political power, however, 
such economic accumulation (or the misappropriation of state/public wealth by a 
private few) does not necessarily denote economic accumulation for the continent, nor 
has it proved to offer Africa an economic advantage over the other continents. The 
phenomena of the politics-of-the-belly and the associated misuse of state resources as 
well as bad governance, are not essential for the economic development of Africa, and 
have been aptly termed by Rene Dumont as the `False Start in Africa' (Dumont 1966). 
Dumont states that, together, these phenomena `remain large obstacles to the realistic 
policies which alone can produce essential socio-economic revolutions' (Ibid, p. 292). 
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As far back as the mid 1960s, Dumont had already identified Ghana (among other 
countries on the African continent) as an example of where `the dichotomy between 
progressive economic development and destructive misuse of resources can be seen 
most vividly' (Ibid, p. 293). 
3.1.2 Ethnonationalism versus political nationalism 
To understand the true nature and pattern of nationalism and politics in Ghana, one 
must come to appreciate the stark reality, that there is a fundamental difference 
between the ideals within the theory of political nationalism and what actually occurs 
in practice. To explain this, it is important to highlight the conflict between the two 
theories of ethno-nationalism and political nationalism. Ethnonationalism (sometimes 
referred to as cultural nationalism), is a form of nationalism based on feelings of shared 
or common ethnicity (Kellas 1991, p. 51) and derived from members of similar tribal, 
ethnic or national group. This form or theory of nationalism, which derives from 
Herder, ` ... perceives the nation as a natural solidarity endowed with unique cultural 
characteristics' (Hutchinson 1994, p. 42), hence the term cultural nationalism. Political 
nationalism (also known as official nationalism or civic nationalism), on the other 
hand, focuses on rationality and citizenship rights, or `the belief in reason as the ethical 
basis of the community ... 
' (Hutchinson 1994, p. 43). It is essentially the nationalism 
of (or towards) the state, encompassing all those legally entitled to be citizens, 
irrespective of their ethnicity, national identity and culture' (Kellas 1991, p. 52). Thus, 
political nationalism has more to do with expressions of patriotism towards the state 
than to a particular identity group, within a multi-ethnic or multi-national state setting 
(Ibid). Hutchinson aptly states that, `of course, this is a cosmopolitan conception that 
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logically looks forward to a common humanity transcending traditional differences' 
(Hutchinson 1994, p. 43). Theory postulates an antagonistic relationship between 
ethnonationalism and political nationalism. Ethnonationalism is deemed to undermine 
political nationalism and vice versa, in that, one should advance at the expense of the 
other. Whereas ethnonationalism arises essentially out of ethnic or national affiliation 
and considerations, political nationalism should arise out of supposed rational, non- 
ethnic and non-national choices and attitudes towards the cosmopolitan state. 
Therefore, within a state of multiple identity groups such as Ghana, a conflict of 
interest would exist among political attitudes, aims and choices for multi-party 
democracy and electoral politics. The idea of political nationalism seems to be an 
imposition on the will of adherents to cultural nationalism, and the conflict or tension 
between the two political attitudes could not have been better encapsulated by the 
statement below: 
In contrast, for cultural nationalists the state is at best, accidental, and is 
frequently regarded with suspicion as a product of an over-rationalist ethos that 
seeks to impose a mechanical uniformity on living cultures. Rejecting the ideal of 
uniform citizenship rights as the basis of solidarity, cultural nationalists perceive 
the nation as a differentiated community, united not by reason or law, but by 
passionate sentiments rooted in nature and history. According to this organic 
conception found, for example, in Herder, humanity, like nature, is infused with a 
creative force that endows all things with an individuality. Nations are primordial 
expressions of this spirit; like families, they are natural solidarities. Thus the 
Slovak poet, Kollar, contrasted the formal allegiance due his state with the 
instinctual loyalty he offered his cultural nation. Cultural nationalists demand that 
the natural divisions within the nation - sexual, occupational, religious and 
regional - be respected because the impulse to diversity is the dynamo of national 
creativity (Hutchinson 1994, p. 44). 
It must be noted however, that within the context of African politics, in which the 
"politics of the belly" is pervasive (Bayart 1993), political rationality, reasonableness or 
ethicality, as enshrined in the theory of political nationalism, could be different from (if 
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not the opposite of) the meaning portrayed by the Hutchinson and Kellas definitions, 
and that for some Ghanaians, political rationality is found in, and demonstrated by, 
making political choices which would best serve the calculated interests of their 
ethnonational group. Their rationality is embedded in the argument that the 
pervasiveness of the "politics of the belly" leaves them with no other preference than to 
make political choices geared at placing their group in state control, as this would serve 
their best interests, and by extension that of the state. As confirmed by Hameso, `for as 
long as the state engulfs society, ethnic strategy is but a legitimate response. 
Participation as it is, it remains available, prone to use and abuse' (Hameso 1997, p. 
41). Where "politics of the belly" is the status quo, this seems not a selfish attitude, but 
rather, the rational way to go. It means that in the political rationality of Ghanaian (or 
African) reality, for some, ethnonationalism is the patriotism towards the state. For this 
group of people, being an ethnonationalist is the true/right way of being a political 
nationalist. If one's interests would be best served when the status quo is controlled by 
one's ethnonational group, it falls within the rationality of the individual, to ensure that 
one's political preferences are skewed towards that which reflects the identity interests 
of one's group. Therefore, within the contextual background of "politics of the belly", 
ethnonationalism becomes equated with political nationalism. Therein lies the paradox 
between theory and reality. 
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3.1.3 Tribalism versus ethnonationalism 
Before discussing any distinction between tribalism and ethnonationalism, and the 
complexity of their dual existence within the melting pot of politics, it is worth 
pointing out, that contrary to the usual narrow restriction of tribalism to Africa by 
Western authorship and discourse (Curtin et al 1978, p. 579; Hameso 1997, p. 8) and 
the comparatively widespread application of the term to African examples, the 
occurrence of tribalism is just as universal across the globe as the existence of 
ethnonational groups (Hameso 1997, pp. 4-5), and that, not only is tribalism not 
peculiar to Africa, but also synonymous with nineteenth century European nationalism 
(Davidson 1992, pp. 74-5), and indeed twenty-first century European nationalism, and 
elsewhere across the globe. As stated in the New Ulster Movement (NUM) Publication 
No. 921, negative ascriptions of one identity group against the other in the Irish 
identities crises, which has its roots from as far back as the 12`h century, is termed as 
tribalism. In Northern Ireland, there has been `a Catholic tribalism, an Anglican 
tribalism and a Presbyterian tribalism, which has further degenerated into "Catholic" 
and "Protestant", "Orange" and "Green"'22 
The distinction between tribalism and ethnonationalism is sometimes also blurred, thus 
contributing to the complex nature of issues of identity politics. It would appear that, 
the evolution of terminological usage has assigned ethnonationalism to the 
demonstration of partriotism towards one's ethnonational group, and tribalism to the 
negative usage and/or manipulation of ethnonationalistic potential for controversial 
purposes. The distinction can be more or less reduced to the respective use and abuse 
21 New Ulster Movement. Tribalism or Christianity in Ireland?, NUM, 1973 (Publication No. 9), p. 7. 22 [bid. 
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of ethnonational identity. Therefore, whereas diversity in political participation, and 
quests for national self-determination or autonomy, are deemed as demonstrations of 
ethnonationalism, "politics of the belly" (Hameso 1997, p. 40), and/or the manipulation 
of ethnonational identities for electoral or other political purposes are deemed as 
tribalistic. The scenario becomes even more complex and confusing, in that, politicians 
often tend to malign legitimate expressions of political diversity, ethnonational self- 
determination and autonomy, as tribalism, with the intent to repress the former 
(Hameso 1997, pp. 38-43). As the term itself is ab-used, it has become the case, 
therefore, that prescription of tribalism occurs by both an abuse of ethnonationalistic 
potential, as well as for cat-calling purposes. 
Since Ghana's independence in 1957, the nationalistic expressions of Ghanaian citizens 
towards the state have reflected the paradox of theoretical conflict between 
ethnonationalism and political nationalism on one hand, and the practical reality of 
their equal status, on the other. The patterns of ethnonationalism in the country's 
politics, especially in electioneering and multi-party democracy, confirms this paradox. 
Although, in the immediate pre-independence period, ethnonationalistic expressions 
were made towards regionalisation and/or federalisation in Ashanti, the Northern 
Territories and Trans Volta Togoland [Allman 1993; Lentz & Nugent (eds. ) 2000, p. 
22], the anti-colonial nationalism promoted and strengthened political nationalism, in 
that, country people fought for a common aim - (independence for the whole country) - 
irrespective of citizens' individual ethnonational identities. Perhaps the fact that the 
anti-colonial nationalism was unified under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who 
was Nzima, and whose ethnonational identity was not of the aforementioned 
contentious locations, helped submerge ethnonationalism. However, in the post- 
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colonial era, identifiable patterns of both ethnonationalism and/or tribalism have 
resurfaced. For example, in the last elections of 1996, the Volta Region, which is 
predominantly Ewe, voted en masse - 94.5% for the Ewe Rawlings (Nugent 1999, p. 
306)23. In another example, the main Opposition party - the New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
- is dominated more by Ashantis than any other identity group, owing to its Ashanti 
foundations, although this view is not generally accepted by some of the party's 
prominent members24. These patterns of tribalism and ethnonationalism shift or change 
in variation with the socio-political context. As patterns of ethnonationalism in voting 
behaviours echo from the political context and the issues at stake, it has become clear 
that ethnonational allegiance plays a definite role in party politics and electioneering. 
For example, in addition to qualities, the ethnonational identity of a presidential 
candidate is a major influence over voter decisions. Negative ethnonational ascriptions 
can primarily disqualify politicians from being candidates, or ultimately take away 
votes if they became candidates. For example, during the 1979 electioneering 
campaign, the late Victor Owusu (died December 2000), an Ashanti political 
heavyweight from the Danquah-Busia political tradition and prospective presidential 
candidate, who once made an undiplomatic assertion against Ewes, alienated himself 
from many non-Akan prospective voters (Nugent 1995, p. 224). Victor Owusu was on 
record to have made a pronouncement in the Parliament of the Second Republic of 
Ghana, along the lines that, Ewes were inward-looking25 and nepotistic [Smock & 
Smock, 1975, p. 247; Lentz & Nugent (eds. ) 2000, p. 24]. In another example during 
the same 1979 electioneering campaign, the choice of a Northerner as the presidential 
23 Statistical details of the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections are provided in Appendix Vill. 
24 See transcript of my interview with the NPP Member of Parliament for Tema, Mr Ossei Aidoo, in 
Appendix IX. 
2 The response of the NPP Member of Parliament for Tema, to my unstructured interview with him 
(Appendix IX), also seems to reflect this view, a possible indication that the source of the view may be 
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candidate contributed immensely to the Peoples National Party's (PNP) victory which 
swept the late Dr Hilla Limann into the presidency. A large proportion of the votes 
from Northern Ghana were cast in favour of the PNP since Limann, a Northerner, was 
the party's candidate. A current demonstration of the complexity of the dual occurrence 
of ethnonationalism and tribalism is what seems to have contributed to the strategic 
decision-making of the vice-presidential candidates of the NDC, NPP, CPP and NRP, 
as discussed in sections 2.6.2,2.7.1 and the Glossary in Appendix II. At the same time 
as Northerners demonstrated ethnonationalism by campaigning for the vice-presidential 
slot (of the NDC for example), the intentionality of any party in considering a Northern 
vice-presidential candidate, was the hope of manipulating Northern votes into their 
political baskets at the election -a demonstration of tribalism. Or one can equally 
argue that Northerners have been manipulating their ethnonational identity to their 
political advantage - also tribalism. It is fair to pinpoint that sometimes it becomes 
difficult to ascertain whether the politics manifesting is ethnonationalism or tribalism. 
Tribalism and ethnonationalism seem more easily discernible from the viewpoint of the 
governed than from government, in that, there is as yet no scientific evidence of the 
"politics of the belly" other than the usual exchange of accusations from rival and/or 
past governments and political parties (see footnote 29 in Section 5.1.1). No 
government has commissioned an enquiry that can catalogue the phenomenon as 
scientific, despite the widespread knowledge of it. To date, the nearest to a scientific 
attempt can be found in the anti-corruption campaign commissioned by the World 
Bank. 
peculiar to the NPP, at least. 
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The government's Governance Issue Paper, released as part of the National Instutional 
Renewal Programme, reveals that: 
Ghana is among seven (7) African countries that is piloting the new integrated 
strategy to fighting corruption sponsored by the World Bank and other 
development partners. The approach is preventive. It is to attack the root causes 
and fight it with a coalition of internal forces. The methodology requires a 
country-wide diagnostic survey to delineate areas of attention for priority action. 
The survey is expected to provide a firm empirical basis for developing an action 
plan, the sharing of information and responsibility among coalition partners and 
finally, implementing and monitoring an integrated national anti-corruption 
programme. Several anti corruption campaigns in the past has failed, but now the 
nation is taking the bull by the horn. The core anti-corruption group is in the 
process of refining the country Action Plan. The next steps identified for 
immediate action are: (a)The Establishment of a coalition group; (b) Organisation 
of a stakeholders' meeting to determine the structure and composition of the 
coalition and to adopt the Action Plan; (c) Obtaining a signed permission from 
the President of the Republic for the purpose of undertaking a diagnostic survey 
with the assistance of Donors; (d) Integrating anti-corruption measures into the 
on-going public sector reforms; (e) The commencement of an awareness creation 
campaign in earnest26. 
The practice has been that, governments, in order to have a broad appeal to the whole 
populace, indulge in ethnic arithmetic at the helm of affairs in order to maintain a 
balance (Hameso 1997, p. 42). For example, in the early days of the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC) - the paramilitary government headed by Rawlings 
before he won the 1992 elections - `there was a deliberate effort to achieve a rough 
ethnic balance' in its top hierarchy (Nugent 1995, p. 43). Public awareness of the 
calculative or strategic positioning of government and public officials through ethnic 
arithmetic is widespread. In some cases (as it became with the P/NDC later on), the 
ethnic arithmetic skews off-balance depending on the aims of the power brokers within 
the governing caucus. The analysis explains that since Rawlings became Head-of-State 
from December 1981, some of the major allegations levelled against him are: that his 
26 Office of the President of Ghana. Governance Issue Paper for the I Oth Consultative Group Meeetine. 
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rulership in Ghana has been with the assistance of an ethnocentric clique of 
personalities from his own Anlo Ewe tribe (Yeebo 1992, p. 52); that the majority of 
this clique are also from his own Adzovia clan in Eweland (Adjei 1993, p. 262); that 
his closest advisers draw from Ewes (Shillington 1992, pp. 144-5). Hence, the initial 
perception of Rawlings' rulership and ruling caucus as tribalistic and Ewe-based 
(Herbst 1993, pp. 86-7) has not waned. Although other authors, for example 
Millington, have portrayed Rawlings as a politician who plays a balanced game of 
ethnic arithmetic (Shillington 1992, pp 144-5), the vast majority of the literature on 
Ghanaian politics seem to directly suggest the role of tribalism in government and point 
fingers to Rawlings' rulership as a prime example. The complexity of the dual 
occurrence of tribalism and ethnonationalism within the same political arena is 
compounded by the equally complex relationship between each of the two phenomena 
and the "politics of the belly". As aptly summarised by Jean Francois Bayart: 
in Africa ethnicity is almost never absent from politics, yet at the same time it 
does not provide its basic fabric. Put this way, the dilemma is naturally absurd. 
Manifestations of ethnicity inevitably involve other social dimensions, as 
anthropologists have long demonstrated. And in the context of the contemporary 
state, ethnicity exists mainly as an agent of accumulation, both of wealth and of 
political power. Tribalism is thus perceived less as a political force in itself than 
as a channel through which competition for the acquisition of wealth, power and 
status is expressed (Bayart 1993, p. 55). 
Morrison's study also concluded, in its analysis, that, `rather than fade and disappear 
from the African scene, ethnicity will grow more varied and complex, forcing 
governments to deal with it. Ethnicity has already emerged as a distinct tool for 
politicians and for circulating the benefits of central government' (Morrison 1982, p. 
National Institutional Renewal Programme Secretariat, Accra, 1999, pp. 10-11. 
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19). The general effect of the "politics of the belly" is that it elicits a response from 
citizenry which reflects in voting patterns. 
The dual existence of tribalism and ethnonationalism is a pervasive feature in Ghanaian 
politics, however, the exploitation of ethnonationalism does not always occur for the 
sharing of material benefits (as portrayed by Bayart and Morrison), but sometimes, for 
the purposes of consolidating power. For example during Rawlings' P/NDC era, it is 
evident that certain key portfolios within the national security set-up, foreign affairs 
bureau and important areas of the economy have been held by Ewes. This is due to the 
fact that Ewes, could be trusted by Rawlings to ensure his safety, do his bidding, as 
well as perform duties to the best of their ability in honour of an Ewe president and the 
Ewe group. It is generally observed that, in addition to Ewes seeing the Rawlings era as 
their chance of being part of the ruling caucus (something which seems to have eluded 
them in the past), they see it also as a duty to ensure Rawlings's safety and success as 
one of their kin. It is therefore rational for Rawlings to cash in on ethnonationalism, 
and only rational for Ewes to vote for him at elections. Patterns of tribalism, whether 
solely for the purposes of material benefits (as held by Bayart and Morrison), for power 
consolidating purposes, or just for sheer ethnic arithmetic, or a mixture of all three, are 
as evident as the awareness exists countrywide. 
Given the pervasivenes of the "politics of the belly", it must be understood why some 
people demonstrate political rationality by making political choices geared towards 
their best-calculated ethnonationalistic interests, and also, why this should be seen as 
their political nationalism. Individual political attitudes are therefore indicators of 
approval or otherwise of the status quo. The benefits accruable from the "belly 
155 
156 
politics", cause citizens to develop an interest in the politics surrounding the 
distribution of opportunity, wealth and political power. For example, in a study 
conducted by Agyeman, citizens revealed their willingness `to give up tribalism in 
favour of nationalism (only) if the social, political and the economic advantages 
derived from tribalism are removed' (Agyeman 1988, p. 45). Agyeman's study further 
revealed that, politically, tribalism is seen as disadvantageous at the state level but 
advantageous at the sub-state level (Ibid, p. 44), and that 62.9% of Ghanaians admit to 
the dysfunctional effects of tribalism on the potential homogenisation of sub-groups 
within the state, hence lending support to the suppression of tribalism (Ibid, p. 42), as a 
means of preventing a further undermining of the state. Among the many strong views 
which were expressed during a round-table discussion organised by Ghana's Institute 
of Economic Affairs (IEA) under the title Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Ghan a, 
Professor Dominic Agyeman, a leading sociologist of ethnicity in Ghana is quoted as 
saying that `ethnic diversity should be exploited for nation-building, ... equitable 
allocation of state resources and a non-ethnic mode of the selection of public officials 
should be the policy of all governments, ... ethnic conflict in Ghana is likely to change 
from verbal confrontation to physical ones if the regime in power treats with contempt 
complaints of opposition parties' (GRi. Newsreel, 26 June 1997). During the J. B. 
Danquah Lectures 1988 organised by the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
Professor Adu Boahen, in addressing the issue of social injustice and inequity, said 
`public offices must be distributed equally and equitably among the various ethnic 
groups in the country' (Boahen 1989, p. 66). Also, as part of the 39`h anniversary 
lectures of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, Professor George Hagan, head of 
the institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, delivered a lecture entitled 
Factors Undermining the Viability of the State in Africa" Internal Factors. In the 
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lecture, he identified the creation of unjust systems, and unequal distribution of 
resources as the causes of internal power struggle in African states (GRi Newsreel, 19 
November 1998). He further identified that instead of opening up state institutions to 
all citizens on the basis of equality, many see them as opportunities to lord it over other 
groups on the basis of religion, cult, class, caste, language or regional location, and that 
instead of uniting the people, state institutions become agents of division and group 
competition (Ibid). He is quoted as saying that `besides poor planning and management 
strategies, resource dislocations occur through corruption and abuse of power' (Ibid). 
The themes in the above quotations reflect the views earlier expressed by Bayart and 
Morrison on tribalism and the "politics of the belly", and are in sharp contrast with the 
themes of fair ethics, rationality and patriotism towards the state inherent in 
Hutchinson's theory of political/civic nationalism. An empirical gap therefore exists 
between the theory and actual practice. As it is clear that the theoretical conflict 
between attitudes of ethnonationalism and political nationalism is not universally 
demonstrated by all Ghanaians, it has become necessary to investigate the extent to 
which the attitudes are pervasive, and their effects on Ghanaian politics. 
3.1.4 Integration, urbanisation/detribalisation 
Political expression, aspiration and participation occur through instant actions such as 
voting, and also, long-term processes of integration. The latter (political integration) is 
seen to take place through `a series of experiences and activities which lead to the 
development of linkages between national [state] and sub-national [sub-state] political 
units. The linkages are identified by positive and negative interactions which lead to 
increased flexibility between the national and sub-national units' (Morrison 1982, p. 
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89). Political integration is therefore defined as `the development of linkages and 
flexibility in relations between the national government [the cosmopolitan state] and its 
sub-units' (Ibid, p. 183). Thus, interaction with national [state] agencies, functional 
interdependence and shared values serve as indicators of political integration. It is 
assumed that `the cumulative effect of interdependence and interactions lead to 
relationships which constitute a degree of integration', and that the acceptance and co- 
operation of a sub-national unit with the national government [the cosmopolitan state] 
indicates that the former has "value orientations" towards the latter (Ibid, p. 13). 
Education, occupation and urbanisation have been identified as some of the variables 
which influence not only social mobilisation and/or integration, but also interaction 
with the state, or political integration (Ibid, p. 104). Although the ratio of political 
involvement between urbanites and non-urbanites varies from country to country, the 
trend seems pervasive that urbanite political involvement exceeds that of non- 
urbanites. A report on urbanization and political involvement between France and USA 
confirms that `intranational studies have persistently shown higher political 
involvement among urban residents and, more strongly still, among people of more 
advanced education' (Campbell et al 1966, p. 270). The point is made therefore that 
urbanisation enhances political involvement, and that there seems to be some grounds 
for the existence of the notion that the urban exposure orientates its subjects towards 
involvement and interaction with the institutions of the cosmopolitan state, whose 
political and logistical strength are usually concentrated in the metropolis. It must be 
noted however, that the notional trend that urbanites are detribalised and should 
therefore be political nationalists is not globally universalistic, and generally not 
consistent with Africa, or at the very least Ghana. As already argued, within the status 
quo of "politics of the belly" in multinational African states, the local political 
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rationality enhances ethnonationalism rather than political nationalism. Despite the 
widespread notion that urbanisation, with its concomitant integrative and modernising 
opportunities, constitutes detribalisation, and subsequently, that urban mobilisation 
... a transfer of primary allegiance 
from the ethnic group to the state .. could 
lead to ' 
' (Connor 1994, p. 35), it seems that on the contrary, urbanites are only partially 
detribalised. Furthermore, in certain urbanite situations, primary allegiance to 
ethnonational identity is actually rejuvenated. Morrison's case study of national [state] 
identity vis-ä-vis Ashanti identity (conducted from 1971 to 1974) revealed that any 
group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or otherwise) tended to reassert its 
ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration (Morrison 1982, p. 186). 
Detribalisation is referred to by some authors as an actual alienation from 
autochthonous and tribal roots (Francis 1976, p. 404), and that its definition must 
necessarily be inherent in migration from an "uncontaminated" rural setting and 
subsistence life to urban industrial areas, and/or an assimilation into an urban society 
and culture (Watson 1958, pp. 3-8). Other authors argue that detribalisation is more 
attitudinal rather than any de-rooting from a tribal base, and that it should be seen as 
the process of attitudinal separation from general tribal or other sub-national attitudes 
resulting from urbanisation and integration. Whereas, the modernising factors of 
urbanisation, such as education and integration, do enhance detribalisation, many 
authors do not see a constant correlation between these enhancing factors and 
detribalisation. For example, Watson identifies that assimilation into urban culture 
`does not necessarily imply "detribalisation"' (Ibid, p. 5), a view corroborated by 
Agyeman, who also claims that urbanisation does not necessarily result in 
detribalisation (Agyeman 1988, pp. 35-6). This view is supported by the fact that, `in 
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spite of the growing social distance between the educated and the illiterate masses, the 
educated are not detribalised or isolated from their kinship groups' (Ibid, p. 36). The 
views of Watson and Agyeman are also corroborated by Lucy Mair, the famous 
anthropologist. According to Mair, `as generally used nowadays, however, 
"detribalization" refers to the adoption of city ways of life in cities, and not to the 
rejection of traditional ways in the country' (Mair 1965, pp. 11-2). 
However, it would appear that the widespread notion that urbanization should lead to 
detribalization, is not simply because the modernising factors associated with the 
former accelerates the latter, but also that the conceptualization of some authorship 
(Wilson 1941, pp. 12 & 16; Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6; Wilson and Mafeje 1963, pp. 13-46, 
53) does equate the two processes with each other, that is, that urbanization is 
detribalization. Hence, the essential difference is not to be sought between the two 
terms or concepts, but instead, the depth of the phenomenon. 
Attempts at drawing a neat distinction between the rural lifestyle and the urban 
opposite have therefore been confused by the argument that, detribalization is not just 
about physical or geographical alienation from tribal autochthons or bases - 
(geographical detribalization) - plus a change in lifestyle akin to the urban setting, in 
that, so long as urbanites still maintain relations with tribal roots - irrespective of 
physical alienation, detribalization has not occurred. It is therefore argued by others, 
that detribalization is only deemed to have occurred when an individual develops the 
attitude to reduce relationships and contact with tribal roots even when both parties are 
accessible to each other - (attitudinal detribalisation). The extreme end of attitudinal 
detribalization is envisaged as when an individual ceases to have (cuts off) 
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relationships with tribal bases or autochthons, including communication and 
commuting. Given the various arguments from the polarized authorships, a distinction 
should be drawn between geographical detribalization and attitudinal detribalization. 
Godfrey Wilson's comparative study of pre-modern and modern Northern Rhodesia, 
not only helps draw a neat line between rural and urban life, but also makes the 
important point that, the process of detribalization begins with the process of 
urbanization, or vice versa. Wilson describes the tribal setting as a world of its own, a 
we-group scenario within which the lifestyle and cycle of members largely depends 
upon, and is restricted mainly to themselves, and not between similar groups elsewhere. 
In the tribal setting, a person belongs to: 
a single tribe - that is, easily understand one another's speech and possess a 
common name and a homogeneous culture - and often it was a few thousand 
only; ... marked 
by a high degree of autonomy ... social relationships were only 
confined to little areas of a few square miles. Subsistence agriculture or cattle- 
keeping seldom involved a man in cooperation with any save friends and relatives 
who lived nearby. Marriage was a local affair and seldom joined families more 
than thirty miles apart. Religious ritual, ceremonial, warfare hunting and fishing 
were only occasionally organised on any large scale; normally they were confined 
to the family, the village and the local district or chiefdom; and so a high degree 
of autonomy in each primitive community was inevitable ... consisted almost 
entirely of men personally acquainted with one another; there were few 
impersonal relations. Business, law and religion joined men mainly to those they 
had known all their lives. Kinship had an enormous importance in this world of 
personal relations, since it set a large proportion of them for each individual for 
life. The village was the main unit of local aggregation and villages themselves 
were small. Writing was unknown; there was no need for it, when few messages 
had ever to be sent more than a two days journey, and when all messages were 
simple ... there was 
little possibility of specialization, and hence the level of 
technical achievement was low ... Men differed in wealth, as in status; but 
differences of wealth were seldom embedded in a class system ... Of land there 
was sufficient for all; and normally the economic functions and wealth of the 
different families in a primitive community were too similar to give rise to any 
class distinctions ... It was almost a world in itself, a homogeneous world and its 
contacts with the neighbouring tribes were slight ... the bonds of kinsfolk and 
neighbourhood were as much a matter of business - that is of reciprocal 
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economic advantage - as of affection, duty and respect ... 
(Wilson, 1941, pp. 9- 
12). 
By contrast, Wilson paints the opposite scenario of the emerged social change in the 
urban setting, as: 
... members of a 
huge, world-wide community, and their lives are bound up at 
every point with the events of its history. New methods of transport by bicycle, 
lorry and rail have increased their own range of travel twentyfold. Many of them 
now speak a European language, and most of them have learnt the language of 
some other tribe than their own ... They have entered a heterogeneous world, 
stratified into classes and states ... 
in pre-European Northern Rhodesia there 
were thousands of almost self-sufficient primitive communities; now there are 
none, and Northern Rhodesia itself is only a small part of a world-wide 
community. To-day, then, Northern Rhodesia is in process of rapid adjustment to 
the conditions of world community; a community in which impersonal relations 
are important; where business, law and religion make men dependent on millions 
of other men whom they have never met; a community articulated into races, 
nations and classes; in which the tribes, no longer almost worlds in themselves, 
now take their place as small administrative units; a world of writing, of 
specialized knowledge and of elaborate skill. The relationships of kinship and 
village life are becoming yearly less important, for kinsmen and fellow villagers 
no longer make up half each individual's world. New local groups have grown up 
and continue to grow in the industrial, administrative and commercial towns on 
the line of rail; and in each town the members of a hundred tribes live cheek by 
jowl (Ibid, pp. 12-3). 
The contrast between the two scenarios speaks for itself. Wilson argues that the process 
of social change which transforms tribespeople from the exigencies of the former to the 
latter scenario, is termed as detribalisation (Ibid, p. 12) or urbanization (Ibid, p. 16), 
and that the rising demand for labour in urbanised centres is one main push factor 
which causes migrant labour to become temporarily urbanized, or graduate into a state 
of permanent urbanization (Ibid, pp. 46-71). According to Wilson therefore, the process 
of urbanization is itself the process of detribalization, and that, so long as one is 
urbanized, one is detribalised. Using Broken Hill, an urban dwelling in Northern 
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Rhodesia as a case, the results of Wilson's study establishes a clear connection or 
linkage between urbanization and detribalization. Wilson identifies 4 main categories 
or shades of detribalised or urbanised folk: (1) peasant visitors ` ... come mainly from 
the nearer villages; they have spent most of their working lives in the country [village] 
but they pay occasional short visits to town [urban centre] and there enter employment' 
(Ibid, p. 46). 8.6% of Broken Hill belonged to this category; (2) a migrant labourer is 
`one who has spent between one third and two thirds of his time in town and between 
two thirds and one third in the country since first leaving his tribal area' (Ibid). 20.5% 
of Broken Hill were migrant labourers; (3) temporarily urbanized folk are those who 
have `been born and brought up in the country; they have spent most of their time, in 
long periods, in the towns since the age of fifteen and a half years; they pay occasional 
short visits to their rural homes and people from home come to visit them' (Ibid). A 
temporarily urbanized person is therefore `one who spends the best of his (or her) 
working life in the towns but his childhood and old age in the country' (Ibid, p. 54). 
69.9% of Broken Hill consisted of temporarily urbanized folk (Ibid, p. 47); (4) 
permanently urbanized folk are those `who have been born and brought up in town and 
who know no other home' (Ibid), that is, `one who spends all his life in the towns' 
(Ibid, p. 54). Only 1% of Broken Hill belonged to this category. 
Wilson's findings revealed not only a demonstration of geographical detribalization, 
but also the fact that social change sometimes resulted in attitudinal detribalization. 
Among the many factors which contributed to the processes of detribalisation and/or 
the various stages of urbanization, marital status and cohabitation had an influence on 
the attitudes of urban male dwellers towards their tribal roots, including spending 
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patterns (Ibid, pp. 48-65). Wilson's findings revealed three different categories and 
their corresponding attitudes. According to Wilson: 
The first category (married: wives in town) is the most stabilized; its members go 
home on the average once after each period of five years, six and a half months in 
town, and 82.7% of them are temporarily urbanized; among them the personal 
transfer of wealth to the country is only 11.5% of their cash wages; but it is this 
category which makes the greatest demand on the rural areas for produce ... The 
second category (married: wives in the country) is the least stabilized; its 
members go home on the average, once after each sixteen months in town and 
only 35.25% of them are temporarily urbanized; among them the personal transfer 
of wealth to the country is 32.2% of their cash wages ... The third category 
(single men and youths) falls between the other two, but approximates most 
closely to the first. Its members (excluding the permanently urbanized) go home, 
on the average, once after each period of three years two and a half months in 
town; while 66.5% of them are temporarily and about 2.4% permanently 
urbanized. Among them the personal transfer of wealth to the rural areas is 20.1 % 
of their cash wages (Ibid, pp. 58-63). 
According to Wilson therefore, `marriage is the closest of all personal relationships' 
(Ibid, p. 62) and the most important factor contributing towards attitudinal 
detribalisation. The other factor working in conjunction with marriage, to stimulate 
attitudinal detribalisation, is distance (Ibid, pp. 62-9). 
Another study completed on the Langa township near Cape Town, by Monica Wilson 
and Archie Mafeje, to investigate the character, mobility and turnover of the African 
labour force in the Cape Peninsula, from the periods 1955-7 and 1961-2, also resulted 
in similar conceptualization and findings to those of Godfrey Wilson (Wilson and 
Mafeje 1963). Wilson and Mafeje also equate the `process of urbanisation' (Ibid, p. 53) 
- and/or absorption - with the processes of physical alienation of migrant labour from 
tribal bases into towns (Ibid, pp. 13-46), and describes partly urbanized men as `would- 
be townsmen who are "trying to push in and be absorbed", trying to imitate townsmen' 
(Ibid, p. 21). Wilson and Mafeje conceptualise categories of urban folk as: (1) migrant 
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labourers; (2) semi-urbanized, and; (3) urbanized folk (Ibid, p. 15). Furthermore, their 
study also reveals changes in the attitudes and values of urbanized folk towards tribal 
bases, indicated by spending patterns and distance. Their findings also reveal attitudinal 
differences between the sexes (Ibid, pp. 15-6). 
In another study conducted by Philip Mayer on Xhosa society in East London, South 
Africa, Mayer clearly sets the distinction between rural and urban Xhosa society by 
revealing the effects caused by social mobility (Mayer 1961). Mayer also equates 
urbanization with detribalization and depicts both terminology as the process of social 
mobility - movement of individuals from the rural to the urban area (Ibid, pp. 4-6). 
Furthermore, he makes a distinction between physical alienation from the rural area - 
(geographical detribalization) and changes in culture, values and attitudes - (attitudinal 
detribalization), by distinguishing between the "way of life" of the "town-rooted" and 
the "country-rooted" (Ibid, p. 6). Mayer's conceptualisation of changing identities 
within the process of detribalization (or urbanization) is not too different from those of 
Godfrey Wilson, or Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, and ranges between migration 
and stabilization. Mayer points out that stabilization is a strong indicator for identifying 
those fully or genuinely urbanized, but not vice versa (Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6). But in 
addition to a distinction between physical and attitudinal detribalization, Mayer further 
makes the very important point, that not all urbanites are detribalized. Irrespective of 
the terminological confusion, Mayer's message is clear about those who have become 
`culturally "urbanized" without having been correspondingly "detribalized"' (Ibid, p. 
10). These, described by Mayer as "double-cultured", are adept in both rural and urban 
cultures, and not to the neglect of either. Mayer conceptualizes urbanization as both a 
state (or condition) as well as a process. (Ibid, pp. 5,10-1). 
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The relevance of the conceptualization and findings of the above-mentioned studies 
seem only relevant to the discussion on urbanization and detribalization. Godfrey 
Wilson's study does not investigate inter-tribal relationships, and therefore, is unable to 
inform readers of the nature of such relationships as they existed in Rhodesia. The 
study did not offer participants the opportunity to demonstrate their nationalistic 
feelings vis-ä-vis other groupings in a broad context of competition for territorial 
political power and wealth. At the time of Wilson's study, the political situation was 
different. Rhodesia was then (1940) under colonial administration, but is now 
independent as Zimbabwe, and under an indigenous administration which may or not 
be a fair reflection of its subject groupings, in terms of the control and distribution of 
political power and wealth. Wilson's study is therefore unable to inform us of the 
patterns of ethnonationalism versus political nationalism, and/or the competitive 
responses of the various subject groupings towards the post-colonial Zimbabwean state. 
The Wilson and Mafeje (1963) study also took place when South Africa was still 
apartheid. As the study was not about political attitudes, subjects were not offered the 
opportunity to express them. Philip Mayer's study also has no political ambitions to it. 
However, in Agyeman's study conducted in 1970, which investigated Ghanaian 
attitudes on nationalism and ideological education, citizens revealed their willingness 
, to give up tribalism in favour of [political] nationalism (only) if the social, political 
and economic advantages derived from tribalism are removed' (Agyeman 1988, p. 45). 
Agyeman's study further revealed that, politically, tribalism is seen as disadvantageous 
at the national [state] level but advantageous at the sub-national [substate] level (Ibid, 
p. 44), and that 62.9% of Ghanaians admit to the dysfunctional effects of tribalism on 
national integration, hence, the advocacy for the abolition of tribalism in order to 
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prevent tribal favouritism (Ibid, p. 42), and in order that tribalism would cease to 
undermine the state. 
Also, Morrison's case study, conducted in Ghana from 1971 to 1974, on citizenship 
identity under a single Ghanaian state vis-ä-vis Ashanti national identity, revealed that 
any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination (identiy-based or not) tended to 
reassert its ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration (Morrison 
1982, p. 186). 
No doubt, in a multi-national state, urbanisation and integration lead to a shift of 
primary allegiance from tribal and autochtonous bases to the state and its institutions 
which are very well concentrated in the urban areas, and enhance the potential for 
political nationalism. But at the same time, where "politics of the belly" is prevailing, 
ethnonationalism is enhanced at the expense of political nationalism. 
Tribal mobilization and coagulation occurs in urban settings irrespective of their 
potential for integration, modernisation and social mobilisation. Rather than the 
integrative potential of urbanisation fostering a unified identity through political 
nationalism under the incubative capacity of single statehood, in multi-national states, 
urban dwellings tend to constitute ripe settings for the gestation, or rejuvenation of 
tribal consciousness (Morrison 1982, p. 186). According to Connor: 
If the processes that comprise modernization led to a lessening of ethnic 
consciousness in favour of identification with the state, then the number of states 
troubled by ethnic disharmony would be on the decrease. To the contrary, 
however, a global survey illustrates that ethnic consciousness is definitely in the 
ascendancy as a political force, and that state borders, as presently delimited, are 
being increasingly challenged by this trend. And, what is of more significance, 
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multi-ethnic states at all levels of modernity have been afflicted ... That social 
mobilization need not lead to a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic 
group to the state is therefore clear (Connor 1994, p. 35). 
Obviously, Connor is making the point that geographical detribalization and urban 
integration do not necessarily result in attitudinal detribalization. 
Thus, within multinational states, despite the integrative, modernising and 
mobilisational potential inherent in urbanisation, as well as the potential for unifying 
different ethnonational groupings under a single statehood, it would appear the capital 
cities provide just the ripe arena for the entrenchment of ethnonational consciousness. 
This has resulted not only in the immense difficulty often encountered in attempts at 
forging a single national identity within multi-national states, but in some cases, the 
split-up of states. The latter scenario has not occurred in Ghana, although as already 
hinted by Professor Agyeman (above), the potential for explosion exists if 
ethnonationalism and the "politics of the belly" are not suppressed. 
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3.2 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
This research therefore aimed at: (1) conducting a survey of Ghanaian urbanites in 
order to measure the current trends of ethnonationalism versus political nationalism by 
investigating their voting attitudes and intentions, in order to establish the extent to 
which proneness towards political nationalism by supposedly detribalised urbanites, is 
imagined or real, of style or substance; (2) critically examining patterns in Ghanaian 
voting behaviours by analysing the distinctive patterns between ethnonational and state 
attitudes. 
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3.3 METHODOLOGY 
Due to the immense advantages inherent in the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative strategies in research (Brannen ed. 1992), both methodologies were utilized 
as appropriate. The overall research strategy included: (a) a questionnaire-administered 
survey; (b) unstructured interview/s as opportuned, and; (c) analyses of media reports. 
Unlike the other large cities in Ghana which have been founded by specific 
ethnonational groups, Tema, the industrial city chosen for this research, has been 
founded on the implosion of job-seekers and employees from across the country (see 
section 3.5). Any ethnonational skew in the city's population is therefore artificial and 
circumstantial. The survey data was analysed using the SPSS software. Qualitative data 
was examined and analysed through analytic induction. Themes and concepts which 
are 'grounded' to the research or 'closely and directly relevant to, (Nachmias & 
Nachmias 1992, p. 284) electoral politics in multi-national Ghana were derived via the 
grounded theory method developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The idea was to 
develop 'grounded' rather than 'grand' concepts for the political situation under 
investigation (Gilbert ed. 1993, p. 168). Media sources included both print and 
cyberspace media. 
3.3.1 The questionnaire 
Although it seems easy to demarcate facts from attitudes and viewpoints, the evolution 
of experience within social science has proved, that with regard to certain issues, such 
as ethnicity and identity, the boundary between fact and attitude is sometimes vague, 
blurred, subjective or even ambiguous (Converse & Presser 1986, p. 17). This 
questionnaire was designed as an instrument to be used in a factual as well as an 
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attitudinal survey. The questionnaire therefore posed questions which elicited both 
factual and tentative responses, and was designed to build a political history of 
respondents, such that, their tentative views for the 2000 elections were not in abstract, 
but related to past political behaviour as well as family political orientation. 
3.3.2 Assumptions underpinning the questionnaire 
The questionnaire can be found in Appendix X. Among many other things, the 
questionnaire accounted for the assumptions inherent in detribalisation and aimed to 
elicit the attitudes of urbanites towards ethnonationalism and political nationalism 
through their voting intentions. Additionally, it solicited views on the extent to which 
urbanites felt detribalised, as well as any deliberate attempts towards attitudinal 
detribalisation, their propensities to maintain association with their roots or otherwise, 
and the reasons behind such actions. In view of the fact that urbanites also have the 
tendency to bond or coagulate along ethnonational lines, and also Morrison's view that 
any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or not) tended to 
reassert its ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration (Morrison 
1982, p. 186), the questionnaire sought to elicit views on potential or tentative voting 
intentions as dependent on the ethnonational identities of presidential candidates and 
the prevailing political context. In addition to certain aspects of the questionnaire 
already discussed, the basic backgrounds of all interviewees as well as their political 
orientation, were sought. Responses derived from this section aided in forming a 
demographic picture of what type of respondents they were. Their interests and levels 
of engagement in politics were also sought in order to know their levels of familiarity 
with, and commitment to political activity. Response choices of "ineligibility" indicate 
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the possibility of some respondents having not registered to vote in 2000 for whatever 
reason. The section on "freedom of expression" elicited some indication on how candid 
and bold respondents were with regard to political expression. Like all opinion polls, 
there is no guarantee that opinions are the truth (and even candid opinions could have 
changed by election day), however, it helped to know the type of respondent, as this 
was measured against questions 22 - 30. The section labelled "tentative votes - 
pressure or prevailing factors" was aimed at eliciting how respondents were affected by 
public opinion and pressure, whether they had a "mind of their own" and how strongly 
they would maintain their stance and stick to their own convictions and not be swayed 
by public thinking. The section was also aimed at testing whether or not respondents 
were ethnonationalistic. The section labelled "urbanised/detribalised" dealt with the 
length of urban experience respondents have had, their means of maintaining urban- 
rural relationships through postal services, telecommunication or travel, as well as 
whether any form of attitudinal detribalisation had been a natural urban experience or 
with deliberate effort. The section on "religious background" is straightforward but 
responses could serve as explanation to religious voting patterns, regarding the choice 
of candidates. The section on "tribal derivation" was left at the end since its earlier 
appearance on the questionnaire might alarm certain respondents and prevent free and 
candid responses. However, it was only included for purposes of confirming the 
ethnonational identities of respondents (as already given in Q. 3). Generally, a typical 
Ghanaian surname easily gives away one's ethnonational identity. 
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3.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON GHANAIAN ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL 
ATTITUDES 
It must be noted that, first, both past and present voters' registers in Ghana do not give 
place for indicating ethnonational identity. Second, scientific post-election surveys 
conducted so far did not investigate ethnonationalism in politics as a stand-alone issue, 
but as one of many aspects of Ghanaian political attitudes. Results of these surveys 
have therefore not been forthcoming as far as any detailed analyses of the specific 
patterns and deep intricacies of ethnonationalism in electoral politics are concerned. 
Moreover, their results have very limited predictive value for future trend setting. For 
example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), in cooperation 
with the Electoral Commission of Ghana, conducted a national survey of Ghanaian 
public opinion from February 26 to April 16 1997. The survey measured attitudes about 
the December 1996 elections, politics and the economy. Results of the survey interview 
(conducted by Research International - R. I. in Ghana) revealed, among other things, 
that, `a quarter (26%) of all Ghanaians felt that relations between ethnonational groups 
ranged from `somewhat bad' to `very bad'. Pessimism about mutual ethnonational 
relations was highest in the Ashanti, Greater Accra, Western and Volta regions. One- 
fourth (25%) of all Ghanaians claim to have been discriminated against because of their 
ethnonational identity. This was highest among the Frafra and Ewe' (McCarty 1997, p. 
3). This IFES survey did not investigate ethnonationalism in voting habits. 
In another example, both a pre- and post-election survey conducted by the Department 
of Political Science of the University of Ghana, sought information on respondents' 
ethnonational identities, party alliances and votes in the last elections. However, this 
was circumstantial to the research in that the survey was not specifically aimed at 
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investigating ethnonational patterns in voting behaviours alone, but rather many 
variables. The Department's survey investigated the combination of `agential and 
structural variables that intricately combined to produce the particular pattern of 
results' in the last elections (Jonah 1998, p. 229). The survey was based on the 
hypothesis that `neither agency nor structure by itself can fully explain the election 
results of 1992 and 1996 ... structural variables constitute the social, economic and 
political parameters within which agential factors operate. Structures then are the 
external bounds and limits within which Ghanaian voters exercised their free choices in 
the elections of 1992 and 1996' (Ibid). The survey identified the "structural" factors as 
the ethnic, industrial, urban-rural and regional structures of the country, and the 
"agential" factors as `the recorded feelings, reasons and decisions of the Ghanaian 
electorate acting as free agents and exercising their free choices in elections generally 
considered to be free and fair' (Ibid). The research posited the broad overview that the 
former influenced the latter (Ibid, pp 229-55). The Department's survey results reveal 
strong indications that `ethnicity is a major factor that influenced Ghanaian voters in 
both the 1992 and 1996 Presidential elections' (Ibid 1998, p. 246), that a full 
understanding of the past elections cannot be gained `without reference to the ethnic 
factor' (Ibid), and that `to ignore the ethnic factor is to ignore a major key to 
understanding the mind of the Ghanaian voter (Ibid). However, the survey has limited 
predictive value for the 2000 elections (as far as patterns of ethnonationalism and 
political nationalism are concerned) since it failed to gather data on voters' intentions. 
Second, although it makes mention of mass, patriotic, block voting along ethnonational 
lines, it failed to demonstrate or detail the specific antagonisms between which 
ethnonational groups, and also the manifestations of such antagonisms against 
presidential candidates. Third, the Department's survey did not investigate the 
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intricacies in ethnonationalistic and/or tribalistic behaviours of supposedly detribalised 
urbanites. 
This research, however: (a) had predictive value for the 2000 elections with regard to 
patterns of ethnonationalism and political nationalism; (b) reveals the specific 
antagonisms between which ethnonational groups, and also; (c) reveals antagonisms 
against presidential candidates as a result of their ethnonational identities. More 
interestingly, the study has been conducted on urbanites, who are supposed to be 
detribalised, and are expected to be political nationalists. 
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3.5 TEMA 
Tema is essentially an artificial creation to suit the industrial need for a dwelling site 
for urban workers. Unlike the other traditional cities in Ghana, for example Kumasi, 
Cape-Coast, Accra and Tamale, which were founded as settlements by specific 
ethnonational groups such as the Ashanti, Fanti, Ga-Adanbge and Dagomba 
respectively, Tema was founded strictly on migrant urban skilled workers without any 
specific ethnonational basis. Therefore, whereas there would always be more Ashantis 
in Kumasi, more Fantis in Cape-Coast, more Ga-Adangbes in Accra and subsequently 
more Dagombas in Tamale, any ethnonational skew in the population of Tema is 
artificial and circumstantial. Obviously, the ethnonational configuration of Tema is not 
equi-representative of all the groups, but this is by chance and not design. 
As a result of a governmental decision in 1951 to construct a new deep water 
harbour/port in Tema for the exchange of both imports and exports to augment the 
Volta River Electrification Scheme (meant essentially for the supply of electrical power 
to the aluminium smelting and other industries catering for Ghana's mineral and farm 
produce), a city was planned to host any migrant labour in relationship with the 
Scheme. Tema was therefore a joint entity embracing the harbour, the city and related 
industries and a unique city to be utilised for the purposes of this research, in that, the 
city guarantees: (a) an urban population not traditionally assembled on the basis of a 
traditional ethnonational settlement, and; (b) a multi-national, supposedly detribalised 
urban population, whose political attitudes can be investigated. 
A land area of 64 square miles (102.4 sq. kilometres) or 40000 acres of stool land was 
procured by the Ministry of Housing, Town and Country Planning for the purposes of 
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developing the city. In July 1952, Ordinance No. 35 established the Tema Development 
Corporation (TDC), which was entrusted to the building of 24 Communities, to house 
at least 250,000 people. According to the Master Plan, the city was to evolve into its 
full plan over a 25-year period from 1961-1985, and to host 250,000 people. Due to 
intensive labour migratory movements, the average annual population growth rate for 
Tema was estimated at 12% for the first ten years and 7% for the following 15 years, or 
an average 9.1% over the 25-year period. As compared with a 5% growth rate for 
Accra and 2.5% for the whole country, that of Tema was to be very high indeed 
(although Accra, the country's capital and traditional home for the Ga tribe, had a 
larger traditional and stool land allocation). It was estimated that by 1985, Tema will be 
populated by 234,000 people. Due to reductions of fiscal injections into Tema's 
development as a result of general economic slump faced by subsequent governments, 
the Tema Project did not progress at the planned rate, however, the 1984 census gave 
the population of the city as 189,102. The Tema Project seems to have picked up again 
and at the moment has already built up to 20 Communities. Lately, private housing 
development has been introduced as pieces of the allocated land has been sold into 
private ownership for private development. Although this has rejuvenated the Tema 
Project, private developments have different architecture, but with planning permission 
from the TDC. This has changed the architectural landscape of Tema from as it would 
have been had all the buildings been erected by the TDC. 
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Chapter 4 
Fieldwork, Analysis And Interpretation 
Of Data 
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4.1 FIELDWORK 
4.1.1 Methodological innovation to surmount the 'culture of silence' 
The fieldwork and data gathering process, was mainly through one-to-one, 
computerised, questionnaire-based interviews. I also had an unstructured interview 
schedule with the Member of Parliament for Tema. The computerisation of the primary 
data-gathering process was chosen to surmount the prevailing cultural and political 
inhibitions to the original plans, such as the'culture of silence' (Boahen 1989, p 1), and 
its potential for a low rate of return to questionnaire distribution. The computerised 
research strategy was instrumental to achieving the aims of the field trip, in that, it also 
enabled the data gathering process to be completed in a record time from the period 
22/01/99 to 20/02/99. Altogether, there were 501 respondents to the questionnaire. 
Computerised survey strategies are now widely used as the need for innovation has 
prompted their adoption in the West since the late 1980s (Survey Methods Centre 
Newsletter, Summer 1989, pp. 1-12). However, in the relatively poor regions of the 
world, such as West Africa, a computerised survey was both revolutionary and 
innovative. None of the surveys conducted so far in Ghana have been computerised. 
4.1.2 The 'culture of silence' 
The phrase 'culture of silence' came into being when the Ghanaian President first used 
it in a speech he delivered in Sunyani, Ghana, in April 1987, to describe the 
development of a political culture whereby freedom of political expression was lacking 
(Boahen 1989, pp. 1,54). Ghana had been under oppressive and repressive military 
rule from 1981 until 1992 when resumption of multi-party democracy occurred. 
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Although the 'culture of silence' has been waning since 1992, freedom of expression 
was generally not being fully exercised by citizenry. The 'culture of silence' manifests 
in several ways including: (a) refusal to air views critical to the government for fear of 
political intimidation through detention, liquidation of assets, or any sort of 
molestation; (b) murmuring as against a positive declaration of opinion; (c) selective 
media coverage due to fear of the media to broadcast or publish views critical to the 
government. In the past, some media houses, for example, the "Catholic Standard" and 
the "Free Press" have had to be closed down as a result of harassment from the 
government; (d) as a result of the above, silence, apathy and indifference as a means of 
protest against the government, instead of the usual open and organised protest through 
demonstrations and/or media presentation; (e) a prevailing state of anomie, alienation 
and lack of freedom of association (Boahen 1989, pp. 51-8). Obviously, breaking the 
culture of silence is necessary for the full realisation of freedom of expression and 
association, and their subsequent contribution to national development (Ibid 1989, pp. 
67-8). 
4.1.3 Problems to initial data-gathering strategy 
An initial idea of distribution and retrieval of questionnaires by post was discounted 
because of: (a) an expected low response rate for any of the reasons attributable to the 
'culture of silence' (Ibid); and (b) the strategy not guaranteeing freedom of respondents 
from household pressure and neighbouring political influences. It became clear that the 
postal venture did not offer good value for money. House to house questionnaire-based 
interviews with a representative random sample, an appropriate strategy which would 
guarantee a response rate of some success also had to be shelved owing to the negative 
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impact of the 'culture of silence'. Graduating from being ruled by a military regime to 
an elected government, freedom of political expression was gradually increasing, but 
most citizens would still not be comfortable with the idea of their political opinions 
being recorded through a survey exercise, however well intended. 
4.1.4 Innovative research strategy 
Finally, a strategy that will guarantee the acquisition of a cross-section of respondents 
fairly representative of the city's population, as well as complete anonymity and 
confidentiality to respondents was adopted. The use of high technology strategy aided 
in the administration and eliciting of data from a total of 501 respondents in only four 
weeks via a questionnaire of 53 questions each. This is remarkable, in that, pursuing 
any of the previously intended data-gathering strategies would have taken several 
months to complete, and would still not guarantee bias-free data. All questions and 
answers were coded into numerical representation and programmed into SPSS 
computer software. Respondents to the questionnaire recited their answers in the coded 
numbers, which were then inputted directly into a laptop computer as the answers were 
being given. The spreadsheet mechanism of SPSS easily facilitated this data-inputting 
method and the laptop was easy to carry around to all places including street corners, 
factory plants, market places, classrooms and other nooks. The portable and battery- 
operated laptop was very handy for such operations and for places without electricity. 
This research strategy guaranteed respondents the anonymity, security and most of all, 
the confidentiality, which encouraged freedom of expression. Respondents were 
engaged on one-on-one basis and no third party was within easy earshot. Even in 
circumstances where others were within reasonable proximity, reciting answers in 
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coded numbers made eavesdropping not worthwhile, since an eavesdropper could not 
easily decipher a response being given in numerical codes. Moreover, respondents were 
freed from any neighbouring pressure and gave responses freely, knowing that their 
responses could not be known by others. This methodology also meant that the 
database for the whole fieldwork was automatically and simultaneously created as 
interviews took place. By the end of all interviews, a computerised database already 
existed for the whole questionnaire-based interview process. Last but not least, in a 
country where ownership of a laptop was a luxury limited to city executives and their 
offices, the parading of a laptop in public places and for the purposes of conducting a 
survey on political attitudes provoked a lot of interest which made the acquisition of 
respondents much easier. 
4.1.5 Sampling 
The prospect of availability of eligible respondents led me to visit places which offered 
the possibility of a group of adults on site. Therefore, the factories, markets, shopping 
malls, schools and restaurants provided the perfect sampling sites for the interviews. 
Adults of the eligible voting age by 2000 (at least 17 years) were interviewed in the 
large factories which granted permission for interviews to be conducted on their site 
when approached. These are Volta Aluminium Company Ltd (VALCO), Cocoa 
Processing Company Ltd (CPC), Ghana Textile Printing Company Ltd (GTP), Ghana 
Cement Works (GHACEM), Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd (GTMC), 
and Wahome Steel Industries Ltd. Factory respondents included both management and 
factory hands. Final year students of Tema Secondary School were also interviewed. 
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Teachers from a number of schools also responded to the questionnaire 27 . Last but not 
least, shopkeepers, market traders and sailors from the harbour also took a keen interest 
in the research and responded to the questionnaire. Respondents reflected a wide age 
and class range. The sample is not typically representative of Tema as a population 
census would be. Hence, the results of the survey have validity regarding relationships 
between the variables, but not absolute validity for the individual variables. However, 
the slightly unrepresentativeness of the sample is balanced by a data-gathering 
procedure which eliminated household pressure and neighbouring political influences 
that would have inhibited respondents from speaking freely. A number of respondents 
also gave vital information through answers to unstructured interviewing, most notably 
the Member of Parliament for Tema. 
4.1.6 Problems to innovation 
It would be realised at a latter stage, that some Ghanaians, particularly those with 
sympathies for the ruling NDC, were unhappy about the idea of any survey being 
conducted for whatever purposes, in that, it was an avenue for assessing any public 
disaffection to the ruling party, and that the potential existed for results of the survey to 
carry negative consequences. To them, any such revelations would be considered as 
ammunition to the Opposition parties. Others, were also suspicious of the intentions of 
the survey, some suspecting the CIA or other foreign collaboration, and duly 
questioned the "authorities" behind the survey. In all the factory sites, and even in some 
of the market shops, I had to produce copies of the covering letters from Middlesex 
27 See Appendix VI(a) for a list of names and official addresses of headteachers of some of the schools 
visited. Not all schools visited are happy for their identity to be made public. 
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University and the University of Ghana, before clearance was given to interview 
respondents. In Aluworks, a large aluminium plant within walking distance from 
Wahome Steel Industry, I was refused clearance to carry out interviews because (as I 
was told), the management was not sure of how they would be viewed by the 
government for allowing such an exercise to be carried out on its premises. I was 
however not given any such excuse in neighbouring Wahome. 
Overall, the innovative research strategy of using a laptop for a questionnaire-based 
survey was highly successful and has positive implications for research methodology in 
political cultures where the 'culture of silence' exists in any variety. 
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4.2 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FIELDWORK DATA 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The sample is not as typically representative of Tema as census data. Hence, the results 
of the survey have validity regarding relationships between the variables, but not 
absolute validity for the individual variables. The last but one census in Ghana was 
held in 1984. Its statistics are out of date and neither has current relevance nor reflect 
the drastic changes which Tema has experienced, both geographically and numerically, 
since then. Within the last 10 years alone, the city's growth rate has accelerated rapidly. 
As at 1990, there were 12 Communities, but now there are 24. Provisional results of the 
last Housing and Population Census, held in 2000, puts Ghana's current population at 
18.4 million (GRi Newsreel, 28 July, 2000; 
http: www. mclglobal. com/History/Jul2000/28gOn. htmi). Final results and itemised 
details for cities (e. g. Tema) are not yet available. 
All statistical data pertaining to the survey and ordered from the SPSS data editor are 
made available in Appendices XI - XXI, for reference. It must also be noted, that 
throughout the chapter, `Akan' is the collective name for the emerged ethnonational 
group represented by the Fantis, Ashantis, Akyems, Bonos and Akwapims on the 
questionnaire. Similarly, the Bolga, Dagomba, Dagaaba and Gurenne groups 
collectively represent "Northerners" or "Mabians". To avoid baffling respondents with 
terminology, one's ethnonational group or identity simply refers to "tribe" on the 
questionnaire. Subsequently, "level of tribalism" on the SPSS survey data refers to 
level of ethnonationalism, and "tribalistic" means ethnonationalistic. 
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4.2.2 Gender (g l) 
Out of 501 respondents to the questionnaire, 63.7% were male and 36.3% were female 
(Table 2; Appendix XI). 
Table 2: (q I). 
4.2.3 Age distribution (g2) 
49.5% of respondents were within the 17-30 age range, 27.5% within the 31-40 age 
range, 17.6% within the 41-50 age range, and 4.8% within the 51-60 age range ('T'able 
3; Appendix XI). This is obvious from the fact that most of the urban/industrial work 
force are between the vibrant age of 17 and 50, and that those nearing retirement at 60 
years are fewer in number. Also, the large number of final year secondary school 
students interviewed -112 or 22.4% - explains the high figure for the 17-30 year group 
(Ibid). 
Table 3: (q2). 
AGERANGE 
0-16 
FREQUENCY D, 
--- 17-30 248 -----49.5 
31-40 138 27.5 
41-50 88 17.6 
51-60 24 4.8 
61-70 1 0.2 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
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4.2.4 Tribal (ethnonational) distribution (q3) 
The tribal distribution of respondents indicated that 52.5% represented the Akan 
grouping of Fanti, Ashanti, Akyem, Akwapim and Bono, 21.2% represented the Ga- 
Adangbes, 19% represented Ewes, 4.2% represented Northerners and 3.2% represented 
Nzimas (Table 4; Appendix XI). 
Table 4: (q3). 
TRIBE 
1ýanti 
FREQUENCY 
100 
VALID % 
20.0 
Ashanti 76 15.2 
Ak em 39 7.8 
Akwapim 45 9.0 
Bono 3 0.6 
Ga-Adan 7be 106 21.2 
Nzima 16 3.2 
Bol Ja 10 2.0 
Da Tomba 7 1.4 
Dagaaba 1 0.2 
Gurenne 3 0.6 
Ewe 95 19.0 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
4.2.5 Occupational distribution (g4) 
Of the occupational distribution, 38.5% were professionals (one profession or another - 
e. g. teachers described themselves as professionals). 2% were specialists, 2.8% were 
managers, 10.8% were clerical staff, 3.8% were administrative staff, 14.2% were 
skilled workers, 4% were semi-skilled and only 1.6% were unskilled (Table 5; 
Appendix XI). 
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Table 5: (q4). 
OCCUPATION 
Unskilled 8 
VALID% 
1.6 
semi-skilled 20 4.0 
Skilled 71 14.2 
Clerical 54 10.8 
Administrative 19 3.8 
Managerial 14 2.8 
Professional 193 38.5 
Specialist 10 2.0 
Student 112 22.4 
"TOTAL 501 100.0 
4.2.6 Education (g5) 
There are three main levels of education - primary, secondary and tertiary. Any form of 
education below secondary is considered to be primary. Secondary education 
constitutes anything after primary but before university level, and includes secondary, 
technical and vocational schooling, as well as teacher training for primary school 
teachers. Tertiary education includes education at universities, polytechnics and 
professional awarding bodies such as institutes for management and journalism. 
The level of education was very high. 47.3% of respondents had studied to tertiary 
level, 47.5% to secondary level, and only 5.2% had ended education at primary level 
(Table 6; Appendix XI). 
Table 6: (q5). 
EDUCATION 
P IIlllafj 
FREQUENCY 
5.2 
Scc(o) ndar 238 47.5 
Tertiary 237 47.3 
'IiYI'AL 501 100.0 
188 
Ow. 
189 
4.3 HYPOTHESIS/AIMS 
As outlined in the Introduction, and also in section 3.2,, the research aimed at. (1) 
conducting a survey of Ghanaian urbanites in order to measure the current trends of 
ethnonationalism versus political nationalism, by investigating their voting attitudes 
and intentions, in order to establish the extent to which proneness towards political 
nationalism by supposedly detribalised urbanites, is imagined or real, of style or 
substance; (2) critically examining patterns in Ghanaian voting behaviours by analysing 
the distinctive patterns between ethnonational and state attitudes. Some characteristics 
of respondents (variables) are investigated in order to examine what bearing they have 
on political attitudes. These are: the traditional party orientation of respondents and 
their families; the current party orientation of respondents; political participation, and; 
freedom of expression. Voting attitudes of respondents are later examined for 1996 and 
2000, and comparisons made. This is followed by a critical examination of 
ethnonationalism on voting patterns. The political stability of respondents is also 
investigated in order to examine the extent of shiftability of voters with regard to party 
loyalty. Afterwards, the analysis digs deeper into examining the true nature of 
respondents and the extent to which they are ethnonationalists or political nationalists, 
as well as the extent to which this is influenced by association with their tribal roots or 
ethnonational bases. This is done by establishing: the type of voter - whether 
ethnonationalist or political nationalist; their level of ethnonationalism, and; the extent 
to which they are associated with their roots. Examining the levels of ethnonationalism 
is very much the same as examining those for political nationalism, as both attitudes 
highlight each other, that is, the higher the one, the lower the other, and vice versa. 
Although variables such as gender, age, occupation and education do not form the main 
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thrust of the thesis, any influence they have on political attitudes is also examined and 
discussed. 
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4.4 PARTY ORIENTATION 
4.4.1 Traditional party orientation of respondent's families (g6): 
As many as 28.5% indicated that their families were not traditionally orientated to any 
specific party. 24.2% indicated that their families were traditionally orientated to the 
NDC, 34.5% to the NPP and 10.6% to Nkrumahism. 2% of respondents indicated that 
their families were somewhat orientated towards parties other than any of the three 
mainstream political traditions (Table 7; Appendix XI). 
Table 7: (q6). 
PARTY 
Ndc 
FREQUENCY 
121 
VALID % 1 
24.2 
Npp 173 34.5 
nkrumahist 53 10.6 
Other 10 2.0 
None 143 28.5 
1 0.2 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
4.4.2 Traditional party orientation of respondents (q7)" 
As many as 29.1% of individual respondents indicated that they had no traditional 
orientation towards any of the three mainstream political traditions. 23.6% were 
traditionally orientated towards the NDC, 34.3% NPP and 11% Nkrumahists. 2% did 
not have a traditional orientation towards any of the three mainstream political 
traditions ('Fable 8; Appendix XI). 
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Table 8: (q7). 
PARTY 
Ndc 
FREQUENCY 
118 
i 
23.6 
Npp 173 34.5 
nkrumahist 53 10.6 
Other 10 2.0 
None 146 29.1 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
4.4.3 Current party orientation of respondents (Q8): 
As many as 28.7% had no party orientation at all. 24.2% were orientated towards the 
NDC, 37.9% NPP, 6.4% Nkrumahisrn. Only 2.8% did not belong to any of the three 
mainstream political traditions (Table 9; Appendix XI). 
Table 9: (q8). 
PARTY 
Ndc 
FREQUENCY 
121 
VALID% 
24.2 
N 190 37.9 
nkrumahist 32 6.4 
Other 14 2.8 
None 144 28.7 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
It is evident from the party orientation tables (7,8 & 9) that the traditional party 
orientation of individuals and their families had generally stabilised for all three 
mainstream traditions with a meagre percentage range of plus/minus 0.2% - 0.6%. 
I lowever, it is noticeable from tables 7 and 9 that whereas current party orientation of 
respondents and the traditional party orientation of their families had stabilised for 
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individual NDC supporters (remaining at 24.2%), between those same variables, the 
NPP had an increase of 3.4%, "other" (that is, any non-mainstream or minor party) 
increased by 0.8%, and Nkrumahists had a decrease of 4.2%. It is clear that the NPP 
and some minor parties had gained from a shift in support from the Nkrumahist camp. 
This may be explained by the fact that at the time of interviews, the Nkrumahist 
coalition seemed divided and disorganised while the NPP was shaping up and seemed 
more focused (see Glossary in Appendix II). A little percentage of support had 
therefore moved away from Nkrumahism towards the NPP and any other minor party. 
Stability for the NDC is also explained by the general feeling that some NDC 
supporters were disillusioned about the party but were at the same time reluctant to 
shift support towards the NPP or any other minor party. Despite any apparent freeze or 
stability in orientation or support figures for the NDC, the actual voter intentions for 
the 2000 elections indicated a decline in votes for the party (Tables 19-22; Appendix 
XI). 
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4.5 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Political participation as used here, denotes any overt demonstration by respondents in 
the overall political process. This would include a wide range of activities, for example, 
registration to vote, formal registered membership with a party, or ordinary but active 
support to a party such as distribution of leaflets, sticking of posters, and attendance at 
rallies and conferences (yet without party registration). 84.4% of respondents had 
registered to vote, 9.8% were ineligible to register as they were under 18 at the time of 
the survey, 2.6% had no support for any of the candidates, and 3% were simply 
apolitical. Only 30.5% of respondents were registered members of any party. 7% could 
not afford party registration, 14.6% were disillusioned about the parties, and a good 
46% were apolitical and not interested in political party participation, or perhaps did 
not want to be identified with a party. This explains why only 27.7% participated in 
politics at the local level, as little as 8.4% at both district and national levels, 1.2% at 
all levels, but 54.3% participated at no level at all (Tables 10-15; Appendix XI). The 
implicit suggestion or indication that there were some who had registered with a party 
but were not actively involved with the party, is confirmed by the data. A cross- 
tabulation of party registration (Q15) and level of party political participation (Q18) 
reveals that 5.2% of registered party members (to any party) had no active involvement 
with the party at any level, other than their party registration (Appendix XII). In another 
light, the implicit suggestion or indication that there were some who were actively 
involved with party activities but remained unregistered members of the party, is also 
confirmed by the data. Although: 27.7% claimed local involvement in politics, 15.8% 
were registered members of a party and 12.0% were not; 8.4% claimed political 
involvement at the district level, 5.2% had party registration and 3.2% did not; 8.4% 
claimed political involvement at national level, half of these (4.2%) had party 
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registration and the other half did not (Appendix XII). This means that, just as there are 
those who, by reason of party registration, had paid party dues but did nothing more 
and were almost invisible, there were also visible party enthusiasts without any party 
registration at all. This is an indication of the scope for both fluidity and ambiguity as 
far as partisanship is concerned. Nevertheless, there is a link between "party 
registration" (Q15) and "level of party involvement" (Q18), and it can be concluded 
that there is a significant association between the two variables. This is written as: 
X''- 129.27; df = 4; p<0.01 
The subtable for symmetric measures provides a measure of the strength of the 
association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: Phi 
= 0.508; p<0.01 (Appendix XII; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284). 
Of all respondents with party registration, 13.4% were registered members of the NDC, 
14.8% for NPP, 2.4% for Nkrumahists, and 0.2% for the other minor parties. Most 
respondents - 44.1% familiarised themselves with the politics through the media, only 
16.8% attended political rallies, 6.8% fed from both rallies and the media, and 32.3% 
did none of these (Tables 13 & 16; Appendix XI). 
4.5.1 Are you a registered voter (g 13)?: 
In Ghana, individuals of voting age (18) register to vote on a local basis, and not via the 
party as in U. S. A. The voters' register is opened every year, and country-wide elections 
take place every four years. 
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Table 10: Voter registration (cil 3). 
Table 11: If `no' (to g13), _why arcyouunot_a registered voter ((114'? 
ANSWER 
incli phlc 
FREQUENCV 
11 
1' 
I. }; 
ii . ati\'c 
1 2. (, 
it-political 15 3.0 
n/a 424 84.6 
I U'FA1_ 501 100.0 
'fahle 13: ! Iycs' (toi (11 5), which p rt% (cal())'': 
PARTY 
Npp 
FREQUENCY 
74 
VALID% 
14.8 
Nkrumahist 12 2.4 
Other 1 0.2 
n/a 347 69.3 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
Table 14: It' `no' (tý q 15), vhy are you n(it a registered member UI' atiV party ((117) 
ANSWER 
I)isllusion 
FREQUENCY 
73 
VALID% 
14. x, 
a- political 232 46.3 
n/a 160 31.9 
` 1 0.2 
TOTAL 501 1(111. (1__ 
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Table 12: me Ynu a rcv. istcred mcnil cr of any Party ((115)? 
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4.5.2 What is your level of political participation (q 18)? 
The levels of political participation are local, district and national, and individuals can 
be involved in any combination of these. Participation at the "district" level includes 
any form of participation above the local level but not at the national level. 
Participation could range from mere attendance at rallies to actual decision-making 
activities such as election of officers or amendments to the party constitution. Some 
amount of participation is restricted to only registered party membership. For example, 
whereas anyone could attend campaign rallies, only registered party members and 
officers could vote at the national conference to elect candidates for national elections. 
Table 15: Level of political participation (g 18). 
LEVEL 
Local 
FREQUENCY 
139 
VALID% 
27.7 
District 42 8.4 
National 42 8.4 
all levels 6 1.2 
None 272 54.3 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
Table 16: How do you familiarise yourself with the politics q19)? 
This denotes the means by which respondents acquainted themselves with political 
phenomena. 
ANSWER 
, fittend rallies 
FREQUENCY 
84 
1' 
16. E 
Media 221 44.1 
all (both) 34 6.8 
None 162 32.3 
'TOTAL 501 100.0 
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4.6 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
66.5% said they freely shared their political opinions with others. The remainder who 
felt no such freedom confided in: none (13.8%); only friends (9.2%); spouse and unit 
family (5.2% each), and; distant relatives (2%). If 66.5% claimed they freely shared 
their political opinions, it can be safely concluded that, largely, the opinions gathered 
from this survey were freely given (Tables 17 & 18; Appendix XI). 
Table 17: Do you freely share your views/opinions with everyone (q20)?: 
Table 18: If `no' (to q20), please state confidants and preference order (q21) 
PREFERENCE 
spouse 
FREQUENCY 
26 
VALID% 
5.2 
family 26 5.2 
friends 46 9.2 
distant relations 2 0.4 
none 69 13.8 
n/a 332 66.3 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
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4.7 VOTES 
4.7.1 1996 
During the 1996 parliamentary elections, 26.9% of respondents voted for the NDC 
parliamentary candidate, 42.1% for NPP, 3.2% for Nkrumahists and 1% for 
independent or other candidates. During the presidential elections, 34.7% of 
respondents voted for Rawlings (NDC), 43.7% for Kufour (NPP), and I% for Mahama 
(Nkrumahism). 15% of respondents were ineligible to vote for an MP, either as a result 
of age disqualification or non-registration to vote. Another 11.8% did not vote at all 
either as a result of dislike for candidates, non-registration to vote, apathy or other 
reason. For the presidential elections, 14.2% were ineligible to vote and 6.4% did not 
vote at all, for any of the reasons outlined above (Tables 19 & 20; Appendix X1). 
Table 19: Vote in 1996 parliamentary elections (g9): 
PARTY OF MP 
Ildc 
FREQUENCY 
135 
1'. 
26.9 
n 211 42.1 
nkrurnahist 16 3.2 
other 5 1.0 
none 59 11.8 
ineligible 75 15.0 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
Table 20: Vote in 1996 presidential elections (ql O)_ 
VOTE 
R'M III1":, 
FREQUENCY 
1 'A 
VALID% 
34.7 
Kufour 219 43.7 
Maharna 5 1.0 
none 32 6.4 
ineligible 71 14.2 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
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4.7.2 2000 
For the 2000 parliamentary elections, 19.6% intended to vote for the NDC 
parliamentary candidate, 43.7% for NPP, 3.8% for Nkrumahist, 1.2% for the NRP 
("new NDC"), and 1.8% for independent or other candidates. 23.2% were undecided. 
For the presidential elections, 26.9% intended to vote for Ata Mills (NDC), 44.5% for 
Kufour, 1% for Tanor (NRP) and another 1% for independent or other candidates. 
20.6% were undecided. 0.8% would not be eligible to vote for an MP and 6% would 
vote for no parliamentary candidate for similar reasons outlined above. Also, 1.2% 
would not be eligible to vote for a presidential candidate and 4.8% would vote for no 
presidential candidate for similar reasons already outlined. Whereas voter intentions for 
the NPP parliamentary and presidential candidates for 2000 seemed to have stabilised 
with the 1996 figures (with meagre increments of 1.6% and 0.8% for parliamentary and 
presidential elections respectively), the same results for the NDC indicated drastic 
decrements of 7.3% and 7.8% for parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. 
This constituted a sure sign of reduction in urbanite votes for the NDC in the 2000 
elections. Statistically, this is partly attributable to the fact that as much as 23.2% and 
20.6% were yet undecided about their choice of candidates for the 2000 parliamentary 
and presidential elections respectively. Given that current party orientation or support 
(at the same period) for the NDC was stable (as compared with family orientation), it 
becomes clear that slightly over a third of the remaining undecided urbanite voters 
would not vote for the NDC (Tables 21 & 22; Appendix XI). Also, given that the NPP 
was already in the lead in the urban area, this was additional bad news for the then 
ruling NDC party. Furthermore, given that since January 1999, the ruling party (NDC) 
had become more unpopular due to the high spate of scandals, failed policies and 
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political manipulations in Parliament, the shift of undecided votes away from the NDC 
would be on the increase among urbanites. 
The issue of the large percentage of undecided voters can also be explained further, in 
that, a percentage of the Ewe (and other non-Akan) solidarity for the NDC was on hold 
because the NDC presidential candidate for 2000 was not Ewe but Akan (Fanti). 
According to the survey, 11.4% of total respondents who voted for the NDC 
parliamentary candidate in 1996 were Ewes (Appendix XIII). Voter intentions for the 
parliamentary elections in 2000 indicated that this had reduced to a mere 5.6% (Ibid). 
Also, in 1996, the 12.97% of total respondents who voted for Rawlings (NDC 
candidate) were Ewes (Appendix XIII). Voter intentions for the presidential elections 
in 2000 indicated that this figure had also dwindled to 7.98% (Ibid). These constitute 
sure signs of ethnonationalism in voting attitudes. It would appear that a main reason 
for this indecision on the part of some voters could be attributed to the change of the 
NDC presidential candidate's ethnonational identity from Ewe to Akan. A cross- 
tabulation of "tribe" (Q3) and "choice of presidential candidate for the 2000" elections 
(Q12) indicated that the percentage of undecided voters was higher among Ewes than 
the other groups. Although, 20% of all respondents were Fantis and 19% were Ewes 
(only 1% difference), the data reveal that as at the time of this survey, 32.6% of Ewe 
respondents were undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000, as 
against 15% of Fanti respondents, or 14.5% of Ashanti respondents, or 20.8% of Ga- 
Adangbe respondents. The Dagombas register the highest percentage of undecideds - 
42.9%, but out of the total number of respondents (501) Dagombas numbered only 7 or 
1.4% (Appendix XIII). This pattern of indecision could well have changed by the time 
of the presidential elections in December 2000, as some would have made up their 
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minds by then, however it is interesting to note the patterns of ethnonationalism which 
had emerged, as a result of the relationship between ethnonational identity and political 
indecision among potential voters. 
Table 21: Tentative vote in 2000 parliamentary elections (q] 1): 
PARTY ,1 
ndc 
FREQUENCY 
98 
VALID% 
19.6 
npp 219 43.7 
nkrumahist 19 3.8 
new ndc 6 1.2 
other 9 1.8 
none 30 6.0 
ineligible 4 0.8 
undecided 116 23.2 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
Table 22: Tentative vote in 2000 presidential elections (q12): 
VOTE 
Ata Mills 
FREQUENCY 
135 
D% 
26.9 
Kufour 223 44.5 
Tanor 5 1.0 
other 5 1.0 
none 24 4.8 
ineligible 6 1.2 
undecided 103 20.6 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
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4.8 THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNONATIONALISM ON VOTING HABITS 
The survey tested for the extent to which a presidential candidate's ethnonational 
identity influenced urban voter attitudes, in other words, the tendential response of the 
urban population towards a candidate's ethnonational background. As the influence of 
patriotism towards one's ethnonational group - (positive ethnonationalism) - on voting 
habits is already of widespread occurrence (see sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), it is important 
that the nature and extent of ethnonational resentment - (negative ethnonationalism), 
was also measured. The 'politics of the belly' had cast a historical influence on voting 
habits, but the tendency for an urbanite to vote against any presidential candidate, or 
abstain from voting as a result of direct resentment towards the candidate's 
ethnonational identity group is to be considered as an extreme demonstration of 
negative ethnonationalism. Questions 26-30 of the questionnaire sought to elicit the 
voting attitudes of interviewees vis-ä-vis the ethnonational background of a presidential 
candidate. Both a negative vote or abstention are regarded as constituting a protest 
against one's candidacy due to the candidate's ethnonational background. An abstention 
is taken to mean a form of reservation, and constitutes a protest. As shown in Table 23, 
the survey revealed that 16.6% of Ghanaian urbanites would outrightly not vote for a 
presidential candidate if he/she were a Fanti, 23.6% if the candidate were Ashanti, 34% 
if Ewe, 21.8% if Ga-Adangbe, and 21.8% if a Mabian or Northerner. Demonstration of 
direct, negative ethnonationalism was highest against the Ewe and Ashanti groups, the 
two groups known to have the strongest mutually antagonistic relationship. 
Subsequently, in a cross-tabulation of the ethnonational identities of interviewees (Q3) 
versus their tentative votes vis-ä-vis a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity 
(Q26-30), the highest among the patterns of mutually antagonistic identity relationships 
are represented as follows: a total 6.4% of Ewes (2.6% against and 3.8% abstain) and a 
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total 6.2% of Ga-Adangbes would outrightly not vote for a candidate if he/she were an 
Ashanti; a total 7.8% of Fantis, 6.2% of Ashantis 6.4% of Ga-Adangbes would 
outrightly not vote for a candidate if he/she were an Ewe (Appendix XIV). 
Table 23: Extreme negative ethnonationalism 
Vote if candidate 
was: 
against 
%age 
abstain 
%age 
Cumulative 
protest %age 
Fanti 6 10.6 16.6 
Ashanti 13.2 10.4 23.6 
Ewe 21.8 12.2 34 
Ga 10.2 11.6 21.8 
Northerner 12.0 9.8 21.8 
(Table derived from Appendix Al). 
A cross-tabulation of tribe versus voter intentions for parliamentary candidates for the 
2000 elections reveals that, among the total 23.2% undecided voters, 9.4% were Akan, 
7.2% were Ewes, 4.8% were Ga-Adangbe, 1.4% were Northerners and 0.4% were 
Nzimas. Also, a cross-tabulation of tribe versus voter intentions for the 2000 
presidential elections indicates that among the total 20.6% of undecided voters, 7.2% 
were Akan, 6.2% were Ewe, 4.4% were Ga-Adanbge, 1.6% were Northerners, and 
1.2% were Nzima (Appendix XIII). As Akans were more prone to vote for an NPP 
presidential candidate, it could be safely argued, that irrespective of the reasons for the 
temporary indecision, the NPP would gain more from the army of undecided voters. It 
204 
205 
could also be argued that some of the undecided voters at the time of the survey, who 
voted against Rawlings in 1996 because he was an Ewe, could now vote for the NDC 
presidential candidate in 2000, because he was not Ewe. 
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4.9 STABILITY OF SUPPORTERS 
Respondents were quizzed to test for their political stability and potential vote shifting 
as influenced by general public opinion or endorsement of any party (Q 22 & 23). 
28.3% said they would vote NDC if the party was riding highest in public endorsement, 
and 41.5% said they would vote NPP. On the other hand, 49.9% said they would vote 
NPP if the party was riding highest in public endorsement, and 19.4% said they would 
vote NDC (Appendix XI). A difference of 8.9% between the NDC high and low 
[28.3%-19.4%] and 8.4% [49.9%-41.5%] between the NPP high and low, meant that 
the NDC had only a 0.5% edge over the NPP on the luckiest days for both parties. 
However, the fact remained, that the NPP would register 49.9% of votes whereas the 
NDC would register only 28.3% (Ibid). 
4.9.1 The Ga-Adanbge factor 
Yet another issue was the comparative unpredictability of Ga-Adangbe political 
attitudes vis-ä-vis the two main opposing parties (NDC and NPP). The Ga-Adangbe 
political complexion did not easily lend itself to analysis. First, Ga-Adangbes do not 
have special predominance in the formation and maintenance of any of the three 
mainstream political traditions. Second, Ga-Adangbe support for the NDC and NPP 
seemed to be shared on a near equal basis. It therefore became difficult to judge to any 
meaningful extent, whether, as a collectivity, they were ethnonationalists or political 
nationalists. The fact of being non-Akan tends to lend a sway in affiliation towards the 
political leanings of the non-Akan stream/led parties (e. g. the NDC). However, the 
skew has not been that strong to make anything concrete out of it. The survey results 
indicate that during the 1996 parliamentary elections, 6.6% of total respondents who 
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voted NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 7.2% of them voted NPP -a difference of only 
0.6%. For the 2000 parliamentary elections, the survey revealed that 7% of total 
respondents who intended to vote NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.6% of them intended 
to vote NPP -a difference of only 0.4%. For presidential elections, the survey revealed 
that in 1996,9.78% of total respondents who voted NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.6% 
of them voted NPP - difference of 3.2%. In 2000,8.6% of total respondents who 
intended to vote NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.8% of them intended to vote NPP -a 
difference of 1.8% and a reduction in the difference of 1.4% from 1996 (Appendix 
XIII). As already hinted, the ethnonational skew of the Ga-Adangbe political 
complexion has been very narrow between the two parties. A tendency to feel non- 
Akan may exist, and which may explain the reduction in votes away from the 
presidential candidates of Akan-led NPP. But this difference is still narrow - 1.8% for 
2000 (Ibid). Both the NDC and NPP had been doing their best to woo the Ga- 
Adangbes, with the NDC slightly in the lead. Given that urban support generally sways 
towards the NPP, the narrow Ga-Adangbe skew towards the NDC was an indication 
that their tendency to affiliate with non-Akanness is something not to be ignored 
altogether. Naturally, more Ga-Adangbes would tend to support the NDC than the NPP 
because of the anti-Akan factor. Therefore among all factors, any forecasts or 
speculation regarding the December 2000 elections needed to examine very closely the 
Ga-Adangbe factor, in order to be comprehensive and very accurate. Despite the 
significant Ga-Adangbe presence among the NPP high echelons (e. g. the party 
Chairman, General Secretary and National Campaign Manager)", Ga-Adangbe anxiety 
to have total control over Ghana's capital city, Accra, is one very important reason why 
they would prefer the NDC to any other party whose ethnonational composition reflects 
29 See section on NPP in Glossary of political parties in Appendix II. 
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a predominance of any identity group/s which have no traditional links with the capital 
(e. g. NPP). Accra is also the traditional capital for Ga-Adangbes. In addition to various 
contentious and controversial land claims, and the sale of similar plots of land by Ga- 
Adangbe traditional landowners to multiple "buyers", thereby causing numerous cases 
of litigation, some of the Ga-Adangbe claims over citizens of Accra have been 
religious, to which non-Ga-Adangbes and non-traditionalists (Ga-Adangbe or 
otherwise) would not wish to oblige. For example, the annual Ga-Adangbe 40-day 
drum ban in respect of the Homowo festival had caused serious controversies over the 
years and reached new heights in 1999. Non-Ga-Adangbe Accra citizens and several 
Charismatic churches (some of whose congregants are Ga-Adangbes) refused to 
comply with the drum ban. The Wulomo (Ga-Adanbge traditional priesthood) 
organised aggressive attacks against offenders resulting in bloody clashes in which 
church congregants were clubbed, knifed and beaten with weapons. Reverend Tackie 
Yarboi, the Ga-Adangbe Pastor of Victory Bible Church, who is also an heir apparent 
to the Ga-Adangbe throne in Accra, suffered a broken skull when his church was 
attacked for not observing the ban. The royal household claimed that, as he is of royal 
blood, he should have known better not to have transgressed. Both central government 
and the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA) negligently turned a blind eye to these 
criminal attacks, leaving the Ga-Adangbe traditionalists to carry out their 
unconstitutional aggression against residents of Accra who had indulged in drumming 
(Ghana Review International, Newsreel, 21 May 1999). Constitutionally, drumming is 
not a legal offence, and no citizen is legally obliged to observe a traditional drum ban. 
The Police failed to protect attacked residents of the city even when they were tipped of 
impending attacks. However, they moved in to prevent a subsequent counter-attack by 
city residents of Christian orientation against the Wulomoist shrine and priests. It 
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would appear that the La Mantse, Nii Kpobey Tettey Trusu III, ordered the Lakpa 
Wulomo to quit the Wulomoist shrine, not only because the former had Christian 
leanings, but also because he has disciplinary authority over the latter. The Police 
therefore intervened to avert clashes as two huge crowds, each in support of the La 
Mantse and the Wulomo priest, converged to observe how the quit order was to be 
effected (Daily Graphic August 6,1999). Incidentally, the ruling NDC's Minister of 
Interior, who also had ministerial control over the Police, is a Ga-Adangbe royal, and 
the NDC government was not interested in upsetting the Ga-Adanbge indigenes, from 
whom a fair amount of its urban support would be derived. It is not surprising 
therefore, that during the crucial pre-Homowo season in 1999, the government held 
"behind closed doors" meetings with the chiefs of the Accra Traditional area to dispel 
"wrong" impressions harboured by the traditionalists regarding the government's 
position on the chieftaincy's politics, as well as support for the Homowo festival. At 
the meeting, the government pledged adequate security protection and the maintenance 
of law and order during the Homowo celebrations (Ibid). 
Most Ghanaians would claim they are Christian, even if they are not church attenders. 
It is therefore not surprising that 96.6% of all respondents to the survey claimed that 
they were Christians. It is also usual for some nominal or Orthodox Christians to be 
syncretistic and observe both traditional and Christian practices. But the fanatical 
Charismatics of the Christian Faith, whose numerical strength seems to be growing at 
an alarming rate, do not wish to observe the drum ban, and therefore became the main 
targets of aggression from the Ga-Adangbe Wulomo traditional priesthood. 41.1% of 
the survey's respondents were Charismatics (Appendix XI), and most of the largest 
Charismatic churches are based in Accra and Tema. There was anxiety that any 
209 
210 
government and political party with no particular sympathies towards Ga-Adangbeness 
would neither support the idea of Ga-Adangbe religion being obligatory to residents of 
the capital, nor any of the other political scheming to control Accra in other forms. Ga- 
Adangbes feared they would lose grip of their traditional control over the city if the 
NPP should win the elections. There had been speculation that most Charismatics 
would not vote for the NDC in the next elections since the government failed to protect 
their religious interests with regard to the Homowo drum ban issue. The paradox of the 
scenario was that the NDC presidential candidate for 2000 (Ata Mills) is a Charismatic 
Christian, and a regular attendant at the Assemblies of God Church. Mrs Mills also 
regularly attends one of the pioneering Charismatic churches in Ghana - Christian 
Action Faith Ministries (CAFM). On the other hand, the NPP candidate (Kufour) does 
not attend a Charismatic church, and would have a greater tendency to be sympathetic 
towards Ga-Adangbe traditional religion, but he was the candidate of a party with a 
predominantly Akan support base. It could not be guaranteed that an NPP government 
would have sympathies for Ga-Adangbe traditional religion as had been demonstrated 
by the NDC. It was therefore very difficult to judge how the Charismatics, especially 
those within the Accra-Tema metropolitan area, would be voting in December 2000. 
Religion has not been known to be a key factor in Ghanaian politics, but it would 
appear that the clash between the Charismatic churches and Ga-Adangbe traditional 
priesthood had stirred up religious sentiments and introduced the potential for religion 
to have a bearing on the outcome of the election results in Accra and Tema. 
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4.10 NATURE OF VOTERS 
4.10.1 Type of voter 
Further analytical work was carried out on the survey data to elicit more intricate 
patterns as to the very nature of the respondents and what types of political animal they 
were. A universal, objective criteria was used to derive a typology. Based on the survey 
results, a new column was created on the SPSS data editor for "level of tribalism". This 
had six categories including: (1) extreme - "ext"; (2) very high - "vh"; (3) high - "h"; 
(4) low - "1"; (5) very low - "vl"; (6) benefit of the doubt - "b". Subsequently, any 
respondent whose "level of tribalism" was extreme, very high, or high, was deemed an 
ethnonationalistic voter or an ethnonationalist, and those whose "levels of tribalism" 
were low, very low, or had to be given the benefit of the doubt, were deemed as 
political nationalists. The typology was derived from how respondents answered the 
questions, as below: 
if a respondent would vote against a presidential candidate not of their tribe in any 
of section "e" questions 26-30, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting an extreme 
level of tribalism or "ext". 
" if a respondent would vote against a presidential candidate of their tribe in any of 
section "e" questions 26-30, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very low 
level of tribalism or "vi". 
. if a respondent is Akan, and indicated "2" or "NPP" throughout from section "b" 
questions 6/7-12, and/or similar in section "e" questions 22-25, the respondent is 
categorised as exhibiting a very high level of tribalism or "vh". 
211 
212 
" if a respondent is Ewe and indicated "1" or "NDC" throughout from section "b" 
questions 6/7-12, and/or similar in section "e" questions 22-25, the respondent is 
categorised as exhibiting a very high level of tribalism or "vh". 
9 if a respondent is Ewe and indicated "1" or "NDC" in any of section "b" questions 7- 
10, but "8" and/or "7" in questions 11-12 respectively, the respondent is categorised as 
exhibiting a very high level of tribalism or "vh". 
" if a respondent is Akan and indicated not "2" or "NPP" in question 6, but "2" or 
"NPP" in any of questions 7-12 (even if not in section "e" questions 22-25), the 
respondent is categorised as exhibiting a high level of tribalism or "h". 
" if a respondent is Ewe and indicated not "1" or "NDC" in question 6, but "1" or 
"NDC" in any of questions 7-12 (even if not in section "e" questions 22-25), the 
respondent is categorised as exhibiting a high level of tribalism or "h". 
" if a respondent is Akan and voted not "2" or "NPP" in any of questions 6-8, but "2" 
or "NPP" in any of questions 9-10, and/or 11-12, the respondent is categorised as 
exhibiting a low level of tribalism or "1". 
" if a respondent is Ewe and voted not "1" or "NDC" in any of questions 6-8, but "1" 
or "NDC" in any of 9-10, and/or 11-12, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a 
low level of tribalism or "1". 
9 if a respondent is a Mabian/Northerner and indicated "3" or "Nkrumahist" in any of 
section "b" questions 7-11 and/or section "e" questions 22-25, the respondent is 
categorised as exhibiting a high level of tribalism or "h". 
" if a respondent is Akan and indicated "1 "/"NDC" or "3"/"Nkrumahist" at some 
stages in questions 6/7-12, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very low level 
of tribalism or "vi". 
212 
213 
" if a respondent is Ewe and indicated "2"/"NPP"at some stages in questions 6/7-12, 
the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very low level of tribalism or "vl". 
" if a respondent is in none of the categories set above, or is not registered to vote and 
does not intend to enter the voters register, the respondent is given the benefit of the 
doubt - "b". It is taken to mean that the respondent's political colour is indecipherable 
and therefore unknown. 
Table 24: Type of voter 
'Fribalistic 361 72.1 
non-tribalistic 140 27.9 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
Table 25: Type of voter by group 
tribali non- total cumulative% 
stic tribalistic 
voters voters 
akan 211 42.1% 52 10.4% 263 52.5 
ga- 49 9.8% 57 11.4% 106 21.2 
adangbe 
nzima 10 2% 6 1.2% 16 3.2 
norther 12 2.4% 9 1.8% 21 4.2 
ners/ 
mabians 
ewe 79 15.8% 16 3.2% 95 19 
total 361 72.1% 140 279% 501 100.0 
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The frequencies for "type of voter" reveal that 72.1% of Ghanaian urbanites are 
ethnonationalistic voters and only 27.9% vote non-tribalistically or are political 
nationalists (Tables 24 & 25; Appendices XI & XV). A cross-tabulation of "tribe" and 
"type of voter" reveal that, although Fantis constituted 20% of total respondents, 16% 
intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 4% are political nationalists. Although 
Ashantis constituted 15.2% of total respondents, 12% intended to vote as 
ethnonationalists, and only 4% are political nationalists. Akyems constituted 7.8% of 
total respondents, but 6.6% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 1.2% are 
political nationalists. Akwapims constituted 9% of total respondents, but 7.4% intended 
to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 1.6% are political nationalists. Bonos constituted 
0.6% of total respondents, but 0.2% are ethnonationalistic and 0.4% are political 
nationalists. Altogether, among the 52.5% of total respondents who are Akan, 42.09% 
demonstrated ethnonationalism, and only 10.41% are political nationalists. Ga- 
Adangbes constituted 21.2% of total respondents. 9.8% intended to vote as 
ethnonationalists, and 11.4% are political nationalists -a difference of 1.6%. Once 
again, with the Ga-Adangbes, the general skew towards either ethnonationalism or 
political nationalism, was not strong enough to base an emphatic judgement on. 
Nzimas made up only 3.2% of total respondents, but 2% intended to vote as 
ethnonationalists, and 1.2% are political nationalists. Mabians (Northerners) 
constituted 4.2% of total respondents, but 2.4% intended to vote as ethnonationalists 
and 1.8% are political nationalists. Ewes made up 19% of total respondents, but as 
much as 15.8% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 3.2% are political 
nationalists. Of the total number of respondents, 42.1% demonstrating 
ethnonationalism by their vote are Akan, 15.8% are Ewes, and 9.78% are Ga-Adangbe 
(Appendix XV). Given that 52.5% of all respondents are Akan, 19% are Ewes and 
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21.2% are Ga-Adanbges, a representation of the percentage of ethnonationalistic voters 
for each identity group against the respective percentages of overall group responses 
equals Akans (80%), Ewes (83%), but for Ga-Adangbes only (43%). Whereas the 
representations of ethnonationalism for Akans and Ewes are high, that for Ga- 
Adangbes is around midpoint, or average. This is due to the political complexion of 
Ga-Adangbes not being easily susceptible to analysis, as already outlined. The 11.4% 
of remaining Ga-Adangbes, for whom it was impossible to decipher what type of voter 
they were as a result of insufficient evidence, and who were given the benefit of the 
doubt, became classified as political nationalists. Generally, Ga-Adangbes had 
managed to conceal their votes (Ibid). Also, the data reveal that, generally, Ghanaian 
urbanites are more of ethnonationalists than political nationalists, and therefore, that 
proneness towards political nationalism is more imagined than real, of style rather than 
the substance of Ghanaian politics. 
4.10.2 Level of ethnonationalism: 
Table 26: 
LEVEL 
extreme 
FREQUENCY 
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42.1 
very high 128 25.5 
hi h 21 4.2 
low 4 0.8 
very low 38 7.6 
benefit 99 19.8 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
The frequencies reveal that among Ghanaian urbanites, 42.1% of respondents 
demonstrated extreme levels of ethnonationalism, 25.5% very high, 4.2% high, 0.8% 
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low, 7.6% very low, and 19.8% had to be given the benefit of the doubt due to 
insufficient evidence, 11.4% of whom are Ga-Adangbes (Table 26; Appendix XV). A 
cross-tabulation of "tribe" and "level of tribalism" reveals that among Ghanaian 
urbanites a total 22.6% of Akans exhibit extreme levels of ethnonationalism and a 
further 17.4% exhibit very high levels of it. The figures for Ewes are 7.2% and 7% 
respectively. Those for Ga-Adangbes are 9% and 0.6% respectively (Appendix XV). 
The representation of these percentages against those of their respective overall group 
responses equals: Akans (42.9% and 33% for extreme and very high levels of 
ethnonationalism respectively); Ewes (37.78% and 36.7%); Ga-Adangbes (42.3% and 
2.83%). Given that, of the 21.2% of overall Ga-Adanbge respondents only 9.8% could 
be deciphered politically, it is clear that almost all who were politically decipherable 
exhibited extreme levels of ethnonationalism (Appendices XV & XI). There is 
therefore a strong suggestion that either: if all Ga-Adangbes were politically 
decipherable, almost all would be ethnonationalistic voters of at least very high or 
extreme degree, or; most Ga-Adangbes had (within the political complexities of the 
Ghanaian context) managed to conceal their political complexion for whatever reason. 
Since, for most of them, their indecipherableness was no fault of theirs other than that 
the rigorous questionnaire still failed to have them cough out their ethnonationalistic 
intestines, it can be safely concluded also, that the general political history of Ghana 
makes it easier for Ga-Adangbes to conceal their political complexion than all the other 
ethnonational identity groups. 
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4.11 ASSOCIATION WITH ROOTS 
The frequencies indicate that of all respondents, 74.5% said they lived in Tema. 55.7% 
since 1961 and 18.8% within the post-1990 period. Thus, 55.5% had lived in Tema for 
over 10 years, 10.2% from 4-10 years, 3% from 4-12 months, and 1.2% for 3 months or 
under. 74.7% of respondents had tasted city life before coming to live in Tema, 27.3% 
of these in Accra and 10.4% in Kumasi, the two largest cities in Ghana. A further 17% 
had lived in any combination of the eleven cities, and 58.1% had always lived in a city. 
18.2% had tasted village/town life for over 10 years prior to coming into the city, 
10.6% from 4-10 years, 7.4% 1-3 years, 2.6% from 4-12 months, and 2.8% for 3 
months or under. A good 90.4% visited their relatives, 55.5% wrote to them, 67.9% 
telephoned them, and 81.4% actually visited their individual villages or home towns 
(Appendix XI). 
A further column was created on the SPSS data editor. Its contents were derived from a 
universal criteria to indicate a respondent's "association with roots", centring around 
whether a respondent visits relatives, writes to them, telephones them or actually visits 
their individual villages or hometowns. These were based on questions 39,42,45 and 
48 of the questionnaire. A typology was derived thus: 
" if a respondent indicated "yes" or "1" in all of section "f' questions 39,42,45 & 48, 
the respondent is categorised as having very high association with roots. 
" if a respondent indicated "yes" or "1" in any 3 of section "f' questions 39,42,45 & 
48, the respondent is categorised as having high association with roots. 
" if a respondent indicated "yes" or "1" in any 2 of section "f' questions 39,42,45 & 
48, the respondent is categorised as having average association with roots. 
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" if a respondent indicated "yes" or "I" in only one of section "f' questions 39,42,45 
& 48, the respondent is categorised as having low association with roots. 
" if a respondent indicated "no" or "2" in all of section 'f' questions 39,42,45 & 48, 
the respondent is categorised as having apathy for association with roots, or being 
apathetic to roots. 
Table 27: Association with roots 
LEVEL 
'cry high 
FREQUENCY 
171 
i 
34.1 
high 186 37.1 
average 102 20.4 
low 26 5.2 
apathetic 16 3.2 
TOTAL 501 100.0 
A lot of respondents - 34.1 %- registered as "very high", that is, they visited relatives, 
wrote to them, telephoned them and also visited their individual villages or 
hometowns. A further 37.1% registered as "high" or exhibited any three out of the four 
indicators of association with roots. Another 20.4% were "average" or exhibited any 
two of the indicators. 5.2% registered "low" or exhibited only one of the four 
indicators. Only 3.2% were "apathetic" in associating with their roots, or did not 
exhibit any of the four indicators (Table 27; Appendices XI & XV). The results 
therefore give a strong indication that, generally, urbanites are more highly inclined to 
be associated with their roots than otherwise, and that, for the vast majority of 
Ghanaian urbanites, geographical detribalisation would not lead to attitudinal 
detribalisation. In other words, the Ghanaian urbanite is generally not fully detribalised 
by urbanisation, or, that urbanisation does not always lead to attitudinal detrihalisation. 
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The research confirms the fact that, it is not universalistic for the integrating and 
modernising factors associated with urbanisation to lead to attitudinal detribalisation, 
and explains why most Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists. Furthermore, as 
72.1 % of Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists, and 27.9% are political nationalists 
(Appendix XV), it can be concluded, that political nationalism is more of style rather 
than the substance of Ghanaian politics, and that, most Ghanaian urbanites consider it 
more rationalistic to be ethnonationalist than political nationalist. Engagement with the 
metropolis, and integration into the institutions of state and government, have neither 
swayed Ghanaian urbanites towards attitudinal detribalisation nor political nationalism. 
The opposite ideal could have been possible had it not been the "politics of the belly" 
and the associated ethnic arithmetic, which results in a reciprocal voter behaviour 
whereby votes are cast in calculative ethnonational interests. The link between "politics 
of the belly" and ethnonationalism is clear, however any idea that political nationalism 
would prevail in the absence of "politics of the belly" is yet to be proven. 
A cross-tabulation of "tribe" versus "association with roots" also revealed that 
irrespective of one's ethnonational identity, most Ghanaian urbanites exhibit "very 
high" and "high" levels of association with their roots as against "average", "low" and 
"apathetic" (Ibid). However, a cross-tabulation of "length of residence in a city" versus 
"association with roots" astonishingly reveals that, generally, the longer Ghanaians 
lived in the urban area, the higher the association with their roots became. The cross- 
tabulation reveals that 18.2% and 20.2% of total respondents who had lived in Tema 
for more than 10 years exhibited "very high" and "high" association with roots 
respectively, as against 12.8% for "average", 2.6% for "low" and 1.8% for "apathetic" 
(Appendix XVI). For those who had lived in Tema from 4-10 years, 3.4% and 4.2% 
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exhibited "very high" and "high" association with roots respectively as against 2.2% 
for "average" and 0.2% each for "low" and "apathetic". For those who had lived there 
for 1-3 years, 1.6%, 1.8% and 0.6% exhibited "very high", "high" and "average" 
association with roots respectively, and 0.4% for "low" and none for "apathetic". For 
those who had lived there for three months and under, only 0.8% and 0.2% exhibited 
"very high" and "high" respectively, 0.2% for "apathetic" and none for "average" and 
"low" (Appendix XVI). The statistics imply that association with roots would seem to 
diminish for those who had lived shortest in the city. For example, out of the 6 
respondents who had been in Tema for three months or under, 0.8% exhibited "very 
high" association with roots, 0.2% exhibited "high", 0.2% was "apathetic" and 
obviously none for "average" and "low" (Ibid). It is clear that even the most recent city 
residents had very high associations with their roots. However, the data does not prove 
the existence of a direct relationship between length of stay in the city and association 
with roots. Also, even though the statistics suggest an association between length of 
stay in the city and association with roots, chi-square is not a suitable statistical test for 
measuring the strength of association (if any). 
In another interesting finding, a cross-tabulation of "level of tribalism" and "association 
with roots" also reveals that the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the 
highest levels of association with roots. The cross-tabulation reveals that 15%, 14.2% 
and 9.8% of total respondents who exhibited "very high", "high" and "average" 
associations with roots respectively, also exhibited "extreme" levels of 
ethnonationalism at the same time (Appendix XVI). A further 9.4%, 10% and 3.8% of 
total respondents who exhibited "very high", "high" and "average" associations with 
roots respectively, exhibited "very high" levels of ethnonationalism at the same time. 
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Only 1.8%, 1.6% and 0.6% of those who exhibited "very high", "high" and "average" 
associations with roots respectively, exhibited "high" levels of ethnonationalism at the 
same time. Even lower still, only 0.2%, 0.2% and 0.4% of those who exhibited "very 
high", "high" and "average" associations with roots respectively, exhibited "low" 
levels of ethnonationalism at the same time (Ibid). However, the data does not prove 
that levels of ethnonationalism are generally high because of urbanites' association 
with their roots. Although, it is common knowledge that ethnonationalism is a 
calculative and rationalistic response to "politics of the belly", there does not seem to 
be any direct relationship between ethnonationalism and association with roots. It can 
be concluded therefore, that as far as Ghanaian politics is concerned, ethnonationalism 
comes rather naturally and rationalistically, and does not have to be propelled by an 
individual's association with tribal roots. The evidence also clearly suggests, that 
generally, the notion that urbanisation leads to attitudinal detribalisation is more 
imagined than real, and that for most Ghanaian urbanites, political nationalism is more 
of style rather than the substance of politics. 
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4.12 GENDER AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
The survey revealed that females were more apathetic towards party political 
commitment than males. Overall, 30.5% of respondents were registered members of 
any party (Table 12; Appendix XI). It can be concluded that there is a significant 
association between the variables "gender" (Q 1) and "party registration" (Q 15). This is 
written as: 
X1= 17.23; df= l; p<0.01. 
The subtable for symmetric measures also provides a measure of the strength of the 
association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: Phi 
= 0.185; p<0.01 (Appendix XVII; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284). 
The survey also revealed that males had a greater tendency to freely share their political 
views than females. Overall, 66.5% of all respondents indicated that they exercised 
freedom of political expression (Table 17; Appendix XI). It can be concluded that there 
is a significant association between the variables "gender" (Q 1) and "freedom of 
political expression" (Q20). This is written as: 
X 9.87; df = 1; p<0.01. 
The subtable for symmetric measures provides a measure of the strength of the 
association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: Phi 
= 0.14; p<0.01(Appendix XVII; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284). 
As already stated, 66.5% of respondents indicated they freely shared their political 
opinions. Also, a cross-tabulation of question 1 (gender) and question 21 (confidants 
and preference order) reveals that of those who did not freely share their political 
opinions, there existed an almost equal proportion for males and females who would 
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share their opinions with no one at all - 6.8% and 7% respectively. For those who did 
not freely share their political opinions, females had a different preference order from 
males. Whereas the confiding order for males was, in descending order: "friends", 
"spouse" and "family", for females it was: "friends", family" and "spouse". Three 
times as many females 4.2% will share their political opinions with friends as against 
those who would share with spouses 1.4%. Therefore, among females who had 
difficulty sharing their political opinions, the tendency ratio of sharing them with 
friends to spouses is 3: 1. Also, the tendency ratio for males sharing their political 
opinions with their spouses to females doing the same is 2.7: 1. There is therefore a 
clear indication that between spouses, males felt freer to share their political opinions 
with their wives than females with their husbands (Appendix XVII). We can deduce 
from Appendix XVII, with a measure of certainty, that whereas freedom of political 
expression seemed to be a rarity between spouses, males felt freer to share political 
opinions with their wives than females would with their husbands. There was a greater 
tendency for females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions. In a 
society where a 'culture of silence' (Boahen 1989) has existed and is not fully broken, 
and where to a very large extent males are the main opinion leaders, it becomes 
difficult for females to freely air their views on many issues, especially those as 
explosive as politics. Even in circumstances not specifically adverse, the intimidation 
posed by the male-dominated society contributes to the phenomenon of females hiding 
their feelings on certain issues, including the political. A cross tabulation of question I 
(gender) and question 8 (current party orientation) reveals that, out of the 28.7% who 
had no specific party orientation, the proportion of male to female is equal, that is 
14.4% each (Appendix XVIII). 
223 
224 
4.13 AGE AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
Overall, the data reveal that, irrespective of age-group, there were consistently more 
votes for the NPP presidential candidate than that of the NDC candidate. There was 
only 1 respondent for the 61-70 age group. Owing to the minimum voting age being 18, 
only those aged at least 17 years at the time of the survey, and would be eligible to vote 
in 2000, had relevance to the survey. As responses within the 17-30 age group were the 
most obvious to be affected, in that some respondents would have been ineligible to 
vote in 1996 due to age or other reasons, this analysis concentrates on them. The data 
reveal that in 1996,27.4% of respondents in this age-group voted for Rawlings and 
36.3% for Kufour -a gap of 8.9%. For the 2000 tentative votes, we had 26.2% and 
46.8% respectively -a gap of 20.6% (Appendix XIX). This signified a 2.2% [27.4%- 
26.2%] decrease in votes for Rawlings, and a 10.5% [46.8%-36.3%] increase for 
Kufour. It is obvious that this was partially due to the increase in eligible voters for the 
2000 elections. However, the general pattern across the data is maintained, that 
irrespective of age group, there were more votes for the NPP than the NDC, either for 
1996 or 2000. This pattern is attributable to the generality that the NPP has more 
support than the NDC in Tema, and is comparatively stronger among urbanites than 
ruralites. The pattern does not reflect the whole country. A further analysis of the data 
indicated that: for the 31-40 age group, the NDC-NPP vote gaps for 1996 and 2000 
measured 4.4% and 13.1 % respectively; those for the 41-50 age group were 12.5% and 
12.5%, respectively, and; those for the 51-60 age group were 20.8% and 29.2% 
(Appendix XIX). Therefore, not only did the NPP generally have more vote potential in 
urban areas, but also, that the gaps had widened or increased to their advantage for all 
the age groups represented within the survey, with the exception of 41-50. This 
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signifies that the NPP's strength among urbanites had increased even further between 
1996 and 2000 at the age levels represented regardless of the ethnonational identity 
connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision exhibited by some 
respondents, as explained in section 4.7.2 "Votes - 2000". However, the data does not 
prove the existence of a direct relationship between age and voting habits, either for 
1996 or 2000. Additionally, chi-square is not a suitable test for measuring a strength of 
association between the two variables, if any, in that, 53.3% and 69% of cells from the 
output listings for age versus 1996 and 2000 votes respectively, have expected count 
less than 5, and the minimum expected count for both output listings is 0.01 (Appendix 
XIX; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281). 
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4.14 OCCUPATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
The general pattern within the data reveals that the NPP commanded a majority of 
votes. This may not only be attributable to the simple reason that the NPP's stronghold 
is in the urban area as explained in section 4.13, but also that priority to the choice of a 
presidential candidate had been given to party rather than personality. The general rule 
was that potential voters chose whichever candidate was presented by their favourite 
party. The fact of the NPP championing urbanite Tema seemed to mask any 
significance of association between occupation and politics. Perhaps a countrywide 
survey may reveal such an association. The gaps between the votes for the NDC and 
NPP across the occupations were generally close, with the exception of professionals, 
among whom there was a wide gap between presidential choices either for 1996 or 
2000. Responses for the 1996 presidential votes (Q10) indicate that 37.3% of all 
professional respondents voted for Rawlings whereas 52.8% voted for Kufour, a gap of 
15.5%. For 2000,24.9% of respondents intended to vote for Ata Mills (NDC) whereas 
49.2% intended to vote for Kufour, a gap of 24.3% (Appendix XX). Although the gap 
has again increased to the NPP's advantage, there were decreases in votes for each 
party's candidate - 3.6% for the NPP candidate and 12.4% for the NDC candidate. The 
survey data reveal that 20.7% of professional respondents were still undecided on 
which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000 (Ibid). Perhaps this should explain the 
decreases in votes for both party candidates, especially the NDC candidate. As the 
analysis in section 4.7.2 "Votes - 2000" reveals, this was partially attributable to the 
identity group connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision exhibited 
by some respondents, owing to the fact that the NDC candidate for 2000 was Akan and 
not Ewe. The data clearly shows that among the urban population in Tema, the NPP 
had more support among Ghanaian professionals than the NDC. However, it must be 
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noted that this is not a countrywide survey. Besides, Tema was chosen due to the 
ethnonational neutrality of its origination or foundation, which is central to the thesis. 
Chi-square is not a suitable test for measuring the strength of association, if any, 
between occupation and choice of presidential candidates (Appendix XX; Kinnear and 
Gray 1999, p. 281). 
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4.15 EDUCATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
The data reveal that, for all levels of education, the NPP candidate commanded more 
votes than the NDC candidate, and that, the gaps between votes for the candidates had 
accentuated for 2000. This does not reflect the whole country. For 1996, the gap 
between votes towards the NDC and NPP candidates were: 3.9% [46.2%-42.3%] for 
respondents with primary education, 7.9% [39%-31.1%] for secondary, and 12.6% 
[50.2%-37.6%] for tertiary. For 2000, the gap between tentative votes were: 38.4% for 
primary, 16.8% for secondary, and 16.1% for tertiary education (Appendix XXI). In 
addition to the general increase in numerical strength for the NPP, it was also clear that 
the NPP generally had more support from people with higher education than the NDC. 
It must be noted that, 14.2% of respondents were ineligible to vote in 1996 as against 
only 1.2% for 2000 (Appendix XXI), and consequently, it would be expected that this 
increase in voter eligibility should benefit both parties. But the data reveal a general 
reduction in votes for the NDC and an increase for the NPP. For 1996, the NDC's votes 
from respondents with: primary education was 42.3%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 
15.4%; secondary education was 31.1%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 27.7%; 
tertiary education was 37.6%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 27.4%. For 1996, the 
NPP's votes from respondents with: primary education was 46.2%, but for 2000, this 
had increased to 53.8%; secondary education was 37%, but for 2000, this had increased 
to 44.5%; tertiary education was 50.2%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 43.5% 
(Appendix XXI). There does not seem to be a pinpoint explanation to these undulating 
patterns, however, it must be borne in mind that 20.6% of all respondents were 
undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000, and that the identity 
connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision exhibited by 
respondents from the various ethnonational groups (see section 4.7.2) had a role to play 
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in the reduction in NDC votes. The lack of a specific pattern is also highlighted by 
another interesting observation, that at the same time as the NDC's highest drop in 
support was from respondents with only primary education (42.3% for 1996; 15.4% for 
2000), the NPP's only drop in support was from respondents with tertiary education 
(50.2% for 1996; 43.5% for 2000). Chi square is not a suitable statistical test for 
measuring the strength of association (if any) between level of education and choice of 
presidential candidates (Appendix XXI; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281). 
Finally, although the thesis would have liked to examine some further interesting 
relationships between, lets say, tribe and gender, or age, or occupation, or education, or 
any of the other variables within the survey, there is no rational way of amalgamating 
the categories under tribe, and therefore, chi-square is not suitable for investigating the 
associations, if any, between tribe and those variables. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
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The research findings offer the following conclusions and contribution to knowledge. 
5.1 ETHNONATIONALISM AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM 
Contrary to the ideals of political nationalism, as espounced by Hutchinson and Kellas 
(Hutchinson 1994, pp. 42-7; Kellas 1991, p. 52), in practice, most Ghanaian urbanites 
are ethnonationalists, and that, generally-speaking, political nationalism is more of 
style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics. Overwhelming evidence from the 
data indicates that 72.1% of Ghanaian urbanites intended to vote ethnonationalistically, 
and only 27.9% were political nationalists. 52.5% of total respondents were Akan: 
42.09% were ethnonationalists and only 10.41 % were political nationalists. 19% of 
total respondents were Ewe: 15.8% were ethnonationalists, and only 3.2% were 
political nationalists. 21.1% of total respondents were Ga-Adangbe: 9.78% were 
ethnonationalists and 11.37% were political nationalists. In other words, 80% of 
urbanite Akans, 83% of urbanite Ewes and 46.2% urbanite Ga-Adangbes were 
ethnonationalists. Akans and Ewes score highest on the scale of ethnonationalistic 
voters, and constituted the extreme ethnonationalists, both positively and negatively. 
5.1.1 Extremes of ethnonationalism and ethnonational resentment 
The data reveal that 42.1% of Ghanaian urbanites exhibit extreme levels of 
ethnonationalism, 25.5% very high levels, and 4.2% high levels. In other words, a total 
of 71.8% of Ghanaian urbanites demonstrated at least high levels of ethnonationalism. 
Clearly, the general level of ethnonationalism is upbeat. Those who have been given 
the benefit of the doubt constitute 19.8%, and even this as a result of insufficient 
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evidence. Therefore, in reality, there could be more ethnonationalists than the 71.8% 
which the data revealed. 
Negative ethnonationalism (or ethnonational resentment) is highest towards Ashantis 
and Ewes. Furthermore, mutual ethnonational resentment is highest between the 
Ashanti and Ewe. The research revealed that: 16.6% of Ghanaian urbanites would 
outrightly cast votes against, or perhaps keep their vote altogether, if a presidential 
candidate was a Fanti; 23.6% if the candidate was Ashanti; 34% if an Ewe; 21.8% if a 
Ga-Adangbe, and; 21.8% if a Mabian or Northerner. The data also reveal that the 
Ashanti and Ewe have the strongest mutually antagonistic relationship. A cross- 
tabulation of the ethnonational identities of interviewees versus their tentative votes 
vis-a-vis a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity, revealed the highest among 
the patterns of mutually antagonistic ethnonational relationships: 6.38% of Ewes and 
6.18% of Ga-Adangbes would not vote for a candidate who happened to be an Ashanti; 
also, 7.78% of Fantis, 6.18% of Ashantis and 6.38% of Ga-Adangbes would not vote 
for a candidate who happened to be an Ewe. 
There seems to be a broad Akan versus non-Akan alignment in these patterns of 
ethnonational resentment. The pinpoint explanation for this phenomenon is not totally 
clear in Ghanaian politics, and is to be sought from within the perceptions of 
Ghanaians for several reasons embedded in a combination of the myths of origin, 
"politics of the belly" and political events of the recent past. For example, it is a known 
fact, that any mutual antagonism between the Ashanti and Ewe, have arisen from the 
post-colonial period, and accentuated to a certain level when one political stalwart of 
the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia tradition, the late Victor Owusu, bellowed in the 
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Parliament of the Second Republic, that Ewes were nepotistic and inward-looking 
[Smock & Smock, 1975, p. 247; Lentz & Nugent (eds. ) 2000, p. 241. The ruling 
Progress Party (PP) of the Second Republic, of which Busia was Prime Minister, was 
of the Danquah-Busia political tradition. The mutual antagonism between the Ashanti 
and Ewe reached its heights during the period of the so-called Ewe-led and ruling 
P/NDC. Akans in general and Ashantis in particular, felt that the "politics of the belly" 
had worked to their deficiency, especially when the strategic ethnic arithmetic (Nugent 
1995, p. 43) had been heavily skewed towards the Ewes of Rawlings (Adjei 1993, p. 
262; Herbst 1993, pp. 86-7; Shillington 1992, pp. 144-5; Yeebo 1992, p. 52), and also, 
when 94.5% of the Ewe-dominated Volta Region voted for Rawlings during the 1996 
elections (Nugent 1999, p. 306). The P/NDC was also of the opinion that the "politics 
of the belly" during the 27-month Busia administration of the Second Republic 
benefited the Danquah-Busia political tradition, this view coming from President 
Rawlings himself'. As there was no ancient enmity between Ewes and Ashantis 
(Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8), it becomes clear that political events within the post-colonial 
29 See news item (below), which also appeared in the electronic GRi Press Review of 14 March 
2000: 
The Crusading Guide 
NPP dares Rawlings! 
The Crusading Guide says that the NPP has challenged President Jerry Rawlings to tell 
Ghanaians what State enterprises were sold by the Busia administration, and the persons to 
whom they were sold. "The party expects the President to accept this challenge to substantiate 
his allegation with facts and figures", the party is quoted as saying. The paper in a story on its 
back-page, said the NPP's sentiments were expressed in a statement signed by the national 
chairman, Mr S. A. Odoi-Sykes, in reaction to President Rawlings' Declaration at a rally in 
Bolgatanga, the Upper East Regional capital, that "the NPP is richer than the NDC because 
during Busia's 27 months of administration, the (NPP) were able to sell state enterprises to 
themselves and they grew richer". According to Mr Odoi-Sykes, this statement is false and 
completely unfounded. "Every Ghanaian knows that it is rather the NDC, which is sitting on 
ever-rising mountain of money amassed from dubious and questionable sources", he is quoted 
as saying. The NDC, Mr Odoi-Sykes maintained, "uses the money to form a multiplicity of 
political groups as allies of the NDC, and also uses its enormous wealth to influence and rig 
national elections"... GRi/ 
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period, which have touched on the sensitivities and insecurities of both groups, exert 
the most important influence on the current mutual antagonism, which have in turn 
enhanced the invocation of the distant myths of origin in explaining present patterns of 
nationalism. The extremes of ethnonationalism being demonstrated by the two groups 
perfectly fits Morrison's theory, that any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination 
(identity-based or not) tended to reassert its identity base in order to thwart country- 
wide integration (Morrison 1982, p. 186). The late Victor Owusu, who was the 
Attorney-General during Busia's administration, died in December 2000 and was given 
a state burial in March 2001 by the current, Danquah-Busiaist, Kufour administration. 
A state-burial for him would have been unthinkable if the NDC were currently in 
power. 
5.1.2 The Ga-Adangbe factor 
The Ga-Adangbe political complexion was difficult to decipher, and that, the general 
political history of Ghana made it easier for Ga-Adangbes to conceal their political 
complexion than all the other groups. 21.2% of total respondents were Ga-Adangbe: 
9.8% were ethnonationalists and 11.4% were political nationalists, the latter having 
been given the benefit of the doubt and categorised as political nationalists due to 
insufficient evidence. Therefore, as 46.2% of urbanite Ga-Adangbes were 
ethnonationalists, an uncertainty remains about the remainder. Also, as it has been 
difficult to tell whether Ga-Adangbes are skewed towards any particular political party, 
and as both the historical and ensuing evidence made it difficult to decipher their 
political complexion, this raises an issue of further research into the phenomenon. 
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5.1.3 The religious factor 
Following from the Ga-Adangbe factor, it is worth noting that although religion is 
usually not a key factor in Ghanaian voter choices, the clash between the Charismatic 
churches and Ga-Adangbe traditionalists had stirred up religious sentiments which may 
well have had some bearing on the 2000 elections, at least in the Accra-Tema 
metropolitan area. On one hand, the Charismatic orientation of Mills, who was at the 
same time the flagbearer of a party which was politically sympathetic to Ga-Adanbge 
traditional religion, and Kufour's orientation as the flagbearer of a party not overtly 
sympathetic towards Ga-Adangbe traditions, left religious voters with difficult choices 
to make. 
5.1.4 Political participation 
Despite the enormous scope within Ghanaian politics for partisan prostitution, that is, 
fluidity and ambiguity of party loyalties, there is a significant association between party 
registration and level of party involvement. 
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5.2 URBANISATION/DETRIBALISATION AND ASSOCIATION WITH 
ROOTS 
Urbanites do not become fully detribalised as a result of urbanisation, and this confirms 
the notion of geographical detribalisation leading to attitudinal detribalisation as not 
being universalistic. Indeed, the longer Ghanaian urbanites became exposed to 
urbanisation, the stronger the association with their roots became, although there is no 
direct association between ethnonationalism and association with roots. This signifies 
that ethnonationalism comes naturally for Ghanaian urbanites and does not have to be 
worked at, or influenced by an individual's association with roots. Ethnonationalism is 
the rational Ghanaian urbanite response to the "politics of the belly". The thesis 
scientifically corroborates, the view held by Agyeman, Mair and Watson, that there is 
no constant correlation between urbanisation and attitudinal detribalisation. In other 
words, although urban factors such as modernisation and its associated educational and 
occupational opportunities, enhance social and political integration (Morrison 1982, p. 
104), this does not necessarily lead to a derooting from ethnonational roots (Agyeman 
1988, pp. 35-36; Mair 1965, pp. 11-12; Watson 1958, p. 5); 
The data also reveal that Ghanaian urbanites are more highly inclined to be associated 
with their roots than otherwise. Given the context of the link between "politics of the 
belly" and ethnonationalism, a lack of direct association between the latter and 
association with roots only goes to signify that: (a) where "politics of the belly" 
prevails in a multi-national state, ethnonationalism is of natural, rational, reasonable 
and ethical consequence, and; (b) ethnonationalism is not consequential from citizens' 
association with their roots. As the data revealed that: 34.1% exhibited "very high" 
association with their roots; 37.1 % "high", and; 20.4% "average", a total of 91.6% of 
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Ghanaian urbanites had, at the least, an average association or attachment with their 
roots. It becomes clear, that detribalisation is more attitudinal than any de-rooting from 
ethnonational authochthons and that, geographical alienation from roots, and 
integration within an urban melting pot of multiple identities, do not always fully 
detribalise urbanites. 
Agyeman's study on Ghanaians revealed that education and urban integration did not 
distance urbanites from their kingroups (Agyeman 1988, p. 36). However, my research 
goes further to reveal that the longer Ghanaian urbanites experienced urban life, the 
higher the association with their roots became. As already mentioned, this thesis does 
not prove, or offer the view, that association between urbanites and their roots 
influences ethnonationalism. Rather, the latter is as a consequence of the "politics of 
the belly". 
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5.3 ETHNONATIONALISM AND ASSOCIATION WITH ROOTS 
As the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the highest levels of association 
with roots, a suggestion is implied, that some sort of association exists between levels 
of (ethnonationalism) and levels of (association with roots), but the data does not reveal 
any direct relationship between the two, and therefore the thesis does not offer a view 
that there is a relationship between ethnonationalism and association with roots. 
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5.4 GENDER AND POLITICS 
Although, the research did not set out to investigate the relationship between gender 
and politics, the data have provided information for an interesting discussion. 
Compared between the two sexes, there is a greater tendency for Ghanaian females to 
try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions. Within the male-dominated 
power relations of Ghanaian society, women generally seem to play second fiddle, and 
are therefore not usually given to freely airing their views on politically-sensitive 
issues. Jette Bukh (1979) highlights the view that the traditional household structure in 
Ghanaian society secures for women a basis for subsistence production, at the same 
time maintaining them in a secondary position. This difficult position for women is 
inherent in the societal policy of the traditional African state, and it would appear that 
`women's possibility for fighting back is very limited' (Bukh 1979, p. 89). Any 
argument that Bukh's views may be exclusive to rural women would not hold, in that, 
in a wider and more inclusive attempt, the findings and conclusions of the 
ISSER/DPPC Research Team's investigations on Ghanaian women30 reveal that they 
have a subordinate image in Ghanaian society, and generally play secondary roles. The 
views of Bukh and the ISSER/DPPC team are also confirmed by Yaw Oheneba-Sakyi, 
who also reveals that there are subordinate gender roles for women in Ghanaian 
society, and that this is a bi-product of the traditional system (Oheneba-Sakyi 1999, pp. 
119-43). Perhaps, the intimidation caused by this subordinate sceondary image is an 
explanation to why there is a greater tendency for Ghanaian females to try as much as 
possible to conceal their political opinions. It can also be argued, that the opposite 
30 This is to be found on pages xiii and xiv of a report entitled Women in Public Life in Ghana, presented 
to the Department for International Development (DID) of the British Government by a joint research 
team comprising of members of the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) of 
the University of Ghana, and the Development and Project Planning Centre (DPPC) of the University of 
Bradford. For citation, see section B. 1.3 in the bibliography. 
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gender of the interviewer could have inhibited female respondents from fully revealing 
their political intentions. However, this is not to be considered as a major issue, in that, 
in addition to the confidentiality and anonymity of the interview process, 66.5% of 
respondents indicated that they had freedom of expression (Table 17; Appendix XI). 
Besides, for females, it was the sharing of political views with their spouses that was a 
main problem, and not with friends, other family members (Appendix XVII), or an 
interviewer of the opposite sex. Within the intimidating, male-dominated Ghanaian 
society, females generally preferred to conceal their political views, particularly if they 
would differ from those of their spouses, on issues as sensitive as politics. It would 
appear that any explanations to the comparative political self-gagging of Ghanaian 
women in general, and spouses in particular, are to be sought from the countrywide 
image of the traditional household political system which still holds sway among 
urbanites, and not from the `culture of silence' which is not gender-specific. This issue 
goes to strengthen the thesis that geographically-detribalised urbanites may not be 
detribalised attitudinally. 
It must be noted, however, that in the past decade, the role of Mrs Rawlings has 
brought changes to the relationship between gender and politics. The 31 December 
Women's Group, (the official women's wing of the NDC) founded by Mrs Rawlings, 
has been engaged in raising the political awareness of women as citizens, as well as 
empowering them for political roles. The effect of the heightened awareness of women 
in current Ghanaian politics has been phenomenal, in that, the Opposition NPP, for fear 
of losing out on women votes, seriously considered a female as the vice-presidential 
candidate for the 2000 elections (GRi Press Review, 24/05/00; 
http: //www. mcglobal. com/History/May2000/24e2000/24eOr. htmi). Although this did 
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not become a reality, one cannot ignore the fact that serious consideration has been 
given to women in Ghanaian politics, and that the door for this trend to continue is 
wider than before. 
5.4.1 Other demographic factors and politics 
In Ghanaian politics, it is not so much the factors of age, occupation, or education 
which matter as the ethnonational considerations. 
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5.5 THE NATION-STATE PROJECT 
It would seem then, that the Ghanaian nation-state project would perhaps be difficult to 
complete, given the prevalent context of the rationalization of ethnonationalism, as 
well as the "politics of the belly", and that nationalism within the matrix of any multi- 
national African state, such as Ghana, would not provide the ideal context for national 
integration and/or ethnonational homogeneity where the political and national units and 
frontiers will coincide (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1; Gellner 1983, p. 1). The tension or 
conflict between ethnonationalism and political nationalism, as demonstrated by the 
survey data, proves that the attempt of the colonial legacy to subjugate separate 
national identities under a single state, which then should act as an incubator for the 
gestation of new nationhood (Smith 1991, p. 59), is only achievable within the 
understanding that whereas ethnonational homogeneity is a tall order for any new 
multi-national state, ethnonational heterogeneity is not a problem for the attainment of 
national identity for, as well as nationality within, the postcolonial state. In other 
words, modem Ghana is a nation and all citizens within the Ghanaian state have similar 
nationality irrespective of ethnonational heterogeneity. The rationalization of 
ethnonationalism by majority of citizens, in response to the pervasive "politics of the 
belly", seems an indirect nod of approval to the latter, and the scenario clearly 
indicates, that the state does not have a smooth ride in creating `the necessary condition 
and matrix for the gestation of national loyalties' (Ibid). This seems to reflect the views 
of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz when they reiterate the thoughts of an African 
- scholar Mwayila Tshiyembe, that `... since in Africa all countries (with a few 
exceptions such as Lesotho and Swaziland) are multi-ethnic nations, the only 
appropriate political order is one which makes space for a political framework 
grounded in this multi-ethnic reality' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 62). 
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The prospects of national integration for a state with subject groupings sharply 
antagonistic towards each other, and where the state system perpetuates these 
antagonisms through unfair political arithmetic motivated by ethno-sectarian interests, 
are very bleak. Despite its jurisdictive authority over the modern Ghanaian territory, the 
state has somewhat failed to live up to egalitarian expectations, and this is encapsulated 
in what Chabal and Daloz state, that: 
... 
it is not because state power makes it possible to rule over a given "national" 
territory that the state can be said to be meaningfully institutionalised. 
Centralization of power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
development of a modem (Weberian) state - the fundamental attribute of which 
is its institutional emancipation from society. Because the African post-colonial 
state has failed to become differentiated from the society over which it rules, it 
cannot acquire the neutral political status which alone would allow its 
legitimation and its proper institutionalisation. Such a process would require at 
the very least that the political system overcome the particularistic constraints 
which presently govern its very functioning (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 13). 
It must be noted that, the comparative stability of the Ghanaian state, vis-ä-vis others in 
Africa, can be attributed mainly to the presence of a demographically dominant ethnie - 
the wider Guan ancestry (or at least the emerged Akan identity). Furthermore, the less 
explosive degree of ethnonational antagonisms in Ghana, vis-a-vis other parts of 
Africa, for example Nigeria, Rwanda and the Congo, should be attributable to the 
rationalization of ethnonationalism and its general acceptability by a greater percentage 
of Ghanaians. 
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5.5.1 Latent sub-regional secessionisms and irredentisms 
It is important that other impediments to national integration within the Ghanaian state 
are highlighted. Recent developments indicate that the four non-Ewe districts of the 
Volta Region of Ghana, from which the 52% votes in favour of the annexation of 
British Togoland to Ghana largely emanated, and who form part of the "Central Togo 
Minorities" (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3), have made representations to the government for 
the creation of a separate administration from the Ewe-speaking area of the Region, on 
the basis that past governments have discriminated against them in terms of 
development planning. If successful, the new region is to be called Oti Region, after the 
main River Oti which runs through the four districts. The chiefs of the area claim that 
the `Ewe-Akan rivalry, which has been a plague in the Volta Region for years, has 
resulted in deprivation of development in their areas which are Akan dominated' (GRi 
Press Review 29/07/99; Ghanaian Independent July 29,1999). Agitation for a separate 
administrative region has been a recurrent feature for a few years running, without 
success. An attempt in 1997 was unsuccessful. The increasing pressure of these 
renewed representations could result in the granting of a separate administrative region 
for the agitating districts in the Oti River basin. Should this occur, Ewes in Ghana 
would be even more isolated, especially in a post-Rawlings Ghana, and the temptation 
would be strengthened for the option of a secession bid by Ewes in Ghana to join their 
historical relatives in neighbouring Togo. 
In the 1956 plebiscite, 42% of the Volta Region, mainly the Ewe-speaking part of the 
Region, voted against their political annexation with Ghana. The unsteady relationship 
between Togo and Ghana since the annexation (Amenumey 1989, pp. 337-45) has 
continued with periodical allegations against each other. As recently as 1998, the 
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Ghanaian Foreign Office had to officially disassociate itself from reported armed 
incursions into Togo from the common border between the two countries, and the 
Togolese Opposition Leader, Gilchrist Olympio (who sometimes resided in Ghana), 
also denied any knowledge or involvement with these incursions (Pan-African News 
Agency Online News, August 17,1998). Subsequent joint military exercises between 
both countries to contain the security situation have not been adequate enough to ease 
the strain. Reports reveal that the Ghanaian Armed Forces have been on the edge to 
deal with Togolese threats including several instances of land encroachment, 
annexation and usage by Togolese, and violations of Ghanaian air-space by Togolese 
military aircraft (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 18 August, 1999). In the latest of what is 
now clearly a border dispute, Togolese from Hanyigbatodzi had crossed at least two 
kilometres into Ghanaian territory, claiming that `they recognised the old traditional 
boundaries and not the international frontier' (Ghanaian Times, August 20,1999). Lt- 
Colonel John Forkuo, the Commanding Officer of the Ghana Artillery Regiment at Ho 
(the capital of the Volta Region) has disclosed that `most of the pillars between Pillar I 
and Pillar 148, which the two countries erected jointly in 1974, to mark the 
international frontier between them, were recently destroyed by Togolese' (Ghanaian 
Times, 20 August 1999). The situation has not yet reached the point of an armed 
international conflict between the two countries. 
Dating from the time of Nkrumah (when the annexation took place) until now, the idea 
of an Ewe secession from Ghana to join their ancestral relatives in Togo is not only 
antithetical to governmental position because of the constraints of the 1963 OAU 
Charter and the 1964 Arusha Declaration (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 107; Neurberger 1991, 
p. 107), but also ironically antithetical to the history of pan-Eweist irredentism within 
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the West African sub-region. The latter (pan-Eweist irredentism) has been stalled due 
to the emergence of Eyadema's non-Ewe administration and its subsequent long period 
of rule. It is interesting to note that the main Togolese Opposition to Eyadema's party 
and government are Olympioists, who are also proponents of pan-Eweist irredentism. 
Also interesting is the fact that both Ghana's Ewe Rawlings and Togo's non-Ewe 
Eyadema have been respective heads-of-states over the same period since the early 
1980s until now. It is obvious that the prevalence of the non-Ewe Eyadema 
administration has prevented the resurgence of pan-Eweist irredentism in the West 
African sub-region at the same time that neighbouring Ghana was ruled by an Ewe. 
Owing to the uneasy relationship between Ghana and Togo since 1960, and also the 
suspicion between the governments of Eyadema and Rawlings, there has been a 
governmental commitment to tackle border disputes with the tact and sensitivity that it 
deserves. A secession of Ghanaian Ewes to Togo would automatically wipe out border 
incursions between neighbouring historical relatives, but a secession movement is not 
likely to be successful so long as either Eyadema or his non-Ewe power bloc remains 
the governing power in Togo. There is therefore a political stalemate in the sub-region 
as far as pan-Eweist irredentism is concerned. Since it is in the interests of the Eyadema 
power bloc to suppress the resurgence of pan-Eweist irredentism in the sub-region, a 
post-Rawlings, non-Ewe-dominated Ghana after the December 2000 election is an era 
which the Eyadema power bloc looked forward to. The complexity of the future 
political landscape is to be seen in the fact that the Eyadema power bloc is antithetical 
to any prospective secession bid by Ghanaian Ewes to join Togo, in that, the less Ewes 
incorporated into Togo, the better for the bloc. Therefore, the potential fears for 
Ghanaian Ewes include: (a) further isolation by the other Ghanaian ethnonational 
groups in a post-Rawlings era; (b) the possible granting of regional administrative 
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autonomy to the Oti districts away from the Volta Region; (c) the impossibility of 
secession to Togo, and; (d) an even further restricted prospect of pan-Eweist 
irredentism in the West African sub-region. Ewes would seem to be boxed-in, thus 
increasing the potential for frustration. The explosive potential which can result from 
Ewe suppression should not be overlooked. Whatever the case may be, the Ewe 
response would also depend on the future "politics of the belly" and how this plays 
itself vis-ä-vis the mutual ethnonational antagonisms, and subsequently the extent to 
which Ewes in Ghana feel they belong, in contradistinction with their historical 
affiliations to Togo, irrespective of the nature of the Togolese political landscape. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
It is clear, that ethnonationalism is more the substance of Ghanaian politics than style, 
even among urbanites, and furthermore, that despite the enhancement of socio-political 
integration by interactive urban factors such as education, occupation and 
modernisation (Morrison 1982, p. 104), not only does ethnonationalism strongly 
prevail over political nationalism, but also, that within the pervasive political culture of 
"politics of the belly", ethnonationalism has established itself as the rational way to go. 
Largely, the ethnonationalistic attitudes of Ghanaian urbanites are not inhibited by 
urbanisation, and this casts the notion of geographical detribalisation leading to 
attitudinal detribalisation more into the shadows of rarity than common occurrence, at 
least in Ghana. Furthermore, it indicates that any proneness of urbanites towards 
political nationalism is more of an imagination than reality, in the Ghanaian case. 
Given: (a) the prevalence of the "politics of the belly", and; (b) the prevailing heights 
of ethnonationalism in Ghanaian politics, it is easily predictable that political 
nationalism will continue to be more of a style, than of a rational choice. Largely, 
patriotic allegiance of general citizenry is first to the ethnonational group, and second 
to the state. Despite the pretence among Ghanaian urbanites, and the often false 
impression given, that ethnonationalism is not a consideration when it comes to voting, 
the opposite is rather the case, and for most people, it is the main issue. The thesis 
indicates that both the current and future potential for the prevalence of this trend 
remains very high within the Ghanaian political context, unless a reversal of the 
prevailing "politics of the belly" occurs. 
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The above view is attributable to and consistent with findings from the thesis, as well 
as observations also made by Chabal and Daloz, that: 
... neo-patrimonialism continues to suit 
both patrons and clients ... The very 
dynamics of the system foster the continuation of vertical (communitarian, 
nepotistic or clientelistic) social relations ... 
As we have noted, such a state of 
affairs may not be desirable in the long term for the country as a whole, but it 
remains both entirely coherent and eminently reasonable for those Africans who 
can manage to benefit from the system as it works (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 
104). 
It must also be concluded, that the comparative stability of the Ghanaian state, as 
opposed to other African examples where inter-ethnic issues have been highly 
explosive, can be attributed to a number of factors including: the presence of a 
predominant core ethnie (the wider Guan ancestry); the Akan factor; a rationalization 
of ethnonationalism, as well as; the nod of approval given to the "politics of the belly". 
The rationalization of ethnonationalism and the "politics of the belly" works against 
national integration, or accentuates ethnonational heterogeneity, especially if state 
power is utilised as motivated by ethnonationalism. In reality, the Weberian ethos of 
the state has been rejected by Africa in general, and Ghana in particular, and `it is 
perhaps true that the model of the rejection of the transplanted state, on grounds of 
cultural incompatibilities, comes closest to an accurate analysis of the political 
evolution of post-colonial Africa' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 13). While the prospects 
for national integration are slimer but reachable, and given that the equation of the 
ethnic arithmetic will never balance, it becomes a huge responsibility how the state 
manages its citizens, and by what level of patriotic motivation (towards the state) this 
occurs. It would take a strong political will from both politicians and the rest of 
citizenry to transform the political game from ethnonationalism to political nationalism 
in Weberian terms. Where a nation is emerging, or has already emerged in a multi- 
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national state, the durability of the national feeling among citizens will very much 
depend on the fairness of state conduct and an attitude towards the eradication of the 
"politics of the belly". The Ghanaian nation-state project, and by extension, that of 
most African countries, has not prospered on the infertile ground of multiple national 
identities boxed under a single state. 
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Chapter 6 
Postscript 
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6.1 THE 2000 ELECTIONS AND TRENDS IN ETHNONATIONALISM 
VERSUS POLITICAL NATIONALISM 
Results of the 2000 multi-party presidential elections lend more support to the thesis. 
As summarised in the Introduction, explained in section 3.1.1, confirmed in sections 
4.7.2,4.8 and 4.10.1, and reiterated in sections 5.1 and 5.1.1, within the rationality of 
the Ghanaian political reality, citizens would make political choices skewed towards 
the interests of their ethnonational group, in reciprocation to the "politics of the belly". 
Ethnonationalism remains the substance rather than the style of Ghanaian politics. 
Posterity would have it that neither presidential candidate of the two leading parties, 
Mills and Kufour, would win a clear majority for a one-off victory. Mills won 44.5% 
of votes cast and Kufour won 48.2%. A run-off or second round ballot solely between 
the two candidates became necessary in order to determine a clear winner. In the first 
round, Dan Lartey, the GCPP presidential candidate, won 1% of all votes cast country- 
wide. Professor George Hagan of the CPP won only 1.8% of the countrywide vote and 
only 3.19% of votes cast in the Central Region. Obviously, and as discussed in section 
2.6.1, he was not a real threat to Mills despite any panic which his candidacy may have 
aroused in the Mills camp. Goosie Tanoh also won 1.2% of national votes cast, and his 
candidacy did not detract significantly from the NDC's votes despite being leader of 
the NRM which broke away from the former. Charles Wereko-Brobbey also won only 
0.3% of the country-wide vote, and did not detract a significant fraction of votes from 
the NPP despite being leader of the UGM which broke away from the former. Edward 
Mahama of the PNC won 2.9% of the countrywide votes, but as a Northerner (from 
Nanlerigu), he won 8.12% of votes cast in Northern Region, 22.46% of Upper-East 
Region and 15.57% of Upper-West Region. Clearly, his candidacy detracted 
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significant votes from the major candidates, as would be discussed shortly. That noted, 
it seems clear that the first round of election was largely a two-horse race between the 
two leading parties - NDC and NPP. According to the Ghanaian Times, voter turn out 
for the first round was 59.2% as against 77% for 1996. Altogether, 6.46 million voted 
out of 10.67 million registered voters at a total of 20,112 polling stations (GRi Press 
Review 12/12/00; http: //www. mclglobal. com/History/Dec2000/l2l2OO/l2 I Or. html). 
Table 28: Summary of Presidential Results - First Round 
Candidate 
Dan Lartey 
Ata Mills 
George Hagan 
Edward Mahama 
Wereko-Brobby 
Goosie Tanoh 
John Kufuor 
Valid Vote 
Votes (%) 
67,504 1.0 
2,895,575 44.5 
115,641 1.8 
189,659 2.9 
22,123 0.3 
78,629 1.2 
3,131,739 48.2 
Source: Elecloral Commission; http: // 'vv. ghanaelections. com/index-summary. htm 
As both hinted and discussed in several sections of the thesis (3.1.1,3.1.2,4.7.2,4.8, 
4.10.1,4.10.2,5.1), ethnonational patterns in voting habits would constitute a 
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distinguishing factor in the election results. In the first round ballot, 75.55% of votes in 
the Ashanti Region went to Kufour and 22.73% went to Mills. 88.81% of votes cast in 
the Volta Region went to Mills, and 6.94% to Kufour. Although Rawlings was no 
longer a candidate, he remained leader of the NDC, and therefore the fact of Mills 
being an Akan-Fanti did not prevent the Ewe-dominated Volta Region from delivering 
their vote to the NDC owing to the Rawlings factor. Besides, Ewes preferred to vote 
for the Fanti Mills rather than Ashanti Kufour, thus confirming the mutual antagonism 
between Ewes and Ashantis already discussed in sections 2.1,3.1.2,4.8 and 5.1.1 of 
the thesis 
As highlighted in the Introduction as well as in Section 3.4, owing to the required 
indication of ethnonational identity from respondents to the 1999 research survey of 
voter-intent for the 2000 elections, the political attitudes of Ga-Adangbes (for 
example) could be isolated and analysed in section 4.9.1. On the contrary, the 2000 
election results published by the Electoral Commission, can only provide a general 
pattern of votes in the Ga-Adangbe-dominated Greater-Accra Region. In this Region, 
Mills won 43.21% of the votes and Kufour won 53.18%. This 10% difference is not as 
strongly skewed as the gap between election results for the two candidates in the 
Ashanti and Volta Regions. However, it still constitutes a significant change in voting 
patterns within the Greater-Accra Region. Results of the 1999 survey of voter-intent 
reveal a vote gap of only 3.2% and 1.8% respectively for the 1996 and 2000 
presidential elelctions between the NDC and NPP candidates (section 4.9.1; Appendix 
XIII). The gap increase for 2000 can, among other things, be attributed to Christian 
voters, particularly the Charismatics, who would have demonstrated their discontent at 
the NDC government's handling of the Homowo drum-ban issue (section 4.9.1), as 
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well as the increasing feeling among citizens regarding the need for political change. It 
will also be recalled that 11.4% of Ga-Adangbe voters were deemed as politically 
indecipherable (table 25) at the time of the survey in 1999, and could have contributed 
to increasing the gap. Despite the significant change in voting patterns in the Greater- 
Accra region, given that it is impossible to isolate and analyse the intricate patterns of 
nationalism for the Ga-Adangbe ethnonational group, the recommendation remains (as 
discussed in section 5.7.2) that further investigation into the group's political 
complexion is merited. 
Northerners seem to have faithfully delivered the Northern vote to the NDC in return 
for the party faithfully heeding the request from Northerners to field a vice-presidential 
candidate from the North, and particularly since the party was also the first among the 
others to nominate their running mate for the presidency (see Section 2.6.2 and also the 
Glossary in Appendix II). As the election drama would unfold, final vote counts from 
the Regions in Southern Ghana trickled into the Electoral Commission much earlier 
than those from Northern Ghana, and it would appear that Kufuor was maintaining a 
clear lead until vote counts from Northern Ghana were finalised and added to the total. 
It is clear that Northern Ghana votes contributed to Mills closing the gap with Kufuor, 
and prevented the latter from maintaining a clear lead in the first round ballot. The 
results in Table 29 reveal that Mills had 50.75% of votes in the Northern Region, 
52.13% in Upper East, and 62.29% in Upper-West, whereas Kufuor won 29.58%, 
18.58 and 15.51% respectively in the said three Regions of Northern Ghana. It is 
interesting to note that Dr Edward Mahama, the presidential candidate for a 
comparatively insignificant party - the PNC, beat Kufour in the Upper-East and Upper- 
West Regions by winning 22.46% and 15.57% respectively of the countrywide vote. 
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Edward Mahama is a native of the North, and it would appear that he gained from the 
ethnonationalistic sentiments of the citizens in Northern Ghana. The results Further 
reveal that any election threat the NRP posed to the NDC was not as dangerous, since 
Tanoh - the NRP candidate, only managed to attract snippets of the countrywide votes. 
Table 29: 2000 First Round Presidential Ballot (Selected Results) 
region mills '. 
Ashanti 286,017 22.73 950,602 75.55 3,138 0.25 4, 0.35 
420 
B-Ahafo 270,465 44.64 306,512 50.59 10,447 1.72 6, 1.09 
634 
Central 237,227 43.73 269,501 49.68 2,791 0.51 7, 1.34 
291 
Eastern 308,047 41.34 409,635 54.97 4,525 0.61 7, 1.04 
738 
G-Accra 467,017 43.21 574,737 53.18 2,927 0.27 15, 1.43 
423 
Northern 286,21 1 50.75 166,827 29.58 45,804 8.12 12, 2.30 
990 
U-East 125,753 52.13 44,829 18.58 54,185 22.46 4, 2.03 
887 
ti-West ll1,345 62.29 27,714 15.51 27,824 15.57 4, 2.40 
295 
Volta 506,614 88.81 39,535 6.94 1,905 0.33 3, 0.56 
I82 
Western 273,355 43.93 314,501 50.54 4,873 2.90 4, 0.76 
735 
TOTAL 2871051 44.8 3104393 48.44 158,419 2.5 71, 1.1 
595 
Source: GRi Newsreel I [/1l/UU; 
http: www. mclglobal corn/History/Dec2000/1112000/111On. la im! 
Soon after the elections, at least four of the opposition parties which are not NDC 
decoys - PNC, NRP, UGM and CPP - pledged their support for Kufuor in the second 
round (GRi Press Review 12 December 2000, 
http: //www. mclglobal. com/1-listory/Dec2000/1212000/l2l Or. htntl). 't'his seems to have 
made a lot of difference, in that, for example, Edward Mahama's votes in the North 
would now be diverted towards Kufuor. As the results in Table 30 reveal, Kufuor 
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performed much better in the North during the second round ballot. Although Mills 
won 51.10%, 57.17% and 61.97% of votes in the Northern, Upper-West and Upper- 
East regions respectively, Kufuor won 48.90%, 42.83% and 38.03% respectively for 
the same Regions. There is a clear improvement in his performance in the three 
Regions during the run-off, as compared to his votes during first round ballot -29.58%, 
18.58 and 15.51 % respectively. 
Table 30: Summary of 2000 Presidential Run-off 
Given that Kufuor won in every other region with the exception of Volta Region (same 
for the first round), the improvement in his Northern Ghana performance strategically 
contributed to his clear win during the run-off. A comparison between the first and 
second round ballots indicate that Mills' countrywide total decreased by it mere 1.7%, 
whereas Kufuor's increased by 7.46%. As there does not seem to he significant 
differences in Mills' performance in the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West 
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Regions between the first and second round ballots 50.75%[51.10%], 52.13%[57.17%] 
and 62.29%[61.97%] - run-off results in parenthesis, it is quite clear that Kufuor 
gained substantially from Edward Mahama's pledge of support, among other things, 
during the run-off. 
Further analyses of the data reveal that the Volta Region's overall support for the NDC 
in both rounds hardly changed: 88-81% [88.47%] but votes won by Kufuor from the 
same Region increased: 6.94% [11.53%], perhaps due to gains from the coalition of 
opposition parties within the Region. Nevertheless, the staunch support of the Ewe- 
dominated Region for the NDC should not be missed. In a similar vein, Kufour's votes 
from the Ashanti Region during the run-off increased: 75.55% [79.89%] while Mills' 
votes decreased: 22.73% [20.11%J. As already discussed in sections 2.1,3.1.2,4.8 
and 5.1.1 of the thesis, and as it still stands, Ewe-Ashanti mutual antagonism remains, 
and continues to reflect in the polarity of voting patterns between the Volta and 
Ashanti Regions. 
The second round results in the Greater-Accra Region indicate that Mills' votes 
decreased slightly: 43.21% [40.5%] while Kufuor's votes increased: 53.18% 
[59.95%]. 
Despite any general consistencies between patterns of the election results published by 
the Electoral Commission, and those of the 1999 research survey of voter-intent, it 
should also be pointed out that there is no constant relationship between election fever 
indicators and actual result on voting day. For example, regarding the "Krobo vote" 
discussed in section 2.9.1 of the thesis, although the news media highlighted the pre- 
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election fever of the Yilo Krobos in the Eastern Region and their general determination 
to switch camp from the NIC to NPP, the detailed tally of Yilo Krobo constituency in 
Table 31 indicates that Mills won 54.3% of votes counted whereas Kufour won 45.7%. 
The results also indicate that only 51.2% of registered voters in the constituency voted 
during the run-off. For a place classified as an NDC safe area, the NDC's performance 
was rather poor. However, the point is made that the pre-election popular outcry 'to 
ignore the NDC's vain promises and test the NPP for the next four years come 
December 2000 elections' (GRi Press Review 02/06/00; 
http: //www. mcglobal. com/History/Jun2000/O2f2000/O2fDr. html) did not translate into 
reality. It is also worth noting, as the results indicate, that the Krobo area (including 
Lower and Upper Manya Krobo) generally voted in favour of the Nl)C candidate 
Mills. 
Table 31: Selected Run-off Results by constituencies: Eastern Region 
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Source: http: //www. ghanaelections. com/index results. htm; Electoral Commission 
of Ghana 
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6.2 UPDATE ON THE "POLITICS OF THE BELLY" 
As already concluded in section 5.6 of the thesis, current trends in ethnonationalism 
and/or political nationalism are not likely to change significantly unless there is a 
significant reversal in the trends of the prevailing "politics of the belly". To quote: 
Given: (a) the prevalence of the "politics of the belly", and; (b) the prevailing 
heights of ethnonationalism in Ghanaian politics, it is easily predictable that 
political nationalism will continue to be more of a style, than of a rational choice. 
Largely, patriotic allegiance of general citizenry is first to the ethnonational 
group, and second to the state. Despite the pretence among Ghanaian urbanites, 
and the often false impression given, that ethnonationalism is not a consideration 
when it comes to voting, the opposite is rather the case, and for most people, it is 
the main issue. The thesis indicates that both the current and future potential for 
the prevalence of this trend remains very high within the Ghanaian political 
context, unless a reversal of the prevailing "politics of the belly" occurs ... 
While the prospects for national homogenisation is slimer but reachable, and 
given that the equation of the ethnic arithmetic will never balance, it becomes a 
huge responsibility how the state manages its citizens, and by what level of 
patriotic motivation (towards the state) this occurs. Where a nation is emerging, 
or has already emerged in a multi-national state, the durability of the national 
feeling among citizens will very much depend on the fairness of state conduct 
and an attitude towards the eradication of the "politics of the belly" (section 5.6). 
President Kufuor, stated in his inaugural speech on 7 January 2001 that he will ensure 
zero tolerance of corruption in his administration, with himself leading in example 
setting. However, the announcement, a few days afterwards, of his brother as the 
Defence Minister to his administration only confirms the concerns already raised in the 
conclusions of the thesis. 
In the "winner takes all" philosophy of multiparty democracy, it would appear that 
Kufour has no choice but to choose cabinet and other ministerial appointees from the 
membership of his own party, in the same way that the Republican George W. Bush of 
USA is not expected to recruit Democrats into his cabinet, nor Tony Blair of UK to 
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recruit similar ministerial appointees from among the Tories. But judging from 
Kufour's initial list of appointments, it becomes clear that the ethnic arithmetic is even 
more skewed towards Akans, (and particularly Ashantis), to a greater degree than the 
ethnonational skew in any government under Rawlings. Unlike Kufour's NPP, the 
P/NDC began not as an established party with a longstanding political tradition, but 
with revolutionary cadres, leftist academics and cronies, and therefore, had no 
established traditional and partisan restrictions with regard to choice of appointees. 
The P/NDC therefore had both the choice and chance to even the ethnonational 
arithmetic with regard to government appointees. Despite any partisan restrictions 
binding on Kufour's choices, his current list is ethnonationalistically loaded. It would 
be difficult for the NPP to argue that the party could not find competent appointees 
from other ethnonational groups, especially given Kufour's loud pre-election 
campaigns that he would form an all-inclusive government. As at 7 March 2001, the 
list of Kufuor's appointed Ministers and nominees for deputy ministerial posts 
indicated a predominantly Akan government. Out of the appointed Ministers, there are 
72% Akans, 14% Northerners, 8.3% Ga-Adangbes, 3% Ewes and 3% Nzimas 
(Appendix XXII). The list of nominees for deputy ministerial positions is also heavily 
skewed towards the Akan. There are 53% Akans, 35 % Northerners, 6% Ga-Adangbes, 
6% Ewes and no Nzima (Appendix XXII). The ratios for current appointments and 
nominations put together are: Akans - 63%; Northerners - 24.2%; Ga-Adangbes - 
7.1%; Ewes - 4.2%; Nzimas - 1.4% (Ibid). With this trend, there does not seem to be 
much hope for the eradication of the "politics of the belly", and it would appear that 
the nation-state project discussed in section 5.5 is far from achievement. Subsequently 
therefore, ethnonationalism, rather than political nationalism, would continue to 
dominate the substance of Ghanaian politics, and prevail as the rational guide to: (a) 
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the distribution of opportunity by government, and; (b) reciprocatory political choice 
making by citizens, to reflect the reality of the country's politics. This cycle of 
rationality would continue until further notice. As stated, `it is for this reason that the 
prospect for institutionalisation is illusory' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 104). 
262 
263 
6.3 UPDATE ON PAN-EWEIST IRREDENTISM IN THE WEST AFRICAN 
SUB-REGION 
In another development regarding the prospects of pan-Eweist irredentism and Ghana- 
Togo relations as discussed in sections 2.11.2 and 5.5.1 of the thesis, it must be noted 
that soon after Kufour's inauguration as president, he made his first foreign trip by 
visiting Togo on the invitation of Gnasingbe Eyadema to celebrate the 34th anniversary 
of the coup which brought the latter to power through the assassination of Togo's first 
president, Sylvanus Olympio. The exiled Opposition Leader of Togo, Gilchrist 
Olympio (son of Sylvanus), has since, publicly agonized over the visit and condemned 
it as ill-advised and not circumspect (GRi Newsreel, 16 January 2001). The 
Olympioists and the Olympio-led Opposition in Togo have been the historic core 
supporters of pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region. The period of 
Eyadema's non-Ewe-led administration has neither contributed positively towards pan- 
Eweist irredentism nor the flourishing of any Olympio-led Opposition, and Gilchrist's 
connections in Ghana even during the administration of the Ewe Rawlings, were not 
enough to fan a resurgence of pan-Eweism in the sub-region, especially given the 
historicity of the political sensitivity between the two countries, as well as the uneasy 
relationship between Rawlings and Eyadema. As Gilchrist explains: `Lets put it this 
way, I go to Ghana because I have family, friends and business there. We do not 
depend on Ghana for political support. We have never had it. Since the EU began 
sponsoring discussions between the opposition and government in Togo, the position of 
Ghana particularly in the last two years has not been in our favour' (Ibid). However, 
despite any lack of political support from Ghana, it would appear that the last 
development which Gilchrist and the Togolese Opposition would have bargained for 
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was that of a friendship between any president of Ghana and Eyadema of Togo. The 
current Togolese Opposition would therefore feel even more marginalized in the sub- 
region by this development. As discussed in section 5.5.1, given that Kufuor's NPP 
administration is more likely to agree to a split of the Volta Region of Ghana by 
granting regional administrative autonomy to the non-Ewe Oti districts within the said 
Region, and also given that the remainder of the Volta Region cannot secede to Togo, it 
would appear that Ewes in the Volta Region would feel even more marginalized and 
frustrated, yet with the least help on the horizon at this particular juncture in the 
geopolitique of the sub-region. A latent pan-Eweist irredentism combined with a 
frustrated and marginalized Ewe ethnonational group constitutes a potential time bomb. 
This may perhaps underpin reasons for President Kufour's choice of his brother as the 
Minister of Defence, to deal with any potential for insurrection within a military 
previously stuffed with Ewe appointees at sensitive positions by the erstwhile Rawlings 
regime (section 3.1.3). The new NPP government has since effected strategic portfolio 
changes across the military top hierarchy. As the "politics of the belly" perpetuates, so 
does ethnonationalism dominate as the rationality of the Ghanaian political reality. 
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1979. After a short period of what seemed to be free and unchecked corruption in the 
handling of state affairs, and to the disappointment of the AFRC, the latter re-appeared 
through another coup d'etat on 31 December 1981 as the PNDC, still under the 
leadership of Rawlings. Since it was the para-military PNDC which metamorphosed 
into the civilian NDC over an unbroken period of rulership from 1981 until 2000, they 
shall hereafter be referred to as the P/NDC where both apply in context. The NDC does 
not seem to have any particular political tradition, and appeared to concentrate on 
maintaining a populist appeal. According to the results of the 1996 elections, Jerry 
Rawlings polled 4,099,760 votes - 57.4% of total, and the NDC won 133 parliamentary 
seats (see Appendix VIII). The results of two seats were disputed, resulting in their loss 
by the NDC, and leaving the party with 131 seats. Professor John Ata Mills (Vice- 
President from 1996-2000) became the NDC's presidential candidate for the 2000 
elections. As the current constitution grants the automatic assumption of the presidency 
by the vice-president in the absence of the former, there were country-wide 
apprehensions about the prospects of a Mrs Rawlings vice-candidacy for the 2000 
elections. Citizens seemed to smell a potential political dynasty for the Rawlingses in 
such an arrangement After serious political tussles between several ethno-sectarian 
interests within the party, Alhaji Amidu, a Northerner, was chosen as the running mate 
to Mills. 
The "Danquah-Busiaists": The New Patriotic Party - NPP was the main 
Opposition Party to the NDC, and belonged to the Danquah-Busia political tradition. 
This tradition has a long history in the politics of Ghana, having evolved during the 
pre-independence struggle of the 1950s from the roots of the National Liberation 
Movement (NLM)' and the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). The tradition 
became the Progress Party (PP) during the Second Republic of Ghana when Dr Busia 
was Ghana's Prime Minister, after having won the 1969 multi-party elections. The 
tradition or party adopted the name Popular Front Party (PFP) during the 1979 
presidential elections, and finally NPP in 1996. John Kuffour, the NPP presidential 
candidate for the 1996 elections, polled 2,825715 votes (40.09%) and the NPP won 61 
parliamentary seats (see Appendix VIII). The tradition maintained the same name - 
NPP - for the 2000 elections. At the national delegates conference held in Sunyani on 
24 October 1998, John. Kufuor was re-elected as the party's presidential candidate for 
the 2000 elections by an overwhelming majority. Despite sharing some high profile 
party portfolios with personalities from other ethnonational groups, the NPP is widely 
perceived as an Ashanti party. The Party Chairman (Samuel Odoi-Sykes), General 
Secretary (Dan Botwe) and National Campaign Manager (Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey) are 
all Ga-Adangbes. The National Youth Organiser (Courage Quashigah) is an Ewe and a 
prominent defector from the Rawlings camp. However, owing to the party's Ashanti 
roots, and the open secret that one has to be at least Akan to be its flagbearer, the 
party's Ashanti image prevails. The party's current First Vice Chairman is Ama Busia, 
daughter of the former Prime Minister. 
' For brief details on the roots of the NLM, see sections 1.3.4 and 2.11 of the thesis. 
The NPP, having observed the political landscape, took into consideration the fragility 
of the Northern versus NDC relationship. However, being also sensitive to the female 
vote, the NPP was torn between a male or female Northern candidate, with Joshua 
Hamidu and Madam Hawa Yakubu at the forefront of possible choices. Hamidu is 
from the Kusasi tribe and Yakubu is of the Dagomba tribe, both in Northern Ghana 
(GRi Press Review, 24/05/00; 
http: //www. mcglobal. com/History/May2000/24e2000/24eOr. htmi). Both the NPP and 
NDC seemed to be stalking each other as to what type of candidate should be chosen 
for each party's vice-presidential slot (GRi Press Review 19/06/00; 
http: //www. mclglobal. com/History/Jun2000/19f2000/l9fDr. html). Soon after the 
NDC's announcement of Alhaji Amidu, the NPP also announced Alhaji Mahama Aliu, 
a Northerner, as the running mate to Kufour. 
The "Nkrumahists": A "third" party-political grouping was formed, known as the 
People's Convention Party (PCP), with Mr. P. K. Donkor Ayifli as its acting National 
Chairman. This "third" party-political grouping - PCP - came under the broad 
Nkrumahist "banner". It was formed out of a coalition of three previous parties which 
pretend to be inclined to a political tradition aligned to the ideals of Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah (the first President of Ghana). The "Nkrumahist" grouping has therefore 
consisted of (a) the old PCP (originally led by Mr P. K. Donkor Ayifli and which 
party's acronym was adopted for the coalition); (b) the People's National Convention 
(PNC - led By Dr Edward Mahama), and; (c) the National Convention Party (NCP - led 
by Mr K. Sarpong-Kumankumah). It is noticeable that the word "Convention" is 
always maintained in accordance with the name of Nkrumah's party, the Convention 
People's Party (CPP). Despite the Nkrumahist overtones, the PCP was a very small 
party in terms of importance. In the last elections in 1996, out of a total of 200 seats in 
parliament, the PNC won only 1, and the NCP won 5. Dr. Edward Mahama, the 
presidential candidate for the PNC polled only 210,980 votes during the presidential 
elections - (3%) of the total presidential votes (see Appendix VIII). The first major 
unification event of all the Nkrumahist factions after the 1996 elections took place in 
November 1997. Not long after this, in April 1998, there were rumours that Dr Edward 
Mahama was being considered by the ruling NDC government for the post of vice- 
president in the 2000 elections. However founded or otherwise the rumours might have 
been, accusations of traitorship were hurled at him, resulting in his refusal to join the 
next round of PCP unification talks. A "reshuffle" within the PCP resulted in Dr 
Edward Mahama being ousted out of the PCP "coalition", thereby paving way for the 
re-constitution of a new Nkrumahist coalition known as Convention Party (CP). This 
reconstituted coalition was formed on Saturday June 13 1998, the 49" anniversary of 
the formation of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) in 1949. The constant 
metamorphosis of the "Nkrumahist" following became a source of confusion, allowing 
less room for the neat definition of "Nlaumahist" parties. As the metamorphosis would 
unfold for the 2000 elections, the CP re-merged as Convention People's Party (CPP) 
with Professor George Panyin Hagan as their presidential candidate. He is a Fanti from 
Cape Coast, and his entrance into the presidential race is a contributory factor to the 
resultant keen competition for Fanti votes between himself and NDC's Mills (see 
section 2.7.1 of the thesis). Professor Hagan also chose Alhaji Ibrahim Abubakar, a 
Northerner, as his running mate. The PNC remained as the other "Nkrumahist" party 
for the 2000 elections, fielding Edward Mahama as its presidential candidate. 
The National Reform Party - NRP (formerly The NDC "Reform Movement") 
Serious disagreeing factions within the NDC jointly formed the NDC Reform 
Movement, led by Goosie Tanor. The NRP received its certificate of party registration 
from the Electoral Commission in July 1999. Although this party did not command a 
substantial percentage of votes, its activities undermined the NDC to some extent, and 
managed to attract some disaffected MPs and supporters from the NDC camp. The 
party's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections was Goosie Tanoh, and his 
running mate was Cletus Kosiba, also a Northerner. 
The Democratic People's Party - DPP 
The DPP is one of the "minor" parties set up by the NDC as a strategy to proliferate the 
political scene with other minor parties in order to divert votes from the Opposition 
camp. The DPP received its certificate as a political party on 28 September 1992 under 
PNDC Political Parties Law (PNDCL 281). The party has therefore participated in the 
past two consecutive multi-party elections (1992 and 1996) with no national aim other 
than acting as a decoy party for the NDC. For the 1996 elections, the party's leader and 
deputy were President Rawlings and Vice-President John Ata Mills respectively. So 
much is the DPP's identification with the NDC that, the party threatened to sue the 
NPP's flagbearer for campaigning that the NDC used state funds to acquire campaign 
vehicles. The DPP's beef with the NPP was that the latter could not substantiate the 
statement (GRi Newsreel 12 - 09 - 00), even though the DPP could also not 
substantiate that the statement was false. It was argued that the onus lay on the NDC to 
sue the NPP in this case, and rightly so, the DPP is "another NDC". 
The Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere - EGLE - Party 
The EGLE party is also one of the NDC's decoy parties for the 1992,1996 and 2000 
elections. As is usual with their contribution to the NDC campaign strategy, the party 
always joined forces with the NDC shortly before an election. For example, although it 
was a registered to take part in the 2000 elections, it eventually "pulled out". It received 
its party certificate on 13 August 1992 under PNDCL 281. Together with the DPP, 
they share an electoral alliance with the NDC. The party's presidential candidate at 
anytime is the same as that of the NDC. 
The Great Consolidated Popular Party - GCPP 
This party became legal in 18 June 1996, and is perceived as one of the decoys. The 
presidential candidate for the 2000 elections is Dan Lartey. The Women Organiser is 
Madam Victoria Annan (related to the Speaker of Parliament during the Rawlings 
government- Justice Annan). 
The United Ghana Movement - UGM 
The UGM is a breakaway faction of the NPP, headed by Dr Charles Wereko-Brobbey, 
the founder, leader and flagbearer for the 2000 elections. Wereko-Brobbey would 
prefer to be the NPP's flagbearer. The UGM's legal certificate as a party was issued on 
10 January 1997, after the NPP lost the 1996 elections. 
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APPENDIX VI(a). 
LIST OF SCHOOLS IN TEMA WHERE STAFF MEMBERS GRANTED 
INTERVIEWS, AND WHICH ARE FAVOURABLE TO BEING PUBLICLY 
ACKNOWLEDGED: 
1. Aggrey Road Nos. 1&2 Primary Schools. 
2. Aggrey Road No. 4 Primary School 
3. Aggrey Road Junior Secondary School (JSS). 
4. Mrs Emelia Annan, Headteacher, Mexico No. 2 JSS, P. O. Box BT 146, Tema. 
5. Mrs Nyarko, Headmistress, Tema Parents Association School, P. O. Box 539, 
Tema. 
6. Ms Elizabeth Boakye-Dankwah, Headteacher, Onninku Drive No. 1 JSS, P. O. 
Box 429, Tema. 
7. Mrs Addy, Headteacher, Onninku Drive No. 2 JSS. 
8. James Mensah, Headmaster, St Paul's Methodist Preparatory School, P. O. Box 
25, Tema. 
9. Grace Lokko, Headmistress, St Paul's Methodist JSS. 
10. Tema Secondary School. 
APPENDIX VII 
From: Anthony Mawuli Sallar [masallar@unixg. ubc. ca] 
Sent: 05 February 1998 19: 36 
To: Steve Garbrah 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aol. com; 
okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
> etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana under the 
> protection of Ewe Language 
> Steve 
Steve 
What exactly do you mean by that? What kind of nonsense is that. Go read 
your history. Do you know about colonialism, do you know about Partition 
for Africa etc. Do you know where your ancestors come from? For all you 
know they may have originated from the Pigmies in the Congo, from 
the so called Bushmen present day Namibia, or from the Nubians in the 
Sudan wherever. Will they be Ghanaians? You don't know. 
I don't want to read that kind of crap from you 
anymore. You are noted for spewing a lot of crap and garbage on this net. 
Please spare us. Go learn some history of Ghana or European history and 
study partition of Africa. 
MS 
From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb. alexia. net. au] 
Sent: 05 February 1998 21: 59 
To: Anthony Mawuli Sallar 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aol. com; 
okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
G'day ms 
why are you crying MS?? are you telling me that all Ewe speaking people in Ghana 
today are native Ghanaians?? please educate me on this issue? MS Did you 
migrate 
from Togo or M to Ghana?? 
enjoy 
Steve. 
Anthony Mawuli Sallar wrote: 
> On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
>> etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana under the 
>> protection of Ewe Language 
>> Steve 
> Steve 
> What exactly do you mean by that? What kind of nonsense is that. Go read 
> your history. Do you know about colonialism, do you know about Partition 
> for Africa etc. Do you know where your ancestors come from? For all you 
> know they may have originated from the Pigmies in the Congo, from 
> the so called Bushmen present day Namibia, or from the Nubians in the 
> Sudan wherever. Will they be Ghanaians? You don't know. 
>I don't want to read that kind of crap from you 
> anymore. You are noted for spewing a lot of crap and garbage on this net. 
> Please spare us. Go learn some history of Ghana or European history and 
> study partition of Africa. 
> MS 
From: Anthony Mawuli Sallar [masaliar@unixg. ubc. ca] 
Sent: 06 February 1998 00: 36 
To: Steve Garbrah 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aoi. com; 
okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
> why are you crying MS?? are you telling me that all Ewe speaking people in Ghana 
> today are native Ghanaians?? please educate me on this issue? MS Did you 
migrate 
> from Togo or M to Ghana?? 
Garbrah 
You are still exhibiting your ignorance relating to African history, 
Ghanaian history and European history with special emphasis on The 
partition of Africa. 
BTW who is a native Ghanaian. Do give me that definition then we can 
debate. 
I guess by M you mean Trans Volta Togoland. People from TVT did NOT 
migrate to Ghana. Another exhibition of your lack of knowledge on the 
Plebiscite. Also note that most of Eweland were under British rule before 
other inland areas in present day Ghana. 
MS 
From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb. alexia. net. au] 
Sent: 06 February 1998 01: 23 
To: Anthony Mawuli Sallar 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aol. com; 
okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Ms 
Good on you, 
My definition of native Ghanaian is everybody expect people addmited to Ghana by 
plebiscite: 
> On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
>> why are you crying MS?? are you telling me that all Ewe speaking people in 
Ghana 
>> today are native Ghanaians?? please educate me on this issue? MS Did you 
migrate 
>> from Togo or TVT to Ghana?? 
> Garbrah 
> You are still exhibiting your ignorance relating to African history, 
> Ghanaian history and European history with special emphasis on The 
> partition of Africa. 
> BTW who is a native Ghanaian. Do give me that definition then we can 
> debate. 
>I guess by TVT you mean Trans Volta Togoland. People from TVT did NOT 
> migrate to Ghana. Another exhibition of your lack of knowledge on the 
> Plebiscite. Also note that most of Eweland were under British rule before 
> other inland areas in present day Ghana. 
> MS 
From: Bensa Nukunya [bensal23@grove. ufl. edu] 
Sent: 06 February 1998 15: 28 
To: Steve Garbrah 
Cc: okyeame@mit. edu 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
As the old saying goes, Ignorance is no excuse. 
Steve you know very well that the Gold became Ghana Coast on independence 
day. 
I wasn't born then but I have had the chance of taking some history 
lessons both in primary school and seconadary school (motown to be 
precise). 
I may be mistaken but I remember very well that the plebiscite took place 
before indepence and during the time both the Gold coast and TRANS VOLTA 
were jointly governed by the Britrish. That plebiscite which took place 
was a question to the people of Trans Volta whether they wanted to 
merge with the Gold Coast or merge with Togo to where some Ewes were. 
Many people have their own explanations to this, but I think the result of 
the plebiscite was a merger of two countries (if I may call it that) to 
form one just like the two Germanies did recently. Thus none of the two 
groups can claim to be more Ghanaian than the other. On the other hand 
the choice was that of the people of the trans volta and the British had 
the power to implement it. The country Ghana itself has artificial 
borders which were created by foreigners, so whoever was added to the list 
last or even first has no right to claim that others arre not native 
enough. Delaware citizens being the first state of the USA do not 
claim to be more american than alaska natives. That's why they leave 
peacefully. But this is not so in Ghana. Because some see Ewes as a 
source of stiff competition in matters such as 
politics, job opportuinities, (What do you know Champions, beauty 
queens and what have you? ) they come out with certain unfounded theories. 
My advice to such people who don't like ewes because Ewes work 
should also learn to work hard so they will also excel in what ever 
they 
do in competition with the Ewe people. 
Bensa. 
On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
> Ms 
> Good on you, 
> My definition of native Ghanaian is everybody expect people addmited to Ghana by 
> plebiscite: 
From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas. ucla. edu] 
Sent: 06 February 1998 18: 26 
To: Andy Kwawukume 
Cc: CpCoaster@aol. com; okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote: 
> Mark, 
> That Aliens Compliance Order was a mean one and shoddily implemented. No 
> grounds to excuse it. 
Well, if you talk about the implementation of it I may agree with you 
but the fact still remains that the order was necessary in these 
modem times as we are no more nomads. 
> As for worrying about my dead great grandpas, I was not the least worried. 
It's good that you're not worried for you are surely a Ghanaian! 
Time has to tell when you, not a long ago, implicated that you know 
my roots. By the way, my great grandpa, Nana Tutu, was bom in the 
confines of the present-day Ghana. I hope I have now answered your 
query. 
> Anyway, it'd be sheer waste of time for me to type out CMB reports of how 
> devastating the Order was on the cocoa industry, for instance. 
Well, can the farm labourers be classified as modem-time slaves? You 
are an expect on slavery so let me hear more on that. 
You'd 
> retreat into your bunker as usual, when faced with hard evidence, and come 
> back 3 or so months later to make song and dance about how good Busia's 
> prototype of white racists' agenda was. 
go off the net when I have pressing issues to attend to and not due 
to the rumblings on okyeame. I hope you get that right. We are making 
'impossible things possible' as my old school teacher used to brag 
about. Don't ask me what! 
The Saint 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 00: 17 
To: Kwadwo Boahene; okyeame@mit. edu 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Kwadwo 
This is what I wrote below: 
>At 04: 05 AM 2/6/98 +0100, Andy wrote: 
»As for worrying about my dead great grandpas, I was not the least worried. 
»Not even for Yorubas living at Anloga. Nobody could touch them without 
>>invoking the wrath of the townsmen. We have lived with Yorubas for 
>>centuries and intermarried with them and never considered them as strangers 
>>you Akans do. 
>Kwadwo writes: 
>How did you come to such conclusion, Andy? If Yorubas were no strangers the 
>people of Anloga do you think they will be strangers to Anytown, Akan? 
>Remember that not all Nigerians left Ghana. There are still so many in the 
>Akan areas as Anloga. Next time check yourself before you make such a 
>blatant untrue statement. 
I am a loss at your response. I did not reach any conclusion. I just 
narrated empirical facts. Fact is, Ewes and Gas once lived with the Yorubas 
in Nigeria. Remnants of Ewes are still there in Lagos State in their own 
settlements along the coast of Badagry. Sure, Yorubas could be regarded as 
strangers to some towns in Ghana, just as some still regard Ewes (e. g., 
Steve Garbrah) and some others as not "natives" of Ghana. That's why Busia 
and the PP ordered them out! I did not say all Nigerians left. Did I? Of 
course, we've had a new influx of Nigerians and Yorubas to Ghana. ECOWAS, 
you know. But short of the Africa Unity our tradition stands for. 
Alliance Compliance Order was a stinking anti-black and African wicked 
order. Unless we have the courage to accept these internal causes of 
problems in Africa, Euro-Americans will never take seriously our attacks on 
their roles in making these internal problems intractable. 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
From: Kwadwo Boahene [kemet@pop. erols. com] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 14: 06 
To: okyeame@mit. edu 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Andy, 
Don't play dumb with me. You know what I am talking about. Re-read 
the part that I posted. Whether you reached any conclusion or not is not my 
business. All that I wanted to point out was not for you to make such 
statesments as below: 
°»>We have lived with Yorubas for 
>>>centuries and intermarried with them and never considered them as strangers 
»>you Akans do. " 
The statement above is my problem. What makes you think Akans considered 
the Yoraba's as strangers? You never answered my question and you went into 
this thing with the Aliens Compliance Order. 
»>Sure, Yorubas could be regarded as 
»>strangers to some towns in Ghana, just as some still regard Ewes (e. g., 
»>Steve Garbrah) and some others as not "natives" of Ghana. That's why Busia 
»>and the PP ordered them out! 
Yep, Yorubas could be regarded as strangers in SOME towns in Ghana. Haba, 
now you're are talking - some towns in Ewe and Akan and whatnot. This is 
not the same as you said in your first mail. Good. 
I don't think the PP gov't made his decision that "strangers" should get of 
Ghana. At this point it will not make sense for me to get into this with 
you. The merits and de-merits of the have been debated and over and over 
again. I took issue with you about the statement about Akans considering 
Yoruba's as strangers. 
Thanks, 
Kwadwo 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 00: 17 
To: Anthony Mawuli Sallar; Steve Garbrah 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; okyeame@mit. edu; 
radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Folks, 
Well, it seems I have to comment on this after all. 
At 11: 35 05.02.98 -0800, Anthony Mawuli Sallar wrote: 
>On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
» etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana 
under the 
» protection of Ewe Language 
» Steve 
When I read this crap, I deleted the mail immediately! After all, Affluent 
advised that we leave the peddlers of this kind of garbage alone, and 
they'd fade away! You know too that I know better than believe that. 
And then Mawuli responded 
>Steve 
>What exactly do you mean by that? What kind of nonsense is that. Go read 
>your history. Do you know about colonialism, do you know about Partition 
>for Africa etc. Do you know where your ancestors come from? For all you 
>know they may have originated from the Pigmies in the Congo, from 
>the so called Bushmen present day Namibia, or from the Nubians in the 
>Sudan wherever. Will they be Ghanaians? You don't know. 
Good questions, Tony! But to answer them, Steve and his ilk needs complete 
re-education of themselves as you suggested. Their miseducation is profound 
and having a great toll on the nerves of some of us, for a long, long time 
now. I think I have suffered enough (their ignorance, foolish statements, 
etc. ) in their hands! 
Steve particularly stand out as outstanding among the miseducated. When I 
first read his Ashanti Home Page, I was mortified and horrified and so sent 
him a private mail. Well, I am aware that many of my "natural allies" like 
to be praised and "glamorised" and so might not see anything wrong with the 
things he wrote there. Moreover, I thought he was one of those boastful 
"natural allies" that has got or adopted a Fanti name, for one reason or 
the other: marriage or rewarding a kind Fanti a la JB, e. g. But the 
challenges and tasks confronting us cannot be dealt with on those terms. 
And as a concerned Ghanaian, I made contact with Steve to upbraid him 
privately. Little did I know that Steve is a bleeding "confused Fanti"!!! 
Well, that is how Cape Coaster branded him. I think his kind of disease is 
worse than that. 
I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present Togo are 
descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek refuge 
among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal strip to the 
West. No, Steve would not know that because he is one of millions of 
miseducated Ghanaians/Africans. 
Half of Togo's population in Ghana? What are they doing in Ghana, btw? Does 
that include Konkombas and allies too, or only Ewes? I thought "Ghanaians" 
were still running away in their 1000s a few years ago to Togo, many of the 
women (overwhelming majority of whom we all know their ethnic origins as 
Akan) to engage in prostitution. Mind you, not in trokosi shrines.: -) 
Steve, most of us Ewes don't respect the colonial border drawn to split our 
houses, farms, lands, etc., etc., into two! The CPP promised to negotiate 
for a union after independence and urged supporters to vote for its policy 
in the plebiscite instead of voting for those calling for either union or 
separation before independence. People are still waiting for that 
negotiation to commence! 
Concerning the plebiscite, are you aware that the so-called British 
Togoland, that's, southern VR which became part of the Gold Coast long 
before the Ashanti Kingdom and the Northern Territories became British 
Protectorates, was not allowed to participate? Even when that area became 
the strongest advocate for outright separation due to the fall out with the 
CPP? And do you know that the CPP/British position "won" by a few votes, 
obviously rigged? I can't recollect the exact number since its over 20 
years since I read details of the poll. George Padmore's The Gold Coast 
Revolution has the details too. The chapter on what he termed 
"Irredentism". In present Togo, the union or separation led by Olympio 
boycotted the plebiscite there -a mistake - spelling their doom. Olympio 
later won the elections for independence but it was too late. 
Then, do you know that the TVT, down to Lome was part of the British 
annexation until Queen Victoria gave the area to her German cousin as a 
birthday present?!!! And this was not accepted by the people of the area, 
who immediately started working against this balkanisation? And that when 
WWI broke out, the British made a deal with the Torgbi Sri 11 who raised 
15,000 troops to kick out the Germans from Togo, with the promise that 
there would be a union of the people, but the British renegade on this 
deal? They took back what they gave to the Germans after the Berlin 
Conference, minus Lome. TOLIMO was simply a culmination of decades of 
frustration and suppression. 
I know Ewes from Ghana who were literally stateless in Nigeria in the 
1980s. To listen to their stories can bring tears into your eyes if you've 
any human feeling of pity. When they went to the Ghana High Comm. to get 
passports, they were driven away as Togolese, simply because they have Ga 
names among their Ewes names. It is reasoned they must be the so-called 
Mina-Ewes by the non-Ewe passport officers, even though they speak perfect 
Anlo-Ewe. Indeed some speak Ga too fluently, having grown up in Accra. You 
see, most are the descendants of the Ga fugitives who also took refuge 
among Ewes from the last quarter of the C17th. I bet Steve did not know 
about this history too, at least until he joined Okyeame. When these 
unfortunate people finally decided to get Togolese passports, they were 
insulted and chased away as criminal Ghanaians. Fact is, they were bom and 
bred within present Ghana (just as their great grandparents) and could not 
tell the Togolese passport officers the name of the next village in Togo to 
that they claimed their great great grandparents came from on their bid to 
return to Accra! 
Steve, chew on these things because they'd come to haunt you and your 
jaded, reactionary compatriots in the near future when the full story is 
re-told on Okyeame and elsewhere. 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb. alexia. net. au] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 14: 11 
To: Andy Kwawukume 
Cc: Anthony Mawuli Sallar; Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; 
okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Andy, 
I know you do post garbage on okyeame, I dont have time for you, I 
decided not to reply your mails long ago, b'cos all your writings 
are load of "SHIT; It seems to me that you have nothing better to do 
than to attach people, 
RIP 
IN NORWAY 
Steve 
> Folks, 
> Well, it seems I have to comment on this after all. 
> At 11: 35 05.02.98 -0800, Anthony Mawuli Sallar wrote: 
> >On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
>» etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana 
> under the 
>» protection of Ewe Language 
>» Steve 
> When I read this crap, I deleted the mail immediately! After all, Affluent 
> advised that we leave the peddlers of this kind of garbage alone, and 
> they'd fade away! You know too that I know better than believe that. 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 08 February 1998 02: 45 
To: sgarbrah@melb. alexia. net. au 
Cc: Anthony Mawuli Sallar; Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; 
okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
At 00: 10 08.02.98 +1000, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
>Andy, 
>1 know you do post garbage on okyeame, I dont have time for you, I 
>decided not to reply your mails long ago , b'cos all your writings 
>are load of "SHIT; It seems to me that you have nothing better to do 
>than to attach people, 
Steve, keep to your policy of not responding to my posts. Will continue to 
save me a lot of head pains and heartaches! My nerves are already seriously 
frayed! You don't have much to offer on Okyeame, btw. At least not against 
what I have to peddle. Indeed, I even pride myself on my ability to descend 
into the mud pit to make mud balls to throw myself at the face of 
mudslingers. I don't wait for the mudslingers to get their hands dirtied! No! 
BTW, no one needs to impose a culture of silence on you. You did it to 
yourself already! 
'Bye 'bye! 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
From: Amoah, M [M. Amoah@LSE. AC. UK] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 15: 50 
To: 'okyeame@mit. edu ; 'africa_think_tank@databack. com' 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
Hi everyone, 
I've been sketchily following this topic for a while. While I'm not 
interested in following up on the tribal connotations in the debate, I 
just wish to seek some verifications to a few statements made. On 
7/2/98, Andy K wrote: - 
>I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present Togo are 
> descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek 
> refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal 
> strip to the West. 
Andy K, according to the record/s, the Anyi people (also called 
Anyii or Brosa) founded the Anyin State. The capital of the Anyi State 
is Anyi (Enchi) in the Western Region. They were formerly residing in 
Anwianwia in the Ahafo district and their king was Abirimuro. Asantehene 
Opoku Ware defeated the Anyi in 1743, as a result of which they moved 
southwards in two groups, one which founded Nkwantaya, and the other 
Gyedua (now in the Wasa-Amanfi area in Western Region). The Gyedua-Anyi 
had a conflict with their landlords (The Wasa-Amanfi people) and as a 
result left, crossed the Tano River, and thus founded Anyi (Enchi) as 
already stated above. -[Meyerowitz 1952: 117] 
As the records indicate, any movement of the Anyis was 
south-westwards and not in the opposite direction towards Eweland as is 
being suggested by Andy K. I do not yet know of any records which 
indicate that Anyis from Fantiland sought refuge in Eweland after the 
Asante conquered Elmina. Perhaps Andy K would like to state his sources 
(page and all) to confirm/deconfirm his statement above. Thanks. 
In the same post on 7/2/98, Andy K wrote: - 
> Concerning the plebiscite, are you aware that the so-called British 
> Togoland, that's, southern VR which became part of the Gold Coast long 
> before the Ashanti Kingdom and the Northern Territories became British 
> Protectorates, was not allowed to participate? Even when that area 
> became the strongest advocate for outright separation due to the fall 
> out with the CPP? And do you know that the CPP/British position 
> "won" by a few votes, obviously rigged? 
I wish to state that according to the records of the plebiscite, 
there were 194,230 registered voters and 82% or 160,587 people voted. 
Out of these 58% or 93,095 voted for the CPP/British position of union 
with the Gold Coast, and 42% or 67,492 voted for separation. -(Amenumey 
1989: 266). Andy K, I do not think that a 16% difference constitutes "a 
few votes" as you claim. Second, there is no suggestion or any proof 
anywhere that the plebiscite was rigged as Andy K claims. Perhaps Andy 
Kwaukume would like to stop deceiving people with his posts. 
Having said that, I noticed that on 6/2/98, Steve Garbrah made some 
comments regarding specifically: - Ewes, the plebiscite of 1956 and 
nativity. Bensa Nukunya replied thus below: - 
"........... Because some see Ewes as a source of stiff competition in 
matters such as politics, job opportuinities, (What do you know 
Champions, beauty queens and what have you? ) they come out with certain 
unfounded theories. My advice to such people who don't like ewes because 
Ewes work should also learn to work hard so they will also excel in what 
ever they do in competition with the Ewe people. 
Bensa. 
I think that the contents of Bensa's reply are not necessary and 
have no relevance or direct bearing to the issues being discussed, to 
repeat: - Ewes, plebiscite and nativity. Bensa Nukunya's above statement 
is sweeping and unscientific. For example: 
(1). Which people see Ewes as a source of competition.....? 
(2). What must "people" excel in, in order to "compete" with 
Ewes? 
(3). Perhaps Bensa Nukunya would like to substantiate his 
statements. 
I think that perhaps, it would be better if Nukunya, in addition 
to disturbingly digressing, does not bombard us with 
tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which only 
seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all 
Ghanaians. 
cheers everyone, 
frisky. 
From: Peter K Achireko [achirepk@tuns. ca) 
Sent: 07 February 1998 21: 58 
To: M. Amoah@LSE. AC. UK 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Hi Frisky, 
Thanks for your contribution on this longly-dragged subject. 
My best regards to you. 
Achiter 
> Hi everyone, 
> I've been sketchily following this topic for a while. While I'm not 
> interested in following up on the tribal connotations in the debate, I 
> just wish to seek some verifications to a few statements made. On 
> 7/2/98, Andy K wrote: - 
> 
From: CK Ladzekpo [ladzekpo@uclink4. berkeley. edu] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 09: 52 
To: 'okyeame@mit. edu' 
Cc: M. Amoah 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
My dear Rev. Amoah, 
On Sat, 7 Feb 1998, Rev M. Amoah wrote: 
>I think that perhaps, it would be better if Nukunya, in addition 
>to disturbingly digressing, does not bombard us with 
>tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which only 
>seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all 
>Ghanaians. 
You have conveniently left out a comment on Steve Garbrah's difinition of 
who is a native Ghanaian. Nukunya was responding to that difinition. Is 
your silence a consent and what Steve Garbrah wrote is not in your words 
"tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which only 
seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all 
Ghanaians? I would appreciate a clarification. 
Regards, 
CK Ladzekpo 
From: Amoah, M [M. Amoah@LSE. AC. UK] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 18: 00 
To: 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa_think tank@databack. com' 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
On 7/2/98, CK Ladzekpo wrote: - 
> You have conveniently left out a comment on Steve Garbrah's difinition 
> of 
> who is a native Ghanaian. Nukunya was responding to that difinition. 
> Is 
> your silence a consent and what Steve Garbrah wrote is not in your 
> words 
> "tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which 
> only 
> seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all 
> Ghanaians? I would appreciate a clarification. 
> Regards, 
> CK Ladzekpo 
NO mate! all I'm saying is that, that section of the reply given 
by Bensa Nukunya was not necessary, whatever the question was, and 
especially with relevance to the issues being discussed ie; Ewes, 
plebiscite and "native Ghanaians". 
cheers, 
frisky. 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 08 February 1998 02: 47 
To: Amoah, M; 'okyeame@mit. edu; 'africa think_tank@databack. com' 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
Folks, 
Frisky needs some apor. 
At 15: 49 07.02.98 -0000, Amoah, M wrote: 
>Hi everyone, 
>I've been sketchily following this topic for a while. While I'm not 
>interested in following up on the tribal connotations in the debate, I 
>just wish to seek some verifications to a few statements made. On 
>7/2/98, Andy K wrote: - 
»I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present Togo are 
» descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek 
» refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal 
» strip to the West. 
So I wrote above. Perhaps I should have made it clear that for the Ashantis 
to reach the Elmina and the coastal strip to the west, they had to defeat 
all the people in their way too, thus displacing them. And one has to be 
aware that those early kingdoms were in the interior, not along the coast. 
Expansion to the coast happened later. 
> Andy K, according to the record/s, the Anyi people (also called 
>Anyii or Brosa) founded the Anyin State. The capital of the Anyi State 
>is Anyi (Enchi) in the Western Region. They were formerly residing in 
>Anwianwia in the Ahafo district and their king was Abirimuro. Asantehene 
>Opoku Ware defeated the Anyi in 1743, as a result of which they moved 
>southwards in two groups, one which founded Nkwantaya, and the other 
>Gyedua (now in the Wasa-Amanfi area in Western Region). The Gyedua-Anyi 
>had a conflict with their landlords (The Wasa-Amanfi people) and as a 
>result left, crossed the Tano River, and thus founded Anyi (Enchi) as 
>already stated above. -[Meyerowitz 1952: 117] 
> As the records indicate, any movement of the Anyis was 
>south-westwards and not in the opposite direction towards Eweland as is 
>being suggested by Andy K. I do not yet know of any records which 
>indicate that Anyis from Fantiland sought refuge in Eweland after the 
>Asante conquered Elmina. Perhaps Andy K would like to state his sources 
>(page and all) to confirm/deconfirm his statement above. Thanks. 
Here you are with a source. From D. E. K Amenumey (1986: 18) we read: 
"Meanwhile the fugitives settled at Kpodji (later named Glidzi), Zowla and 
Anfoin. They were not actually on the coast but beyond the lagoon. The 
chief of the Ga fugitives Ofori Nbiabia (Foli Bebe) who had joined the 
first band of fugitives paid court to the King of Tado. He secured the hand 
of a daughter of the King in marriage. Soon after the arrival of the Ga 
fugitives [in 1677, to be precise], a group of immigrants from Elmina (in 
the Gold Coast) led by Quarm Dessou went to settle on the beach to the 
west, some few kilometres from the Ga immigrants, at what became Anexo. 
Contacts developed between the two peoples with the result that they became 
fused. The Ga element however, predominated because of their numbers. The 
entire community came to be known locally as Ge, but "Mina" and "Popo" in 
European documents". 
Among these Akan fugitives, the Anyis were obviously predominant since they 
also lent their name to the new state that was formed, that is, Genyi 
(Ga-Anyi, remember, Ewes say Ge for Ga. Why? I don't know ). Other Akan 
fugitives settled among Ewes later and you'd read about them from pp. 16-20. 
In fact, you'd even understand why the people of Tongu/Bator, where the 
trokosi is found, speaks that atrocious and funny Ewe. 
> In the same post on 7/2/98, Andy K wrote: - 
>> Concerning the plebiscite, are you aware that the so-called British 
» Togoland, that's, southern VR which became part of the Gold Coast long 
» before the Ashanti Kingdom and the Northern Territories became British 
» Protectorates, was not allowed to participate? Even when that area 
» became the strongest advocate for outright separation due to the fall 
» out with the CPP? And do you know that the CPP/British position 
» "won" by a few votes, obviously rigged? 
>I wish to state that according to the records of the plebiscite, 
>there were 194,230 registered voters and 82% or 160,587 people voted. 
>Out of these 58% or 93,095 voted for the CPP/British position of union 
>with the Gold Coast, and 42% or 67,492 voted for separation. -(Amenumey 
>1989: 266). Andy K, I do not think that a 16% difference constitutes "a 
>few votes" as you claim. Second, there is no suggestion or any proof 
>anywhere that the plebiscite was rigged as Andy K claims. Perhaps Andy 
>Kwaukume would like to stop deceiving people with his posts. 
The figures you presented obviously represent the totals, and even though I 
was trying to remember from 20 yrs ago, I still think George Padmore 
presented different figures. When I wrote, I was thinking of the votes in 
the predominantly Ewe areas down south of the TVT. In fact, those areas 
voted overwhelming for separation. Their votes, whoever, were cancelled out 
by the votes in the northern parts stretching from Kete Kratchi, thru' 
Yendi to much of the Upper East, dominated by non-Ewes who could not wait 
to re-join their kins to the west from a position of strength. 
The rigging allegation may not be true but that is what TOLIMO members and 
the people of Alavanyo who rose up In arms believed. 
I think I have answered your concerns addressed to me. 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
From: Amoah, M [M. Amoah@LSE. AC. UK] 
Sent: 08 February 1998 17: 09 
To: 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa_think tank@databack. com' 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
On 8/2/98, Andy K wrote: - 
The figures you presented obviously represent the totals, and even 
though I 
was trying to remember from 20 yrs ago, I still think George Padmore 
presented different figures. When I wrote, I was thinking of the votes 
in 
the predominantly Ewe areas down south of the TVT. In fact, those areas 
voted overwhelming for separation. Their votes, whoever, were cancelled 
out 
by the votes in the northern parts stretching from Kete Kratchi, thru' 
Yendi to much of the Upper East, dominated by non-Ewes who could not 
wait to re-join their kins to the west from a position of strength. The 
rigging allegation may not be true but that is what TOLIMO members 
andthe people of Alavanyo who rose up in arms believed. 
Andy K, 
If you knew the "rigging" allegation was untrue, you should not 
have misinformed us by reiterating it, and concluding that the 
plebiscite was "obviously rigged". Neither did you say this allegation 
was a "belief" of "TOLIMO members of Alavanyo". In any case by 
reiterating their false "belief', you believed their belief. Also, you 
claim above that the votes that made the enormous 16% difference came 
from the non-Ewe 'north' of the Volta Region. In view of the fact that 
the 'north' of the Volta Region is (and has always been) sparsely 
populated as compared with the Ewe-dominated 'south', one can therefore 
conclude that the Ewes in the 'south' did not adequately patronise the 
plebiscite. If the Ewes in the 'south' did not adequately utilise their 
opportunity to decide for themselves, who is to blame? 
On the same day, Andy K, also wrote: - 
Here you are with a source. From D. E. K Amenumey (1986: 18) we 
read: 
"Meanwhile the fugitives settled at Kpodji (later named Glidzi), 
Zowla and Anfoin. They were not actually on the coast but beyond the 
lagoon. The chief of the Ga fugitives Ofori Nbiabia (Foli Bebe) who had 
joined the first band of fugitives paid court to the King of Tado. He 
secured the hand of a daughter of the King in marriage. Soon after the 
arrival of the Ga fugitives [in 1677, to be precise], a group of 
immigrants from Elmina (in the Gold Coast) led by Quarm Dessou went to 
settle on the beach to the west, some few kilometres from the Ga 
immigrants, at what became Anexo. Contacts developed between the two 
peoples with the result that they became fused. The Ga element however, 
predominated because of their numbers. The entire community came to be 
known locally as Ge, but "Mina" and "Popo" in European documents". 
Among these Akan fugitives, the Anyis were obviously predominant 
since they also lent their name to the new state that was formed, that 
is, Genyi (Ga-Anyi, remember, Ewes say Ge for Ga. Why? I don't know). 
Other Akan fugitives settled among Ewes later and you'd read about them 
from pp. 16-20. In fact, you'd even understand why the people of 
Tongu/Bator, where the trokosi is found, speaks that atrocious and funny 
Ewe. 
Andy K, 
The above quote from Amenumey 1986, as you can clearly see for 
yourself, does not mention the Anyi whom you claim (from your original 
post on 7/2/98) Ewes in Togoland have been descendent from. (Your quote 
is below to refresh your own memory). Neither does the Amenumey quote 
say that the "immigrants" from Elmina were Anyis. Nor is there any 
suggestion that those immigrants were Fantis. 
"I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present 
Togo are 
descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek 
refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal 
strip to the West. " -(Andy K : 7/2/98). 
And then you leave the quote alone, and start talking about 
"Akan fugitives, the Anyis" who helped to form a Ga-Anyi state. But 
there is no proof to indicate that the Anyis were from Fantiland or any 
Elmina for that matter. And then you continued to talk about "other Akan 
fugitives" (all outside the quote) who settled among Ewes. Although you 
have not proved that these "Akan fugitives" were Fantis or any Fantis 
from Elmina for that matter. You would realise that all the information 
you have given on 8/2/98, does not support you claim on 7/2/98 that the 
Anyis were Fantis who came from Elmina. I am afraid that your earlier 
mail was misinformative. 
The "Ga" people earlier mentioned in Amenumey's quote (also 
known as the "La" or "Ga Boni" were Guans who migrated through Eweland 
before entering the Gold Coast because when they left Mossi territory in 
Northern Ghana, they wandered to Benin and had to retract to the Gold 
Coast. It was actually their wanderings through Benin that brought them 
into contact with Ewes. These Ga, La or Ga Boni people settled west of 
the mouth of the Volta and among the Kpesi aborigines and founded the 
towns of La Doku and La Badi under their leader Okpaolebi. These same Ga 
Boni people founded Accra together with the Ga Wo and Ga Masi (who also 
came with the Ga Boni from the Benin detour). A quarrel betwen the Ga 
Boni and the (Ga-Wo-and-Ga-Masi) caused a split and the Ga Boni people 
left to found the Late district and also part of the Akwapem district. 
-(Meyerowitz 1952: 77-78). 
The Kyerepon people, who also came from the same "Mossi 
territory" in Northern Ghana, just as the Ga Boni, also wandered 
through Benin before re-entering the Gold Coast. on entering the Gold 
Coast they settled in Nsawam near Accra, founded the town of Abotoase, 
and were later sacked by the Akwamu, as a result of which they moved on 
to found the Kyerepon and Akwapem States in the Kyerepon and Akwapem 
districts respectively. -(Ibid: 78-79). 
Andy K, you would realise that settlers in modern Ghana who had 
contact with Ewes as a result of passing through Benin settled in the 
Akwapem, Late, Accra and Kyerepon districts. They are/were nowhere near 
Elmina, neither were they Anyis. Again, I'm afraid your statement on 
7/2/98 was misinformative. 
Anyway, I only joined this debate to seek some clarifications 
which haven't been forth coming. I' gone now. 
bye bye, 
frisky. 
From: CK Ladzekpo [ladzekpo@uclink4. berkeley. edu] 
Sent: 08 February 1998 14: 49 
To: Kwadwo Boahene 
Cc: 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa_think_tank@databack. com; Amoah, M 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
On Sun, 08 Feb 1998 08: 55: 52 -0500 Kwadwo Boahene wrote: 
>If you want to know, a native Ghanaian is someone who lives in present day 
>Ghana. Nothing more nothing less. 
CK Ladzekpo's comment: 
Thanks for your response. I do appreciate it. Your "ADF Repudiation Rule" 
analogy is interesting. It suggestes some "us against them" theory. I do 
not think that analogy should apply in this case. Anything that has the 
potential of threatening the well being of our country, Ghana should 
receive a united attention of all Ghanaians. From that persperctive, I 
made my enquiry. 
I do not know if native Ghanaian, Steve Garbrah is serious with his 
opinion. If he is kidding, he should realise that, a child playing with a 
matches is also capable of burning the house down. 
Do you know what is interesting? It looks like it becomes a tradition on 
Okyeame that when we see something wrong, we do nothing about it untill it 
is completely out of control. Then the faded calls for peace. Steve 
Garbrah had made a very irresponsible statement and everybody keeps quiet 
As it is turning out, so many people disagree with him but are keeping 
quite. You disagree with him. Rev. Amoah also disagreed with him but at 
the same time trying to legitimize the statement as some intellectual 
discourse. I am very baffled by the "double talk" and "double standard". 
But anyway, let me take the opportunity to thank Rev. Amoah for his 
response and wish he could have been clearer like Kwadwo Boahene. 
Thank once again. 
CK Ladzekpo 
>At 08: 59 AM 2/7/98 +0000, you wrote: 
»Brother Kwadwo, what is your opinion on Steve Garbrah's position on who is 
»a native Ghanaian? In case you forgot what he wrote, here is a copy. 
>Under normal circumstances I would not have answered your question because 
>of what I call the "ADF Repudiation Rule. " This is where when anytime one 
>black leader is accused of allegedly anti-semitism all other the black 
>other leaders are asked to repudiate his actions. Well, the reserve though 
>never happens. And I think we should not get to this ADF thing. 
>If you want to know, a native Ghanaian is someone who lives in present day 
>Ghana. Nothing more nothing less. 
>Thanks, 
>Kwadwo Boahene 
>>On Fri, 06 Feb 1998 12: 22: 43 +1100, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
»>My definition of native Ghanaian is everybody expect people addmited to 
»>Ghana by 
»>plebiscite: 
From: Amoah, M [M. Amoah@LSE. AC. UK] 
Sent: 09 February 1998 19: 15 
To: 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa_think tank@databack. com' 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
On 8/2/98, Doe Ladzekpo wrote: - 
> As it is turning out, so many people disagree with him but are keeping 
> quite. You disagree with him. Rev. Amoah also disagreed with him but 
> at 
> the same time trying to legitimize the statement as some intellectual 
> discourse. I am very baffled by the "double talk" and "double 
> standard". 
> But anyway, let me take the opportunity to thank Rev. Amoah for his 
> response and wish he could have been clearer like Kwadwo Boahene. 
Dear Doe Ladzekpo, 
Please do not try to play some "politics" with who said this and 
that. 
Your above statement that I "disagreed" with Steve Garbrah is 
false. I have never made any comment on Steve Garbrah's statement, so 
how can you implicate me of "legitimising" his statement? Netters are no 
babies, so you can't pull any wool over anyone's eyes with this one. I 
only entered the debate to seek some factual clarifications. That done 
I'm gone. BTW, in case you haven't scrutinised all the mails properly, 
the statistics I quoted were from Amenumey 1989. Andy K's quote (he 
claims) is from Amenumey 1986. The statistics I quoted from Amenumey is 
something he cannot lie about because those same statistics on the 
plebiscite are everywhere. If you have any disagreements about Amenumey 
(claiming that he is your cousin), his book and your claim that his book 
is not thorough and comprehensive enough, that is your business, and not 
mine. In any case I have not said that whatever Andy K said which is not 
in Amenumey's book is not true. I have simply asked him to cite his 
sources. Is that a problem for you? Finally as far as Trokosi is 
concerned, I presented facts that I came across. The issues I disagreed 
with in the Trokosi debate are specifically to do with the fact that the 
"explanations" brought forth to dispute the Ellis quote did not suffice, 
and therefore were fabrications. Period. If you want to dispute those 
facts, please review the sources and let your review be refereed. 
Thanks. Anyway, just to recap,. I only entered this debate to seek some 
clarifications, which have not been forthcoming. Very disappointing 
indeed! You can carry on the debate without me. Please do not politicise 
me around the debaters. Thank you. 
frisky. 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 09 February 1998 01: 48 
To: Amoah, M; 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa_think_tank@databack. com' 
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
Frisky, 
It is obvious you are under very wrong impressions. I expect my single 
statement on "Anyis from present Fantiland" settling in present Togo Rep. 
not to make much sense to many but not to the extent it has confused you. 
Can you then tell me where the name Ge-nyi came from? 
First, once again, you are trying to deny the obvious. I was not in the 
mood to engage in long quotes from books to support what I have known long 
ago before I first read it in any book. "Anyitorwo" is a designation which 
at least most Anlo-Ewes know. After all, the great great parents of some of 
us received them when they arrived as fugitives. Most Anyis, of course, 
escaped to the present Cote d'Ivoire following the Ashanti expansion. One 
thing I'd grant though is not all the "Akan" fugitives arriving from the 
Elmina/Fanti area or the whole of the Western Region could be identified as 
Anyis or Fantis, these entities also being mixed from origins. Indeed, the 
Denkyeras and Akims, among others, arrived at different periods to. Fanti 
fugitives who founded Anecho with the Gas were referred to as Adjigos. The 
Adjigo family, descendants of Quarm Desson, provided the chief in Anexo 
until rivalry with the much richer Lawson family led to civil war and their 
being driven out. See Amenumey p. 24,86,90-93. See also W. K. A. Gaba: The 
history of Anecho (Aneho): Ancient and Modern, no date. Same people founded 
present Osu-Aneho (Anorhor) in Accra upon the return of some. I personally 
know many scions of the families involved in those ancient disputes. Some 
are indeed related by marriage. 
I quoted in length how all this occurred, when and where they settled in my 
memorable first post on Okyeame, way back in 1994. Simple fact is I'm not 
in the mood to type out all that stuff. You've one ref. And there are 
others. Sandra E. Greene (1995) for example. 
As for your spin on the Gas, made me laugh! Look! They are all over in my 
family (nuclear and extended), town and clan! I have 3 sisters, 2 got 
married to Ewes of Ga extraction, one to a Yoruba born and bred in Keta. 
You don't mean you know their own history than them? 
When you ever go to Anloga, ask to be shown the area known as Lashibi. Ask 
to speak to Amega Le (La), Mr Tettey in private life. 
BTW, I am just reading through a Ga-Adangbe history from Gilbert Addy in 
order to comment on it from a position of knowledge before he puts it on 
his web site. 
I haven't seem anything about Mossi yet.: -) The last known place of 
settlement before the Gas moved to present Ghana was Nigeria! I make no 
claims to be an expert on Ga history but I'd know a spin when I see one! 
As for the plebiscite, it was not confined to the present VR. I wrote that 
it did not take place in the populous British Togoland, which was part of 
the Gold coast proper. Had that been the case, it'd be a clear win for the 
separation and then union later position of most Ewes. Then, you seem to 
miss what I said about the extent of the former Mandated TVT where the 
voting took place. Portions have been added to the present Eastern, 
Northern and Upper East! It is the remnant which has been added to the Ewe 
part of the Eastern Province of the colony, with headqtrs at Dodowa, to 
form the present VR. The Mamprusi area of the UER and Dagbon area around 
Yendi were/are also heavily populated, and non-Ewe. It was only the slave 
raiding areas of the TVT that was depopulated. As for the distribution of 
the ballot, I have to cross-check for myself. 
I do not want to enter into any long drawn exchanges on these matters and 
is thus brief in what I write. Naturally, you'd fine plenty to write about 
as my not proving what I say, as if even quotes may make any difference. 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
At 17: 09 08.02.98 -0000, Amoah, M wrote: 
>On 8/2/98, Andy K wrote: - 
>The figures you presented obviously represent the totals, and even 
>though I was trying to remember from 20 yrs ago, I still think George Padmore 
>presented different figures. When I wrote, I was thinking of the votes 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 07 February 1998 23: 22 
To: Mark Opoku-Adusei 
Cc: CpCoaster@aol. com; okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
>On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote: 
» Mark, 
» That Aliens Compliance Order was a mean one and shoddily implemented. No 
» grounds to excuse it. 
Marc responded 
>Well, if you talk about the implementation of it I may agree with you 
>but the fact still remains that the order was necessary in these 
>modern times as we are no more nomads. 
Andy responds 
What modem times in the late 60s? Haven't you heard the Europeans had 
already formed EU by then, with aim to remove border restrictions, and visa 
requirements have now been removed for members? Heard of the Schengen 
Agreement before you left Germany? 
Marc writes 
>lt's good that you're not worried for you are surely a Ghanaian! 
Man! I don't need you to tell me I am a Ghanaian. My grandparents built up 
Ghana from scratch, sacrificing personal and the family wealth to do so. I 
had already written yesterday in another post some of us were part of the 
Gold Coast before Yaa Asantewaa led your part of Ghana to another and the 
final capitulation. By even then, as we historians know, no "brave" men 
could be found to lead the field.: -) 
They took seriously the warning of Nana Krachi Dente to make stout sandals 
and run for dear life in the previous encounter.: -) 
>Time has to tell when you, not a long ago, implicated that you know 
>my roots. By the way, my great grandpa, Nana Tutu, was born in the 
>confines of the present-day Ghana. I hope I have now answered your 
>query. 
Know your roots? Of course, I know where you are coming from. But your 
"ahenfie"?, that's another question. That your forebear was born within the 
confines of present-day Ghana does not mean much to me. Whether they were 
born in Nigeria or Guinea a 200 years ago is not important! My position is 
that some and their parents were also bom within the confines of 
present-day Ghana before independence and therefore qualified for automatic 
citizenship! They should not have been ordered outll!! 1!!!!!!!! HEAR THAT 
NOW????????? 
» Anyway, it'd be sheer waste of time for me to type out CMB reports of how 
» devastating the Order was on the cocoa industry, for instance. 
You wrote 
>Well, can the farm labourers be classified as modern-time slaves? You 
>are an expect on slavery so let me hear more on that. 
I don't know what you mean by "modern-times slaves". What I know is that 
the cash crops farms such as palm oil, rubber, groundnuts, cotton and cocoa 
in West Africa were established with largely slave labour. Both African 
landlords and the European settlers were involved. But then there was a lot 
of free labour later, when the slave trade was abolished and suppressed by 
the colonialists. Many ex-slaves, however, remained on their former 
masters' farms on share-cropping basis, just as happened in the Americas 
too. Same applies to pastoral societies too. Reports abound of the parlous 
conditions such people were living in certain parts of Africa well into the 
1930s. This slavery-based economy was finally disrupted by WWI 1. WW1 had 
also caused a lot of disruption to the use of slave labour, as the 
colonialists needed the labour for their own use and war efforts. BTW, why 
is it so difficult fir you to know some of these things from your own 
backyard, i. e, ahenfie? OK, I think I know. Not even some inner circle Ewes 
know that some Ewe villages were actually settlements for slaves for some 
powerful families/clans/chiefs. Same applies to your end too. Taboo 
subject, eh? 
Let me give you a few refs.: 
1. Allan and Humphrey Fisher (1970) Slavery and Muslim In Africa detailed 
the use of slaves in much of Africa well into this century. 
2. William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Cocoa Plantations and Coerced Labor in 
the Gulf of Guinea, 1870-1914, in Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage, 
and Emancipation in Modem Africa and Asia, ed. by Martin Klein, The Univ. 
of Wisconsin Press, 1993. There are other contributions in it which will 
make you relax about African slavery. Do you know that India was having 
more slaves than the Americas combined? Of course, many came from Africa, 
thanks to the Arab-Swahili/Turkish Ottoman empire!!! 
Closer to home, Claire Robertson's in a contribution titled 
"Post-Proclamation Abolition and Slavery in Accra: A Women Affair? (hope I 
get the title right), in Women and Slavery in Africa, eds. Claire 
Robertson and Martin Klein, etc., etc. 
wrote of how slaves were still being sold in the first decades of this 
century for the cocoa farms. In fact, process fell, she claim, due to the 
earlier raids of Samori and Babatu in the north and beyond. 
I guess I have said enough. Go and find out for yourself. Also, those who 
do not understand how slavery still impact on our efforts at development in 
many spheres of life should go read for themselves. 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas. ucla. edu] 
Sent: 08 February 1998 00: 34 
To: Andy Kwawukume 
Cc: CpCoaster@aol. com; okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
On Sun, 8 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote: 
> Andy responds 
> What modem times in the late 60s? Haven't you heard the Europeans had 
> already formed EU by then, with aim to remove border restrictions, and visa 
> requirements have now been removed for members? Heard of the Schengen 
> Agreement before you left Germany? 
You seem to be losing the logic in this argument and I think I have 
to reiterate it here. Free movement of people, goods and services 
within a particular region and among a group of countries occur when 
there is a mutual agreement to that effect. Until that agreement comes 
into effect, every country has the right as regard to controls at their 
borders including issues on citizenry. Before the EU was born in late 
1950s one could not live anywhere without the necessary papers. Even most 
of the restrictions were lifted only last two years or so when the 
Scheninger Agreement was signed. It took the Europeans at least four 
decades to conclude such an uniformity. 
And now, we had Ghana where there were no official guidelines regarding 
identity whilst our neighbours were clinging to theirs. So what kinda 
a country was that? Could we even draw economic policies whilst 
certain info are even lacking. The order did not mean to expel the 
'aliens' but to get them documented. Every alien had the opportunity 
to apply for resident permit. In Africa, before the official 
interpretation of laws get to the masses, it will have already gone 
sour and misinterpretated just as the Alien Compliance Order. 
If your ancestors had lived on the land for centuries, you had every 
right to claim your Ghanaian citizenship. 
This is the gist of the whole matter and I don't understand your 
difficulty in seeing this too. Most of the time you don't sit down 
to gather the facts before you go amok. 
The Alien Compliance Order did not state that if we had a West African 
Union, aliens should seek for visas, work permit etc. 
> Man! I don't need you to tell me I am a Ghanaian. My grandparents built up 
> Ghana from scratch, sacrificing personal and the family wealth to do so. I 
> had already written yesterday in another post some of us were part of the 
> Gold Coast before Yaa Asantewaa led your part of Ghana to another and the 
> final capitulation. 
So what is the basis of your furry here?. Have I said you are not a 
Ghanaian?. I will not write the above statements if you tell me I'm a 
Ghanaian. By your statements, you are trying to prove that you are 
a Ghanaian. Someone who believes he is not a Ghanaian would write such 
statements. 
> My position is 
> that some and their parents were also bom within the confines of 
> present-day Ghana before independence and therefore qualified for automatic 
> citizenship! They should not have been ordered out!!!!!!!!!!!!! HEAR THAT 
> NOW????????? 
Who told you the Alien Compliance Order disqualified such group of 
people (West Africans as you've characterised above) of 
citizenship whilst even people from India, Pakistan, Lebanon 
Syria etc, etc. were enjoying citizenship?. Boy, get your facts 
well before you engage in an argument of this sort. 
The Sain 
From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas. ucla. edu] 
Sent: 09 February 1998 00: 04 
To: Andy Kwawukume 
Cc: CpCoaster@aol. com; okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Andy, 
I have made my points very clear to you and you can verify the 
facts. The Alien Compliance Order was necessary in all aspects 
and people who argue against it either do it out of political reasons 
or they are not very sure of their citizenry. Period! Happy Sunday. 
The Saint 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 09 February 1998 02: 38 
To: Mark Opoku-Adusei 
Cc: CpCoaster@aol. com; okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
At 16: 03 08.02.98 -0800, Mark Opoku-Adusei wrote: 
>Andy, 
>1 have made my points very clear to you and you can verify the 
>facts. The Alien Compliance Order was necessary in all aspects 
>and people who argue against it either do it out of political reasons 
>or they are not very sure of their citizenry. Period! Happy Sunday. 
>The Saint 
Mark, 
I am arguing against the ACO on political, social and economic grounds. It 
is against all my Pan-African perspectives. 
As for your insinuation about not being sure about citizenry, that tickles 
me as an Anlo-Ewe with my own tuft within the Gold Coast colony before 
Agyeman Prempeh 1 was deported to the Seychelles! Nothing to be proud of, 
that's, becoming a colonised people, btw. Perhaps that is why the 
missionaries only gained access to Anloga in 1913, and full co-operation 
became possible only after the Awoamefia Torgbi Sri II, aka Cornelius 
Kwawukume, was promised and later appointed into the Legislative Council in 
1916. Yeah! We got representation first among all the people and chiefs of 
present Ghana! Just watch me stage a comeback. I know where I come and 
where I am going, man! The country has gone to the dogs since our 
grandfathers went on retirement, and people without any experience or 
memories acquired from their ancestors have taken over the realms of 
office. Their book knowledge is also faulty, riddled with big holes! 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas. ucla. edu] 
Sent: 09 February 1998 18: 42 
To: Andy Kwawukume 
Cc: CpCoaster@aol. com; okyeame@mit. edu; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
On Mon, 9 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote: 
> The country has gone to the dogs since our 
> grandfathers went on retirement, and people without any experience or 
> memories acquired from their ancestors have taken over the realms of 
> office. Their book knowledge is also faulty, riddled with big holes! 
> Andy Kwawukume 
> Norway 
Heheheeeee, who are the dogs?.. The Aggreys, Danquahs, Nkrumahs and the 
Busias? Is Rawlings among the doggees? 
From: Amoah, M [M. Amoah@LSE. AC. UK] 
Sent: 09 February 1998 19: 35 
To: 'opokuadu@seas. ecla. edu' 
Cc: 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa think tank@databack. com'; 
CpCoaster@aol. com; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings? 
> Frisky, 
> You have really educated Andy. I thought he was indeed a 'pope' in his 
> own area, history, but now I will never take his polluted history 
> stuffs seriously. I will take time to research into all his citations 
> at the ucla library to prove their authenticity. Happy Sunday. 
> The Saint 
Hahahahaaaaaaaa The Saint, 
If you want to cross-check all of Andy K's "citations", you have 
a lot of surprises to meet. Happy hunting! You'll be lucky if he "cites" 
fully though. I'm not sure you want to grope around reading a whole book 
just because And K said it was there. You might not find it! And if 
there is something there it might not be about what he meant to say! 
"Researching" into Andy K's "citations" is a whole research career in 
itself. Good luck with your findings 
cheers, 
frisky. 
From: Doe Ladzekpo [doe@hia. net] 
Sent: 09 February 1998 10: 49 
To: Amoah, M 
Cc: 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa_think_tank@databack. com'; Mark 
Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol. com; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Amoah, M wrote: 
> Andy K, 
> The above quote from Amenumey 1986, as you can clearly see for 
> yourself, does not mention the Anyi whom you claim (from your original 
> post on 7/2/98) Ewes in Togoland have been descendent from. (Your quote 
> is below to refresh your own memory). Neither does the Amenumey quote 
> say that the "immigrants" from Elmina were Anyis. Nor is there any 
> suggestion that those immigrants were Fantis. 
> "I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present 
> Togo are 
> descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek 
> refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal 
> strip to the West. " -(Andy K : 7/2/98). 
> And then you leave the quote alone, and start talking about 
> "Akan fugitives, the Anyis" who helped to form a Ga-Anyi state. But 
> there is no proof to indicate that the Anyis were from Fantiland or any 
> Elmina for that matter. And then you continued to talk about "other Akan 
> fugitives" (all outside the quote) who settled among Ewes. Although you 
> have not proved that these "Akan fugitives" were Fantis or any Fantis 
> from Elmina for that matter. You would realise that all the information 
> you have given on 8/2/98, does not support you claim on 7/2/98 that the 
> Anyis were Fantis who came from Elmina. I am afraid that your earlier 
> mail was misinformative ....................................................... 
> ..................... 
bye bye, 
> frisky. 
Hi Frisky, 
Let me state up front that I have not read Amenumey's book. The quotes 
by you and Andy from Amenumey shows it is a very interesting piece to 
read. Amenumey is my cousin and we grew up, though at different 
periods, in the Anya family compound at Anyako were the elders often, as 
they sitll do today, gathered the little ones around and recount to us 
the ancestral oral history of the Ewes and their neighbours as it was 
told them by their parents and grand parents. I believe Mr. Amenumey 
did further studies to collect more information to add to what we were 
told in childhood. The backdrop, however, is likely to be loaded with 
the oral history just as Andy's grand parents would have impacted to 
their children with a few differences here and there. 
I spent a lot of time in Anexo, in Togo and heard a lot more information 
from the people of Togo about their relationship to the Ge (Ga) people 
of Ghana. I will not write all of it in a book. Some will amount to 
digging dirt on a neighbour when we have no way of checking the validity 
of some of these stories. 
My caution to all of us is this. We just went through a nerve raking 
"dirt digging" process of half truths on the Trokosi issue. Frisky, 
there were issues around Trokosi you quoted from a few books and often 
checked everybody's comments against those "facts" you read and 
verhemently condemned others' explanations as lies or untrue statements 
just because they are not in the books you read. Unfortunately we may 
be seeing the beginning of another one: - "The Togo Ewe & Ga 
Relationship" as you start to insist that whatever Andy said which is 
not in Amenumey's book must be unture. Believe me, Amenumey would leave 
out some issues, especially if he feels he can still deliver his message 
wighout dabbling into the imotional ones that he cannot prove. 
Doe 
From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa. net] 
Sent: 10 February 1998 03: 17 
To: doe@hia. net; Amoah, M 
Cc: okyeame; africa_think tank; radom@cam. gradcorp. com 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
At 02: 49 09.02.98 -0800, Doe Ladzekpo wrote: 
cut, cut 
>1 spent a lot of time in Anexo, in Togo and heard a lot more information 
>from the people of Togo about their relationship to the Ge (Ga) people 
>of Ghana. I will not write all of it in a book. Some will amount to 
>digging dirt on a neighbour when we have no way of checking the validity 
>of some of these stories. 
Doe, you could not say it better! When I wrote my last post, I had to edit 
and cut out some names of families I knew. Not only that, I had to re-write 
the stuff in a more neutral and balanced manner, so that none of the 
families mentioned take offence should my post get to their notice. Fact 
is, there are conflicting versions of almost everything that happened in 
history. Amenumey presented both or triple, versions of the stories as 
best as he could, but we know each side sticks to their version. Moreover, 
Amenumey is neither the original source nor only source available on many 
of the things he wrote on. Same applies to the other authors too. It is 
dangerous to take sides, especially if you come from the area, as some of 
us do. I simply do not have the energy to represent all sides and hence 
give only the ref. and pages for anyone seriously interested to find out 
for him/herself. 
Of course, when I am sure of a story, I stick out my neck and defend the 
position. That is what I did after quoting at length Newman's (1995) on 
Nubia. If we can even well-researched fault books written by scholars 
barely three years ago, how much more books written by common travelers and 
adventurers on Africa over a century ago? Of course, Frisky believes their 
fictions as "facts"! 
His spin on the Gas in Eweland is one of the funniest I have read. We all 
have funny stories of origins, mind you! I thought the Gas claiming they 
came from the sea and th Akans from a hole were funny enough! Of course, 
historians will say they only mean they came by sea, (not from it), and 
from a cave respectively! Frisky's spin lack even simple logic: no, it was 
the Guans who settled in Benin among the Ewes, and then went to La, etc. So 
where did Gas come from in the first place? Were they always in present 
Ghana? What about the accepted presence In Nigeria? And when did the Guans 
moved in and moved out? BTW, Ewes moved there (Benin) as immigrants barely 
800 years ago, according to the more reliable sources. Why go and quote 
unreliable and discredited sources as "facts" when the exact years of the 
flight of the Gas, Fantis and other Akans into Eweland are recorded 
history, not word of mouth (oral) history alone? Heard before how the Gas 
circumcised the Akwamu Prince and heir apparent, Akonnor, who was sent to 
them to be trained as a merchant? I have written about this more than once 
on Okyeame. It is enough! 
Frisky, for your info, my wife's ancestors also came from the Fanti 
immigrant stocks. She therefore belongs to the "Eblu" clan, while I myself 
belong to the 5 Star Adzovia clan. The funny thing is that my kids become 
Adzovia automatically, while that of my sisters become Eblu clan members 
because of marriage to "Eblu" clan members. Their children must therefore 
observe Ga-Adangbe customs and are deprived of certain privileges! Stupid! 
Isn't it? That's why our grandfathers and fathers have been trying to erase 
this clan thing and we must continue it. Read Sandra Greene (1995) for the 
absurdities of clannishness, and how the ethnic outsiders in the Anlo area 
try to avoid it or cope with it. She has done a good job but as an insider, 
I can tell where she stretched her analytical ability to explain what no 
one is willing to or can volunteer sensitive information to her, being an 
outsider. Shouldn't we be allowed to keep some state secrets from even 
prying historians forever? No? Or Yes? Since I am an interested party, I 
don't think I can preside over these cases. 
I have said enough for today. 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
From: Doe Ladzekpo [doe@hia. net] 
Sent: 10 February 1998 08: 03 
To: Amoah, M 
Cc: 'okyeame@mit. edu'; 'africa think tank@databack. com' 
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings? 
Rev. Amoah, 
I wish I know a way to tell you how to debate without sounding so 
nauseating. Unfortunately I don't. One thing very important to me, 
however, is that whatever you would enclose in quotes and assign my name 
to it, please make sure you are indeed quoting me but not someone else 
or from your imagination. You could take your time and read with some 
comprehension first, then you put your pen to paper. Most people do just 
that. 
Doe 
> Dear Doe Ladzekpo, 
> Please do not try to play some "politics" with who said this and 
> that. 
> Your above statement that I "disagreed" with Steve Garbrah is 
> false. I have never made any comment on Steve Garbrah's statement, so 
> how can you implicate me of "legitimising" his statement? Netters are no 
> babies, so you can't pull any wool over anyone's eyes with this one. I 
> only entered the debate to seek some factual clarifications. That done 
> I'm gone. BTW, in case you haven't scrutinised all the mails properly, 
> the statistics I quoted were from Amenumey 1989. Andy K's quote (he 
> claims) is from Amenumey 1986. The statistics I quoted from Amenumey is 
> something he cannot lie about because those same statistics on the 
> plebiscite are everywhere. If you have any disagreements about Amenumey 
> (claiming that he is your cousin), his book and your claim that his book 
> is not thorough and comprehensive enough, that is your business, and not 
> mine. 
Doe's Reply: 
Rev. Amoah, 
I hope this is just a joke and that you are not telling us with any 
seriousnes that this is your understanding of the English I wrote when I 
said "I believe Amenumey did further studies to collect more 
information to add to what we were told in childhood". Man, you've been 
doing a damn good job cock-screwing your own intelligence in your quest 
and effort to find and sling cheap shots at people. It really marvels 
me why a Rev. Will take the paths you do. May be one day I will learn. 
Doe 
In any case I have not said that whatever Andy K said which is not 
> in Amenumey's book is not true. I have simply asked him to cite his 
> sources. Is that a problem for you? Finally as far as Trokosi is 
> concerned, I presented facts that I came across. The issues I disagreed 
> with in the Trokosi debate are specifically to do with the fact that the 
> "explanations" brought forth to dispute the Ellis quote did not suffice, 
> and therefore were fabrications. Period. If you want to dispute those 
> facts, please review the sources and let your review be refereed. 
> Thanks. Anyway, just to recap,. I only entered this debate to seek some 
> clarifications, which have not been forthcoming. Very disappointing 
> indeed! You can carry on the debate without me. Please do not politicise 
> me around the debaters. Thank you. 
> frisky. 
From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb. alexia. net. au] 
Sent: 23 June 1998 08: 56 
To: Andy Kwawukume 
Cc: paul qyartey; Okyeame@africaonline. com 
Subject: Re: Tribal Conspiracy at Wesley College? 
In reply to Andy-k's mail ( this time I will write more than my usual few lines- 
will try to be Gentle for only today) 
It looks as if only a few of us using the forums are strong enough to stand up to Andy-k 
and his one-sided comments. Andy-k is pretending to be non-tribal, but his true 
affiliations come out very clearly in his writing. It is becoming more and more obvious 
to all of us that Andy-k and his associates are ANTI Ashanti and ANTI Akan. It would 
indeed be hard for him to prove otherwise. The 'tone' of his comments 'speak' the anger 
and hatred in his heart towards the Ashantis. How can I tolerate this abuse being thrown 
in the direction of the feet of Ashantis and Akan? Nana Yaa Asantewaa stood against 
the British. http: //www. ashanti. com. au/nana. htm 
Let me recall what happened to me when I visited Amsterdam (Holland) for the first 
time. At the Central Station I met a Ghanaian, who offered me assistance and invited 
me to his house, as I was new to the city. What a humane gesture, to offer help to a 
stranger in a new country. I was highly taken up by his generosity. But at his house 
one of the questions he asked was "which part of Ghana are you from? " I was happy to 
tell my fellow countrymen that I was from Akan Tribe. His immediate next question 
was to ask me what I did do when Victor Owusu insulted Ewes. I didn't know what he 
was talking about. I was only young then. So, I said I didn't say or do anything. The 
next minute he told me to get my bags and leave his house. He virtually kicked me 
out. Why? Maybe because I was young and didn't share his views? That is how the 
Ewe guy behaved. 
When I listen to Andy-k I can feel the same attitude. I 'know' he would treat any Akan 
the same way.. Where is the trust among us? If an Ewe gets in to a position of power, 
he will select and appoint fellow Ewes all around him. (EXECTIVE CLUB) This is 
not because he is tribalistic, but because he doesn't trust anyone other than a fellow 
Ewe. This must change. UNITED WE STAND, ONE NATION ONE PEOPLE 
You may remember when they closed the border with Togo at Aflao, only those who 
could speak Ewe, Just say the magic word "yen Bro"(something like that) and they will 
allow you to cross. No one speaking Twi was able to cross the border. I witnessed 
this. That says a lot about the Ewes attitude towards the Akan. 
Now more and more people in Ghana and on OKYEAME are afraid to speak out. As 
countless lies are added, the truth is being distorted. We don't share this hatred and bad 
attitude towards others. I know who I am and what I stand for. But Andy-k doesn't. I 
have helped and still continue to help more Ewes than Andy-k has ever done. At the 
moment I am helping an Ewe that his own people from Eweland doesn't even want to 
know of. (If you want to know more about this boy write to me privately and I will tell 
you his story). I don't care about the tribe you belong to but if you do the 'right' thing 
you will always get my support. 
I will continue to fight the kind of bigotry and stupidity displayed by Andy-k and his 
associates, who spread lies around the world about the Ashanti and Akan. Andy-k's 
command of English or number of letters behind his name (BA's, MA's etc) is not going 
to make him sound like the good and honest man he is pretending to be. If anyone 
questions Ewe Andy-k is ready to jump to the defence (even 'kill' for). There are many 
things about Ewes I would like to know but Andy-K will labell me trabalistic, Ask any 
question about Asanteman, Any Ashanti will be only willing to explain, without 
jumping in to conclusions and distorting the truth? Show us your true colours Andy-k, 
I know what Andy-K stand for. 
Hon Members of Okyeame understand and will not to be influenced by the command 
of Andy-K's English. 
Let me remind you Andy-K, the British won the Ashanti war, but they could not win 
the control of the Sika Dwa Kofi. They could not defeat the sprit of the Ashantis. 
ANDY-K I CAN DRIVE YOU MAD. 
STEVE 
"KANEWO 
Andy Kwawukume wrote: 
Steve, 
As you can see, I normally delete superfluous post (previous mail) from mails when 
responding. I simply did same to yours. I did not delete any of yours. Why should I? 
Thanks for more of your idiotic poor stuff, anyway. Just showing everybody what we 
have to deal with. I advise all those who are writing to find fault in what I write to 
concentrate their energies on the like of Steve, or they'd be FORCED to read and hear 
unpleasant things from me too. That much is guaranteed! Tit for tat, and a bit more to 
choke on! 
Andy Kwawukume 
Norway 
At 18: 08 20.06.1998 +1000, Steve Garbrah wrote: 
»» 
Andy-k 
why didnt you post the whole mail instead of my reply to your good DOCTOR? 
I always replied according to the tone of your stupid mail. I refuse to be what you 
want me to be, To me you are Number one Bigot, and all your associates are fools. I 
have no respect for you and your crew. I'm glad to know that you have discovered your 
tribal roots which is Togo. Let me tell you Steve comes from Ghana not Togo. "who the 
cup fit" 
Have a nice weekend. 
Steve (KANEWO) 
From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@ashanti. com. au] 
Sent: 20 August 1999 11: 29 
To: csucc@ghana. com 
Cc: Okyeame@mit. edu 
Subject: Re: a lost pal testing 
MS 
Na who you the call trouble maker? Oga you thing say you fi hide? 
na lie, We day as if we no day, Andy-K "Your buddy" don run. 
Nice to know you are doing well, I hope your are putting your ideas into 
action 
you seems to have thousands of ideas (I hope they are not dead) Ghana 
need you. 
cheers 
Steve G. 
csucc@ghana. com wrote: 
> Hi folks 
> This is an anonymous message to some folks. You know yourselves so 
> please write back. Just to tell you I am alive and kicking. I miss 
> you all.. . Magic 
feet you dey, Azar you dey, Abuzzena you dey, 
> Kadzilla you dey, Buchii you dey, Cape Coaster now in Ghana you dey, 
> AndyK how is your new abode, pal Bodome, Ewuraba Ketsiina, Roxxi are 
> are you still alive, Eric Yankah I miss you pal, Mawuli Tse you dey, 
> sister Theresa good morning from home, Ash fighter marc Edusei-Poku 
> how be, Yaw Ahenkorah how be.. . still lashing our indefatigable, hard 
> working first lady, what about that trouble causer in 
> Australia ... whatshisname? 
My political opponets, K. Danso and the 
> Prof himself. Prof thanks so much for the ride last time around in 
> that heavy downpour (don't break the code to anybody o. k? ) I got 
> home safely. I hope you have all been of good behaviour, moral 
> uprightness, and no fights on the net. I got to go home. Those 
> that I have failed to mention ... not that I love you less but simply I 
> am just tired after a hard days work. Next time o. k. 
>I have just had a great meal of groundnut soup, fufu and 
> grasscutter soup. I can't stand light soup. Of course after the meal 
>I washed it down with a giant bottle of Star Beer. The best beer I 
> tell you. Who says enjoyment no dey for here. Sure enjoyment but no 
> bread, or dough or sika but we dey. 
> Mr. Anonymous 
From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb. alexia. net. au] 
Sent: 24 August 1999 12: 28 
To: Amoah, M (ex) 
Subject: Re: a lost pal testing 
Frisky 
Another TvT Mawuli sallar 
Cheers 
Steve 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Amoah, M (ex) <M. Amoah@lse. ac. uk> 
To: 'Steve Garbrah' <sgarbrah@ashanti. com. au> 
Date: Monday, 23 August 1999 10: 30 
Subject: RE: a lost pal testing 
>Hi Steve, 
>who is <csucc@ghana. com>. please fill me in. 
>thanks, 
>frisky 
APPENDIX VIII 
1996 ELECTION RESULTS: 
Presidential Votes By Candidate And Region: 
region rawlings % kufour % mahama % 
Ashanti 412,475 32.8 827,821 65.8 17,736 1.4 
B-Ahafo 395,382 61.7 230.457 36 14,635 2.3 
Central 313,386 55.7 241,542 42.9 7,995 1.4 
Eastern 459,090 53.8 384,597 45 10,251 1.2 
G-Accra 658,826 54 528,484 43.3 32,723 2.7 
Northern 370,330 62.1 190,621 32 35,318 5.9 
U-East 230,791 69 54,041 17.4 45,696 13.7 
U-West 145,812 74.6 21,871 11.2 27,754 14.2 
Volta 690,421 94.5 34,538 4.7 5,292 0.8 
Western 405,992 57.3 289,730 40.9 12,862 1.8 
TOTAL 4,099,760 57.4 2,825,715 39.6 219,980 3 
Parliamentary seats of Main Parties by Region: 
region ndc npp pcp pnc 
Ashanti 5 28 0 0 
B-Ahafo 17 4 0 0 
Central 14 3 0 0 
Eastern 15 Ti 0 0 
G-Accra 13 9 0 0 
Northern 18 3 1 1 
U-East 12 0 0 0 
U-West 8 0 0 0 
Volta 19 0 0 0 
Western 12 3 4 0 
TOTAL 133 61 5 1 
APPENDIX IX 
INTERVIEW WITH TEMA MP: 
The unstructured interview with the MP for Tema, Mr Ossei Aidoo, a lawyer by 
profession, yielded a very interesting view regarding what he figured was the source 
and nature of the ethno-rivalry in mainstream politics. Mr Aidoo is an MP for the NPP, 
which is generally viewed as being Akan or Ashanti dominated. He is himself an 
Ashanti. I met him at the famous Big Base restaurant in Tema which he frequented. His 
answer to one of my questions posited the view that Ewes do not join Akan-dominated 
parties because Ewes in general are not open. Below is an excerpt from the interview. 
uestion: `It is common to hear that the Opposition NPP is Ashanti dominated, and 
the NDC is Ewe dominated, and generally Ashantis should support the NPP whereas 
Ewes should support the NDC. Having observed the exceptions to the rule, it is 
noticeable that more Ashantis have freely joined the NDC than more Ewes would join 
the NPP. Even in Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti, you find that a substantial percentage 
voted for the NDC in the 1996 elections, whereas in the Ewe Volta Region 94.5% of 
votes were cast in favour of the NDC. It seems clear that a comparatively greater 
number of Ashantis identify with the NDC than Ewes would identify with the NPP. 
Would you attribute this phenomenon to the NDC being more open to other tribes than 
the NPP? ' 
Answer: `No. The answer to your question is this: Ashantis are more open, liberal and 
enterprising. That is why Ashantis are free to join other parties which are not Ashanti- 
led or Ashanti-dominated, and would not face any persecution from fellow Ashantis. 
However, Ewes would not freely join any party which has the history of Akan origins 
or even Akan leadership because they would be persecuted for doing so by fellow 
Ewes. Many people claim that Ashantis are generally rich, loud and are braggarts by 
attitude. However, I would say that Ashanti culture is more liberating and allows 
freedom of expression, association and enterprise. It is this free, enterprising spirit of 
embarking on challenges which has made Ashantis more successful and loud. It is 
unfortunate that any negativity should be associated with this. I think it is prejudicial. I 
understand that your research is seeking to investigate the role of tribalism in Ghanaian 
politics and any associated tribal patterns. Contrary to the usual and common views 
which people would have about tribes and politics in Ghana, I would like to stress that 
in your analysis, you make the distinction clear that, Ashantis are more open, more 
embracing and more liberal. Also, Ashanti culture embraces and encourages dissent, 
freedom of speech and of association. This is why we can condone division within our 
camp. Also, this is why you would notice that Ashantis are freer to join other parties not 
controlled by their tribe, for example the NDC, whereas Ewes would generally not want 
to affiliate or identify with the NPP for reasons best known to themselves'. 
INTERVIEWER'S COMMENT: 
In his explanation, the Tema MP gives the impression that Ashantis are open to other 
tribes. However, this view is not shared by many people in Ghana. Contrary to the 
attribution of openness, the perception (whether right or wrong) is widespread that the 
NPP is Ashanti-dominated, and an open secret exists that one has to be at least Akan in 
order to be the party's flagbearer. Despite the representation of other tribes in the 
party's hierarchy, the Akan lobby remains strongest. 
APPENDIX X 
Section (a) - BASIC BACKGROUND 
(1). What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
(2). How old are you? 
1.0-16 
2.17-30 
3.31-40 
4.41-50 
5.51-60 
6.61-70 
7.71-80 
8.81-90 
9.91-100 
(3). What is your tribe? 
1. Fanti 
2. Ashanti 
3. Akyem 
4. Akwapim 
5. Bono 
6. Ga/Adangbe 
7. Nzima 
8. Bolga 
9. Dagomba 
10. Dagaaba 
11. Gurenne 
12. Mampruli 
13. Gonja 
14. Hausa 
15. Ewe 
(4). What is your occupation? 
1. Unskilled 
2. Semi-skilled 
3. Skilled 
4. Clerical 
5. Administrative 
6. Managerial 
7. Professional 
8. Specialist 
9. Pensioner 
10. Student 
(5). What is your level of education? 
1. primary 
2. secondary 
3. tertiary 
Section (b) - POLITICAL ORIENTATION 
(6). What is the traditional party orientation of your family? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahist" 
4. other 
5. none 
(7). What has been the traditional party orientation of yourself? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahist" 
4. other 
5. none 
(8). What is your current party orientation? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahist 
4. other 
5. none 
(9). What is the party of the MP you voted for in the 1996 Parliamentary 
elections? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahist" 
4. other 
5. none 
6. not eligible 
(10). Which Presidential candidate did you vote for in the 1996 Presidential 
elections? 
1. Rawlings 
2. Kufour 
3. Mahama 
4. None 
5. Ineligible 
(11). What would be the party of your choice MP in the 2000 Parliamentary 
elections? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahist" 
4. "new ndc" 
5. other 
6. none 
7. not eligible 
8. undecided 
(12). Which Presidential candidate would you vote for in the 2000 
Presidential elections? 
1. Atta Mills 
2. Kufour 
3. Tanor 
4. Other 
5. None 
6. Ineligible 
7. Undecided 
Section (c) - INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICS 
(13). Are you a registered voter? 
1. yes 
2. no 
(14). If No, why are you not registered? 
1. Ineligible or under 18 currently 
2. I support no particular party or candidate 
3. I am not interested in politics 
4. N/A 
(15). Are you a registered member of any party? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
(16). If Yes, which party? 
1. ndc 
2. npP 
3. "nkrumahist" 
4. other 
5. N/A 
(17). If No, why are you not a registered member of any party? 
1. lack of pre-requisite resources to become a registered member of any party 
2. disinterested/disillusioned about the parties and politics for whatever 
reason 
3. no apparent reason 
4. N/A 
(18). What is your level of party political participation? 
1. local 
2. district 
3. national 
4. all of the above 
5. none of the above 
(19). How do you familiarise yourself with the politics? 
1. attend political rallies and meetings 
2. follow the agenda of parties from the media 
3. all of the above 
4. none of the above 
Section (d) - FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
(20). Do you freely share your political opinions/views with everyone? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
(21). If No, please state confidants and preference order: - 
1. spouse 
2. close family members 
3. friends and peers 
4. distant relatives 
5. no one at all 
6. N/A 
Section (e) - TENTATIVE VOTES - PRESSURE OR PREVAILING 
FACTORS 
(22). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the 
NDC? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahists" 
4. "new ndc" 
5. other 
6. none 
7. not eligible 
(23). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the 
NPP? 
1. ndc 
2. npP 
3. "nkrumahists" 
4. "new ndc" 
5. other 
6. none 
7. not eligible 
(24). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the 
"nkrumahist" coalition? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahist" 
4. "new ndc" 
5. other 
6. none 
7. not eligible 
(25). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the "new 
ndc"? 
1. ndc 
2. npp 
3. "nkrumahist" 
4. "new ndc" 
5. other 
6. none 
7. not eligible 
(26). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Fanti? 
1. For 
2. Against 
3. Abstain 
4. Not eligible 
(27). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is an Ashanti? 
1. For 
2. Against 
3. Abstain 
4. Not eligible 
(28). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is an Ewe? 
1. For 
2. Against 
3. Abstain 
4. Not eligible 
(29). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Ga? 
1. For 
2. Against 
3. Abstain 
4. Not eligible 
(30). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a 
Mabian/Northerner? 
1. For 
2. Against 
3. Abstain 
4. Not eligible 
Section (f) - URBANISED/DETRIBALISED? 
(31). Do you live in Tema? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
(32). If Yes, during which time period? 
1.1961-1990 
2. post 1990 
3. both 
4. N/A 
(3 3). If No, are you a 
1. visitor? 
2. job-seeker? 
3. student? 
4. N/A 
(34). For how long have you lived in Tema? 
1.0-3 months 
2.4-12 months 
3.1-3 years 
4.4-10 years 
5. Over 10 years 
6. N/A 
(35). Have you lived in another city before? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not sure 
(36). If Yes, which one? 
1. Accra 
2. Tema 
3. Kumasi 
4. Tamale 
5. Bolgatanga 
6. Wa 
7. Sunyani 
8. Koforidua 
9. Takoradi 
10. Cape-Coast 
11. Ho 
12. Combination 
13. N/A 
(37). Have you always lived in a city? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
(38). If No, state how long you've lived in a village/town prior to city life: 
1.0-3 months 
2.4-12 months 
3.1-3 years 
4.4-10 years 
5. Over 10 years 
6. N/A 
(39). Do you visit your relatives? 
1. yes 
2. no 
(40). If Yes, do they live in: - 
1. urban areas? 
2. rural areas? 
3. Both? 
4. N/A 
(41). If no, why do you not visit them? 
1. they visit me 
2. not necessary 
3. at loggerheads with relatives 
4. too expensive to travel 
5. e-mail usage 
6. aim towards detribalisation 
7. detribalised 
8. N/A 
(42). Do you write to relatives? - (snail mail) 
1. Yes 
2. No 
(43). If Yes, how often? 
1. once a month 
2. once a year 
3. once every 3-5 years 
4. once every 10 years 
5. N/A 
(44). If No, why do you not write to them? - (snail mail) 
1. they write to me - (snail mail) 
2. not necessary 
3. preference for physical contact 
4. letter writing is boring and tedious 
5. lack of postal services in the village 
6. snail mail postage too expensive 
7. e-mail usage 
8. aim towards detribalisation 
9. detribalised 
10. N/A 
(45). Do you telephone relatives? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
(46). If yes, how often? 
1. daily 
2. once a week 
3. once a month 
4. once a quarter 
5. once a year 
6. only during emergencies, Christmas and Easter celebrations 
7. N/A 
(47). If No, why do you not telephone them? 
1. Relatives have no phone contact 
2. They phone me 
3. Not necessary 
4. Preference for physical contact 
5. Too expensive 
6. e-mail usage 
7. Aim towards detribalisation 
8. Detribalised 
9. N/A 
(48). Do you visit your village/hometown? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
(49). If Yes, how often? 
1. once or more a year 
2. once every three years 
3. once every 4-10 years 
4. N/A 
(50). If No, why do you not visit your village/hometown? 
1. they visit me 
2. not necessary 
3. too expensive to travel 
4. no relatives left in village/hometown 
5. e-mail usage 
6. aim towards detribalisation 
7. detribalised 
8. N/A 
Section (g) - RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION 
(51). What is your religious orientation? 
1. Christian 
2. Moslem 
3. Traditionalist 
4. Other 
5. A-religious 
(52). If Christian, 
1. Orthodox 
2. Charismatic 
3. N/A 
Section (h). TRIBAL/ETHNIC DERIVATION 
(53). What's your surname? 
1. Fanti 
2. Ashanti 
3. Akyem 
4. Akwapim 
5. Bono 
6. Ga/Adangbe 
7. Nzima 
8. Bolga 
9. Dagomba 
10. Dagaaba 
11. Gurenne 
12. Mampruli 
13. Gonja 
14. Hausa 
15. Ewe 
16. African 
17. European 
18. American 
19. Asian 
20. Australian 
21. Other 
Frequencies APPENDIX XI 
Statistics 
level of 
gender age tribe occupation education 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 501 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
traditional traditional 
party party party of MP In 
orientation of orientation of current party 1996 Party 
our family yourself orientation elections 
-j7-Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
choice of choice of President for President for 
1996 party of choice 2000 are you a 
Presidential in 2000 Parly presidential registered 
elections elections elections voter? 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
If no, why If no, why Are you a are you not a what is your 
are you not a registered registered level of 
registered member of If yes, which member of political 
voter? an a? a an a participation? 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 501 
Missin 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
if no, please 
state 
do you freely confidants and 
how do you share your indicate vote if - greater familiarise political preference by public 
yourself with views/opinion numerical endorsement 
the poli S? order of ndc 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missin 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
vote if - greater 
public vote if - 
vote if - greater endorsement vote if - greater Presidential 
public of public candidate for 
endorsement "Nkrumahist" endorsement 2000 elections 
of npp coalition? of new ndc is a Fanti? 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missing 0 0 0 
Statistics 
vote if - vote if - 
vote if - vote if - Presidetial Presidential Presidential Presidential candidate for candidate for 
candidate for candidate for 2000 2000 elections 
2000 elections 2000 elections elections is a is a 
is an Ashanti? is an ewe? Ga? Northerner? 
Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missing 0 0 0 
Statistics 
If yes, during For how long 
Do you live which time If no, what have you lived in Tema? riod? are ou? in Tema? 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missing- 0 
Statistics 
If no (to Q 37), 
state how long 
you've lived in Have you lived Have you a village/town in another city If Yes, which always lived prior to city before? one? in a ci ? life: - Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
If no (to Q 
Do you visit If yes (to Q 39), why do 
your 39), do they you not visit Do you write If yes (to Q42), 
relatives? live in: - them? to relatives? how often? 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 501 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
If no to Q42, If no (to Q 45), Do you 
why do you Do you If yes (to Q why do you not visit your 
not write to telephone 45), how telephone village/ho 
them? relatives? often? them? metown? 
T -Valid 501 501 501 501 501 
Missin 0 0 0 00 
Statistics 
If no (to Q48), 
why do you not If Christian, 
If yes (to Q visit your What is your what stream, 
48), how often village/hometo religious Orthodox or 
in a year? wn? orientation? 1 Charismatic? 
k 
N- 501 501 501 501 
Missin 0 0 0 0 
Statistics 
What is your level of association 
surname? type of voter tribalism with roots 
N Valid 501 501 501 501 
Missin 0 0 0 
Frequency Table 
gender 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Male 319 63.7 63.7 63.7 
Female 182 36.3 36.3 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 
-100.0 
age 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0-16 2 .4 .4 .4 
17-30 248 49.5 49.5 49.9 
31-40 138 27.5 27.5 77.4 
41-50 88 17.6 17.6 95.0 
51-60 24 4.8 4.8 99.8 
61-70 1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
tribe 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Fanti 100 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Ashanti 76 15.2 15.2 35.1 
Akyem 39 7.8 7.8 42.9 
Akwapim 45 9.0 9.0 51.9 
Bono 3 .6 .6 52.5 
Ga-Adangbe 106 21.2 21.2 73.7 
Nzima 16 3.2 3.2 76.8 
Bolga 10 2.0 2.0 78.8 
Dagomba 7 1.4 1.4 80.2 
Dagaaba 1 .2 .2 80.4 Gurenne 3 
.6 .6 81.0 Ewe 95 19.0 19.0 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
occupation 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid unskilled 8 1.6 1.6 1.6 
semi-skilled 20 4.0 4.0 5.6 
skilled 71 14.2 14.2 19.8 
clerical 54 10.8 10.8 30.5 
administrative 19 3.8 3.8 34.3 
managerial 14 2.8 2.8 37.1 
professional 193 38.5 38.5 75.6 
specialist 10 2.0 2.0 77.6 
student 112 22.4 22.4 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
level of education 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid primary 26 5.2 5.2 5.2 
secondary 238 47.5 47.5 52.7 
tertiary 237 47.3 47.3 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
traditional party orientation of your family 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 121 24.2 24.2 24.2 
npp 173 34.5 34.5 58.7 
"nkrumahist" 53 10.6 10.6 69.3 
other 10 2.0 2.0 71.3 
none 143 28.5 28.5 99.8 
6 1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
traditional party orientation of yourself 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 118 23.6 23.6 23.6 
npp 172 34.3 34.3 57.9 
"nkrumahist" 55 11.0 11.0 68.9 
other 10 2.0 2.0 70.9 
none 146 29.1 29.1 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
current party orientation 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 121 24.2 24.2 24.2 
npp 190 37.9 37.9 62.1 
"nkrumahist" 32 6.4 6.4 68.5 
other 14 2.8 2.8 71.3 
none 144 28.7 28.7 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
party of MP In 1996 Parly elections 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 135 26.9 26.9 26.9 
npp 211 42.1 42.1 69.1 
"nkrumahist" 16 3.2 3.2 72.3 
other 5 1.0 1.0 73.3 
none 59 11.8 11.8 85.0 
ineligible 75 15.0 15.0 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Rawlings 174 34.7 34.7 34.7 
Kuffour 219 43.7 43.7 78.4 
Mahama 5 1.0 1.0 79.4 
none 32 6.4 6.4 85.8 
ineligible 71 14.2 14.2 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
party of choice in 2000 Parly elections 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 98 19.6 19.6 19.6 
npp 219 43.7 43.7 63.3 
"nkrumahist" 19 3.8 3.8 67.1 
new ndc 6 1.2 1.2 68.3 
other 9 1.8 1.8 70.1 
none 30 6.0 6.0 76.0 
ineligible 4 
.8 .8 
76.8 
undecided 116 23.2 23.2 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
choice of President for 2000 presidential elections 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Atta Mills 135 26.9 26.9 26.9 
Kuffour 223 44.5 44.5 71.5 
Tanor 5 1.0 1.0 72.5 
other 5 1.0 1.0 73.5 
none 24 4.8 4.8 78.2 
ineligible 6 1.2 1.2 79.4 
undecided 103 20.6 20.6 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
are you a registered voter? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 423 84.4 84.4 84.4 
no 78 15.6 15.6 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If no, why are you not a registered voter? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ineligible 49 9.8 9.8 9.8 
negative 13 2.6 2.6 12.4 
a-political 15 3.0 3.0 15.4 
not applicable 424 84.6 84.6 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Are you a registered member of any party? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 153 30.5 30.5 30.5 
no 348 69.5 69.5 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If yes, which party 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 67 13.4 13.4 13.4 
npp 74 14.8 14.8 28.1 
"nkrumahist" 12 2.4 2.4 30.5 
other 1 .2 .2 30.7 
not applibale 347 69.3 69.3 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If no, why are you not a registered member of any party? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid no money 35 7.0 7.0 7.0 
disillusioned 73 14.6 14.6 21.6 
a-political 232 46.3 46.3 67.9 
not applicable 160 31.9 31.9 99.8 
5 1 .2 .2 100.0 Total 501 100.0 100.0 
what is your level of political participation? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid local 139 27.7 27.7 27.7 
district 42 8.4 8.4 36.1 
national 42 8.4 8.4 44.5 
all 6 1.2 1.2 45.7 
none 272 54.3 54.3 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
how do you familiarise yourself with the politics? 
Fre uen Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid attend 84 16.8 16.8 16.8 
media 221 44.1 44.1 60.9 
all 34 6.8 6.8 67.7 
none 162 32.3 32.3 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
do you freely share your political views/opinions? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 333 66.5 66.5 66.5 
no 168 33.5 33.5 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid spouse 26 5.2 5.2 5.2 
family 26 5.2 5.2 10.4 
friends 46 9.2 9.2 19.6 
distant 2 .4 .4 20.0 
none 69 13.8 13.8 33.7 
not applicable 332 66.3 66.3 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - greater public endorsement of ndc 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 142 28.3 28.3 28.3 
npp 208 41.5 41.5 69.9 
"nkrumahist" 21 4.2 4.2 74.1 
new ndc 14 2.8 2.8 76.8 
other 13 2.6 2.6 79.4 
none 93 18.6 18.6 98.0 
not eligible 10 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - greater public endorsement of npp 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 97 19.4 19.4 19.4 
npp 250 49.9 49.9 69.3 
"nkrumahist" 26 5.2 5.2 74.5 
new ndc 17 3.4 3.4 77.8 
other 27 5.4 5.4 83.2 
none 74 14.8 14.8 98.0 
not eligible 10 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - greater public endorsement of "Nkrumahist" coalition? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 90 18.0 18.0 18.0 
npp 196 39.1 39.1 57.1 
"nkrumahisr 58 11.6 11.6 68.7 
new ndc 15 3.0 3.0 71.7 
other 19 3.8 3.8 75.4 
none 113 22.6 22.6 98.0 
not eligible 10 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - greater public endorsement of new ndc 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ndc 95 19.0 19.0 19.0 
npp 194 38.7 38.7 57.7 
nkrumahist 27 5.4 5.4 63.1 
new ndc 34 6.8 6.8 69.9 
other 22 4.4 4.4 74.3 
none 119 23.8 23.8 98.0 
not eligible 10 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid for 409 81.6 81.6 81.6 
against 30 6.0 6.0 87.6 
abstain 53 10.6 10.6 98.2 
ineligible 9 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid for 374 74.7 74.7 74.7 
against 66 13.2 13.2 87.8 
abstain 52 10.4 10.4 98.2 
ineligible 9 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid for 322 64.3 64.3 64.3 
against 109 21.8 21.8 86.0 
abstain 61 12.2 12.2 98.2 
ineligible 9 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections Is a Ga? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid for 383 76.4 76.4 76.4 
against 51 10.2 10.2 86.6 
abstain 58 11.6 11.6 98.2 
ineligible 9 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid for 383 76.4 76.4 76.4 
against 60 12.0 12.0 88.4 
abstain 49 9.8 9.8 98.2 
ineligible 9 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Do you live in Tema? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 373 74.5 74.5 74.5 
no 128 25.5 25.5 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If yes, during which time period? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid post-1990 94 18.8 18.8 18.8 
both 279 55.7 55.7 74.5 
NIA 128 25.5 25.5 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If no, what are you? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid visitor 11 2.2 2.2 2.2 
job-seeker 69 13.8 13.8 16.0 
student 51 10.2 10.2 26.1 
not applicable 370 73.9 73.9 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0 
For how long have you lived in Tema? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0-3 mths 6 1.2 1.2 1.2 
4-12 mths 15 3.0 3.0 4.2 
1-3 yrs 22 4.4 4.4 8.6 
4-10 yrs 51 10.2 10.2 18.8 
>10 yrs 278 55.5 55.5 74.3 
N/A 129 25.7 25.7 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100. 
Have you lived in another city before? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 374 74.7 74.7 74.7 
no 127 25.3 25.3 100.0 
Total 501 1 .0 100.0 
If Yes, which one? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Accra 137 27.3 27.3 27.3 
Tema 5 1.0 1.0 28.3 
Kumasi 52 10.4 10.4 38.7 
Tamale 5 1.0 1.0 39.7 
Bolgatanga 8 1.6 1.6 41.3 
Wa 1 .2 .2 
41.5 
Sunyani 5 1.0 1.0 42.5 
Koforidua 21 4.2 4.2 46.7 
Takoradi 33 6.6 6.6 53.3 
Cape-Coast 18 3.6 3.6 56.9 
Ho 10 2.0 2.0 58.9 
Combination 85 17.0 17.0 75.8 
N/A 121 24.2 24.2 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Have you always lived In a city? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 296 59.1 59.1 59.1 
no 205 40.9 40.9 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If no (to 0 37), state how long you've lived In a village/town prior to city life: - 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0-3 mths 14 2.8 2.8 2.8 
4-12 mths 13 2.6 2.6 5.4 
1-3 yrs 37 7.4 7.4 12.8 
4-10 yrs 53 10.6 10.6 23.4 
>10 yrs 91 18.2 18.2 41.5 
not applicable 293 58.5 58.5 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Do you visit your relatives? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 453 90.4 90.4 90.4 
no 48 9.6 9.6 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If yes (to 0 39), do they live In: - 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid urban areas? 165 32.9 32.9 32.9 
rural areas 136 27.1 27.1 60.1 
Both 153 30.5 30.5 90.6 
N/A 47 9.4 9.4 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If no (to 0 39), why do you not visit them? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid they 17 3.4 3.4 3.4 
unnecessary 15 3.0 3.0 6.4 
loggerheads 1 .2 .2 6.6 
too expensive 5 1.0 1.0 7.6 
aim towards 1 2 2 7 8 detribalisation . 
detribalised 10 2.0 2.0 9.8 
N/A 452 90.2 90.2 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Do you write to relatives? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 278 55.5 55.5 55.5 
no 223 44.5 44.5 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If yes (to Q42), how often? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid monthly 169 33.7 33.7 33.7 
yearly 84 16.8 16.8 50.5 
every 3-5 yrs 14 2.8 2.8 53.3 
every 10 yrs 10 2.0 2.0 55.3 
N/A 224 44.7 44.7 100.0 
Total 501 
1 
100.0 100. I 
if no to 042, why do you not write to them? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid they write to me 4 .8 .8 .8 
not necessary 103 20.6 20.6 21.4 
preference for physical 70 14 0 14 0 35 3 
contact . . . 
letter writing is boring 10 2 0 2 0 37 3 and tedious . . . 
lack of postal services 6 1 2 1 2 38 5 in the village . . . 
postage too expensive 2 .4 .4 38.9 
e-mail usage 2 .4 .4 39.3 
aim towards 5 1.0 1 0 40 3 detribalisation . . 
detribalised 19 3.8 3.8 44.1 
N/A 280 55.9 55.9 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Do you telephone relatives? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 340 67.9 67.9 67.9 
no 161 32.1 32.1 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If yes (to 0 45), how often? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid daily 27 5.4 5.4 5.4 
weekly 133 26.5 26.5 31.9 
monthly 83 16.6 16.6 48.5 
quarterly 25 5.0 5.0 53.5 
anually 5 1.0 1.0 54.5 
occasions 71 14.2 14.2 68.7 
N/A 157 31.3 31.3 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If no (to Q 45), why do you not telephone them? 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid no phone contact 89 17.8 17.8 17.8 
they phone me 5 1.0 1.0 18.8 
not necessary 38 7.6 7.6 26.3 
preference for 
physical contact 
15 3.0 3.0 29.3 
too expensive 3 .6 .6 29.9 
aim towards 
detribalisation 1 .2 .2 
30.1 
detribalised 9 1.8 1.8 31.9 
N/A 341 68.1 68.1 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Do you visit your villagelhometown? 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid yes 408 81.4 81.4 81.4 
no 93 18.6 18.6 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100. 
If yes (to Q 48), how often in a year? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid > once a yr 317 63.3 63.3 63.3 
once in 3 yrs 50 10.0 10.0 73.3 
once every 4-10 yrs 37 7.4 7.4 80.6 
N/A 95 19.0 19.0 99.6 
5 1 .2 .2 99.8 9 1 .2 .2 100.0 Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If no (to Q48), why do you not visit your village/hometown? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid they visit me 16 3.2 3.2 3.2 
not necessary 40 8.0 8.0 11.2 
too expensive to travel 4 .8 .8 12.0 no relatives left 11 2.2 2.2 14.2 
aim towards 
detribalisation 4 .8 .8 15.0 
detribalised 17 3.4 3.4 18.4 
N/A 409 81.6 81.6 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
What is your religious orientation? 1 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Christian 484 96.6 96.6 96.6 
Moslem 10 2.0 2.0 98.6 
Traditionalist 3 
.6 .6 99.2 Other 3 
.6 .6 99.8 6 1 .2 .2 100.0 Total 501 100.0 100.0 
If Christian, what stream, Orthodox or Charismatic? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Orthodox 278 55.5 55.5 55.5 
Charismatic 206 41.1 41.1 96.6 
N/A 17 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
What is your surname? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Fanti 92 18.4 18.4 18.4 
Ashanti 81 16.2 16.2 34.5 
Akyem 40 8.0 8.0 42.5 
Akwapim 40 8.0 8.0 50.5 
Bono 3 
.6 .6 51.1 Ga/Adangbe 97 19.4 19.4 70.5 
Nzima 11 2.2 2.2 72.7 
Bolga 11 2.2 2.2 74.9 
Dagomba 6 1.2 1.2 76.0 
Dagaaba 2 
.4 .4 76.4 Gurenne 2 
.4 .4 76.8 Hausa 1 .2 .2 77.0 Ewe 87 17.4 17.4 94.4 
Asian 21 4.2 4.2 98.6 
American 1 .2 .2 98.8 European 1 .2 .2 99.0 Poler 5 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
type of voter 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid tribalistic 361 72.1 72.1 72.1 
non-tribalistic 140 27.9 27.9 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
level of tribalism 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid extreme 211 42.1 42.1 42.1 
very high 128 25.5 25.5 67.7 
high 21 4.2 4.2 71.9 
low 4 .8 .8 72.7 
very low 38 7.6 7.6 80.2 
benefit 99 19.8 19.8 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
association with roots 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid very high 171 34.1 34.1 34.1 
high 186 37.1 37.1 71.3 
average 102 20.4 20.4 91.6 
low 26 5.2 5.2 96.8 
apathetic 16 3.2 3.2 100.0 
Total 501 100.0 100.0 
Grosstabs 
APPENDIX XII 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
Are you a registered 
member of any party? 501 100 0% 
what is your level of . 
political participation? 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin To tal 
N Percent N Percent 
Are you a registered 
member of any party? * 0 0% 501 100 0% 
what is your level of . . 
political participation? 
Are you a registered member of any party? * what Is your level of political participation? 
Crosstabulation 
what Is your level of 
local district 
Are you a registered yes Count 79 26 
member of any party? Expected Count 42.4 12.8 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 51.6% 17.0% 
party? 
% within what is your level 
of political participation? 56.8% 61.9% 
% of Total 15.8% 5.2% 
no Count 60 16 
Expected Count 96.6 29.2 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 17.2% 4.6% 
party? 
% within what Is your level 
of political participation? 43.2% 38.1 
% of Total 12.0% 3.2% 
Total Count 139 42 
Expected Count 139.0 42.0 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 27.7% 8.4% 
party? 
% within what Is your level 
of political participation? 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 27.7% 8.4% 
Are you a registered member of any party? * what is your level of political participation? 
Crosstabulation 
what is your level of 
national all 
Are you a registered yes Count 21 1 
member of any party? Expected Count 12.8 1.8 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 13.7% . 
7% 
party? 
% within what is your level 50 0% 16 7% 
of political participation? . . 
% of Total 4.2% . 
2% 
no Count 21 5 
Expected Count 29.2 4.2 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 6.0% 1.4% 
party? 
% within what is your level 50 0% 83 3% 
of political participation? . . 
% of Total 4.2% 1.0% 
Total Count 42 6 
Expected Count 42.0 6.0 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 8.4% 1.2% 
party? 
% within what is your level 100 0% 100 0% of political participation? . . 
% of Total 8.4% 1.2% 
Are you a registered member of any party? * what is your level of political participation? 
Crosstabulation 
what is 
none Total 
Are you a registered yes Count 26 153 
member of any party? Expected Count 83.1 153.0 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 17.0% 100.0% 
party? 
% within what is your level ° 6% 9 ° 5% 30 of political participation? . . 
% of Total 5.2% 30.5% 
no Count 246 348 
Expected Count 188.9 348.0 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 70.7% 100.0% 
party? 
% within what is your level 4% 90 5% 69 of political participation? . . 
% of Total 49.1% 69.5% 
Total Count 272 501 
Expected Count 272.0 501.0 
% within Are you a 
registered member of any 54.3% 100.0% 
party? 
% within what is your level 100 0% 100 0% 
of political participation? . . 
% of Total 54.3% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 129.271a 4 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 135.539 4 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 120.101 1 000 
Association . 
N of Valid Cases 501 
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than S. The minimum expected count is 1.83. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi . 508 . 000 
Nominal Cramer's V . 508 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 501 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
APPENDIX XIII 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
tribe * party of MP in 
1996 Parly elections 501 100.0% 
tribe * choice of 
President for 1996 501 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
tribe * party of choice in 
2000 Parly elections 501 100.0% 
tribe * choice of 
President for 2000 501 100.0% 
presidential elections 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin To tal 
N Percent N Percent 
tribe * party of MP in 
1996 Parly elections 0 . 0% 501 100.0% 
tribe * choice of 
President for 1996 0 
. 0% 501 100 0% Presidential elections . 
tribe * party of choice in 
2000 Party elections 0 . 0% 501 100.0% 
tribe * choice of 
President for 2000 0 
. 0% 501 100 0% residential elections . 
tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections Crosstabulation 
party of M P in 1996 Parl elections 
ndc npp "nkrumahist" 
tribe Fanti % within tribe 15.0% 52.0% 2.0% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Parly elections 11.1% 24.6% 12.5% 
% of Total 3.0% 10.4% . 
4% 
Ashanti % within tribe 15.8% 60.5% 1.3% 
% within party of MP in 8 9% 21 8% 6 3% 1996 Party elections . . 
of Total 2.4% 9.2% . 2% 
Akyem % within tribe 7.7% 71.8% 2.6% 
within party of MP in 2% 2 13 3% 3% 6 1996 Parly elections . . . 
of Total . 6% 5.6% . 2% 
Akwapim % within tribe 11.1% 55.6% 
within party of MP in 3 7% 11 8% 1996 Parly elections . . 
% of Total 1.0% 5.0% 
Bono % within tribe 66.7% 
within party of MP in 9% 1996 Party elections . 
% of Total . 4% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 31.1% 34.0% 2.8% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Parly elections 
24.4% 17.1% 18.8% 
% of Total 6.6% 7.2% . 6% 
Nzima % within tribe 18.8% 43.8% 25.0% 
within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 2.2% 3.3% 25.0% 
% of Total . 6% 1.4% . 8% Bolga % within tribe 50.0% 20.0% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 3 7% . 9% 
% of Total 1.0% . 4% Dagomba % within tribe 14.3% 28.6% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections . 7% 12.5% 
% of Total 
. 2% . 
4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections . 5% 
of Total 
. 2% Gurenne % within tribe 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections . 7% . 5% 6.3% 
% of Total . 2% . 2% . 2% Ewe % within tribe 60.0% 11.6% 2.1%' 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 42 2% 5.2% 12.5% 
% of Total 11.4% 2.2% . 4% 
Total % within tribe 26.9% 42.1% 3.2% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 26.9% 42.1% 
tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections Crosstabulation 
Total 
other none 
Fanti % within tribe 3.0% 12.0% 
% within party of MP in 60 0% 20 3% 1996 Party elections . . 
% of Total . 6% 2.4% 
Ashanti % within tribe 7.9% 
% within party of MP in 10 2% 1996 Party elections . 
% of Total 1.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 10.3% 
% within party of MP in 6 8% 1996 Party elections . 
% of Total . 8% Akwapim % within tribe 13.3% 
% within party of MP in 10 2% 1996 Party elections . 
of Total 1.2% 
Bono % within tribe 
within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 
of Total 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 14.2% 
within party of MP in 25 4% 1996 Party elections . 
% of Total 3.0% 
Nzima % within tribe 12.5% 
% within party of MP in 3 4% 1996 Party elections . 
% of Total . 4% Bolga % within tribe 20.0% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 3.4% 
% of Total . 4% Dagomba % within tribe 14.3% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 1.7% 
% of Total . 2% Dagaaba % within tribe 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 
% of Total 
Gurenne % within tribe 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 
% of Total 
Ewe % within tribe 2.1% 11.6% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 40.0% 16.6% 
% of Total ' . 4% 2.2% % within tribe 1.0% 11.8% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 1 nM_ 4 It ooi 
tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections Crosstabulation 
ineligible Total 
Fanti % within tribe 16.0% 100.0% 
% within party of MP in 21 3% 20 0% 1996 Parly elections . . 
% of Total 3.2% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 14.5% 100.0% 
% within party of MP in 14 7% 15 2% 1996 Parly elections . . 
% of Total 2.2% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 7.7% 100.0% 
within party of MP in 4 0% 7 8% 1996 Parly elections . . 
of Total . 6% 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 20.0% 100.0% 
within party of MP in 12 0% 9 0% 1996 Parly elections . . 
% of Total 1.8% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
within party of MP in 1 3% 6% 1996 Parly elections . . 
of Total . 2% . 6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 17.9% 100.0% 
within party of MP in 25 3% 21 2% 1996 Parly elections . . 
% of Total 3.8% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
within party of MP in 2% 3 1996 Parly elections . 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 100.0% 
% within party of MP In 1 3% 0% 2 1996 Parly elections . . 
of Total . 2% 2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 42.9% 100.0% 
within party of MP in 4 0% 4% 1 1996 Party elections . . 
% of Total . 6% 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Parly elections . 2% 
% of Total . 2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Parly elections . 6% 
% of Total . 6% 
Ewe % within tribe 12.6% 100.0% 
% within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 16.0% 19.0% 
% of Total 2.4% 19.0% 
% within tribe 15.0% 100.0% 
within party of MP in 
1996 Party elections 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 15.00, inn n°A. 
tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
Rawlins Kuffour Mahama 
Fanti % within tribe 19.0% 57.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 10.9% 26.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 3.8% 11.4% 
Ashanti % within tribe 19.7% 59.2% 1.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 8.6% 20.5% 20.0% 
Presidential elections 
of Total 3.0% 9.0% . 2% 
Akyem % within tribe 10.3% 71.8% 2.6% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 2.3% 12.8% 20.0% 
Presidential elections 
of Total . 8% 5.6% . 2% 
Akwapim % within tribe 22.2% 53.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 5.7% 11.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 2.0% 4.8% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 33.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 . 6% . 5% Presidential elections 
of Total . 2% . 2% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 46.2% 31.1% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 28.2% 15.1% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 9.8% 6.6% 
Nzima % within tribe 12.5% 87.5% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 1.1% 6.4% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 
4% 2.8% 
Bolga % within tribe 50.0% 10.0% 20.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 2.9% . 5% 40.0% Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% . 2% . 4% 
Dagomba % within tribe 28.6% 28.6% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 1.1% . 9% Presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% . 4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 5% Presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 66.7% 33.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 1.1% 20.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% . 2% 
Ewe % within tribe 68.4% 13.7% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 37.4% 5.9% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 1A n°i 13 aoL. 
tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 1996 
Rawlings Kuffour Mahama 
Total % within tribe 34.7% 43.7% 1.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 34.7% 43.7% 1.0% 
tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
.1 
none ineligible Total 
Fanti % within tribe 8.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 25.0% 22.5% 20.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.6% 3.2% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 6.6% 13.2% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 15.6% 14.1% 15.2% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 2.0% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 7.7% 7.7% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 9.4% 4.2% 7.8% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 6% . 
6% 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 8.9% 15.6% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 12.5% 9.9% 9.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 8% 1.4% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 1.4% . 
6% 
Presidential elections 
of Total . 2% . 6% 
a-Adangbe % within tribe 4.7% 17.9% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 15.6% 26.8% 21.2% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 3.8% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 3.2% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 3.1% 1.4% 2.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 2% . 2% 2.0% Dagomba % within tribe 42.9% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 4.2% 1.4% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 
6% 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 2% Presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 2% Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 
6% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 6% Ewe % within tribe 6.3% 11.6% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 18.8% 15.5% 19.0% Presidential elections 
tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 
none ineligible Total 
Total % within tribe 6.4% 14.2% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 6.4% 14.2% 100.0% 
tribe * party of choice in 2000 Parly elections Crosstabulation 
party of cho ice in 2000 Part elections 
ndc npp "nkrumahist" 
be Fanti % within tribe 15.0% 54.0% 4.0% 
% within party of choice 15 3% 24 7% 21 1% in 2000 Parly elections . . . 
% of Total 3.0% 10.8% . 8% 
Ashanti % within tribe 9.2% 68.4% 
within party of choice 7 1% 23 7% in 2000 Parly elections . . 
% of Total 1.4% 10.4% 
Akyem % within tribe 5.1% 79.5% 2.6% 
within party of choice 2 0% 2% 14 5.3% in 2000 Parly elections . . 
% of Total . 4% 6.2% . 2% 
Akwapim % within tribe 8.9% 51.1% 2.2% 
% within party of choice 4 1% 10 5% 5.3% in 2000 Parly elections . . 
of Total . 8% 4.6% . 2% 
no % within tribe 33.3% 
within party of choice 5% in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total . 2% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 33.0% 31.1% 3.8% 
within party of choice 35 7% 15 1% 21 1% in 2000 Parly elections . . . 
of Total 7.0% 6.6% . 8% 
Nzima % within tribe 12.5% 50.0% 25.0% 
within party of choice 2 0% 7% 3 21 1% in 2000 Parly elections . . . 
of Total . 4% 1.6% . 8% 
Bolga % within tribe 30.0% 20.0% 
within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections 3.1% 10.5% 
% of Total . 6% . 4% 
Dagomba % within tribe 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections 1.0% . 5% 5.3% 
% of Total . 2% . 2% . 2% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections . 5% 
% of Total . 2% Gurenne % within tribe 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections 1 0°ý . 5% 5.3% 
% of Total 
. 
2% 
. 
2% 
. 
2% 
Ewe %within tribe 29.5% 14.7% 1.1% 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 28.6% 6.4% 5.3% 
of Total 5.6% 2.8% . 2% 
Total % within tribe 19.6% 43.7% 3.8% 
within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 19.6% 43.7% 6 
tribe * party of choice In 2000 Parly elections Crosstabulation 
)e i-anti ro wiuim woe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
of Total 
Ashanti % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Akyem % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Akwapim % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Bono % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Nzima % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections 
% of Total 
Bolga % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Dagomba % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Dagaaba % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Gurenne % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
Ewe % within tribe 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
of Total 
Total % within tribe 
within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 
% of Total 
new ndc other 
3.0% 
33.3% 
1.3% 
16.7% 
2.2% 
16.7% 
1.9% 
33.3% 
. 
4% 
2.1% 
33.3% 
. 
4% 
1.2% 
100.0% 
2.2% 
11.1% 
1.9% 
22.2% 
14.3% 
11.1% 
2.1% 
22.2% 
. 4% 
1.8% 
100.0% 
none 
3.0% 
10.0% 
. 
6% 
5.3% 
13.3% 
. 8% 
5.1% 
6.7% 
. 4% 6.7% 
10.0% 
4.7% 
16.7% 
1.0% 
10.0% 
3.3% 
. 
2% 
12.6% 
40.0% 
2.4% 
6.0% 
100.0% 
tribe * party of choice in 2000 Parly elections Crosstabulation 
ineligible undecided Total 
Fanti % within tribe 2.0% 19.0% 100.0% 
% within party of choice 50 0% 16 4% 20 0% in 2000 Parly elections . . . 
% of Total . 4% 3.8% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 15.8% 100.0% 
% within party of choice 10 3% 15 2% in 2000 Parly elections . . 
% of Total 2.4% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 7.7% 100.0% 
% within party of choice 2 6% 7 8% in 2000 Parly elections . . 
% of Total . 6% 
7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 26.7% 100.0% 
% within party of choice 10 3% 9 0% in 2000 Party elections . . 
% of Total 2.4% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within party of choice 25 0% 9% . 6% in 2000 Parly elections . . 
of Total . 2% . 2% . 6% 
a-Adangbe % within tribe . 9% 22.6% 100.0% 
within party of choice 25 0% 20 7% 21 2% in 2000 Parly elections . . . 
of Total . 2% 4.8% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 12.5% 100.0% 
within party of choice 1 7% 3 2% in 2000 Parly elections . . 
% of Total . 4% 
3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 40.0% 100.0% 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections 3.4% 2.0% 
% of Total . 8% 2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 42.9% 100.0% 
within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections 2.6% 1.4% 
of Total . 6% 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections . 2% 
of Total . 2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Parly elections . 6% 
% of Total 
. 
6% 
we % within tribe 37.9% 100.0% 
% within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections 31.0% 19.0% 
% of Total 7.2% 19.0% 
within tribe . 8% 23.2% 100.0% within party of choice 
in 2000 Party elections 100.0% 100.096 100.0% 
% of Total R°t. ýq Ww_ inn n°- 
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
Atta Mills Kuffour Tanor 
Fanti % within tribe 21.0% 53.0% 3.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 15.6% 23.8% 60.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 4.2% 10.6% . 6% 
Ashanti % within tribe 14.5% 67.1% 1.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 8.1% 22.9% 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 2.2% 10.2% . 2% 
Akyem % within tribe 15.4% 74.4% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 4.4% 13.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.2% 5.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 17.8% 55.6% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 5.9% 11.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.6% 5.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 33.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 7% . 
4% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% . 2% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 40.6% 32.1% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 31.9% 15.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 8.6% 6.8% 
Nzima % within tribe 12.5% 50.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 1.5% 3.6% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% 1.6% 
Boiga % within tribe 20.0% 20.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 1.5% . 9% presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% . 4% 
Dagomba % within tribe 28.6% 14.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 9% 20.0% presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% . 2% Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
, 4% presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 
2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 33.3% 33.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 7% . 4% presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% . 2% 
we % within tribe 42.1% 16.8% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 29.6% 7.2% 
presidential elections 
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 2000 
Atta Mills Kuffour Tanor 
Total % within tribe 26.9% 44.5% 1.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 26.9% 44.5% 1.0% 
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
other none ineligible 
Fanti % within tribe 2.0% 2.0% 4.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 40.0% 8.3% 66.7% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% . 4% . 8% 
Ashanti % within tribe 2.6% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 8.3% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% 
Akyem % within tribe 5.1% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 8.3% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% 
Akwapim % within tribe 8.9% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 16.7% 
presidential elections 
of Total . 8% Bono % within tribe 33.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 16.7% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 5.7% . 9% % within choice of 
President for 2000 25.0% 16.7% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.2% . 2% 
Nzima % within tribe 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
presidential elections 
% of Total 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 4.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 2% Dagomba % within tribe 14.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% Dagaaba % within tribe 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
presidential elections 
% of Total 
Gurenne % within tribe 33.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total .24 Ewe % within tribe 1.1% 7.4% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 29.2% 
presidential elections 
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 2000 
other none ineligible 
Total % within tribe 1.0% 4.8% 1.2% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 4.8% 1.2% 
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
undecided Total 
Fanti % within tribe 15.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 14.6% 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 3.0% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 14.5% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 10.7% 15.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 2.2% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 5.1% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 1.9% 7.8% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 17.8% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 7.8% 9.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.6% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 
6% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 20.8% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 21.4% 21.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 4.4% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 37.5% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 5.8% 3.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.2% 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 50.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 4.9% 2.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 42.9% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 2.9% 1.4% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 6% 1.4% Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 2% presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 
2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 6% presidential elections 
% of Total 
. 6% Ewe % within tribe 32.6% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 30.1% 19.0% 
presidential elections 
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of 
undecided Total 
Total % within tribe 20.6% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 20.6% 100.0% 
Grosstabs APPENDIX XIV 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
tribe * vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 501 100.0% 
elections is a Fanti? 
tribe * vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 501 100.0% 
elections is an Ashanti? 
tribe * vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 501 100.0% 
elections is an ewe? 
tribe * vote if - Presidetial 
candidate for 2000 501 100.0% 
elections is a Ga? 
tribe * vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 501 100.0% 
elections is a Northerner? 
Case Processing Summary 
Cas es 
Missin To tal 
N Percent N Percent 
tribe * vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 0 
. 0% 501 100 0% elections is a Fanti? . 
tribe * vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 0 
. 0% 501 100 0% elections is an Ashanti? . 
tribe * vote If - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 0 
. 0% 501 100 0% elections is an ewe? . 
tribe * vote if - Presidetial 
candidate for 2000 0 
. 0% 501 100 0% elections is a Ga? . 
tribe * vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 0 
. 0% 501 100 0% elections is a Northerner? . 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 
2000 e lections is a Fanti? 
for a ainst abstain 
Fant! % within tribe 88.0% 3.0% 6.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 21.5% 10.0% 11.3% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 17.6% . 6% 
1.2% 
Ashanti % within tribe 81.6% 7.9% 9.2% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate for 15.2% 20.0% 13.2% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 12.4% 1.2% 1.4% 
Akyem % within tribe 82.1% 7.7% 10.3% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate for 7. B% 10.0% 7.5% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 6.4% . 6% . 8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 88.9% 4.4% 4.4% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 9.8% 6.7% 3.8% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 8.0% . 4% . 
4% 
Bono % within tribe 66.7% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for . 5% 2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total . 4% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 79.2% 8.5% 11.3% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 20.5% 30.0% 22.6% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 16.8% 1.8% 2.4% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate for 3.9% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 70.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
within vote if - 
Presidential candidate for 1.7% 3.3% 1.9% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 1.4% . 2% . 
2% 
Dagomba % within tribe 71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate for 1.2% 3.3% 1.9% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 1.0% . 2% . 
2% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate for . 2% 2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 
. 2% Gurenne % within tribe 66.7% 33.3% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for . 5% 
1.9% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total day 90i. 
Page 1 
tribe * vote If - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections Is a Fanti? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
for against abstain 
tribe Ewe % within tribe 73.7% 5.3% 20.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 17.1% 16.7% 35.8% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
of Total 14.0% 1.0% 3.8% 
Total % within tribe 81.6% 6.0% 10.6% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate for 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 81.6% 6.0% 10.6% 
Page 2 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? Crosstabulation 
wLcn - 
Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
Fanti % within tribe 3.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 33.3% 20.0% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total . 6% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 1.3% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate for 11.1% 15.2% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
of Total . 2% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 100.0% 
within vote if - 
Presidential candidate for 7.8% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 2.2% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 11.1% 9.0% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
of Total . 2% 
9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate for 11.1% . 6% 2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total . 2% . 6% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe . 9% 100.0% % within vote if - Presidential candidate for 11.1% 21.2% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total . 2% 
21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 3.2% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate for 11.1% 2.0% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total . 2% 
2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate for 1.4% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
within vote If - Presidential candidate for . 2% 2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total . 2% Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for . 6% 2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total aas 
Page 3 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
tribe Ewe % within tribe 1.1% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 11.1% 19.0% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
of Total . 2% 19.0% Total % within tribe 1.8% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 100.0% 100.0% 
2000 elections is a Fanti? 
% of Total 1.8% 100.0% 
Page 4 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? 
for a gainst abstain 
tribe Fanti % within tribe 74.0% 14.0% 9.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 8% 19 21.2% 17.3% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
of Total 14.8% 2.8% 1.8% 
Ashanti % within tribe 89.5% 5.3% 3.9% 
within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 18 2% 6.1% 5.8% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 13.6% . 8% . 6% 
Akyem % within tribe 89.7% 2.6% 7.7% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 9 4% 1.5% 5.8% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
of Total 7.0% 2% . 6% 
Akwapim % within tribe 71.1% 17.8% 8.9% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 8 6% 12.1% 7.7% for 2000 elections is an 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 6.4% 1.6% . 8% 
Bono % within tribe 66.7% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is an . 5% 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 
. 
4% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 69.8% 19.8% 9.4% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 8% 19 8% 31 19.2% for 2000 elections is an . . 
Ashanti? 
of Total 14.8% 4.2% 2.0% 
Nzima % within tribe 81.3% 18.8% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 3 5% 5% 4 for 2000 elections is an . . 
Ashanti? 
of Total 2.6% . 6% 
Bolga % within tribe 70.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections Is an 1.9% 1.5% 1.9% 
Ashanti? 
of Total 1.4% . 2% . 2% Dagomba % within tribe 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is an 1.1% 1.5% 3.8% 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 
. 8% . 
2% 
. 
4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is an 3% 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections Is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 
2000 elections is an Ashanti? 
for against abstain 
tribe Gurenne % within tribe 66.7% 33.3% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 5% 1.9% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 4% . 
2% 
Ewe % within tribe 65.3% 13.7% 20.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 6% 19.7% 16 36.5% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 12.4% 2.6% 3.8% 
Total % within tribe 74.7% 13.2% 10.4% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 0% 100.0% 100 100.0% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 74.7% 13.2% 10.4% 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections Is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
>e Fanti % within tribe 3.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 33 3% 20.0% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 6% 
20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 1.3% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 11 1% 15.2% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 2% 
15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 7.8% for 2000 elections is an 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 2.2% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 11 1% 9.0% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 
2% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 11 1% . 6% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
of Total . 2% . 
6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe . 9% 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 11 1% 21.2% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 2% 21.2% Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 2% 3 for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is an 
11.1 % 2.0% 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 2% 2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote If - Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is an 1 4°ý 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is an . 2% 
Ashanti? 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation 
vote if - 
Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
tribe Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 
. 6% for 2000 elections is an 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 6% 
Ewe % within tribe 1.1% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 11 1% 19.0% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total . 2% 19.0% 
Total % within tribe 1.8% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 100 0% 100.0% for 2000 elections is an . 
Ashanti? 
% of Total 1.8% 100.0°%. 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 
2000 elections is an ewe? 
for against abstain 
Fanti % within tribe 58.0% 29.0% 10.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential 0% 18 26 6% 16 4% candidate for 2000 . . . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 11.6% 5.8% 2.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 57.9% 30.3% 10.5% 
% within vote if - Presidential 7% 13 21.1% 13.1% candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 8.8% 4.6% 1.6% 
Akyem % within tribe 64.1% 23.1% 12.8% 
% within vote if - Presidential 8% 7 8 3% 8.2% candidate for 2000 . . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 5.0% 1.8% 1.0% 
Akwapim % within tribe 55.6% 26.7% 15.6% 
% within vote if - Presidential 7 8% 11 0% 11.5% candidate for 2000 . . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 5.0% 2.4% 1.4% 
Bono % within tribe 66.7% 
% within vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 . 6% 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 
. 4% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 68.9% 20.8% 9.4% 
% within vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 22.7% 20.2% 16.4% 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 14.6% 4.4% 2.0% 
Nzima % within tribe 56.3% 25.0% 18.8% 
% within vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 2.8% 3.7% 4.9% 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 1.8% . 8% . 6% Bolga % within tribe 60.0% 20.0% 10.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 
candidate for 2000 1.9% 1.8% 1.6% 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 1.2% . 4% . 2% Dagomba % within tribe 42.9% 28.6% 28.6% 
% within vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 . 9% 1.8% 3.3% 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total . 6% . 4% . 4% Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 
candidate for 2000 . 3% 
elections is an ewe? 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections Is an ewe? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential candidate for 
2000 elections is an ewe? 
for against abstain 
tribe Gurenne % within tribe 66.7% 33.3% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 6% 9% 
candidate for 2000 . . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total . 4% . 2% Ewe % within tribe 77.9% 5.3% 15.8% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 23 0% 4.6% 24.6% 
candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
of Total 14.8% 1.0% 3.0% 
Total % within tribe 64.3% 21.8% 12.2% 
within vote if - Presidential 100 0% 100 0% 100.0% candidate for 2000 . . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 64.3% 21.8% 12.2% 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? Crosstabulation 
vote if - 
Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
Fanti % within tribe 3.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 3% 33 20.0% 
candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total . 6% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 1.3% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 11.1% 15.2% 
candidate for 2000 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total . 2% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential 7.8% 
candidate for 2000 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 2.2% 100.0% 
within vote if - 
Presidential 11 1% 9.0% candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
" of Total . 2% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential 
wýýaL, 4-4- f- nMA 11.1% . 6% VQI IJuua% IVI GWV 
elections is an ewe? 
of Total . 
2% . 6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe . 9% 100.0% 
within vote if - 
Presidential 
11 1 °ý 2% 21 candidate for 2000 . . 
elections is an ewe? 
of Total . 2% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 2% 3 candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 1% 11 2.0% candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total . 2% 2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote If - Presidential 
1 4% candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential 
candidate for 2000 . 
2% 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 2°iý 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? Crosstabulation 
vote if - 
Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
tribe Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 6% 
candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total . 
6% 
Ewe % within tribe 1.1% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential 11 1% 19.0% 
candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total . 2% 19.0% 
Total % within tribe 1.8% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential 100 0% 100.0% 
candidate for 2000 . 
elections is an ewe? 
% of Total 1.8% 100.0% 
tribe * vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 
elections is a Ga? 
for ag ainst abstain 
Fanti % within tribe 68.0% 16.0% 13.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 17.8% 31.4% 22.4% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 13.6% 3.2% 2.6% 
Ashanti % within tribe 76.3% 14.5% 7.9% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 15.1% 21.6% 10.3% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
of Total 11.6% 2.2% 1.2% 
Akyern % within tribe 71.8% 15.4% 12.8% 
within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 7.3% 11.8% 8.6% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 5.6% 1.2% 1.0% 
Akwapim % within tribe 73.3% 13.3% 11.1% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 8.6% 11.8% 8.6% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 6.6% 1.2% 1.0% 
Bono % within tribe 66.7% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for . 5% 2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 4% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 85.8% 4.7% 8.5% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 23.8% 9.8% 15.5% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 18.2% 1.0% 1.8% 
Nzima % within tribe 81.3% 12.5% 6.3% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 3.4% 3.9% 1.7% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
of Total 2.6% . 4% . 
2% 
Bolga % within tribe 80.0% 10.0% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2.1% 1.7% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 1.6% . 2% 
Dagomba % within tribe 71.4% 28.6% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 1.3% 3.4% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 1.0% . 4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for . 3% 2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 2% Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for . 
8% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 6% Ewe % within tribe 76.8% 5.3% 16.8% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 19.1% 9.8% 27.6% 
2000 elections Is a Ga? 
% of Total Id ao& i not R 5001. 
tribe * vote If - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 
elections is a Ga? 
for against abstain 
Total % within tribe 76.4% 10.2% 11.6% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 76.4% 10.2% 11.6% 
tribe * vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections Is a Ga? Crosstabulation 
vvwn - 
Presidetial 
ineli ible Total 
Fanti % within tribe 3.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 33.3% 20.0% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 
6% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 1.3% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 11.1% 15.2% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 2% 
15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 7.8% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 2.2% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 11.1% 9.0% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
of Total . 2% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 11.1% . 6% 2000 elections is a Ga? 
of Total . 2% . 
6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe . 9% 
100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 11.1% 21.2% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 2% 
21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 3.2% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 11.1% 2.0% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 2% 
2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 1.4% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote If - Presidetial candidate for . 2% 2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 2% Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for . 6% 2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total . 6% 
Ewe % within tribe 1.1% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 11.1% 19.0% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
tribe * vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidetial 
ineligible Total 
Total % within tribe 1.8% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidetial candidate for 100.0% 100.0% 
2000 elections is a Ga? 
% of Total 1.8% 100.0% 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections Is a Northerner? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential can didate for 2000 elections is a Nor therner? 
for against abstain 
be Fanti % within tribe 74.0% 14.0% 9.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 19 3% 23 3% 18 4% for 2000 elections is a . . . 
Northerner? 
% of Total 14.8% 2.8% 1.8% 
Ashanti % within tribe 75.0% 18.4% 5.3% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 14 9% 3% 23 8 2% for 2000 elections is a . . . 
Northerner? 
% of Total 11.4% 2.8% . 8% 
Akyem % within tribe 76.9% 17.9% 6.1% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 7.8% 11.7% 4.1% lVi 4VVU eIacuvns wd 
Northerner? 
% of Total 6.0% 1.4% . 4% 
Akwapim % within tribe 75.6% 11.1% 11.1% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 8 9% 8.3% 10.2% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
of Total 6.8% 1.0% 1.0% 
Bono % within tribe 66.7% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 5% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total . 4% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 77.4% 12.3% 9.4% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 21 4% 21 7ok 20.4% for 2000 elections is a 
Northerner? 
of Total 16.4% 2.6% 2.0% 
Nzima % within tribe 87.5% 6.3% 6.3% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 7% 3 1 7% 2.0% for 2000 elections is a . . 
Northerner? 
of Total 2.8% . 2% . 2% Bolga % within tribe 70.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is a 1.8% 1.7% 2.0% 
Northerner? 
% of Total 1.4% . 2% . 2% 
Dagomba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is a 1.8% 
Northerner? 
% of Total 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 
for 2000 elections is a 3% 
Northerner? 
% of Total 1ý0ý 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner? Crosstabulation 
vote if - Presidential can didate for 
2000 elections is a Nort herner? 
for against abstain 
be Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 8% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total . 6% 
Ewe % within tribe 75.8% 5.3% 17.9% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 8% 8.3% 18 34.7% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total 14.4% 1.0% 3.4% 
Total % within tribe 76.4% 12.0% 9.8% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 0% 100.0% 100 100.0% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total 76.4% 12.0% 9.8% 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections Is a Northerner? Crosstabulation 
vote if - 
Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
be Fanti % within tribe 3.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 33 3% 20.0% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total . 6% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 1.3% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 11 1% 15.2% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total . 2% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 7.8% for 2000 elections is a 
Northerner? 
% of Total 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 2.2% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 11 1% 9.0% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
of Total . 
2% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
% within vote if - Presidential candidate 11 1% . 6% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
of Total . 2% . 6% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe . 9% 100.0% 
within vote if - Presidential candidate 11 1% 21.2% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total . 2% 
21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote If - 
Presidential candidate 3.2% for 2000 elections is a 
Northerner? 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 
L-- n^^^ -6-t --- _- - 11 1% 2 O, k 
iul LVVV V1"Uuu11s Wd 
Northerner? 
of Total . 2% 2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 4% 1 for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 
for for 2000 elections is a 
Northerner? 
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner? Crosstabulation 
vote if - 
Presidenti 
ineligible Total 
tribe Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 6% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total . 6% 
Ewe % within tribe 1.1% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 11 1% 19.0% for 2000 elections is a . 
Northerner? 
% of Total . 2% 19.0% 
Total % within tribe 1.8% 100.0% 
% within vote if - 
Presidential candidate 100.0% 100.0% for 2000 elections is a 
Northerner? 
% of Total 1.8% 100.0% 
Grosstabs 
APPENDIX XV 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
tribe * type of voter 501 100.0% 
tribe * level of tribalism 501 100.0% 
tribe * association with 
roots 501 100.0% 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin To tal 
N Percent N Percent 
tribe * type of voter 0 . 0% 501 100.0% tribe * level of tribalism 0 . 0% 501 100.0% tribe * association with 
roots 0 . 0% 501 100.0% 
tribe * type of voter Crosstabulation 
type o f voter 
tribalistic non-tribalistic Total 
tribe Fanti % within tribe 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 22.2% 14.3% 20.0% 
% of Total 16.0% 4.0% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 78.9% 21.1% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 16.6% 11.4% 15.2% 
% of Total 12.0% 3.2% 15.2% 
Akyern % within tribe 84.6% 15.4% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 9.1% 4.3% 7.8% 
% of Total 6.6% 1.2% 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 82.2% 17.8% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 10.2% 5.7% 9.0% 
% of Total 7.4% 1.6% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within type of voter . 3% 1.4% . 
6% 
% of Total . 2% . 4% . 6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 13.6% 40.7% 21.2% 
% of Total 9.8% 11.4% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 2.8% 4.3% 3.2% 
% of Total 2.0% 1.2% 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 1.1% 4.3% 2.0% 
% of Total . 8% 1.2% 
2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 1.7% . 7% 1.4% 
% of Total 1.2% . 2% 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 100.0% 
% within type of voter . 3% . 
2% 
% of Total . 2% . 
2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within type of voter . 3% 
1.4% . 6% 
% of Total . 2% . 
4% . 6% 
Ewe % within tribe 83.2% 16.8% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 21.9% 11.4% 19.0% 
% of Total 15.8% 3.2% 19.0% 
Total % within tribe 72.1% 27.9% 100.0% 
% within type of voter 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 72.1% 27.9 100.0% 
tribe * level of tribalism Crosstabulation 
Total 
level of tribalism 
extreme very high high 
Fanti % within tribe 47.0% 25.0% 8.0% 
% within level of tribalism 22.3% 19.5% 38.1% 
% of Total 9.4% 5.0% 1.6% 
Ashanti % within tribe 36.8% 39.5% 2.6% 
% within level of tribalism 13.3% 23.4% 9.5% 
% of Total 5.6% 6.0% . 4% 
Akyem % within tribe 48.7% 33.3% 2.6% 
% within level of tribalism 9.0% 10.2% 4.8% 
% of Total 3.8% 2.6% . 2% 
Akwapim % within tribe 42.2% 40.0% 
% within level of tribalism 9.0% 14.1% 
% of Total 3.8% 3.6% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 
% within level of tribalism . 8% 
% of Total . 2% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 42.5% 2.8% 
% within level of tribalism 21.3% 2.3% 
% of Total 9.0% . 6% 
Nzima % within tribe 56.3% 6.3% 
% within level of tribalism 4.3% . 8% 
% of Total 1.8% . 2% 
Bolga % within tribe 20.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
% within level of tribalism . 9% . 
8% 4.8% 
% of Total . 4% . 
2% . 2% 
Dagomba % within tribe 71.4% 14.3% 
% within level of tribalism 2.4% 4.8% 
% of Total 1.0% . 2% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism . 8% 
% of Total . 2% Gurenne % within tribe 33.3% 
% within level of tribalism . 5% % of Total . 2% Ewe % within tribe 37.9% 36.8% 8.4% 
% within level of tribalism 17.1% 27.3% 38.1% 
% of Total 7.2% 7.0% 1.6% 
% within tribe 42.1%_ 25.5% 4.2% 
% within level of tribalism 100.0% 
1 
100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 42.1% 25.5% 4.2% 
tribe * level of tribalism Crosstabulation 
low very low 
: )e Fanti % within tribe 1.0% 15.0% 
% within level of tribalism 25.0% 39.5% 
% of Total . 2% 3.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 13.2% 
% within level of tribalism 26.3% 
% of Total 2.0% 
Akyem % within tribe 7.7% 
% within level of tribalism 7.9% 
% of Total . 
6% 
Akwapim % within tribe 2.2% 11.1% 
% within level of tribalism 25.0% 13.2% 
% of Total . 2% 1.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 
% within level of tribalism 2.6% 
% of Total . 2% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe . 9% 
% within level of tribalism 2.6% 
% of Total . 2% 
Nzima % within tribe 
% within level of tribalism 
% of Total 
Bolga % within tribe 
% within level of tribalism 
% of Total 
Dagomba % within tribe 
% within level of tribalism 
% of Total 
Dagaaba % within tribe 
% within level of tribalism 
% of Total 
Gurenne % within tribe 
% within level of tribalism 
% of Total 
Ewe % within tribe 2.1% 3.2% 
% within level of tribalism 50.0% 7.9% 
% of Total . 4% . 
6% 
Total % within tribe . 8% 
7.6% 
% within level of tribalism 100.0% 100.0% 
tribe * level of tribalism Crosstabulation 
Total 
benefit Total 
Fanti % within tribe 4.0% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 4.0% 20.0% 
% of Total . 8% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 7.9% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 6.1% 15.2% 
% of Total 1.2% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 7.7% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 3.0% 7.8% 
% of Total . 6% 
7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 4.4% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 2.0% 9.0% 
% of Total . 4% 
9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 33.3% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 1.0% . 6% 
% of Total . 2% . 6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 53.8% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 57.6% 21.2% 
% of Total 11.4% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 37.5% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 6.1% 3.2% 
% of Total 1.2% 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 60.0% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 6.1% 2.0% 
% of Total 1.2% 2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 14.3% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 1.0% 1.4% 
% of Total . 2% 1.4% Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism . 2% % of Total . 2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 66.7% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 2.0% . 6% 
% of Total . 4% . 
6% 
Ewe % within tribe 11.6% 100.0% 
within level of tribalism % 11.1% 19.0% 
% of Total 2.2% 19.0% 
% within tribe 19.8% 100.0% 
% within level of tribalism 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 19 . 8°A 100.0% 
tribe * association with roots Crosstabulation 
association with roots 
very high high average 
tribe Fanti % within tribe 38.0% 34.0% 18.0% 
% within association 22 2% 18 3% 17 6% with roots . . . 
% of Total 7.6% 6.8% 3.6% 
Ashanti % within tribe 28.9% 36.8% 25.0% 
% within association 12 9% 15.1% 18.6% with roots . 
of Total 4.4% 5.6% 3.8% 
Akyem % within tribe 38.5% 30.8% 23.1% 
within association 8 8% 6.5% 8.8% with roots . 
of Total 3.0% 2.4% 1.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 28.9% 37.8% 24.4% 
within association 6% 7 9.1% 10.8% 
with roots . 
of Total 2.6% 3.4% 2.2% 
Bono % within tribe 66.7% 33.3% 
within association 1 2% . 5% with roots . 
of Total . 4% . 2% Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 31.1% 39.6% 24.5% 
within association 19 3% 22.6% 25.5% with roots . 
% of Total 6.6% 8.4% 5.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 37.5% 37.5% 25.0% 
% within association 5% 3 3.2% 3.9% with roots . 
% of Total 1.2% 1.2% . 8% 
Bolga % within tribe 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% 
% within association 2 3% 2 2% 1.0% with roots . . 
of Total . 8% . 
8% . 2% 
Dagomba % within tribe 28.6% 42.9% 14.3% 
within association 1 2% 1 6% 1.0% with roots . . 
% of Total . 4% . 
6% . 2% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
% within association 
with roots . 6% 
% of Total . 2% Gurenne % within tribe 66.7% 33.3% 
% within association 
with roots 1.2% . 5% 
% of Total . 4% . 2% Ewe % within tribe 34.7% 40.0% 13.7% 
% within association 19 3% 4% 20 7% 12 with roots . . . 
% of Total 6.6% 7.6% 2.6% 
Total % within tribe 34.1% 37.1% 20.4% 
within association 
with roots 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 34.1% 37.1% 20.4% 
tribe * association with roots Crosstabulation 
association with roots 
low apathetic Total 
tribe Fanti % within tribe 7.0% 3.0% 100.0% 
% within association 26 9% 18 8% 20 0% with roots . . . 
of Total 1.4% . 6% 20.0% 
Ashanti % within tribe 3.9% 5.3% 100.0% 
within association 11 5% 25.0% 15.2% with roots . 
of Total . 
6% . 8% 15.2% 
Akyem % within tribe 2.6% 5.1% 100.0% 
within association 3 8% 12.5% 7.8% 
with roots . 
of Total . 2% . 
4% 7.8% 
Akwapim % within tribe 8.9% 100.0% 
within association 15 4% 9.0% with roots . 
% of Total . 
8% 9.0% 
Bono % within tribe 100.0% 
% within association 
. 6% with roots 
% of Total . 6% 
Ga-Adangbe % within tribe 3.8% . 9% 
100.0% 
% within association 15 4% 6.3% 21.2% 
with roots . 
of Total . 8% . 
2% 21.2% 
Nzima % within tribe 100.0% 
within association 3.2% 
with roots 
% of Total 3.2% 
Bolga % within tribe 10.0% 100.0% 
% within association 3 8% 2.0% with roots . 
% of Total . 2% 
2.0% 
Dagomba % within tribe 14.3% 100.0% 
within association 3% 6 1.4% 
with roots . 
of Total . 2% 1.4% 
Dagaaba % within tribe 100.0% 
within association 2% 
with roots . 
% of Total . 2% 
Gurenne % within tribe 100.0% 
within association 6% 
with roots . 
% of Total . 6% 
Ewe % within tribe 6.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
within association 23.1% 31.3% 19.0% with roots 
% of Total 1.2% 1.0% 19.0% 
Total % within tribe 5.2% 3.2% 100.0% 
% within association 100 0% 0% 100 100.0% 
with roots . . 
% of Total 5.2% 3.2% 10 . 00 
Crosstabs 
APPENDIX XVI 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
For how long have you 
lived in Tema? * 501 100.0% 
association with roots 
level of tribalism * 
association with roots 
501 100.0% 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin To tal 
N Percent N Percent 
For how long have you 
lived in Tema? * 0 . 0% 501 100.0% association with roots 
level of tribalism 
association with roots 0 . 0% 501 100.0% 
For how long have you lived In Tema? * association with roots Crosstabulation 
association with roots 
very high high average 
For how 0-3 mths % within For how long 66 7% 16 7% 
long have have you lived in Tema? . . 
you lived % within association with 3% 2 5% in Tema? roots . . 
% of Total . 
8% 
. 
2% 
4-12 mths % within For how long 46 7% 40 0% 13.3% have you lived in Tema? . . 
% within association with 4.1% 3.2% 2.0% 
roots 
% of Total 1.4% 1.2% . 
4% 
1-3 yrs % within For how long 36 4% 40.9% 13.6% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 4.7% 4.8% 2.9% 
roots 
% of Total 1.6% 1.8% . 6% 
4-10 yrs % within For how long 33 3% 41.2% 21.6% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 9.9% 11.3% 10.8% 
roots 
% of Total 3.4% 4.2% 2.2% 
>10 yrs % within For how long 32.7% 36.3% 23.0% have you lived in Tema? 
% within association with 53.2% 54.3% 62.7% 
roots 
% of Total 18.2% 20.2% 12.8% 
NIA % within For how long 34 1% 37.2% 17.1% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 25.7% 25.8% 21.6% roots 
% of Total 8.8% 9.6% 4.4% 
Total % within For how long 1% 34 37.1% 20.4% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% roots . 
% of Total 34.1% 37.1% 20.4° 
For how long have you lived In Tema? * association with roots Crosstabulation 
association with roots 
low apathetic Total 
For how 0-3 mths % within For how long 16 7% 100 0% long have have you lived in Tema? . . 
you lived % within association with 
in Tema? roots 
6.3% 1.2% 
% of Total . 2% 1.2% 
4-12 mths % within For how long 100 0% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 3.0% 
roots 
% of Total 3.0% 
1-3 yrs % within For how long 9 1% 100.0% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 7.7% 4.4% 
roots 
% of Total . 
4% 4.4% 
4-10 yrs % within For how long 2 0% 2.0% 100.0% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 3.8% 6.3% 10.2% 
roots 
% of Total . 2% . 2% 10.2% 
>10 yrs % within For how long 7% 4 3.2% 100.0% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 50.0% 56.3% 55.5% 
roots 
% of Total 2.6% 1.8% 55.5% 
NIA % within For how long 7 8% 3.9% 100.0% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 38.5% 31.3% 25.7% roots 
% of Total 2.0% 1.0% 25.7% 
Total % within For how long 2% 3.2% 5 100.0% have you lived in Tema? . 
% within association with 0% 100.0% 100 100.0% roots . 
% of Total 5.2% 3.2% 100.0%, 
level of tribalism * association with roots Crosstabulation 
association with roots 
very high high average 
level of extreme % within level of tribalism 35.5% 33.6% 23.2% 
tribalism % within association with 
roots 
43.9% 38.2% 48.0% 
of Total 15.0% 14.2% 9.8% 
very high % within level of tribalism 36.7% 39.1% 14.8% 
within association with 27 5% 26.9% 18.6% 
roots . 
of Total 9.4% 10.0% 3.8% 
high % within level of tribalism 42.9% 38.1% 14.3% 
within association with 5 3% 4.3% 2.9% 
roots . 
% of Total 1.8% 1.6% . 6% 
low % within level of tribalism 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 
% within association with 
. 6% . 
5% 2.0% 
roots 
of Total . 2% . 2% . 
4% 
very low % within level of tribalism 18.4% 50.0% 18.4% 
within association with 4.1% 10.2% 6.9% 
roots 
% of Total 1.4% 3.8% 1.4% 
benefit % within level of tribalism 32.3% 37.4% 22.2% 
% within association with 18.7% 19.9% 21.6% roots 
% of Total 6.4% 7.4% 4.4% 
Total % within level of tribalism 34.1% 37.1% 20.4% 
% within association with 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
roots . 
% of Total 34.1% 37.1% 20.4% 
level of tribalism * association with roots Crosstabulation 
association with roots 
low apathetic Total 
level of extreme % within level of tribalism 3.8% 3.8% 100.0% 
tribalism % within association with 
roots 
30.8% 50.0% 42.1% 
of Total 1.6% 1.6% 42.1% 
very high % within level of tribalism 7.0% 2.3% 100.0% 
within association with 34 6% 18.8% 25 5% 
roots . . 
of Total 1.8% . 6% 25.5% 
high % within level of tribalism 4.8% 100.0% 
within association with 3.8% 4.2% 
roots 
of Total . 2% 
4.2% 
low % within level of tribalism 100.0% 
within association with 
. 8% roots 
% of Total . 8% 
very low % within level of tribalism 5.3% 7.9% 100.0% 
% within association with 7.7% 18.8% 7.6% 
roots 
% of Total . 4% . 
6% 7.6% 
benefit % within level of tribalism 6.1% 2.0% 100.0% 
% within association with 23 1% 12.5% 19.8% 
roots . 
of Total 1.2% . 4% 19.8% 
Total % within level of tribalism 5.2% 3.2% 100.0% 
within association with 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
roots . 
% of Total 5.2% 3.2% 100.0% 
APPENDIX XVII 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Val id 
N Percent 
gender' Are you a 
registered member of 501 100.0% 
any party? 
gender * do you freely 
share your political 501 100.0% 
viewslopinions? 
gender' if no, please 
state confidants and 501 100 0% indicate preference by . 
numerical order 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Miss in Tot al 
N Percent N Percent 
gender' Are you a 
registered member of 0 . 0% 501 
100.0% 
any party? 
gender' do you freely 
share your political 0 . 0% 501 
100.0% 
viewslopinions? 
gender' if no, please 
state confidants and 
indicate preference by 0 . 0% 501 100.0% 
numerical order 
gender * Are you a registered member of any party? 
Crosstab 
Are you a registered 
member of an Party? 
es no Total 
gender Male Count 118 201 319 
Expected Count 97.4 221.6 319.0 
within gender 37.0% 63.0% 100.0% 
% within Are you a 
registered member 77.1% 57.8% 63.7% 
of any party? 
% of Total 23.6% 40.1% 63.7% 
Female Count 35 147 182 
Expected Count 55.6 126.4 182.0 
within gender 19.2% 80.8% 100.0% 
% within Are you a 
registered member 22.9% 42.2% 36.3% 
of any party? 
% of Total 7.0% 29.3% 36.3% 
Total Count 153 348 501 
Expected Count 153.0 348.0 501.0 
% within gender 30.5% 69.5% 100.0% 
% within Are you a 
registered member 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
of any party? 
% of Total 30.5% 69.5% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.231 1 
. 000 Continuity Correctiona 16.404 1 . 000 Likelihood Ratio 18.014 1 
. 000 Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 000 Linear-by-Linear 
Association 17.196 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 501 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 55.58. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 
185 
. 
000 
Nominal Cramer's V . 185 . 000 N of Valid Cases 501 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
gender * do you freely share your political views/opinions? 
Crosstab 
do you freely share your 
political views/opinions? 
yes no Total 
gender Male Count 228 91 319 
Expected Count 212.0 107.0 319.0 
within gender 71.5% 28.5% 100.0% 
% within do you freely 
share your political 68.5% 54.2% 63.7% 
views/opinions? 
% of Total 45.5% 18.2% 63.7% 
Female Count 105 77 182 
Expected Count 121.0 61.0 182.0 
% within gender 57.7% 42.3% 100.0% 
within do you freely 
share your political 31.5% 45.8% 36.3% 
views/opinions? 
% of Total 21.0% 15.4% 36.3% 
Total Count 333 168 501 
Expected Count 333.0 168.0 501.0 
% within gender 66.5% 33.5% 100.0% 
% within do you freely 
share your political 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
views/opinions? 
% of Total 
. 5° 33.5% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.874 1 
. 
002 
Continuity Correctiona 9.266 1 . 002 Likelihood Ratio 9.750 1 . 002 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 002 . 001 Linear-by-Linear 
Association 9.855 1 . 002 
N of Valid Cases 501 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The minimum expected count is 61.03. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 140 . 002 Nominal Cramees V . 140 . 002 N of Valid Cases 501 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
gender * if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by 
numerical order 
Crosstab 
if no, please state confid ants and 
spouse family__ friends 
gender Male Count 19 12 25 
Expected Count 16.6 16.6 29.3 
within gender 6.0% 3.8% 7.8% 
within if no, please 
state confidants and 
Indicate preference by 73.1% 46.2% 54.3% 
numerical order 
% of Total 3.8% 2.4% 5.0% 
Female Count 7 14 21 
Expected Count 9.4 9.4 16.7 
within gender 3.8% 7.7% 11.5% 
within if no, please 
state confidants and 
indicate preference by 26.9% 53.8% 45.7% 
numerical order 
% of Total 1.4% 2.8% 4.2% 
Total Count 26 26 46 
Expected Count 26.0 26.0 46.0 
within gender 5.2% 5.2% 9.2% 
% within if no, please 
state confidants and 
indicate preference by 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
numerical order 
% of Total 5.2% 5.2% 9. 
Crosstab 
if no, please state 
distant none 
gender Male Count 1 34 
Expected Count 1.3 43.9 
within gender . 
3% 10.7% 
within if no, please 
state confidants and 50 0% 49.3% indicate preference by . 
numerical order 
% of Total . 
2% 6.8% 
Female Count 1 35 
Expected Count .7 
25.1 
% within gender . 5% 
19.2% 
% within if no, please 
state confidants and 50 0% 50.7% indicate preference by . 
numerical order 
% of Total . 2% 
7.0% 
Total Count 2 69 
Expected Count 2.0 69.0 
% within gender . 4% 
13.8% 
% within if no, please 
state confidants and 100 0% 100.0% indicate preference by . 
numerical order 
% of Total . 4% 13.8% 
Crosstab 
if no, please 
not applicable Total 
gender Male Count 228 319 
Expected Count 211.4 319.0 
" within gender 71.5% 100.0% 
% within if no, please 
state confidants and 68 7% 63.7% indicate preference by . 
numerical order 
% of Total 45.5% 63.7% 
Female Count 104 182 
Expected Count 120.6 182.0 
within gender 57.1% 100.0% 
within if no, please 
state confidants and 31 3% 36.3% indicate preference by . 
numerical order 
% of Total 20.8% 36.3% 
Total Count 332 501 
Expected Count 332.0 501.0 
within gender 66.3% 100.0% 
within if no, please 
state confidants and 0% 100 100.0% indicate preference by . 
numerical order 
% of Total 66.3% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.1098 5 . 007 
Likelihood Ratio 15.781 5 . 007 Linear-by-Linear 3 198 1 074 Association . . 
N of Valid Cases 501 
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is . 73. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi . 179 . 007 Nominal Cramees V 
. 179 . 007 N of Valid Cases 501 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
APPENDIX XVIII Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid 
N Percent 
gender * current 
party orientation 
501 100.0% 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin Total 
N Percent N Percent 
gender* current 
party orientation 0 . 0% 501 
100.0% 
gender * current party orientation Crosstabulation 
current oarly orien tation 
ndc npp "nkrumahist" 
gender Male Count 85 126 25 
Expected Count 77.0 121.0 20.4 
% within gender 26.6% 39.5% 7.8% 
% within current 2% 70 66 3% 78.1% party orientation . . 
% of Total 17.0% 25.1% 5.0% 
Female Count 36 64 7 
Expected Count 44.0 69.0 11.6 
% within gender 19.8% 35.2% 3.8% 
% within current 29 8% 33 7% 21.9% party orientation . . 
% of Total 7.2% 12.8% 1.4% 
Total Count 121 190 32 
Expected Count 121.0 190.0 32.0 
9ßo within gender 24.2% 37.9% 6.4% 
% within current 
party orientation 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total a/ 
1 
121Y .4 
gender * current party orientation Crosstabulation 
current part, orientation 
other none Total 
gender Male Count 11 72 319 
Expected Count 8.9 91.7 319.0 
% within gender 3.4% 22.6% 100.0% 
% within current 78 6% 50 0% 63 7% party orientation . . . 
% of Total 2.2% 14.4% 63.7% 
Female Count 3 72 182 
Expected Count 5.1 52.3 182.0 
within gender 1.6% 39.6% 100.0% 
% within current 21 4% 50.0% 36.3% party orientation . 
% of Total . 6% 14.4% 
36.3% 
Total Count 14 144 501 
Expected Count 14.0 144.0 501.0 
% within gender 2.8% 28.7% 100.0% 
% within current 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% party orientation . I% 
of Total 2.8% 28.7% 10 0.0° 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.707a 4 . 001 
Likelihood Ratio 18.687 4 . 001 Linear-by-Linear 
Association 11.890 1 . 001 
N of Valid Cases 501 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum exo 
Symmetric Measures 
ected count Is 5.09. 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 193 . 001 Nominal Cramees v 
. 193 . 001 N of Valid Cases 501 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
APPENDIX XIX 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
age * choice of 
President for 1996 501 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
age * choice of 
President for 2000 501 100.0% 
presidential elections 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin To tal 
N Percent N Percent 
age * choice of 
President for 1996 0 . 0% 501 100.0% Presidential elections 
age * choice of 
President for 2000 0 . 0% 501 100.0% presidential elections 
age * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 19 96 Presidential elections 
Rawlings Kuffour Mahama none 
age 0-16 Count 0 0 0 0 
Expected Count .7 .9 .0 .1 
% within age . 
0% 
. 
0% . 0% . 
0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 
0% . 0% . 
0% 
. 
0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 0% . 
0% 
. 
0% 
17-30 Count 68 90 2 21 
Expected Count 86.1 108.4 2.5 15.8 
% within age 27.4% 36.3% . 8% 8.5% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 39.1% 41.1% 40.0% 65.6% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 13.6% 18.0% . 4% 4.2% 
31-40 Count 61 67 3 5 
Expected Count 47.9 60.3 1.4 8.8 
% within age 44.2% 48.6% 2.2% 3.6% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 35.1% 30.6% 60.0% 15.6% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 12.2% 13.4% . 6% 1.0% 
41-50 Count 36 47 0 5 
Expected Count 30.6 38.5 .9 5.6 
% within age 40.9% 53.4% . 0% 5.7% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 20.7% 21.5% . 0% 15.6% Presidential elections 
% of Total 7.2% 9.4% . 0% 
1.0% 
51-60 Count 9 14 0 1 
Expected Count 8.3 10.5 .2 
1.5 
% within age 37.5% 58.3% . 0% 
4.2% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 5.2% 6.4% . 0% 
3.1% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.8% 2.8% . 0% . 
2% 
61-70 Count 0 1 0 0 
Expected Count 
.3 .4 .0 .1 % within age . 0% 100.0% . 
0% . 0% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 0% . 5% . 
0% . 0% Presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 2% . 
0% . 0% 
Total Count 174 219 5 32 
Expected Count 174.0 219.0 5.0 32.0 
% within age 34.7% 43.7% 1.0% 6.4% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 34.7% 43.7% 4 
age * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
age 
Total 
17-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61-70 
ineligible Total 
Count 2 2 
Expected Count 
.3 2.0 % within age 100.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 2.8% . 4% Presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% . 4% Count 67 248 
Expected Count 35.1 248.0 
% within age 27.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 94.4% 49.5% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 13.4% 49.5% 
Count 2 138 
Expected Count 19.6 138.0 
% within age 1.4% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 2.8% 27.5% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 
4% 27.5% 
Count 0 88 
Expected Count 12.5 88.0 
% within age . 0% 100.0% % within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 0% 17.6% Presidential elections 
% of Total n%% 17 ROA 
Lount 
Expected Count 
within age 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 
0 
3.4 
. 0% 
. 0% 
. 0% 
24 
24.0 
100.0% 
4.8% 
4.8% 
Count 0 1 
Expected Count 
.1 1.0 % within age . 0% 100.0% % within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 0% . 2% Presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 2% Count 71 501 
Expected Count 71.0 501.0 
% within age 14.2% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 14.2% 1nn-nwn 
age * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 20 00 presidentia l elections 
Atta Mills Kuffour Tanor other 
age 0-16 Count 0 0 0 0 
Expected Count .5 .9 .0 .0 % within age . 0% . 0% . 0% . 0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 
0% . 0% . 
0% 
. 0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 0% . 
0% . 0% 17-30 Count 65 116 0 1 
Expected Count 66.8 110.4 2.5 2.5 
% within age 26.2% 46.8% . 0% . 4% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 48.1% 52.0% . 0% 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 13.0% 23.2% . 0% . 2% 
31-40 Count 38 56 3 3 
Expected Count 37.2 61.4 1.4 1.4 
% within age 27.5% 40.6% 2.2% 2.2% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 28.1% 25.1% 60.0% 60.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 7.6% 11.2% . 6% . 
6% 
41-50 Count 27 38 2 1 
Expected Count 23.7 39.2 .9 .9 
% within age 30.7% 43.2% 2.3% 1.1% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 17.0% 40.0% 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 5.4% 7.6% . 4% . 2% 51-60 Count 5 12 0 0 
Expected Count 6.5 10.7 .2 .2 % within age 20.8% 50.0% . 0% . 
0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 3.7% 5.4% . 0% . 0% presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 2.4% . 0% . 
0% 
61-70 Count 0 1 0 0 
Expected Count 
.3 .4 .0 .0 % within age . 0% 100.0% . 0% . 
0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 0% . 4% . 0% . 
0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 2% . 0% . 
0% 
Total Count 135 223 5 5 
Expected Count 135.0 223.0 5.0 5.0 
% within age 26.9% 44.5% 1.0% 1.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 26.9% 44.5% 1 
age * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice o f President for 2000 
none ineligible undecided Total 
age 0-16 Count 0 2 0 2 
Expected Count 
.1 .0 .4 2.0 % within age . 0% 100.0% . 0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 
0% 33.3% 
. 
0% 
. 
4% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 
0% 
. 
4% 
. 
0% 
. 
4% 
17-30 Count 13 2 51 248 
Expected Count 11.9 3.0 51.0 248.0 
% within age 5.2% . 8% 
20.6% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 54.2% 33.3% 49.5% 49.5% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 2.6% . 4% 10.2% 
49.5% 
31-40 Count 6 2 30 138 
Expected Count 6.6 1.7 28.4 138.0 
% within age 4.3% 1.4% 21.7% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 25.0% 33.3% 29.1% 27.5% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.2% . 4% 
6.0% 27.5% 
41-50 Count 5 0 15 88 
Expected Count 4.2 1.1 18.1 88.0 
% within age 5.7% . 0% 
17.0% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 20.8% . 0% 14.6% 
17.6% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% . 0% 
3.0% 17.6% 
51-60 Count 0 0 7 24 
Expected Count 1.1 .3 
4.9 24.0 
% within age . 0% . 0% 29.2% 
100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 0% . 0% 6.8% 
4.6% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 0% 1.4% 
4.8% 
61-70 Count 0 0 0 1 
Expected Count 
.0 .0 .2 
1.0 
within age . 0% . 0% . 0% 
100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 0% . 0% . 
0% . 2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 0% . 0% . 
2% 
Total Count 24 6 103 501 
Expected Count 24.0 6.0 103.0 501.0 
% within age 4.8% 1.2% 20.6% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 4.8% 1.2% 20.6% 100. 
Grosstabs APPENDIX XX 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
occupation * choice of 
President for 1996 501 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
occupation * choice of 
President for 2000 501 100.0% 
presidential elections 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin Tot al 
N Percent N Percent 
occupation * choice of 
President for 1996 0 . 0% 501 100.0% Presidential elections 
occupation * choice of 
President for 2000 0 . 0% 501 
100.0% 
presidential elections 
occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
Rawlins Kuffour Mahama 
unskilled Count 5 2 0 
Expected Count 2.8 3.5 
.1 % within occupation 62.5% 25.0% . 0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 2.9% . 9% . 0% Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% . 4% . 
0% 
semi-skilled Count 8 9 0 
Expected Count 6.9 8.7 .2 
% within occupation 40.0% 45.0% . 0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 4.6% 4.1% . 0% Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.6% 1.8% . 0% 
skilled Count 30 36 1 
Expected Count 24.7 31.0 .7 
% within occupation 42.3% 50.7% 1.4% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 17.2% 16.4% 20.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 6.0% 7.2% . 2% 
clerical Count 26 25 0 
Expected Count 18.8 23.6 .5 
% within occupation 48.1% 46.3% . 0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 14.9% 11.4% . 0% Presidential elections 
% of Total 5.2% 5.0% . 0% 
administrative Count 6 10 1 
Expected Count 6.6 8.3 .2 
% within occupation 31.6% 52.6% 5.3% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 3.4% 4.6% 20.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.2% 2.0% . 2% 
managerial Count 5 9 0 
Expected Count 4.9 6.1 .1 
% within occupation 35.7% 64.3% . 0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 2.9% 4.1% . 0% Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 1.8% . 0% 
professional Count 72 102 1 
Expected Count 67.0 84.4 1.9 
within occupation 37.3% 52.8% . 5% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 41.4% 46.6% 20.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 14.4% 20.4% . 2% 
specialist Count 4 4 0 
Expected Count 3.5 4.4 .1 % within occupation 40.0% 40.0% . 0% % within choice of 
President for 1996 2.3% 1.8% . 0% Presidential elections 
% of Total aO, ate, o% 
occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 1996 
Rawlings Kuffour Mahama 
occupation student Count 18 22 2 
Expected Count 38.9 49.0 1.1 
% within occupation 16.1% 19.6% 1.8% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 10.3% 10.0% 40.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 3.6% 4.4% . 4% 
Total Count 174 219 5 
Expected Count 174.0 219.0 5.0 
% within occupation 34.7% 43.7% 1.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 34.7% 43.7% 1.0% 
occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
none ineligible Total 
unskilled Count 0 1 8 
Expected Count .5 1.1 8.0 
% within occupation . 0% 12.5% 100.0% % within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 
0% 1.4% 1.6% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 2% 1.6% 
semi-skilled Count 1 2 20 
Expected Count 1.3 2.8 20.0 
% within occupation 5.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 3.1% 2.8% 4.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% . 
4% 4.0% 
skilled Count 4 0 71 
Expected Count 4.5 10.1 71.0 
% within occupation 5.6% . 0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 12.5% . 0% 14.2% Presidential elections 
% of Total . 8% . 
0% 14.2% 
clerical Count 2 1 54 
Expected Count 3.4 7.7 54.0 
within occupation 3.7% 1.9% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 6.3% 1.4% 10.8% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% . 2% 
10.8% 
administrative Count 1 1 19 
Expected Count 1.2 2.7 19.0 
% within occupation 5.3% 5.3% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 3.1% 1.4% 3.8% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% . 
2% 3.8% 
managerial Count 0 0 14 
Expected Count 
.9 2.0 
14.0 
within occupation . 0% . 0% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 . 0% . 0% 2.8% Presidential elections 
% of Total . 
0% 
. 
0% 2.8% 
professional Count 16 2 193 
Expected Count 12.3 27.4 193.0 
within occupation 8.3% 1.0% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 1996 50.0% 2.8% 38.5% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 3.2% . 4% 38.5% specialist Count 0 2 10 
Expected Count 
.6 1.4 10.0 
within occupation . 0% 20.0% 100.0% within choice of 
President for 1996 
. 0% 2.8% 2.0% Presidential elections 
% of Total n°/, d°i 9 n°i. 
occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 
none ineligible Total 
occupation student Count 8 62 112 
Expected Count 7.2 15.9 112.0 
% within occupation 7.1% 55.4% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 25.0% 87.3% 22.4% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 1.6% 12.4% 22.4% 
Total Count 32 71 501 
Expected Count 32.0 71.0 501.0 
% within occupation 6.4% 14.2% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 6.4% 14.2% 100.0% 
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
cnotce o f i'resicient tor zooo 
Atta Mills Kuffour Tanor 
unskilled Count 3 2 0 
Expected Count 2.2 3.6 .1 
within occupation 37.5% 25.0% . 0% % within choice of 
President for 2000 2.2% 
. 
9% 
. 
0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 
6% . 4% . 0% 
semi-skilled Count 5 10 0 
Expected Count 5.4 8.9 .2 
% within occupation 25.0% 50.0% . 0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 3.7% 4.5% . 0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 2.0% . 0% 
skilled Count 18 28 3 
Expected Count 19.1 31.6 .7 
within occupation 25.4% 39.4% 4.2% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 13.3% 12.6% 60.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 3.6% 5.6% . 6% 
clerical Count 16 20 0 
Expected Count 14.6 24.0 .5 
within occupation 29.6% 37.0% . 0% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 11.9% 9.0% . 0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 3.2% 4.0% . 0% 
administrative Count 3 10 0 
Expected Count 5.1 8.5 .2 
within occupation 15.8% 52.6% . 0% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 2.2% 4.5% . 0% presidential elections 
% of Total . 6% 2.0% . 
0% 
managerial Count 5 7 0 
Expected Count 3.8 6.2 .1 
within occupation 35.7% 50.0% . 0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 3.7% 3.1% . 0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 1.4% . 0% 
professional Count 48 95 2 
Expected Count 52.0 85.9 1.9 
% within occupation 24.9% 49.2% 1.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 35.6% 42.6% 40.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 9.6% 19.0% . 4% 
specialist Count 3 1 0 
Expected Count 2.7 4.5 .1 % within occupation 30.0% 10.0% . 0% % within choice of 
President for 2000 2.2% . 4% . 0% presidential elections 
% of Total ROL 90/. n0/. 
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 2000 
Atta Mills Kuffour Tanor 
occupation student Count 34 50 0 
Expected Count 30.2 49.9 1.1 
" within occupation 30.4% 44.6% . 0% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 25.2% 22.4% 
. 
0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 6.8% 10.0% . 0% 
Total Count 135 223 5 
Expected Count 135.0 223.0 5.0 
% within occupation 26.9% 44.5% 1.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 26.9% 44.5% 1.0% 
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
occu 
other none ineligible 
unskilled Count 1 0 0 
Expected Count 
.1 .4 .1 
within occupation 12.5% . 0% . 
0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% . 0% . 0% presidential elections 
% of Total . 
2% 
. 
0% 
. 0% 
semi-skilled Count 0 1 0 
Expected Count 
.2 1.0 .2 % within occupation . 0% 5.0% . 0% % within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 0% 4.2% . 0% presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 2% . 0% 
skilled Count 0 5 1 
Expected Count 
.7 3.4 .9 % within occupation . 0% 7.0% 1.4% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 . 0% 20.8% 16.7% presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% 1.0% . 2% 
clerical Count 1 2 0 
Expected Count .5 2.6 .6 
within occupation 1.9% 3.7% . 0% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 8.3% . 0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% . 
4% . 0% 
administrative Count 1 1 0 
Expected Count 
.2 .9 .2 % within occupation 5.3% 5.3% . 0% % within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 4.2% . 0% presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% . 2% . 
0% 
managerial Count 0 1 0 
Expected Count 
.1 .7 .2 % within occupation . 0% 7.1% . 0% % within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 0% 4.2% . 
0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 0% . 2% . 0% professional Count 1 7 0 
Expected Count 1.9 9.2 2.3 
within occupation . 5% 3.6% . 0% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 29.2% . 0% presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% 1.4% . 0% 
specialist Count 0 2 2 
Expected Count 
.1 .5 .1 
within occupation 
. 
0% 20.0% 20.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 0% 8.3% 
33.3% 
presidential elections 
% of Total na/ A04 dv_ 
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 2000 
other none ineligible_ 
occupation student Count 1 5 3 
Expected Count 1.1 5.4 1.3 
% within occupation . 
9% 4.5% 2.7% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 20.8% 50.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% 1.0% . 6% 
Total Count 5 24 6 
Expected Count 5.0 24.0 6.0 
% within occupation 1.0% 4.8% 1.2% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% 4.8% 1.2% 
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
unskilled Count 2 8 
Expected Count 1.6 8.0 
% within occupation 25.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 1.9% 1.6% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 4% 1.6% 
semi-skilled Count 4 20 
Expected Count 4.1 20.0 
% within occupation 20.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 3.9% 4.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 8% 4.0% 
skilled Count 16 71 
Expected Count 14.6 71.0 
within occupation 22.5% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 15.5% 14.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 3.2% 14.2% 
clerical Count 15 54 
Expected Count 11.1 54.0 
% within occupation 27.8% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 14.6% 10.8% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 3.0% 10.8% 
administrative Count 4 19 
Expected Count 3.9 19.0 
% within occupation 21.1% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 3.9% 3.8% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 8% 3.8% 
managerial Count 1 14 
Expected Count 2.9 14.0 
within occupation 7.1% 100.0% 
within choice of 
President for 2000 1.0% 2.8% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% 2.8% 
professional Count 40 193 
Expected Count 39.7 193.0 
% within occupation 20.7% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 38.8% 38.5% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 8.0% 38.5% 
specialist Count 2 10 
Expected Count 2.1 10.0 
% within occupation 20.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 1.9% 2.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total ACV- I no/. 
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 2000 
none ineligible undecided Total 
occupation student Count 5 3 19 112 
Expected Count 5.4 1.3 23.0 112.0 
% within occupation 4.5% 2.7% 17.0% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.8% 50.0% 18.4% 22.4% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0% . 6% 3.8% 22.4% Total Count 24 6 103 501 
Expected Count 24.0 6.0 103.0 501.0 
% within occupation 4.8% 1.2% 20.6% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 4.8% 1.2% 20.6% 100.0% 
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va lid 
N Percent 
level of education * choice 
of President for 1996 501 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
level of education * choice 
of President for 2000 501 100.0% 
presidential elections 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Missin Tot al 
N Percent N Percent 
level of education * choice 
of President for 1996 0 . 0% 501 
100.0% 
Presidential elections 
level of education * choice 
of President for 2000 0 . 0% 501 
100.0% 
presidential elections 
level of education * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 1996 
Rawlings Kuffour Mahama 
level of primary Count 11 12 0 
education Expected Count 9.0 11.4 .3 
% within level of 42.3% 46.2% 0% 
education . 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 6.3% 5.5% 
. 
0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 2.2% 2.4% . 0% 
secondary Count 74 88 2 
Expected Count 82.7 104.0 2.4 
% within level of 31 1% 37.0% . 8% education . 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 42.5% 40.2% 40.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 14.8% 17.6% . 4% 
tertiary Count 89 119 3 
Expected Count 82.3 103.6 2.4 
% within level of 37.6% 50.2% 1.3% 
education 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 51.1% 54.3% 60.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 17.8% 23.8% . 6% 
Total Count 174 219 5 
Expected Count 174.0 219.0 5.0 
% within level of 34 7% 43.7% 1.0% education . 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 34.7% 43.7% 1° 
level of education * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of President for 
none ineligible Total 
level of primary Count 1 2 26 
education Expected Count 1.7 3.7 26.0 
% within level of 3 8% 7.7% 100 0% education . . 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 3.1% 2.8% 5.2% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total . 
2% . 4% 5.2% 
secondary Count 13 61 238 
Expected Count 15.2 33.7 238.0 
% within level of 5 5% 25.6% 100.0% 
education . 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 40.6% 85.9% 47.5% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 2.6% 12.2% 47.5% 
tertiary Count 18 8 237 
Expected Count 15.1 33.6 237.0 
% within level of 7 6% 3.4% 100.0% 
education . 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 56.3% 11.3% 47.3% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 3.6% 1.6% 47.3% 
Total Count 32 71 501 
Expected Count 32.0 71.0 501.0 
% within level of 4% 6 14.2% 100.0% education . 
% within choice of 
President for 1996 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Presidential elections 
% of Total 6.4% 14.2% 100.0% 
level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice o f President for 2000 
Atta Mills Kuffour Tanor 
level of primary Count 4 14 1 
education Expected Count 7.0 11.6 .3 % within level of 
education 15.4% 53.8% 3.8% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 3.0% 6.3% 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 8% 2.8% . 2% 
secondary Count 66 106 1 
Expected Count 64.1 105.9 2.4 
% within level of 27 7% 44.5% . 4% education . 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 48.9% 47.5% 20.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 13.2% 21.2% . 2% 
tertiary Count 65 103 3 
Expected Count 63.9 105.5 2.4 
% within level of 27.4% 43.5% 1.3% 
education 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 48.1% 46.2% 60.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 13.0% 20.6% . 6% 
Total Count 135 223 5 
Expected Count 135.0 223.0 5.0 
% within level of 26 9% 44.5% 1.0% education . 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 26.9% 44.5% 1.0% 
level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice o f President for 2000 
other none ineligible 
level of primary Count 0 2 1 
education Expected Count .3 1.2 .3 % within level of 
education 0% 7.7% 3.8% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 
. 0% 8.3% 16.7% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 
0% . 
4% 
. 
2% 
secondary Count 4 11 3 
Expected Count 2.4 11.4 2.9 
% within level of 1 7% 4.6% 1.3% 
education . 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 80.0% 45.8% 50.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 8% 2.2% . 6% 
tertiary Count 1 11 2 
Expected Count 2.4 11.4 2.8 
% within level of 
. 4% 
4.6% . 8% education 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 20.0% 45.8% 33.3% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 2% 2.2% . 
4% 
Total Count 5 24 6 
Expected Count 5.0 24.0 6.0 
% within level of 0% 1 4.8% 1.2% 
education . 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 1.0%- A 4.8% 1 1,2% 
level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation 
choice of 
undecided Total 
level of primary Count 4 26 
education Expected Count 5.3 26.0 
% within level of 
education 15.4% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 3.9% 5.2% 
presidential elections 
% of Total . 8% 5.2% 
secondary Count 47 238 
Expected Count 48.9 238.0 
% within level of 
education 
19.7% 100.0% 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 45.6% 47.5% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 9.4% 47.5% 
tertiary Count 52 237 
Expected Count 48.7 237.0 
% within level of 21 9% 100 0% 
education . . 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 50.5% 47.3% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 10.4% 47.3% 
Total Count 103 501 
Expected Count 103.0 501.0 
% within level of 20 6% 100 09% education . . 
% within choice of 
President for 2000 100.0% 100.0% 
presidential elections 
% of Total 20.6% 100.0% 
APPENDIX XXII 
THE APPOINTMENTS UPDATE 
The following Ministerial Appointments have been made by President Kufour: as at 7 
March 2001. 
1. Presidential Affairs: Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey - (Ga-Adangbe) 
2. Government Business and Chairman of the National Development Planning 
Commission (NDPC): JH Mensah - (Akan) 
3. Finance: Yaw Osafo-Maafo - (Akan) 
4. Defence: Dr K Addo-Kufour - (Akan) 
5. Foreign Affairs: Hackman Owusu-Agyeman - (Akan) 
6. Attorney-General: Nana Akuffo-Addo - (Akan) 
7. Interior: Alhaji Malik Yakubu Alhassan - (Northerner) 
8. Local Government and Rural Development: K Baah Wiredu - (Akan) 
9. Education: Christopher Ameyaw Akumfi - (Akan) 
10. Education (Primary, Secondary and Girl Child): Christine Churcher - (Akan) 
11. Agriculture: Major Courage Quarshigah - (Ewe) 
12. Agrculture (Fisheries): Ishmael Ayittey - (Ga-Adangbe) 
13. Health: Dr Richard W Anane - (Akan) 
14. Roads and Transport: K Adjei-Darko - (Akan) 
15. Communications: Felix Owusu-Agyapong - (Akan) 
16. Lands, Forestry and Mines: Dr K Afriyie - (Akan) 
17. Employment and Manpower Development: Cecilia Bannerman - (Akan) 
18. Energy: Albert Ken-Dapaah - (Akan) 
19. Science, Technology and Envirionment: Professor Dominic K Fobih - (Akan) 
20. Women's Affairs: Gladys Asmah - (Akan) 
21. Works and Housing: Kwamena Bartels - (Akan) 
22. Tourism: Hawa Yakubu - (Northerner) 
23. Economic Planning and Regional Cooperation: Dr Kwesi Nduom - (Akan) 
24. Presidency - Private Sector Development -C0 Nyanor - (Akan) 25. Presidency - Media Relations: Elizabeth Ohene - (Akan) 26. Trade and Industry: Dr Kofi Konadu Apraku - (Akan) 
27. Ashanti Region: SK Boafo - (Akan) 
28. Brong-Ahafo Region: Ernest K Debrah - (Akan) 
29. Eastern Region: Dr Osafo Mensah - (Akan) 30. Greater-Accra Region: Sheikh IC Quaye - (Ga-Adangbe) 
31. Northern Region: Ben Salifu - (Northerner) 
32. Central Region: Isaac Edumadze - (Akan) 33. Western Region: Joseph Boahene Aidoo - (Nzima) 34. Upper-West: Salifu Mahami - (Northerner) 35. Volta Region: Owusu-Yeboah -(Akan) 
36. Upper-East Region: Moktar Sahanoon - (Northerner) 
Akan - 72%; Ga-Adangbe - 8.3%; Northerners - 14%; Ewe - 3%; Nzima - 3% 
NOMINEES FOR DEPUTY MINSTERIAL POSITIONS 
37. Presidential Affairs: Edward Osei Kwaku - (Akan) 38. Presidential Affairs: Alhaji Moctar Musah - (Northerner) 
39. Parliamentary Affairs: Paapa Owusu-Ankomah - (Akan) 
40. Finance: Grace Coleman - (Akan) 
41. Finance: Dr G Adombila Agambila - (Northerner) 
42. Defence: Eddie Akita - (Ewe) 
43. Foreign Affairs: Alhaji Iddrisu Mustapha Ali - (Northerner) 
44. Justice and Attorney General's Office: Captain Effah Dartey-Nkrabea (Rtd) - 
(Akan) 
45. Interior: Yaw Barimah - (Akan) 
46. Local Government and Rural Development: Alima Mahama - (Northerner) 
47. Education: Rashid Bawa - (Northerner) 
48. Health: Moses Baah Dani - (Northerner) 
49. Agriculture - Soil Science: Dr K Antwi - (Akan) 
50. Agriculture - Agricultural Economy: Dr Abel-Majeed Haroun - (Northerner) 
51. Roads and Highways: Alex Seidu Sofo - (Northerner) 
52. Transport and Communications: Agyeman Manu - (Akan) 
53. Transport and Communications: John Setuni Achiliwor - (Northerner) 
54. Trade and Industry: Akwasi Osei Agyei - (Akan) 
55. Trade and Industry: Boniface Abubakr Saddique - (Northerner) 56. Land, Forestry and Mines: Benjamin Osei Kufuor - (Akan) 
57. Land, Forestry and Mines: Clement Eledi - (Ewe) 
58. Environment, Science and Technology: Anna Nyemekye - (Akan) 59. Manpower Development: Joe Donkor - (Akan) 60. Manpower Development: John Jebbah - (Northerner) 61. Economic Planning: Professor Abena Busia - (Akan) 62. Energy: KT Hammond - (Akan) 
63. Youth and Sports: Joe Aggrey - (Akan) 
64. Works and Housing: Theresa Tagoe - (Ga-Adangbe) 65. Tourism: Nana Akomea - (Akan) 
66. Northern Region: Issah Ketekewu - (Northerner) 67. Brong-Ahafo: Agyei Duffour - (Akan) 
68. Eastern Region: Naa Dometey - (Ga- Adangbe) 69. Volta Region: Kofi Djamasse - (Akan) 
70. Western Region: Sophia Honer-Sam - (Akan) 
Akan - 53%; Ga-Adangbe - 6%; Northerners - 35%; Ewe - 6%; Nzima - 0% 
TOTALS FOR APPOINTMENTS AND NOMINEES: 
Akan - 63%; Ga-Adangbe - 7.1%; Northerners - 24.2%; Ewe - 4.2%; Nzima -1.4% 
Source: Ghana Review International E-mail News Service. 
